The War in Ukraine: Russia’s Spring False Start

Certain aspects of Russia’s war against Ukraine are predictable. One of them is the launch of new offensive operations in the spring. This is timed early enough for Vladimir Putin to be able to present some form of military success on Red Square on 9 May. This year, however, the situation does not appear promising for the Kremlin – at least for now. That said, this is not yet the beginning of a full-scale spring–summer offensive.

Photo: Svitlana Myslyvets / Pexels

The front line currently stretches for approximately 1,200 kilometres. According to some Ukrainian estimates, the number of Russian forces engaged in the war slightly exceeds 700,000 personnel. This is more than Ukrainian forces, but it should be noted that an attacking side must always have a numerical advantage over the defenders.

Since the second half of 2025, it has become increasingly evident that Russian units are suffering losses faster than they are able to replenish personnel. Russia’s difficulties stem not only from manpower constraints (losses are being replaced on an ongoing basis, but there is no prospect of significantly increasing overall personnel levels), but also from the disconnection of Starlink terminals at the beginning of February. This significantly disrupted operational coordination. The satellite internet network was also important for drone guidance systems. Another factor behind local Russian setbacks has been the slowdown of the Telegram messaging service, which is used by the vast majority of Russian soldiers for communication and coordination.

As a result, February 2026 was the first month since November 2023 in which the Russian army lost more territory than it gained. It should be noted that Ukrainian gains were limited to a single sector of the front. In other sectors (with the possible exception of the Kupiansk area in Kharkiv oblast), Russia remains on the offensive and continues to seize territory, albeit at a very slow pace.
At the end of January, Ukraine launched a counteroffensive in Zaporizhzhia oblast, following a series of Russian successes that had continued since autumn 2025. Gains along the administrative border between Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, the operation to capture Huliaipole (almost fully completed), and advances along the left bank of the Dnipro led to growing concern about a potential Russian threat to Zaporizhzhia.

There are strong indications that the Ukrainians have disrupted this plan. Ukrainian forces have also managed to push Russian troops back slightly in the area of Stepnohirsk, south of Zaporizhzhia. From the end of January to mid-March, the 20th Corps liberated over 400 square kilometres, capturing a number of localities, mainly in Dnipropetrovsk oblast near the border with Zaporizhzhia oblast. This does not, however, represent a fundamental shift in the dynamics of operations in this sector. First, at least some of the areas retaken by Ukraine were so-called grey zones, not physically held by either side. Second, Russian forces continue to advance towards Huliaipole, achieving limited tactical gains. Nevertheless, Ukraine has achieved one important objective: in response to its counterattacks, the Russian command was forced to redeploy some units from Donbas to Zaporizhzhia oblast. This has not helped the Kremlin’s plans regarding its priority axis for this year.

The primary objective remains the capture of the remainder of Donetsk oblast still under Ukrainian control. This accounts for only 20% of the oblast’s territory, but it is here that the main defensive line has been located since 2014 – the so-called ‘fortress belt’. This is a 50-kilometre chain of heavily fortified urban centres running from north to south: from Sloviansk, through Kramatorsk (the de facto administrative centre of the oblast after 2014 and the capture of Donetsk by Russian forces), Druzhkivka, to Kostiantynivka.

A frontal assault from the east is unlikely to succeed. Russia will therefore focus on the flanks. It has recently made notable tactical advances on the northern flank (in the Lyman direction) and is also preparing to intensify operations in the south. A likely objective will be to seize control of the main road linking Kostiantynivka and Druzhkivka (the N-20). Russian infantry has long been operating on the south-eastern outskirts of Druzhkivka, attempting to infiltrate the city northwards.

For now, however, the main effort has been directed at the northern flank, towards Lyman. Beyond it lies a forested area, and then – at a distance of around 30 km – Sloviansk, with its strategic connection north-westwards to Kharkiv. In this sector, Russian forces advanced steadily throughout 2025, capturing, among other locations, Siversk, situated south of Lyman. The Russian way of warfare – also in Ukraine – is characterised by ‘reconnaissance by fire’. This best describes the offensive launched on the northern flank of the Donetsk front in late March. The outcome was highly unfavourable for Russia. Russian forces suffered heavy losses. According to Ukraine’s top military commander, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, nearly 5,000 Russian soldiers were killed on 18–19 March. At present, Russian forces are facing visible difficulties in advancing in the northern part of Ukraine’s ‘fortress belt’.

It can be expected that Russia will renew its offensive efforts in this sector. Much will depend on weather conditions. For now, the terrain remains muddy, and spring vegetation has yet to develop. Once conditions improve, heavy equipment will be able to advance more effectively, while foliage will provide better cover for infantry. However, the success of further Russian offensive operations will depend primarily on the size of the reserves assembled. Estimates range from 50,000 to 70,000 troops, most of them in Donbas. At present, it is difficult to assume that this will be sufficient to achieve the objective of capturing the ‘fortress belt’. It should be recalled that the capture of Pokrovsk – a significantly smaller urban centre and more of a logistical hub than a fortified city – took Russian forces nearly two years. This suggests that, on the battlefield – regardless of developments in the diplomatic sphere – there is currently little indication that Russia will achieve a breakthrough this year. For Putin, such a breakthrough would likely be defined as the full capture of Donbas.

The opinion expressed in the article represents the author’s private views, which are an integral part of their individual position.

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