Lukashenko Will Not Abandon Russia. Washington Is Making a Mistake

The current US administration’s attempts to gain leverage over Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko are little more than a waste of time and resources. In practice, they only strengthen both the regime in Minsk and its Russian patron. Just as the idea of a “reverse Kissinger”—driving a wedge between Moscow and Beijing—has virtually no chance of success, so too does any strategy aimed at loosening the ties between Belarus and Russia.

Photo: Pelagiya Tikhonova, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP

The Belarusian regime in 2026 is far more dependent on and subordinate to the Kremlin than it was before 2020. While Lukashenko once retained at least some room for maneuver in foreign policy, that space has now all but disappeared. Even a complete lifting of sanctions would not fundamentally change this reality.

The recent release of Andrzej Poczobut from a Belarusian prison once again highlighted the role played by the United States. Donald Trump has chosen to re-engage with Minsk, much as he did during his first term. The United States has lifted some of the most damaging sanctions, diplomatic contacts have intensified, and Washington has boasted that, thanks to its efforts, Lukashenko is releasing more political prisoners. Yet releasing political prisoners—including high-profile detainees such as Andrzej Poczobut in exchange for Russian and Belarusian intelligence operatives—is a remarkably small price for Lukashenko to pay in return for the economic benefits that follow.

Moreover, if Washington’s objective is to weaken Minsk’s dependence on Moscow—although it is arguably more likely that Trump hopes engagement with Lukashenko could encourage a softer approach from Putin—then easing sanctions on Belarus’s key export commodities achieves precisely the opposite. EU sanctions remain in place, and Belarus’s traditional export route through the Baltic ports remains closed. More than 90 percent of Belarusian exports now travel via Russian Baltic ports, a route that is both longer and more expensive. This reduces Belarus’s profits while generating additional revenue for Russia. In effect, the US decision allows Russia to benefit financially.

This illustrates just how deeply Belarus depends on Russia economically. Even more significant, however, is its dependence in the field of security.

In May, Belarus and Russia conducted joint exercises involving both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, with both presidents taking part. The drills focused on nuclear readiness and the potential use of nuclear forces in a conflict scenario involving NATO. Earlier, Russia had significantly expanded its nuclear infrastructure in Belarus by building additional bases and storage facilities while deploying tactical nuclear weapons that could, if necessary, be delivered by Belarusian forces using Iskander missile systems and modified aircraft.

The deeper integration of Belarus into Moscow’s nuclear planning is no coincidence. Lukashenko portrays this as strengthening Belarus’s security, but in reality it further subordinates the country to Russia. By doing so, the Kremlin turns Belarus into a potential co-belligerent and a likely target of retaliation in the event of a nuclear confrontation involving NATO and Ukraine. Belarus has long functioned as an integral part of Russia’s military system. The addition of the nuclear dimension further reduces Lukashenko’s influence over strategic military decisions. If this trend continues, Belarus could eventually be drawn into the war against Ukraine—even against Lukashenko’s own wishes—should Putin decide to take that step. These concerns most likely explain Kyiv’s recent tougher stance towards Lukashenko and, above all, President Zelenskyy’s decision to establish formal relations with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya.

Taken together, all of this leaves US diplomatic efforts with little chance of achieving their intended objective. It is only a matter of time before this becomes increasingly apparent.

There is another important lesson that policymakers should remember: memory matters in international politics. Yet advocates of another “reset” with Lukashenko seem to forget that throughout his rule, the Belarusian dictator repeatedly sought periods of rapprochement with the West, usually offering only limited concessions regarding political repression and civil liberties. None of those gestures, however, ever extended to Belarus’s relationship with Moscow. Those ties always remained intact.

Nor did these brief thaws in relations with the West last very long. They usually ended once Lukashenko had secured his objectives in negotiations with Russia. His occasional flirtations with the West were never intended as a geopolitical reorientation; they merely served as leverage in his dealings with the Kremlin.

After 2020, when Lukashenko’s grip on power was preserved solely thanks to Moscow’s backing, he effectively became Putin’s vassal, with only very limited room for independent action. The current diplomatic activity between Washington and Minsk is possible only because the Kremlin has little interest in alienating Trump by forcing Lukashenko to reject US overtures. On the contrary, Putin appears to have concluded that Belarus currently serves as a useful channel of communication with the Trump administration—one that remains largely out of the spotlight and attracts far less scrutiny than Steve Witkoff’s high-profile visits to the Kremlin.

The opinion expressed in the article represents the author’s private views, which are an integral part of their individual position.

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