Before and After Georgescu. The 2024-25 Romanian Presidential Elections from a 2026 perspective

“I started to refer to the past months as there has been a ‘Before Georgescu’, and an ‘After Georgescu’ time, which we are living now” – a Member of the Parliament.

Photo: Shutterstock

Introduction

On the night of the 18th of November when the Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca and Digi24 news television channel organised the first presidential election debate in 10 years inviting 8 candidates who had the best chances to get into the second round according to previous survey data: Mircea Geoană (former Deputy Secretary General of NATO, independent), Marcel Ciolacu (Prime Minister at that time, candidate of the Social Democratic Party/Partidul Social Democrat – PSD), Nicolae Ciucă (former Prime Minister, current President of the Senate of Romania, candidate of the National Liberal Party/Partidul Național Liberal – PNL), Elena Lasconi (mayor of Câmpulung in Argeș County, candidate of the Save Romania Union/Uniunea Salvați România – USR), George Simion (candidate of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians/Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor – AUR), Kelemen Hunor (candidate of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania/Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România/Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség – UDMR/RMDSZ), Ludovic Orban (former Prime Minister, candidate of the Force of the Right/Forța Dreptei) and Cristian Diaconescu (former Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Minister of Justice and independent candidate).

In the first moments of the debate, Ludovic Orban dropped out of the race and endorsed Elena Lasconi by encouraging his supporters to vote for her, which complicated the situation since the ballots had already been made and sent abroad for postal voting, so his name could not have been removed from the ballot (Digi24, 2024). Marcel Ciolacu and Nicolae Ciucă, the candidates of the two biggest parties, the PSD and PNL, did not attend the debate. On the day of the debate, breaking news emerged about Ciolacu, about whom the Recorder, an independent and transparent journalistic publication, revealed a scandal called “The Nordis Scheme” (Schema Nordis) which entailed that he and other PSD leaders flew in 2022 on a private jet paid for by Nordis, a company which is now insolvent and under investigation by prosecutors for embezzlement and functioning as an organised crime organisation, despite Ciolacu’s earlier denials of ever being on board. Despite the scandal, experts, the press, and, generally, voters were still sure that Ciolacu would get into the second round, as he was leading every poll and had successfully negotiated the Schengen agreement on the 22nd of November, which further solidified this forecast. Just 7 days later, this proved completely wrong.

The TikTok Surprise

The first round of the 2024 presidential election was held on the 24th of November. After the polling locations closed, the first two exit polls were published, showing Marcel Ciolacu between 24,1% and 24,6% of the vote and Elena Lasconi between 19,6% and 18,2%. The exit polls put Călin Georgescu in 3rd place with between 17,1% and 16,5%. The first two places were predictable, but no one expected Gerogescu to get such a high result, since the final surveys conducted just two days before the election showed him at around 6,8-10,6% in 5th place (Bancăș, 2024). After midnight, the whole situation was flipped on its head, putting Georgescu in first place at the end of the night, having 22,94% of votes; meanwhile, Lasconi and Ciolacu were neck and neck for second place. The final results were announced the next morning, with Lasconi coming in second with 19,18% of the votes. The difference between her and Ciolacu was just 2740 votes.

The biggest question on the 24th of November in Romania was: “Who is Călin Georgescu?” Georgescu has been repeatedly labelled by the press, based on his past statements, as a candidate with legionary and anti-Semitic views, because in 2022, he was convicted for calling the legionary leader Corneliu Zelea Codreanu and Nazi Field Marshal Ion Antonescu “heroes”, who were responsible for the Holocaust in Romania (Știrile PRO TV, 2022). The second political shock of the day was the failure of the two historical parties, which had monopolised the Romanian political system for years. Marcel Ciolacu resigned from the PSD’s presidency (after the December 1 parliamentary elections, he withdrew his resignation and became Prime Minister again, establishing the PSD-PNL-UDMR government), and Nicolae Ciucă also resigned from the PNL leadership. The President of Romania, Klaus Iohannis, stated that he did not receive any information from the secret services regarding external interference in the electoral campaign, since sources began to appear in which Georgescu made pro-Russian, anti-Occidental, and anti-Ukrainian declarations (Apostol, 2024). The President convoked a meeting for the Supreme Council of National Defence (CSAT) on the 28th of November. After the CSAT meeting, President Klaus Iohannis declassified documents revealing that Romanian intelligence services found evidence of over 85,000 coordinated cyberattacks against the IT infrastructure supporting the electoral process and illegal campaign financing in Călin Georgescu’s presidential campaign (Petrescu, 2024). The Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) reported that Georgescu declared no campaign spending, while evidence showed coordinated TikTok promotion funded through unknown third parties. The Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) reported that Romania was targeted by aggressive Russian hybrid actions, including cyber-attacks and sabotage. At the same time, the Interior Ministry identified patterns similar to campaigns used in Ukraine before the invasion.

On the same day, the Constitutional Court of Romania’s (CCR) decided to ask the Central Electorate Bureau (BEC) for a recount of the first round after one of the candidates handed in a valid request to annul the first round of elections arguing that many votes cast for Ludovic Orban were automatically added to Elena Lasconi’s total after he suspended his campaign during the presidential debate (Ardelean, 2024). At the same time, the CCR also delayed its decision to validate the first round until the recount was completed.

On the 2nd of December, the results of the parliamentary elections were released with the far-right and populist parties such as AUR and S.O.S. Romania (SOS) gaining a significantly high percentage (Biroul Electoral Central, 2024). In addition, a new populist far-right party, the Party of Young People/Partidul Oamenilor Tineri (POT), which openly supported Georgescu, also got an unexpectedly high result, mainly attributed to its support for Georgescu in the first round and a prolific social media campaign. In the evening, the CCR announced that it had validated the first round of the presidential elections, after recounting 9,4 million votes without any changes in the order of how the candidates finished.

On the 6th of December, the diaspora voting started for the second round of the presidential election, which was expected to be a tight race. In the afternoon of the same day, the CCR annulled the first round of the presidential elections, meaning that without a valid and cancelled first round, the second round became a non-existent one, thus the diaspora voting was stopped before the election day in Romania would have started. The Constitutional Court justified its decision with the following 3 reasons (Stan, 2024):

The free expression of voters was violated as they were misinformed through an electoral campaign in which one candidate (Călin Georgescu) benefited from aggressive promotion that circumvented national electoral legislation and abusively exploited social media algorithms.
The principle of equal opportunities among electoral competitors was infringed, as the manipulation of digital technologies created obvious inequality between Georgescu, who leveraged these technologies to achieve significantly wider exposure in the online media sphere than other candidates, whose chances were directly reduced.
The court found that state and non-state actors interfered with propaganda or electoral disinformation campaigns, with the state failing in its duty to prevent “any unjustified interference” in the electoral process and to ensure that voters receive correct information about it.

As was to be expected, both candidates who entered the second round heavily objected to the Court’s decision, saying that it was doing major damage to Romanian democracy. Still, the CCR’s decisions were final and binding. The outrage was most intense among Georgescu and AUR voters, but also among the left-wing voters. PressOne, an independent online publication, released an article titled “How did we get here?” in which written Petri and Adamescu (2025) identified causes of the rise of anti-system parties: large parts of Romanian society felt unrepresented, thus chose the anti-system parties over the governing ‘cartel’ ones. These parties can be divided into two different sides: liberal anti-system forces that want to replace the cartel while maintaining democratic institutions (represented by Elena Lasconi) and sovereignist anti-system movements (Călin Georgescu, the AUR and the POT parties) that view institutions and EU membership as the source of Romania’s problems. For instance, Romania has one of the largest regional disparities in the European Union (EU). The winner society of the transition from socialism to capitalism is located in major developed together with the counties and regions in their areas of influence. In comparison, the other part of Romania lives on minimum wage, social help, money earned under the table, for whom the only escape is to emigrate and work the same job for a minimum salary but in euros. The 2024 election results demonstrated that the anti-system phenomenon in Romania is not limited to either the left- or right-wing, but rather a reaction to the failure of the political elite to represent diverse social interests. Georgescu was the perfect anti-system ‘saviour/messiah’ on the white horse against all this failure. Next to the funding linked to Russia, the natural fuel of his candidacy was the culmination of the years-long frustrations and the direct institutional impact on the Romanian society. At the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that more than 2 million people’s votes were annulled. The AUR was relying precisely on these disappointed voters organising multiple protests in Bucharest demanding the reinstating of the second round based on the annulled first round results, electoral integrity, and the resignation of Klaus Iohannis as President (Bonea, 2025). During this period, after the irreversible annulment of the elections, the first to announce his run for the presidency on the 16th of December was Nicușor Dan, the General Mayor of the Capital, who won his 3rd term in 2023 as an independent.

As Klaus Iohannis’s mandate as President was ending on the 21st of December, the issue of who would be the acting President until the new Presidential elections was a pressing one. After the recent parliamentary elections, no new government had yet been formed to decide upon the new date of the presidential elections. The CCR clarified the situation, citing Art. 83(2) of the Romanian Constitution, “the President of Romania shall exercise his office until the new President-elect takes the oathȚ (Presidency of Romania, 2016).” While taking into account that in three days it would already be the 24th of December and the winter holidays were starting, a new date for the redo of the presidential elections could not be expected before the new year. President Iohannis convened the new Parliament on the 22nd of December, but he set one condition: to have an agreed-upon government coalition till then. The creation of a governing coalition was controversial, with the pro-European parties in government and the anti-European (excluding the USR, which was an anti-system party that refused to join the government with the system parties) ones in opposition, namely the AUR, the far-right SOS, and the dark horse of the Parliamentary elections, the far-right POT. On the 23rd of December, the Christmas present for Romanians was the second Ciolacu cabinet, consisting of the PSD, PNL, UDMR, and national minorities.

A New Era of Romanian Politics

Romania entered the new year with the same frustrations but with a new-old Prime Minister. On the 16th of January, the government officially adopted the new dates for the Presidential elections announcing them for the 4th of May, with a potential second round on the 18th of May (Autoritatea Electorală Permanentă, 2024). Now, Romanians only needed to wait for the old or new candidates, but before that, a highly awaited moment happened: Klaus Iohannis announced his resignation from the Presidency of Romania, after which, according to the order of succession, Ilie Bolojan from the PNL, the President of the Senate, became the Acting President of Romania. This was the first time in Romania’s democratic history that the country’s President resigned.

Over the next few months, old and new faces appeared, willing to run for the presidency. The PSD-PNL-UDMR governmental coalition and electoral alliance “Romania Forward” agreed to run a common candidate, Crin Antonescu, who served as Acting President of Romania in 2012, to secure the pro-European and NATO path by gathering the power of the three governing parties. George Simion, the leader of the AUR, and Anamaria Gavrilă from the POT both filed their candidacy with the intent to run in the place of Călin Georgescu, if his candidacy was to be rejected.

Not surprisingly, and as a big relief to the governmental coalition, the BEC rejected Georgescu’s candidacy. After the 2024 elections, more and more worrying facts surfaced about him: such as having former Foreign Legion soldiers protecting him as bodyguards or having Horațiu Potra as security coordinator, a former soldier in the Foreign Legion and later mercenary having a security company he used to send current and former military personnel to Congo under contracts as guards, protection and military advisors for the government forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Păcurar, 2024). Moreover, Potra was also photographed with the former Russian ambassador to Romania, Valeri Kuzmin, and was convicted for forming a paramilitary group that used firearms and white weapons in training. The most alarming fact was that all of this proved that the authorities did not fulfil their duty by letting a candidate with such a questionable background end up on the ballot. After the deadline, the BEC validated 12 candidates, but Anamaria Gavrilă withdrew her candidacy, supporting George Simion to be the main candidate of the sovereigntists, so on the final list there were 11 names listed, among whom the most prominent ones were Nicuşor Dan – independent; Crin Antonescu – PSD-PNL-UDMR candidate; Victor Ponta – independent, former Prime Minister; Elena Lasconi – candidate of the USR (whose leaders supported Dan at the end); and George Simion – from the AUR. According to surveys for the first round, only one of the candidates seemed to be for sure present in the 2nd round, the candidate of the AUR, Simion. Thus, the other candidate’s main campaign strategy was to defeat each other to get the second spot in the second round next to Simion. The last survey (Duca, 2025) before the elections was conducted between April 28 and May 1, with a margin of error of ±2 percentage points at a 95% confidence level and gave 30,2% for George Simion, 24,3% for Crin Antonescu, and 22,4% for Nicuşor Dan, but the first round on the 4th of May went a different way: George Simion gathered 40,96% of the vote, while in second place the centrist anti-system Nicuşor Dan recieved 20,99%, defeating the coalition’s candidate by 86,837 votes (Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania, 2025).

The two anti-system candidates who advanced to the second round showed a clear systemic shift, strengthening the fact that Romanians would prefer a President who brings change from outside the current political system, since the pro-system Antonescu got way fewer votes than what the governmental coalition had hoped for based on their power. One day after the first round, Marcel Ciolacu announced his resignation as Prime Minister and withdrew the PSD Ministers from the government coalition. He stated that PSD would not officially support any candidate in the second round, saying that “each PSD sympathiser will vote as he or she wishes, according to his or her own conscience” (Păcurar, 2025).” PSD members even criticised his statement and decision as he steered the political situation toward even more uncertainty by keeping the PSD from officially becoming a supporter for the pro-European, centrist Nicuşor Dan, instead opening the door for their voters to choose the Eurosceptic, sovereigntist George Simion. Next to the Acting President, Romania now also had an Acting Prime Minister, Cătălin Predoiu, for whom this was his third stint in the role in 20 years.

With a deficit of 20% after the first round, it seemed unlikely that Nicuşor Dan would win the elections over Simion, since he only got the official support of the PNL, UDMR, and USR. Still, the PSD’s support was missing, which was an issue, as they had secured the largest amount of votes in the parliamentary election. The first debate between the two candidates was hosted by Euronews on the 8th of May, where the candidates presented contrasting visions for Romania’s future (Euronews, 2025). Their sharpest disagreement emerged on Ukraine, with Dan supporting continued military aid as essential for regional security, while Simion opposed any financial support for other countries, advocating strict neutrality. Though both supported EU and NATO membership, they differed fundamentally on engagement levels – Simion saw the EU merely as an economic zone with NATO handling all defence matters, while Dan envisioned Romania as an active EU member in both economic and security initiatives. All the polls predicted a tight race (Statista, 2025) where every vote would count as the country became more polarised into two groups: the conservative anti-system Eurosceptics and the centrist anti-system pro-Europeans. No one took their win for granted, both groups had one thing in common: they wanted the other side to lose and lose badly, either to protect the democracy and the Euro-Atlantic path of the country or to protect democracy once again from a nationalistic, Eurosceptical view.

On the 18th of May, the long-awaited second round of the presidential elections ended with the victory of Nicuşor Dan, who received 53,60% of the vote over George Simion, who gathered 46,40%. The CCR validated the elections and on the 26th of May, Dan was sworn in as the 5th President of Romania in the Palace of Parliament, after which he took over the presidential mandate from Acting President Ilie Bolojan at the Cotroceni Palace.

One-year retrospective from 2026

The victory of Nicușor Dan over George Simion in May 2025, while restoring a degree of institutional normality, did not resolve the underlying issues that led to the crisis, since the new President wanted to have a pro-European government, but the nomination of a Prime Minister who could be agreed upon by every pro-European party seemed more challenging than he initially thought. The PSD initially did not want to accept the President’s proposition to have Ilie Bolojan as the Prime Minister of Romania, they would prefer a technocratic Prime Minister over a politically involved one. If the rebuilding of the democratic and institutional trust, and image, was not enough challenge for 2025, the country was facing one of the biggest budgetary deficits in the EU, exceeding 9.3% of GDP in 2024 (European Commission, 2024). Nicușor Dan’s “optimistic and realistic” budget deficit target for 2025 was 7.5% of GDP, though the government officially targeted 7.0%. Working against the clock, by June 2025, Romania needed to form a new government to adopt a package of measures to reduce the budget deficit, for which the deadline was the 30th of June to submit the package of measures to the European Commission. Otherwise, Romania risked having billions of euros in EU funds suspended.

In the last minute, on the 23rd of June 2025, the Parliament swore in the new governmental cabinet led by Bolojan as the Prime Minister, bringing together a four-party coalition: PSD, PNL, USR, and UDMR and the national minorities. The anti-system pro-European USR entering the government and becoming part of the ‘system’ also raised some questions about making agreements with its highly criticised ‘enemies’, but its leaders argued that in the current exceptionally bad situation, the most responsible thing to do was for the USR to help form a majority to adopt all the necessary restrictive measures to decrease the budgetary deficit. The USR and PSD being on the same side also raised a few issues, since the two parties have distinctly different values and plans. USR, being a liberal progressivist party, meanwhile, the PSD is knowingly a conservative one. The PM’s position was agreed upon as a rotating one, which has already been exercised many times in the past years, meaning that from April 2027, the PSD will take the governmental leading position, which caused some reservations during the parliamentary majority forming, since the PSD was considered unpredictable after exiting the governmental coalition in May 2025.

Since its inception, the Bolojan cabinet has come up with multiple restrictive measures to limit the budget deficit, inflation, and government debt and, most importantly, to not lose EU funds by failing to reduce the gap between state revenues and expenditures by the end of 2025. Fortunately, this deadline was later pushed till the end of 2026 summer. The new government knew that these measures of austerity will be highly unpopular, but by being in such a hopeless economic situation, the political elite had no other choices just to assume the role of the antagonist. During the summer of 2025, two waves of restrictive measures for budget spending reduction were adopted by the Romanian Parliament. The first package resulted mainly in tax increases on basic groceries, tobacco products, alcohol, incomes from social media, gambling, and private accommodations. The biggest price increases were felt in the HoReCa hospitality industry sector. Meanwhile, the second Bolojan package targeted the budgetary cut of the State spending, mainly city councils, hospitals, and state-owned companies. On the 23rd of December 2025, the “Ordonanță Trenuleț”/Trainy Ordinance was adopted by the government, a fiscal package designed to control public spending and ensure the sustainability of the next year’s state budget.
Especially after the budget cuts from the local city councils, the PSD indeed threatened the coalition multiple times by leaving it, until the government’s main centre-left party actually joined the opposition at the end of April 2026 by leaving the Bolojan cabinet as a minority coalition government. Furthermore, the PSD united with the AUR for a vote of no-confidence against Bolojan PM. The leaders of the two biggest parliamentary parties decided so based on the most recent polls, which showed that they could secure together a parliamentary majority “if they joined forces at an upcoming general election” (Knapp, 2026). If the no-confidence motion succeeds, the government will fall, and the PM will need to resign. Hence, the lack of decision-makers and a strong legislative state entity will bring back the political instability to Romania, undermining the continuous state-building measures already adopted in times of economic uncertainty.

Conclusion

The 2024-25 Romanian presidential election cycle represents a watershed moment in the country’s post-communist democratic history where the wounds of the electoral impact over the citizens institutional trust had a never-before-seen exposure. What began as a routine electoral process transformed into an unprecedented constitutional and political crisis that exposed deep vulnerabilities in Romania’s democratic institutions and revealed profound societal divisions. The annulment of the 2024 elections following Călin Georgescu’s shocking first-round victory accentuated the tension between protecting democratic integrity and respecting popular sovereignty, with over 2 million votes invalidated due to alleged foreign interference and electoral manipulation, all to protect the country’s fragile democracy.
The “Before Georgescu” and “After Georgescu” divide that now defines Romanian politics serves as a stark reminder that the survival of democracy depends mainly on the political elite’s ability to deliver meaningful representation towards its citizens. Whether Romania can bridge these obstacles while safeguarding its fragile institutional normality with constantly emerging political crises and governmental coalition fails will determine not only its own position in Europe but also the future of Romania as a strong and stable country which can stand its ground in today’s rapidly changing geopolitics. But fo rnow, the first step is done. The next move is upon the willingness of the political elite to either cooperate and build towards the future or gain pwer and govern over the present opportunities.

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The opinion expressed in the article represents the author’s private views, which are an integral part of their individual position.

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