The War in the Persian Gulf: More Losses Than Gains for Russia

The scale of the U.S. and Israeli military campaign against Iran caught Moscow off guard. The likelihood of major geopolitical shifts in the Persian Gulf has rarely appeared as high as it does today. While the Kremlin may reap limited short-term benefits from the escalation, the overall strategic balance is likely to be unfavorable for Russia.

American strategic bomber B-2 Spirit
Photo: U.S. Air National Guard / Master Sgt. Patrick Evenson / Handout via REUTERS

Some commentators argue that the war ultimately benefits Vladimir Putin’s regime. Two factors are most frequently cited. First, the conflict diverts global attention from Russia’s war against Ukraine and reduces diplomatic pressure on Moscow. As long as Washington remains heavily engaged in the Middle East, the Kremlin faces less urgency to negotiate a settlement in Ukraine. Given Putin’s reluctance to freeze the conflict—let alone pursue a lasting peace—this shift in attention temporarily works to Russia’s advantage.

Second, the war has pushed global oil and gas prices upward. For a state whose budget remains heavily dependent on hydrocarbon exports, higher energy prices translate directly into increased revenues. Disruptions to energy supplies from one of the world’s most important oil-producing regions could also expand opportunities for Russian exports, particularly to major Asian markets such as India and China. Yet these benefits are likely to prove temporary. A prolonged disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz would be required to significantly improve Russia’s fiscal position. Short-term price spikes may ease pressure on the Kremlin to introduce unpopular fiscal measures, but they will not fundamentally alter Russia’s structural dependence on energy revenues.

In the longer term, the war in the Persian Gulf may further weaken Russia’s strategic position. Once the conflict subsides, the global oil market could be reshaped in ways that leave even less room for Russian exports. Should sanctions on Iranian oil eventually be lifted, Iranian crude would quickly become a direct competitor to Russian supplies. At the same time, international efforts to target Russia’s so-called shadow fleet would likely intensify.

Beyond the economic dimension, the war poses serious geopolitical risks for Moscow. One of the Kremlin’s primary concerns is the possibility that Iranian actions could draw Arab states in the region more directly into the conflict. Iranian strikes against civilian and energy infrastructure in Gulf monarchies have already altered both the regional balance of power and the political mood among Arab governments. In earlier confrontations between Iran and the United States or Israel, most Arab states sought to remain on the sidelines and strongly opposed escalation. Today, however, some may conclude that their long-term security requires the permanent neutralization of the Iranian regime. Even the possibility of such a scenario represents a strategic setback for Moscow.

Russia has attempted in recent years to balance its partnership with Tehran with expanding relations with Sunni Gulf monarchies. Cooperation within the OPEC+ framework and growing economic ties with states such as the United Arab Emirates have been central to this strategy. Iran’s attacks on energy infrastructure and its attempts to disrupt regional oil and gas exports place Moscow in an increasingly uncomfortable position. The conflict also undermines the perception of Gulf states as a safe haven for Russian capital. In recent years, Dubai has become a major hub for Russian business and financial flows—sometimes described as an informal “third capital” for Russian elites. Growing instability in the region may weaken that role at a time when Western sanctions have already constrained Russia’s access to global financial markets.

Perhaps the most significant consequence of the war is the potential weakening of one of Russia’s key regional partners. American and Israeli strikes on Iranian targets appear to have shocked Moscow, which had expected a far more limited operation focused on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Instead, the possibility that Russia could lose an important strategic partner is becoming increasingly realistic. A weakened Iran would be far less valuable to Moscow as a partner in sanctions evasion, a supplier of military equipment, and a diplomatic counterweight to the United States.

More broadly, the conflict may accelerate the gradual erosion of Russian influence in the Middle East. This trend has already been visible in recent years, including the weakening of Hezbollah, the defeat of Hamas in its war with Israel, and—most significantly—the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. These developments represent not only geopolitical setbacks but also reputational losses for Russia on the global stage. Once again, Putin risks appearing as an unreliable ally—unable or unwilling to support partners in moments of crisis, even when those partners previously assisted Moscow. Iran, after all, provided Russia with crucial support during the early stages of its war against Ukraine.

Finally, the war highlights two additional dynamics unfavorable to Russia. First, the conflict once again underscores the technological superiority of Western weapons systems over Russian military equipment. Second, it reinforces the perception that even entrenched authoritarian leaders remain vulnerable if the United States decides to remove them from power. For Putin—widely known for his obsession with personal security—such developments carry important psychological implications. The elimination of Iran’s leadership may deepen the Kremlin’s sense of vulnerability and reinforce the regime’s growing paranoia. In practice, this could translate into harsher domestic repression and a more confrontational foreign policy, further reducing the prospects for a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine.

The opinion expressed in the article represents the author’s private views, which are an integral part of their individual position.

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