Date: 8 February 2025 Author: Szymon Polewka, Zuzanna Wasiluk
Zoran Milanović: Croatia’s ‘New Old’ President – Post-Election Interview with Matija Horvat
Over the past year, Croatia has undergone an election marathon, featuring parliamentary, European, and presidential elections. The second round of the presidential election, held on January 12, resulted in a victory for Zoran Milanović. To explore the post-election domestic landscape and Croatia’s role in a rapidly changing world, we invited Matija Horvat, an expert from the Croatian think tank Centre for Public Policy and Economic Analysis.
The second round of the presidential election secured another term for Zoran Milanović. What is the key to his political success?
The ruling (center-right) party HDZ won three mandates in a row (2016, 2020, 2024), and Prime Minister Plenković is sometimes perceived as someone who controls all the branches of power in Croatia. According to the Constitution, Croatia has a parliamentary system of government, but Plenković – as some analysts would say – acts like a “chancellor”. Moreover, in almost 9 years of Plenković’s (three consecutive terms) mandate as prime minister, more than 30 ministers resigned due to “crimes and misdemeanors” or plain scandals. Therefore, the presidential elections were a “referendum” against HDZ.
Considering the great disappointment and problems that HDZ generates concerning the rule of law and corruption, in presidential elections, people tend to vote for Milanović who promised to be the “barrier” for HDZ in taking over all the institutions, and who will “fight” against corruption. But this is also populism because President Milanović (as a President in the parliamentary system) doesn’t have the (constitutional) tools and any political will to resolve everyday problems that citizens feel. Also, in these challenging times, with aggressive Russia (and assertive China; nobody addressed PRC in Croatian elections), citizens try to find “security/safety” and Milanović promised (in a populist manner) that he would “keep us from harm’s way”.
We can say that in (the last 25 years, after the semi-presidential system was changed to a parliamentary one, but the President retained some minor authorities and people voted for President in direct elections) Croatia’s presidential elections people tend to vote for the “oppositional” candidate when HDZ is on power (and HDZ is on power most of the time in modern democratic Croatia) and HDZ candidate when “the opposition” is on power.
After 8 years of HDZ, it was expected that Milanović (who was president of the SDP, a center-left party) would win his second mandate as President of the Republic. The key to his success (along with corruption scandals from HDZ) is his populist oratory skill (mixed with humour) which he uses to “fight” for an “ordinary citizen”. Since he was a Prime Minister (2011 – 2015) he knew that most of the people in Croatia are “traditional” and vote more for “conservative” parties.
His “art” is to catch all the (possible) votes. Therefore, he made a (logical) “shift” from urban/left-liberal/social-democrat to “a new age sovereigntist” populist who emits right-wing political messages. His fans from the left-liberal/social-democratic political spectrum ignore that fact and voters from the right spectrum (for whom Plenković is “too much pro-European”) see him as “Tuđman 2.0” who “fights for our national interests”. However, that’s the purpose of this populist mix.
The danger is that Milanović’s – foreign policy – rhetoric is mostly EU/NATO-sceptic, but people vote for him (we must emphasize that turnover for the elections was below 50%) mostly because they see him as a “barrier” for HDZ to take all the institutions and less because of foreign policy isolationism.
In the spring parliamentary elections, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) emerged victorious. What stays behind the shift in public sentiment?
HDZ is still the biggest political party in Croatia. They have branches from the tiniest villages to many cities, although they are still perceived as a party that has more success in rural areas. They can mobilize more voters (often connected in clientelist networks, because in some local areas, HDZ has been in power since Croatia’s independence), and parliamentary elections are different from presidential elections. HDZ is victorious in parliamentary elections because of gerrymandering (electoral law wasn’t changed during Milanović’s government) and because the opposition is too heterogeneous to act as a “single oppositional platform” – without judging their socialist and leftist policies, many of them contrary to CEA’s values.
If the opposition was technically able to “unite”, HDZ would lose. Of course, to “unite” “urban” oppositional political parties (radical left, social democrats, green-left, left-liberals, and centrist parties and voters) with right-wing oppositional parties proved to be too difficult.
There was the possibility to try to make a post-electoral anti-HDZ coalition. Still, one right-wing party (“Homeland movement”/” Domovinski pokret” – the party that was created with unsatisfied former HDZ members who are seen as more “sovereigntist” or “Eurosceptic”) decided to go with HDZ and with few “independent” individuals formed a government coalition. We need to emphasize that Plenković and HDZ – in the last 8 years of their government – always have a tiny parliamentary majority (76 members of Parliament out of 151), but their rule is stable, and Croatian politicians always favor “stability”.
What has captured the public’s attention the most during the presidential campaign?
There were 8 candidates in the first round of the elections (only 1 from the left opposition and Milanović who catches all voters and 6 from the centre-right or far-right spectrum). But it was obvious that Milanović had the biggest chance to win the elections, even in the first round. HDZ (Independent) candidate Primorac was perceived, especially by the media, as a weak politician, who couldn’t fight against Milanović in the rhetorical arena, although Prime Minister Plenković was firmly behind him (although HDZ members knew that he wasn’t a “real HDZ” representative).
For domestic analysts, this campaign was “boring,” and only a “black swan” event or “Force Majeure” could have made any difference. The problem with our presidential campaign is that candidates act like they are running for parliamentary elections and journalists (in debates or interviews), or voters, ask questions like a presidential candidate is running for the Prime Minister’s office.
Therefore, the problem lies in our Constitution. Voters see a President as someone who has electoral legitimacy (he is elected directly in elections and, for example, the Government in the personification of Prime Minister Plenković has more constitutional powers), but de iure and de facto – he is almost (but not 100%) a ceremonial figure.
Some provisions in our Constitution that determine the relationship between the president and the Government are vague or incomplete and in practice, we have a problem of “cohabitation” (although our Constitution provides a parliamentary system, all the actors are still using the phrase “cohabitation”), which Prime Minister Plenković calls “hard cohabitation”.
The President of the Republic has some direct authority in defense (commander in chief of the armed forces) and security segment and is someone who represents our country at home and abroad. Also, the President “ensures regular and coordinated action and the stability of state power”. This (vague) provision is a residue of a (Tuđman’s) semi-presidential system, but nowadays incumbent presidents don’t have the constitutional tools to be “a stability factor”. Therefore, we need a constitutional reform, but to obtain a 2/3 parliamentary majority for this (or, for example, an “impeachment” of the President) is – for the time being – not realistic.
The first round of the presidential election in Croatia was held just after Christmas (on December 29, 2024). Could the unusual timing have influenced the results?
No. Milanović would (most likely) win at any time until the domestic political situation stays the same. Presidential elections are set to be in Christmas/New Year’s time because the first President of Croatia (Franjo Tuđman) died in December 1999 and since then nobody changed the electoral provisions regarding the arranged time of elections. This “small” reform could have been done in 25 years, but now you see how it is (difficult) with “larger” reforms in Croatia.
When it comes to foreign policy, Milanović is known for his contentious stance on Ukraine. How will President Milanović’s presidency impact Croatia’s support for Ukraine?
Since the beginning of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Milanović often repeats Kremlin’s talking points (“NATO expansion has gone too far”,” we are poking the big bear”, “Russia doesn’t lose wars”, “nuclear escalation is imminent”, “Ukraine is a corrupt state”, „the massacre in Buča may not have been committed by the Russians” etc.) and has opposed position on the most important foreign policy issue than the ruling HDZ. The ruling HDZ party firmly supports Ukraine’s cause and Croatia is in 11th place in the world (proportionally to GDP, source: Kiel Institute) in providing aid to Ukraine. In this regard, the President shouldn’t have any constitutional authority to oppose helping Ukraine.
Although the President (for the time being) can’t sabotage military aid (he firmly opposes it, because it “prolongs the war, adds fuel to it and which is other people’s war and not ours”, he would stress that he is not against “humanitarian” help), unfortunately, he can sabotage some decisions regarding Ukraine that need to be co-signed with the Government (fallacies of our Constitution that generate “cohabitation” in a parliamentary system).
He opposed the EUMAM mission to train Ukrainian soldiers in Croatia because “it puts the target on our foreheads” and most of the parliamentary opposition (from the left to the right) imitated his stance and voted against this mission (the opposition often imitates Milanović, but Milanović also imitates “the pulse of the nation”, as all populists do). Recently, the President also opposed the NSATU mission (two Croatian officers would go to Wiesbaden, Germany on a logistical mission), for which he said it represents “direct involvement in a war”.
The Government can’t gather a 2/3 parliamentary majority for these decisions because Milanović (unconstitutionally) acts like a “chief of the opposition” and this “hard cohabitation” – also in foreign policy issues – will likely continue, because the Prime Minister and other HDZ officials refused to attend presidential inauguration ceremony which will be held in February this year, and also Prime Minister refuses to gather a national security council (coordinating body jointly convened by the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister) and there are problems regarding the location and celebration of 30 years since the operation “Storm” (in which Croatia liberated most of its occupied territory). For the time being, we can say that the President will continue to sabotage any decision regarding Ukraine that will come to his desk.
Given what you have said, could Milanović be accused of pro-Russian sentiment? Does his stance resemble that of Serbia?
There is no evidence that the President is directly a pro-Russian player (although there are no official investigations on that issue), and it is important to say that Croatia is not dependent on Russian energy sources. His “anti-Ukrainian sentiment” is partially a product of a domestic political battle with the ruling party; however, it is not justified to destabilize Croatia’s foreign policy (I would emphasize that some ambassadors in certain “important” countries are also not selected, because their appointment depends on the common decision of the President and the Government). Some analysts think that if HDZ was “pro-Russian” then the President would be “pro-Western”. We can say that, for the time being, Ukraine is unfortunately a “collateral victim” of the domestic political arena, disturbed by populism led by Milanović.
Therefore, nothing in Croatia resembles the situation in Serbia. We know that Milanović’s statements on Ukraine are not valid in Western alliances, and some would say that his “cautionary” approach to Russian aggression is anti-Western, but most Croatian citizens are pro-Western, and our entire modern history was a fight to be a part of the West. Here, we need to clarify a few things about Milanović and his populist statements.
In his populist worldview, Milanović mixes several sentiments from our collective memory. He often emphasizes that we are a “small country” and repeats the old folk saying that was attributed to Vladko Maček, a Croatian politician before and during WW2: “When the big ones are fighting, the small ones must be under the table.” He never recalls other “small” countries and their staunchly pro-Ukraine politicians.
That “small country” argument is presented in voters who inherited a more conservative worldview and means that in challenging times, Croatia – as a “small country” – must be cautious (like Maček was “cautious” when he, as an anti-communist politician, didn’t engage in a direct fight – with partisans – against nazi collaborators in Croatia).
Unfortunately, in Croatia during WW2, we didn’t have our version of “Armia Krajowa” like there was in Poland – we only had communist antifascist resistance that was also compromised by crimes and “traditionalist/conservatives” always had repulsion against communists.
That’s why this notion of non-involvement in big wars exists and Milanović exploits this fact and all his statements on Ukraine for him are “prudent” and in our “national interest” because this war (for Milanović) is about “America and Russia”. The fact that he ignores Ukrainian and Croatian agencies are not important to him, because again, he thinks that he works in “our national interest” (because Russia is “big” and “dangerous”).
Here, Milanović forgets that the “small country” argument connected with old “folk talking about big ones, small ones and hiding below the tables” didn’t work well for Croatia during (because of the domestic nazi collaborators and their genocide of non-Croatians) and after WW2 (because of communist crimes), but he pulls this “argument” out from his sleeve when he compares Croatian war of independence (1991-1995) and says that we were under embargo and nobody helped us when we needed help (unlike Ukraine today). Although there are similarities between Serbian aggression in Croatia and today’s Russian aggression in Ukraine, the global nature of this war is different from our war for independence and the president ignores this fact.
Also, the President addresses the voters who inherited nostalgia for former communist Yugoslavia and its role (between the West and the East) as the founder of the non-alignment movement, during the First Cold War. Dictator Tito also didn’t engage in a direct conflict and played a “neutral/non-aligned” role in international relations (and was praised by a lot of politicians of that time). Therefore everything “prudent” about foreign policy from the President also echoes that sentiment.
We also emphasize that some individuals see a “neutral/prudent role model” in international relations, in the legacy of the Republic of Dubrovnik (Ragusa). From the Middle Ages until the beginning of the 19th century, the city of Dubrovnik conducted some sort of “business as usual” with all the actors of that time (this historical analogy is also used in describing the current political situation in the world). Populist Milanović mixes all those sentiments in his current political worldview because he is trying to catch all the (possible) votes.
On the other side, the situation in Serbia or Serbian politicians and most of their voters are different. Serbia and their political leader(s) are still acting as pro-Russian players in neighboring regions of the Western Balkan (even though they – via third states – gave military aid to Ukraine) and they will remain pro-Russian until the end of this regime (and nobody knows what will come after, because there is no pro-Western opposition there). Serbs in Balkan are still talking about the “Serbian world” which is a derivation of “Russian peace/world”. Most of their voters have pro-Russian sentiment (unlike Croatian citizens) and in Serbia, there is no free media. Also, we can’t underestimate the Chinese influence there.
Serbia today is a captured state, a “Balkan light version of Belarus” although the West is trying to push them to be a part of the collective West and is committing the same mistake as with Putin – appeasement (“Wandel durch Handel”, etc.) toward the autocratic Vučić and his regime. Western politicians are making concessions for Vučić’s regime (in Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, or in relations with the independent Republic of Kosovo, which Serbia still sees as its breakaway province), and this should stop. We don’t need this kind of Serbia (that doesn’t want to be in the West) as a part of the West and our think tank (Croatian Centre for Public Policy and Economic Analysis) has already addressed what criteria are needed for a better future (but this is another topic and for another discussion).
Referring to the key international event of recent months, how is Croatia preparing for Donald Trump’s presidency?
Both the President and Prime Minister congratulated U.S. President Donald Trump following his inauguration, wishing him much success in his second term and pledging stronger cooperation between Croatia and the United States in the military and energy sectors. We need to be aware that pro-Russian actors in the Western Balkans think that Trump’s mandate will be fruitful for their aspirations; although they exaggerate their expectations, we need to be cautious about risks coming from the Western Balkans – namely Serbian entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (which “legalization” is a grave mistake of the international community) and Serbia – together.
How will the presidential election impact future relations with the EU?
The result of the Croatian presidential elections will continue the period of “hard cohabitation” on the national level, but relations with the EU will stay without too many obstacles. President Milanović will probably continue with his sovereigntist and populist rhetoric toward the EU, but the Government has the most constitutional powers in everyday EU relations.
I will emphasize that I see a potential danger that “urban opposition” in Croatia (if they succeed in the next parliamentary elections) will take over Milanović’s foreign policy stance (sovereigntist right opposition already has this position) and it is always possible to imagine some new leadership in HDZ that will go back to “factory default settings” and be more like Milanović, but Croatia will probably never act like today’s Hungary or Slovakia (some politicians will, but not our overall policy).
Regarding new elections in the USA, as politicians in the new US administration say, America won’t be focused on our neighbouring region or Europe in a greater sense. Our think tank always advocated never-ending transatlantic bonds, especially through NATO and the EU, but if something different emerges from this administration, I would paraphrase President J.F.K.: “Ask not what the USA can do for Europe – ask what Europeans can do for themselves”. It will not be enough to be geopolitical. Europe must become a strategic player. We need less regulation in everyday problems, yet more integration in the security and defense sectors.
Where do Croatian-Polish relations stand after the recent elections?
President Milanović participated in the meeting of the Heads of State of the Arraiolos Group last October in Krakow. This was a meeting of the Presidents of European Union member countries without executive powers, who meet once a year to discuss key topics of interest to the European Union. The host of this meeting was President Duda. Also, when Prime Minister Tusk was the President of the European Council, he said that “Croatia was like a second home to him, especially in the company of Prime Minister Plenković “. Therefore, I don’t expect serious changes regarding the mutual situation.
The state of Polish-Croatian relations is very good – there are no open disputes on either the political or economic level. We are aware that Polish citizens see us as a safe tourist destination. Former Croatian President Mrs. Grabar – Kitarović and Polish President Duda were the initiators of the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) and although President Milanović is uninterested in 3SI (like in any multilateral form), our Government will continue to support this form of alliance.
Also, both our countries actively participate in the so-called Berlin Process, supporting the European aspirations of the Western Balkan countries – but here, I would again stress that nobody should „negotiate” with nationalistic Vučić (who was a warmonger, and Europeans must know this) – while Croatian soldiers are stationed in Poland as part of NATO’s enhanced forward presence. CEA think tank sees Poland as one of our role models, especially in the large investments in the sector of defense in which Poland leads the way for other European Allies. Also, the Polish attitude towards Russia is something Croatia can learn about and adopt.
The lyrics of one of the Croatian songs from the period of national revival in the 19th century say „Još Hrvatska ni propala, dok mi živimo” and these were taken from the lyrics of the Polish national anthem – Jeszcze Polska nie zginęła, kiedy my żyjemy, so I would say that we’ll stay as friends and allies whatever the future brings.
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We also encourage you to explore Matija Horvat’s latest article, ‘Croatian President on Russian aggression’ and to learn more about the work of our partner, the Croatian think tank Centre for Public Policy and Economic Analysis.
Horvat Matija, ‘Croatian President on Russian aggression’, Croatian Centre for Public Policy and Economic Analysis, January 21, 2025
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