

THE WARSAW INSTITUTE REVIEW


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Dear Readers,



I would like to kindly guide your attention to the newest issue of our quarterly, in which you will find articles by Polish and international authors describing ongoing conundrums on the international arena, as well as referring to history and culture.

An interview with the Ambassador of the Republic of Poland in Berlin, H.E. Prof. **Andrzej Przyłębski**, alongside **Daniel Pogorzelski**'s interview with John Guzlowki, as well as an article authored by Dr. **Krzysztof Rak**. Each of them uniquely elaborates distinct themes impelled by the Second World War. This year commemorated 80 years since Germany's invasion into Poland – the assault which ignited the Second World War. A war, in which Poland's actions saw her forever inscribed onto the pages of history as a nation of honor and faith which fought valiantly.

The article by **Mariusz Klarecki** describes the deliberate and conscious policy of the Germans on the territories of Poland. The Nazis sought to eliminate the Jewish population during the occupation. On top of the unscrupulous annihilation of around 370 000 Varsovian Jews, the losses of this part of the city's populace were severe also in looted works of art and antiques. Moreover, the ongoing developments at EU level are analyzed by Prof. **Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse** and Prof. **Piotr Bajda**. They refer to a new balance of power and impending changes to the EU's political status quo. Could we consider the dynamics following the elections to the European Parliament, as well as the shaping phase of EU institutions, to be indicative of new times ahead in the European Union?

Building on from this, **Robert Rajczyk** elaborates on the paradoxes of the tense situation between Hong Kong and China.

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This perspective aptly puts into context the implications for the geopolitical chessboards on the global scale, which are further examined by **Maria Kądzielska**. She particularly focuses on how maneuvers of the US and China are both symptoms and causes of one another.

On behalf of the whole editorial staff, I wish you an enjoyable read,

IZABELA WOJTYCZKA
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
THE WARSAW INSTITUTE REVIEW

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CONTENTS



HISTORY

MARIUSZ KLARECKI:
WARSAW JEWISH COLLECTIONS
AND THEIR DESTRUCTION
DURING THE GERMAN
OCCUPATION



GEOPOLITICS

MARTA KĘDZIELSKA:
AMERICAN-CHINESE RELATIONS
IN THE TRADE WAR CONTEXT



VISEGRAD REPORT

PIOTR BAJDA:
THE EUROPEAN UNION WILL BE
BETTER OFF WITHOUT FRANS
TIMMERMANS

INTERVIEW

PROF. ANDRZEJ PRZYŁĘBSKI
80 YEARS LATER - THE STATE OF POLISH-
GERMAN RELATIONS IN CONTEXT OF WORLD
WAR II

6

HISTORY

KRZYSZTOF RAK
JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI'S POLICY OF MAINTAINING
THE EUROPEAN STATUS QUO

11

INTERVIEW

DANIEL POGORZELSKI
TELL US WHO YOU ARE

27

HISTORY

MARIUSZ KLARECKI
WARSAW JEWISH COLLECTIONS AND THEIR
DESTRUCTION DURING THE GERMAN
OCCUPATION

32

WESTERN REPORT

MATEUSZ KUBIAK
WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF THE EASTERN
PARTNERSHIP?

45

GEOPOLITICS

MARTA KĘDZIELSKA
AMERICAN-CHINESE RELATIONS IN THE
TRADE WAR CONTEXT

51

GEOPOLITICS

ROBERT RAJCZYK
THE PARADOXES OF AUTONOMY

59

EUROPEAN UNION

TOMASZ GRZEGORZ GROSSE
2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION AND ITS
OUTCOMES

68

VISEGRAD REPORT

PIOTR BAJDA
THE EUROPEAN UNION WILL BE BETTER OFF
WITHOUT FRANS TIMMERMANS

78

VISEGRAD REPORT

ALEXANDER WIELGOS
V4 IN CHANGEFUL ESPIONAGE

85

VISEGRAD REPORT

MARTIN SVÁROVSKÝ
US MILITARY PRESENCE IN POLAND
FROM THE REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE AND
POTENTIAL CZECH CONTRIBUTION

95

VISEGRAD REPORT

DÁNIEL FÓNYI
THE POSITION OF THE V4 IN TERMS OF
SECURITY CHALLENGES THREATENING THE
EUROPEAN UNIONS

107

VISEGRAD REPORT

WOJCIECH JAKÓBIK
POLAND FIRST - POLAND'S PRESCRIPTION
FOR HARD TIMES

114

80 YEARS LATER – THE STATE OF POLISH-GERMAN RELATIONS IN CONTEXT OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

INTERVIEW: IZABELA WOJTYCZKA

Interview with the Ambassador of the Republic of Poland in Berlin, Prof. Andrzej Przyłębski

THE BRUTAL GERMAN INVASION OF POLAND ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1939, IGNITED THE SECOND WORLD WAR. IS THERE AN AWARENESS IN GERMAN SOCIETY REGARDING WHAT HAD HAPPENED 80 YEARS AGO ON THE TERRITORIES OF POLAND?

Awareness regarding the Second World War in the German society is limited. I have to admit that the historical knowledge is either seriously lacking or it is distorted. A question arises, whether it is not a meticulously planned operation, aimed to deliberately distort history?

I'm referring, first and foremost, to altering the language about the truth.

In the media, the Internet, in public discourse, the wrong type of language is used, it is based on lies. Using the term „Polish death camps”, or “Polish concentration camps”, instead of German extermination camps and German concentration camps... is the most infamous example. True, the events were occurring on the territory of Poland, but they were conducted absolutely and entirely out of German initiative, Poles were the victims, and Germans the executioners.

Nevertheless I am certain that this distortion is not a happenstance. It is the result of a deliberate policy, however, the first element of the acceptance



of this distortion is silence, a passive acquiescence. Similar treatment can be noticed with the artificially induced inclination to use the word “Nazi” instead of “German”. In public narration, the word ‘Nazi’ has become deeply ingrained as a reference to people who murdered during the occupation. Today the word ‘Nazi’ is not associated directly with Germans. This is an effort to recreate a more soothing tone, which overshadows the truth.

Similar examples can be found in the books about the history of diplomacy. German diplomats, for instance, attempted to influence, inter alia, the form of the Holocaust Museum in Washington. This was done in order for the history of the Second World War not to dominate the image of Germany in the minds of the recipient – the Americans. Officials, diplomats, and politicians consciously attempted to soften the image of Germany in the Second World War in the eyes of American public. In order to achieve their aims they supplemented

the exhibition with the story of the more recent democratic developments in Germany. They exposed the flourishing commerce, tourism and culture. All this was done in order to mask the truth regarding the tragic history of atrocious and cruel times of war, in which the Germans played the role of the torturers and perpetrators.

WHAT STRATEGY SHOULD THE POLISH STATE UNDERTAKE TOWARDS THIS?

Of course Poland ought to raise the issue of the awareness of the responsibility for the losses incurred in the Second World War. First and foremost, we must have a clear policy regarding raising historical awareness of the events of World War II. We need to speak about what was happening on Polish territories after 1939. Our fundamental advantage over our adversaries is that we need not be afraid of the truth. Polish territories were scenes of unprecedented carnage. This included a special targeting of the intellectual elite,

Such fascist movements are present in German society because they have a sense of pride and superiority. Historically, this is due to their desire to rule over their neighbors.

establishing death camps and an utter obliteration of cities and monuments.

The authentic witnesses of those times should be heard. We need to conduct studies on how Jews were betrayed and murdered, how many Poles were killed, in what conditions they were dying, and what losses Poland as a whole had suffered. We need to start talking about German extermination camps and explaining what the reality these vicious times was like.

A GLOOMY SITUATION IS UNFOLDING. INDEED, IT WAS ON POLISH TERRITORY THAT PEOPLE WERE MURDERED, AND THE NATIONAL WEALTH WAS PLUNDERED ON A MASSIVE SCALE. WHAT TANGIBLE EFFORTS COULD BE UNDERTAKEN TO CONSTRUCT THE NARRATION TRUTHFUL OF THOSE TIMES?

Firstly, we have at our disposal the diplomatic machine – consulates and embassies. Although to effectively bring back the truth, aside from these institutions, we ought to activate other channels. We should also take care of the image of our country in the media.

Regrettably, it is my belief that the current negative attitude towards Poland in Germany is partly to be blamed on the foreign correspondents in Poland, in particular, German correspondents in Warsaw.

An aversion towards Poles is being constructed in German society. Claims that democracy and the rule of law are all but gone in Poland, and people are harassed in the streets are made quite bluntly. To a large extent the “credit” for this situation goes to the German media, which are hammering this image into the minds of ordinary citizens. Personally, I try to fight with the false narrative, by supporting more authentic and objective media, which write about actual events. Of course, these are niche journals, although one should begin with such small steps. This is an undertaking, which may well take a few decades.

CURRENTLY IN GERMANY, NAZI MOVEMENTS ARE STRONGLY REVIVED. HOW IS THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT REACTING?

Fascist parties continue to exist on the German political scene, which is a big problem for the Germans. Although, let’s ask first how the European institutions are reacting? And we can answer quite bluntly that because of the European clout of Germany, European institutions do not react at all. Such is the reality.

However, we also need to note that the German government is taking some steps out of its own accord. The question arises as to how effective those solutions are?

Fascist tendencies in German society are largely a result of an excessive and unhealthy sense of pride and superiority. Historically, this was reflected by the desire to rule over neighbors, perhaps at times, the whole world. When

internal problems arise in this society, radical movements are often reborn. When everything goes well, people associated with fascist circles do not elicit much attention. A good example is the refugee crisis, and I mean not just the actual refugees, mainly from Syria and Afghanistan, but also one hundred thousand *economic* migrants from the Middle East and North Africa, who suddenly began to change the everyday life of the Germans. Sadly, many citizens currently feel very insecure given that people from radically different cultures and with completely different habits abruptly enter their lives.

In this case, pressure should be put on the government to stop uncontrolled migration, and, to clearly distinguish economic immigrants from real refugees. The well-being of citizens needs to be a priority. However, in the absence of adequate government action, we have seen growing tensions. Migrant centers are set on fire, people are attacked, radical militias are created. It is my contention that the current German policies in this respect are largely to blame.

IN 2004, ALL POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE SEJM OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED A RESOLUTION ON POLAND'S RIGHTS TO GERMAN WAR REPARATIONS AND ON UNLAWFUL CLAIMS AGAINST POLAND AND POLISH CITIZENS RAISED IN GERMANY. HOW DO GERMANS PERCEIVE THE TOPIC OF WAR REPARATIONS TODAY?

War reparations are one of the most pertinent problems affecting Polish-German relations. It is a topic that always evokes tensions in mutual relations. Of course, there are two forms of reparations – namely, reparations for the state provided by another country,

Pressure should be put on the government to competently distinguish economic immigrants from real refugees.

and reparations for individual people – citizens. Former President of the Republic of Poland, the late Prof. Lech Kaczyński considered mainly the latter form, that is, reparations for the property which was stolen from Polish and Jewish citizens in Poland. These are items and belongings forcibly seized by the Germans, such as furniture, instruments, artwork, valuables, paintings, and so on, and so forth. A German historian writes that every German family was in possession of plundered goods sent by soldiers who fought in the east.

The idea of reparations seems to be for Germany a real opening of a Pandora's box – the Germans avoid this topic and warn not to talk about it, but at the same time maintain a kind approach towards Poles so as not to expose themselves to possible accusations of indifference on the matter. Currently, there is little awareness in German society of what happened during the Second World War, which is why people do not understand the Polish point of view. In the political environment there is a great fear of even raising the topic. They warn against it, they suggest moving away from these issues in order not to provoke negative emotions. Therefore, it should be clearly stated that there is no understanding on the issue of war claims between Poland and Germany. However, I can see that the gradual improvement of the dialogue,



steadily raising this topic in closed meetings, does give results, and a space for conversation is opening up gradually.

A GROUP OF GERMAN ACTIVISTS, HEADED BY ARCHITECT FLORIAN MAUSBACH, FORMER BUNDESTAG PRESIDENT WOLFGANG THIERS, AND A HISTORIAN DIETER BINGEN, ARE SEEKING POLITICAL CONSENT TO BUILD A MONUMENT IN BERLIN TO COMMEMORATE THE POLISH VICTIMS OF GERMAN OCCUPATION. WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ON THIS SUBJECT?

Such a monument in the center of Berlin would make passers-by aware of what the Third Reich did to Poland. Unlike in many other occupied zones in Europe, the Nazi regime took it upon itself to completely obliterate a whole country and a whole nation starting with the extermination of its elites and ending with the enslavement of the ordinary people. Such a monument would of course be a symbol of the commemoration of all victims of World War II, it would also serve to disseminate knowledge on this subject, not only

among Germans, but also foreign tourists. Berlin is, of course, a city often visited by foreigners.

I have heard some negative comments regarding the concept of the monument. I have heard that monuments are no longer built today, that there are other, more modern ways to express memories. Nobody, however, says exactly what those are. There are also voices claiming that there are more nationalities, which had fallen victims to the Third Reich – the Ukrainians, Belarusians and more, therefore a monument should be made for everyone from Central and Eastern Europe. Of course they suffered too, but this argument serves mainly to detract us from the matter at hand. And as such, of course, it is unacceptable from my perspective – one should stand up against such intentional blurring of reality and historical truth, which I consistently try to do at the Polish Embassy in Berlin, reminding about the real events of the Second World War. Thousands of Belarusians and Ukrainians were citizens of the pre-war Poland, so the monument would be addressed also to them, commemorating their suffering as well.

JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI'S POLICY OF MAINTAINING THE EUROPEAN STATUS QUO

KRZYSZTOF RAK, PhD

Many prominent and influential historians claimed that Polish foreign policy in the interwar period was revisionist or had a destructive effect on the Versailles order. Its alleged culmination was the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of January 26, 1934. Based on this, a conclusion was drawn that Poland became co-responsible for the outbreak of World War II because it signed this pact with Germany. Such views are present not only in today's academic world but also in historical and political journalism. One of the first propagators of

such claims was a British historian Hugh Seton-Watson, who claimed that one of the cornerstones of Polish foreign policy was "territorial greed"¹. According to the researcher, the Non-Aggression Pact of January 26 was "the beginning of German-Polish active cooperation in implementing aggression in Eastern Europe." Seton-Watson considers Poland of the 1930s as a "tool of German imperialism." The Poles allegedly counted on the Germans to destroy the Soviets, and, in exchange

¹ H. Seton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars*, Cambridge 1946, p. 189.



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JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI, MARSHALL OF POLAND. PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN BETWEEN 1921 AND 1926.

for such cooperation, they were to receive a “large part of Russia” as a reward². German historians Klaus Hildebrand and Andreas Hillgruber categorized Poland as a revisionist country, generally pointing to Warsaw’s policy towards Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, and Soviet Russia³. The French historian Jean-Baptiste

Duroselle claimed, on the other hand, that Piłsudski and Beck “pursued an eighteenth-century brand of foreign policy full of secrecy and cynicism,” and that after 1933, they cheered Hitler on the destruction of the Versailles order.⁴ Russian researchers Anatoly Torkunov and Mikhail Narinsky are of a similar opinion. In their textbook, the *History of International Relations*, they claimed that the Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact of January 26, 1934,

² Ibid., p. 388.

³ See K. Hildebrand, *Das vergangene Reich. Deutsche Außenpolitik von Bismarck bis Hitler*, Stuttgart 1996, pp. 586-587 and A. Hillgruber, *Niemcy i Polska w polityce międzynarodowej 1933-1939*, in Czubiński Antoni, Kulak Zbigniew [ed.], *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1933-1945*. XVIII Konferencja Wspólnej Komisji Podręcznikowej PRL-RFN Historyków, 28.05-02.06.1985, Nowogard. Poznań 1988, pp. 61-62)

⁴ See J.B. Duroselle, *La décadence 1932-1939. Politique étrangère de la France*, Paris 1985; I am using an English translation: J.B. Duroselle, *France, and the Nazi Threat. The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939*, New York 2004, pp. 65-66.

strengthened Germany while undermining the Versailles order.⁵

It is essential to confront these views and compare them with the opinions and real politics of the principal architect of Polish foreign policy of that period – Józef Piłsudski.

MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO

The most important program proposal defining the main principles of the foreign and security policy of the Second Republic of Poland was the memorial of the Chief of General Staff Władysław Sikorski, published in January 1922. The document was entitled “Foreign Policy from the Point of View of State Security” and was written by the head of national intelligence, Lt. Col. Ignacy Matuszewski, one of Piłsudski’s closest collaborators at that time – so it was most probably consistent with the Marshal’s views. According to Henryk Bułhak, the fundamental theses of this document constituted “a dogma of political thinking of the leading factors of the Second Republic of Poland throughout the entire period of its existence”⁶. The central “dogma” of this memorial proclaimed that Poland was interested “first of all in maintaining its status quo for as long as possible”⁷. This could not be achieved either through a simultaneous agreement with Poland’s neighbors (and above all with Germany and the USSR) or through an alliance with one of these neighbors against the other. The only way out was to establish an alliance with France and its allied countries.

Piłsudski perfectly understood the difficulty of Poland’s situation. He

⁵ See. А. Торкунов, М. Наринский [eds.], История международных отношений. В 3 томах., vol. II, Межвоенный период и Вторая мировая война, Москва 2012, p. 125.

⁶ Henryk Bułhak, *Polska-Francja z dziejów sojuszu 1922-1939. Cz. I (1922-1932)*, Warszawa 1993, p. 19.

⁷ *Dokumenty z dziejów polskiej polityki zagranicznej 1918-1939*, vol. I 1918-1932, Jędruszcak Tadeusz, Nowak-Kiełbikowa Maria (ed.), Warsaw 1989, p. 183.

Poland was a medium-sized country, but severe social and economic crises plagued it. As a result, it has not been able to change its international environment in line with its own interests.

described it in an interview for “Kurier Poranny” on February 19, 1926. Discussing the issue of the organization of the Polish army, he pointed to the external conditions which Poland had to face:

“By a strange coincidence, despite the most obvious nonsense, Poland is continuously being accused in other countries of some war intentions and plans. Even in various disarmament projects, Poland is put in the foreground, although it is least armed and the newest, and therefore also has the feeblest military organization. I do not want to get into the motives and reasons for these accusations at the international level. I want to say that there is a clear and unambiguous desire in this to have a country in the middle of Europe, at the expense of which all European scores could be settled. [...]”

It is evident then that we are not the only ones who can believe that the existence and presence of Poland as we have today are not yet certain.⁸

Piłsudski had no illusions about assessing Poland’s potential. He certainly did not see his country as a superpower –

⁸ J. Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, vol. 8, Warsaw 1991, pp. 290, 292-294.

In April 1926, Germany and the USSR concluded the Berlin Treaty confirming the cooperation between Berlin and Moscow initiated in Rapallo (April 1922), which was clearly anti-Polish.

unlike some of his successors. From this standpoint, he concluded that the existence and presence of Poland were not entirely certain. Piłsudski's conviction that the state he was in charge of was weak did not change, even in the following years. He expressed it bluntly in 1930 in one of the interviews conducted by Władysław Baranowski: „...we are too weak to force something, to impose something on others, we are too weak even in our affairs”⁹.

The basic idea of the Polish foreign policy of the interwar period was the conviction that Poland did not have a superpower status. It was a medium-sized country, but severe social and economic crises plagued it. As a result, it has not been able to change its international environment in line with its own interests. As a consequence, it had to focus on defending the *status quo*.

LOCARNO: WORLD POWERS UNDERMINE THE VERSAILLES' ORDER

The first major challenge for Poland in maintaining the *status quo* was the Locarno treaties (December 1925). By

signing them, Germany and the Western powers agreed to mutually recognize the inviolability of the western German border – translating *de facto* into the inviolability of the territorial order in Western Europe. This agreement did not concern the eastern borders of the Reich. In addition, from 1924, France began to express a wish to renegotiate the Polish-French military agreement of February 1921, which constituted the basis for the security of the Republic of Poland in the event of a threat both from Germany and the USSR. Policies of the powers in the mid-1920s constituted, therefore, an unambiguous prelude to territorial revision in Central and Eastern Europe.

In the notes made a year before his death, Minister Beck estimated that the Locarno treaties created “two categories – political and legal – of territorial importance in Europe,” and thus, “Germany was solemnly invited to invade the East.” Asked by him about his attitude towards Locarno, Piłsudski supposedly said: “every decent Pole spits when they hear these words.”

In April 1926, Germany and the USSR concluded the Berlin Treaty confirming the cooperation between Berlin and Moscow initiated in Rapallo (April 1922), which was clearly anti-Polish. Poland found itself in a challenging position between two revisionist powers growing in power, alongside the decreasing interest in maintaining the territorial order in Europe of the Western powers.¹⁰

After the coup d'état in May 1926, Piłsudski returned to power and nominated August Zalewski as Polish Foreign Minister. In November 1926, he took part in a meeting of the administration of the Polish Ministry of

⁹ W. Baranowski, *Rozmowy z Piłsudskim 1916-1931*, Warsaw 1938, p. 223.

¹⁰ See T. Komarnicki, *Józef Piłsudski i polska racja stanu*, London, 1967, p. 19.

Europe in 1925: Locarno Conference



Foreign Affairs, and, in a short speech, presented the main points of Polish foreign policy:

“There are two canons of Polish foreign policy, and they are inviolable. Firstly, Poland shall be utterly neutral towards Germany and Russia, so that both countries can be absolutely sure that it will never unite with one of them against the other. Secondly, it is necessary to maintain alliances with France and Romania as a guarantee of peace.”¹¹

¹¹ A. Zaleski, *Wspomnienia*, Warsaw, 2017, p. 201.

It should be noted that these canons correspond precisely to the dogmas contained in Sikorski’s memorial of January 1922, which proves the continuity of the post-May Polish foreign policy.

Piłsudski presented his understanding of the international constellation in more detail during the first meeting of the State Defense Committee on November 26, 1926. The Committee operated under the leadership of the Polish President and was composed of the most important government representatives. During its meeting, Piłsudski gave a detailed

Germany was becoming more and more hostile to revisionist attitudes. It did not seek to warm up relations with Poland, and the Soviet Union, cooperating with Germany and France, did not see any sense in striving for rapprochement with its western neighbor, which it treated as the main enemy.

account of the security and foreign policy of Poland. It is noteworthy to see how the Marshal described relations with Germany and the USSR. He was not afraid of the threat from the West, because he did not see “the possibility that Germans of this generation could attack us or anyone. The Germans are not able to make any military actions at the moment, and they are getting weaker every year because they are technically and morally demobilizing themselves.”¹² The Marshal had no doubt that the main threat to Poland’s security was the Soviet Union:

“There is a group of people in Russia who cannot live peacefully. These people, who form the upper strata of the state hierarchy, can move and lead Russia wherever they want. This element is a great

danger – every surprise can happen – and it must be taken seriously.

“Anxious people in Russia will be looking for us because this country can take its revenge on us – although today’s authoritative considerations assure us that they do not want that revenge. However, internal party friction and a crisis of faith in Bolshevism can easily lead to a desire to get out of this situation by declaring war on us.”

At the moment, the Bolsheviks are working on the internal decomposition of our country, and this is their continuous work”.¹³

As it can be seen in what Piłsudski said, after the May coup, he did not see a direct war threat from both his great neighbors. The Germans were incapable of waging war, and the Soviets were only conducting internal diversions against Poland. This feeling of lack of direct threat was probably the reason why the Marshal tried to bring about a certain “equalization” (as it was commonly said at the time), of relations with Berlin and Moscow. This can be confirmed by his personal conversations with USSR envoy Pyotr Voykov (July 1926), German envoy Ulrich Rauscher (November 1926), and finally, German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann in Geneva (December 1927). These discussions, however, did not bring the expected results. The international environment was not conducive to these efforts: France after Locarno was looking for an agreement with Germany at the expense of Poland, Germany was becoming more and more hostile to revisionist attitudes. It did not seek to warm up relations with Poland, and the Soviet Union, cooperating with Germany and France, did not see any sense in striving for rapprochement with its

¹² Ibid., p. 82.

¹³ Ibid., p. 83.

western neighbor, which it treated as the main enemy. Polish foreign policy at the end of the 1920s did not try to implement any strategic initiatives. This was not only due to the internal political crisis related to the growing authoritarian tendencies in Piłsudski's rule but also to economic problems caused, among other things, by the outbreak of the world crisis.

PIŁSUDSKI'S BALANCING POLICY

Piłsudski began to think about activating Polish foreign policy probably not until the end of 1930. This was caused by the gradual internal stabilization of his regime in Poland, as evidenced by the November elections to the Sejm and Senate concluded with the success of Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government (*BBWR*). Under these circumstances, a "conference" took place on November 18, 1930, in which, among others, participated President Ignacy Mościcki, Marshal Piłsudski, and Józef Beck. During the meeting, the Marshal presented his political plan, initially noting that "we have five years of peaceful life and we need to be able to make use of this time"¹⁴. He then briefly diagnosed the previous governments of his own political camp. He considered that their disadvantage was the fact that "we did not move freely enough and were afraid to settle financial matters as well as foreign policy matters." He also noted that when he is no longer there, "Poland will have to yield to foreigners in matters that do not require any concessions at all, because [...] in many matters where there is pressure from foreigners, one can simply not yield"¹⁵. On this occasion, he criticized Zaleski, who had a habit of using threats that he will exacerbate the international situation in order to bargain more budget money for his department. The Marshal noted that Zaleski would then like to make

concessions regarding national minorities, for which there was no consent, because "soon we could completely reverse our attitude and start to "suck up to the minorities." In general, he negatively assessed the policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accusing it of "going into a completely wrong direction, as it negates the east, tending to be a brown nose of the west"¹⁶.

Sharp criticism of Polish foreign policy may come as a surprise as there was no doubt for the participants that foreign policy was exclusively the domain of the Marshal. Therefore, it had to refer to him mainly because, at that time, Piłsudski had to tolerate Zaleski's at least. In other words, the Marshal had to accept that at the end of the 1920s, Polish foreign policy was submissive to the western powers (mainly France) and neglected (this is probably how the word "negligée" should be understood) what was happening on Poland's eastern border. The Marshal's tolerance for such a state of affairs was undoubtedly conscious and probably related to the internal situation in the country. Piłsudski set himself the overriding goal of stabilizing his power after the May coup. He probably had neither time nor resources to increase his activity on the international stage.

It was no accident that the activation of the Polish foreign policy coincided with the reorientation of the USSR's policy towards Poland. In August 1931, Stalin ordered the Political Bureau and the People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs to finalize negotiations with Poland on the conclusion of a non-aggression pact.¹⁷ This pact was on the agenda of bilateral relations as early as 1925, when on the

¹⁴ K. Świtalski, wyd. cyt., Warsaw, 1992, p. 524.

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 524-525.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 525.

¹⁷ See. Сталин и Каганович. Переписка. 1931—1936 гг., Хлевнюк О.В., Дэвис Р.У., Кошелева Л.П., Рис Э.А., Роговая Л.А. (сост.), Moscow 2001, doc. no. 35, p. 71.

The development of Polish-Soviet cooperation was supposed to be an argument for Germany for the normalization of relations with Poland, while for France, an obstacle to the transformation of the European *status quo*.

eve of Locarno, the Head of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Georgy Chicherin, visited Warsaw. For six years, however, the parties could not agree on this issue, and it was only Stalin's decision that caused the parties to initial the text of the pact in January 1932 and sign it in July. It was a turning point for Piłsudski's foreign policy. Paradoxically, it was Stalin who invited Piłsudski to play and thus contributed to his debut on the international chessboard.

The rapprochement with the Soviet Union, which began at the beginning of 1932, allowed Piłsudski to start a tremendous diplomatic game. Piłsudski exchanged Zaleski for Beck at the end of 1932. Beck reported twice on the contents of the instruction he had received from the Marshal. In his speech to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials on November 3, 1937, on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of his assuming office, he recalled that on November 2, 1932, Piłsudski had given him two instructions:

"First," the Marshal said to me: "You must remember that the times are coming when

the conventional structure of international life, which had been dragging on for almost ten years, will be shaken. Forms, to which the world has almost become accustomed to, are crumbling. We will need to rethink our thoughts and rethink our verifications of states as if they were defining their right to speak in a broader or lesser sense. This phenomenon will be accompanied by many long complications, and for us, for Poland, it may result in taking up a fight against everyone, or at least improving our recent post-war history, which by its very nature left behind streaks of weakness, inaccuracies, and shortcomings. [...]

The second thing — in the same conversation, when he left, the Commander said: "But remember, above all, that you must not make considerations and plans beyond the strength of the instrument that is to perform them, because everything is done by people¹⁸."

Stalin's decision allowed Piłsudski to start balancing between the continental powers. Until now, Poland has been condemned to relations with France, and the lack of maneuver made it its satellite. The finalization of the talks on the non-aggression pact with the USSR gave Poland the possibility of real balancing. This was necessary because, in the early 1930s, the situation for Poland became dramatic. France sought a strategic agreement with Germany at the expense of its ally and, at the same time, the satellite – Poland. On January 8 1933, a few days before Hitler took office as Chancellor, German Ambassador to Paris Roland Köhlm stated in a letter to Director Köpke that "every conversation with politicians (with sporadic exceptions) with whom he had met in the French capital since the beginning of his activity, very quickly and

¹⁸ Józef Beck, *Przemówienia, deklaracje, wywiady 1931-1937*, Warsaw 1938, p. 327.

directly or indirectly touched upon the issue of the eastern German border"¹⁹. The French interlocutors of the ambassador blamed allies for the creation of the „corridor.” For that, they accused above all Lloyd George. In addition, more or less openly, they stated that „the division of Germany is illogical and poses a threat to peace in Europe”²⁰. On February 22, 1933, the French Ambassador to Warsaw, Jules Laroche, in an interview with a German ambassador in Warsaw, von Moltke, once again raised the issue of the „corridor.” He expressed his satisfaction that, as a participant in the negotiations in Versailles, he had nothing to do with delimiting the Polish-German border, because already then he predicted that this would result in permanent hostility between the two countries. The French ambassador also said that: „In the old days, the disconnection of different areas of the state was not unusual, but such a state is actually incompatible with the modern concept of state territory. The corridor in the long term is unmaintainable, which is evident to anyone who has a map in their hands. A close-up with Germany would be in Poland's interest, [...], but it is impossible without the liquidation of the corridor.”²¹

In 1932-1933 France strived for reaching an agreement with Germany, for which it wanted to pay by revising the Polish-German border. However, the weakness of the German armed forces prevented Paris from implementing these plans.

The development of Polish-Soviet cooperation was supposed to be an argument for Germany for the normalization of relations with Poland, while for France, an obstacle to the transformation of the European *status quo*. Hitler's rise to power at

It was no accident that the activation of the Polish foreign policy coincided with the reorientation of the USSR's policy towards Poland.

the beginning of 1933 proved to be an extremely favorable circumstance for Piłsudski's policy. Hitler had been looking for contact with Piłsudski since at least the end of 1930. Through his unofficial emissaries, he tried to signal to him the possibility of a strategic agreement. He wanted to enter into a military alliance with Poland in order to conquer the USSR, the effect of which was to gain new living space for the German nation.²² Although Piłsudski did not respond positively to these attempts, he had remembered them and made use of them in his political game in 1933. In March 1933, Piłsudski decided to also sound Stalin and Hitler out in terms of rapprochement. He did not have to wait long for the effects of his game. On May 2, 1933, Hitler received Alfred Wysocki, Ambassador of Poland to Germany, and declared that in his relations with Poland, he would conduct a policy fully compliant with the existing treaties²³. Piłsudski was simultaneously sounding out Joseph Stalin. At the beginning of

²² The thesis widespread in historiography, according to which Hitler formulated his policy of rapprochement only at the turn of April and May 1933 under the influence of, among others, the threat of preventive war on the part of Poland and isolation on the international arena, is undefendable in the light of my earlier research in the book *Polska – niespełniony sojusznik Hitlera*. See. K. Rak, *Polska – niespełniony sojusznik Hitlera*, [Poland -- Hitler's unfulfilled ally], Warsaw 2019.

²³ See PDD, 1933, doc. 127, pp. 282-283.

¹⁹ ADAP, doc. No. 265, p. 565.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ ADAP, C, I/1, doc. No. 34, p. 72.

May, he sent to Moscow as his emissary Bogusław Miedziński, editor-in-chief of “Gazeta Polska,” who had previously held, among others, the positions of head of Polish intelligence and minister in the Polish government. Miedziński, through Karl Radek, head of the International Information Bureau at the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) and editor of *Izvestia*, a daily newspaper in Russia, offered Stalin, on behalf of Piłsudski, “a proposal for serious cooperation in the field of international politics”²⁴. Karol Radek revisited Warsaw on behalf of Stalin in July 1933 and presented to the Polish side a proposal for an anti-German military alliance. Piłsudski, contrary to the expectations of his co-workers, did not give a negative answer. He ordered to inform the Stalin’s emissary that the Soviet suggestions would be taken into consideration by the Polish side, but at the moment, they are premature.²⁵ At the same time, Piłsudski continued his diplomatic offensive in Germany. At the end of September 1933, Minister Beck made it clear to the Foreign Minister of the Reich Konstantin von Neurath that the Polish government wanted to “gradually regulate most of the open issues through direct talks”²⁶. When Germany withdrew from the League of Nations in October 1933, Piłsudski ordered the new Polish Ambassador in Berlin, Józef Lipski, to meet with Hitler and demand compensation. Hitler received Lipski on November 15, 1933, and declared his willingness to „exclude war from Polish-German relations” in the form of a treaty²⁷. Following this discussion, both sides issued a communiqué stating that they ‘renounce the use of force’ in

their bilateral relations²⁸. In December 1933, Hermann Rauschning came to Warsaw with a message from Hitler²⁹. During the almost one and a half-hour-long conversation, Piłsudski, declaring his willingness to have closer ties with the Germans, stipulated that he would not agree to participate in a possible military expedition to the USSR.³⁰ In December, the Polish-German talks on the joint declaration of non-aggression entered a decisive phase, and on January 26, 1934, it was signed by the MP Lipski and Minister Neurath. Warsaw informed Moscow about this phase of negotiations, but it did not inform Paris. Nevertheless, Stalin began to slow down the Polish-Soviet rapprochement from spring 1934, although the Soviets were aware that the declaration was not directed against the USSR.³¹ At the beginning of 1935, Hitler, through his envoy Hermann Göring, urged Polish politicians and military to join a joint crusade against the USSR. Piłsudski definitely rejected the possibility of Poland’s participation in this project.³² In July 1935, less than two months after Piłsudski’s death, Minister Beck confirmed this position in a conversation with Hitler in Berlin.³³

In the years 1932-1933, Poland strengthened its international position, balancing in the triangle Paris-Berlin-Moscow. It is worth noting that its position

²⁴ Letter from Jan Berson to Bogusław Miedziński, Moscow, June 1, 1933. (AAN, MSZ, p. 6748A).

²⁵ See Bogusław Miedziński, *Pakty wilanowskie*, Kultura 1963, no. 7-8, pp. 113-133.

²⁶ ADAP, C, I/2, doc. 449, p. 828.

²⁷ PDD, 1933, doc. No. 320, p. 714.

²⁸ See PDD, 1933, doc. No. 328, pp. 732-734, and ADAP, C, I/1, p. 126, footnote 2.

²⁹ ADAP, C, Bd. II/1, doc. No. 11, pp. 13-14.

³⁰ I present the course of Piłsudski’s conversation with Rauschning on the basis of a note prepared based on an oral account of Rauschning, written by Gerhard Köpke, Head of Division II of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on December 14, 1933, in Berlin. See PAAA, Geheimakten 1920-1936, R 31076-1 or also PAAA, Büro Reichsminister, Akten betreffend: Polen, Bd. 10, R 28323k.

³¹ See Документы внешней политики СССР. Том 17. 1 января — 31 декабря 1934 г, Moscow 1971, doc. no. 53, p. 139.

³² See PDD, 1935, doc. no. 48, p. 113.

³³ See *ibid.*, doc. no. 218, pp. 499-502.

has not improved as a result of the increase in its superpower potential (increase in population, economy, and army), but as a result of a successful diplomatic maneuver. Poland, as a result of the change of policy by Stalin and then Hitler³⁴, and as a result of Piłsudski's use of this situation, broke out of its existing dependence on Paris.

However, this balancing policy was entirely defensive, as it was a response to the Franco-German agreements of 1932-1933 aimed at territorial revision at the expense of Poland. Thus, the Polish-German declaration of non-aggression was for Poland a successful attempt to maintain the Versailles order in Central Europe. It was only in 1938 that Germany and the Western powers succeeded in destroying it when they decided to partition Czechoslovakia.

THE MARSHAL TAKES STOCK OF HIS FOREIGN POLICY

With regard to Piłsudski's undoubted diplomatic success in 1932-1934, it is impossible not to ask a few questions. How did he intend to continue the rapprochement with Stalin and the agreement with Hitler? Did he consider Polish independence to be permanent? How did he see the future of European politics?

Piłsudski was aware that his life was coming to an end. He often mentioned this during meetings with his closest colleagues. He was also getting physically weaker and weaker, which was also noticed by foreign guests, whom he received in the last years of his life. That is why he was interested not only in the future but also in the past, in summarizing his achievements on the international stage. A good example was the Belvedere Conference on March 7, 1934,

³⁴ While reporting on the course of the conference at the Chief of State's Office on January 31, 1934, Świąłski noted the following remark by Piłsudski: "If it weren't for Hitler, many things wouldn't have worked out." (K. Świąłski, ed. cit., p. 654).

In the years 1932-1933, Poland strengthened its international position, balancing in the triangle Paris-Berlin-Moscow.

attended by President Mościcki, Marshal Piłsudski, former Prime Ministers Bartel, Prystor, Jędrzejewicz, Śławek, Świąłski, and Minister Beck. The Marshal explained at the very beginning that he was inspired by the example of England, where "in moments of a nuisance to the state," the king convenes a meeting with the participation of former prime ministers. He admitted that he held off on convening the conference because "he did not want to hold it at a time when certain foreign affairs were not yet mature, they were in the middle of settling with the entire danger of risk." He then continued with historical deliberations. He recalled the times of Catherine the Great and Frederick the Great when Russia and Prussia made a deal, and Poland was "torn to pieces." He noticed that this "danger always exists for Poland." After World War I, however, it was smaller, because both powers were weaker due to the fact that "Germany was conquered by Entente and Russia was conquered by Piłsudski." However, in 1922, Berlin and Moscow made a deal in Rapallo that was not only against Poland but "rather against the whole world." The position of Poland at that time was challenging:

"Poland was the focus of trouble and eternal fear that it was the source of disagreement. The alliance with France did not give it enough strength. Poland had to sacrifice a lot. This threat to Poland was exploited by everyone... On the Polish



CHANCELLOR OF THE THIRD REICH ADOLF HITLER ACCOMPANIED BY OFFICIALS AT A PARADE. ON THE SIDE, DIVISIONS OF THE ARMY ARE VISIBLE, AND IN THE DISTANCE, THE BERLIN VICTORY COLUMN, 1939

side, there was only one way to do this: to suck up to everyone... and to be shat on while doing that.”³⁵

This unfavorable situation changed when Moscow entered the policy of rapprochement with Poland. However,

³⁵ K. Świtalski, ed. cit., p. 659.

on the German side, the Marshal came across a “hostile attitude, which, in detailed and minor matters, was even harassing.” However, he was able to take advantage of the moment when Germany withdrew from the League of Nations and made Hitler choose – either he would guarantee the security of Poland, or “[...] the Commander would have to use in his military work a defensive system clearly turned against the Germans”. Hitler unexpectedly eagerly picked up on this idea, and as a result, The German-Polish

Non-Aggression Pact was signed. Piłsudski explained this in the following way:

“In this context, Hitler acted bravely against the Prussians when beginning to declare the recognition of Poland as a state officially. The Commander gives less importance to the signed documents than to the fact that the psychology of the German nation about Poland changes because of Hitler's position. Therefore, even if the Prussians came to power, which would be the worst for us, this psychological change in the German nation would be an obstacle to their conversion to the old anti-Polish policy. The Commander then expressed his appreciation for the Germans that they know how to proceed reasonably, step by step.”³⁶

Piłsudski believed that the agreement with Moscow and Berlin caused “huge transformations” on the international arena, and he “won a situation for Poland which [it] never had.” The Marshal boasted that he had succeeded in doing so without making additional commitments to Berlin and Moscow, which was particularly difficult given the current hostility between these two. Moreover, Poland did not have to commit to supporting one side against the other. He recommended maintaining the previous alliances and noted that it would now be easier, because, having signed both non-aggression agreements, Poland would not have to pay for their preservation. This remark, of course, referred to France, which was not literally mentioned by the Marshal. Piłsudski was no longer so optimistic about the future:

“However, the Commander does not believe and warns not to believe that the settlement of peaceful relations between Poland and both neighbors would last forever, and the Commander calculates that good relations between Poland and Germany may still

Piłsudski believed that the agreement with Moscow and Berlin caused “huge transformations” on the international arena, and he “won a situation for Poland which [it] never had.”

last four more years because of the mental changes taking place in the German nation, but whether they last for more – the Commander does not guarantee.

If the Commander is not there, it will be challenging to maintain this arrangement of things, because the Commander has the gift of inventiveness to postpone things or put them differently, if necessary. “That is the clever mind he has got,” said the Commander jokingly.”³⁷

In the end, Piłsudski said that in recent years, he had worked hard to guarantee the security of Poland through diplomatic channels. He respected three fundamental principles that could be called his diplomatic will:

“1. Keeping to the rule that all comes out only in “Selbstbeschränkung.” You have to limit your goals, and [that] the worst is the *ambaschränktesten ist batwanisches Denken* [the publishers of the Świtalski diary translated it as “the obtuse way of thinking is the most limited one”].

2) Never lower your head, that is to say, that it is necessary to respect your dignity, which has always produced excellent results for the Commander.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 660.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 660-661.



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JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI, MARSHALL OF POLAND – A PROFILE PORTRAIT PHOTOGRAPH, 1933

3) Poland's mission is in the East, that is here Poland can reach for the opportunity to become an influential factor in the East. Do not interfere or try to influence relations between western countries. In order to achieve this influence in the East, it is worth it to sacrifice much in terms of Poland's relations with Western countries.³⁸

At the end of the conference, the Marshal noted that the stabilization of Poland's internal situation is due to the fact that external, foreign forces cannot, through their influence on the internal factors of Poland, influence the direction of Poland's foreign policy.

In his diplomatic will, Piłsudski did not give a detailed strategy to his successors. Except for the remark that "Poland's mission is in the East," which meant that the Eastern direction of Polish foreign policy was more important to him than the Western one. He probably wanted to say that the real potential of Poland does not allow it to shape the balance of power in Western Europe but is sufficient to influence the order in Central and Eastern Europe³⁹. The Marshal focused on emphasizing his political methodology. This is because he pointed to the "gift of the inventiveness of postponing things or putting them differently" and "self-limitation." This is not the case here, because he understood that sophisticated strategies, doctrines, or programs could not be effectively implemented in foreign policy. This is because international reality is exceptionally complicated and is full of uncertainties. If Piłsudski had a long-term

³⁸ Ibid., p. 661.

³⁹ A similar idea was expressed by Piłsudski on April 29, 1931, during a meeting in the Belvedere, attended by President Mościcki, Slawek, Prystor, Świtalski, and Beck: "The Commander constantly believes that our focus in the context of foreign policy is in the East – we can be strong there and the Commander always considers it senseless for Poland to get into Western foreign relations too eagerly, because there is nothing else for us other than nose-browning the West. (K. Świtalski, ed. cit., p. 608).

How to treat accusations of destroying the Versailles order in this context? My shortest answer is this: it is the result of a narrowing of the research perspective of the researchers formulating this type of accusations.

strategy and believed in its effectiveness, he would have passed it on to his successors. His message, however, was of a different type – it pointed to the ability to stall and to act unconventionally and surprisingly. Piłsudski's "cleverness" lies in the ability to see and take advantage of an opportunity, and thus a kind of political opportunism, which in its source, undervalued meaning, translates into the ability to take advantage of favorable sets of events. It is, therefore, a kind of political realism or a political attitude characterized by respect for reality and the awareness that a politician should, above all, respect it, and not try to change it, because it simply cannot be done. In short, an effective policy must be characterized by humility in the face of reality.

CONCLUSIONS

How to treat accusations of destroying the Versailles order in this context? My shortest answer is this: it is the result of a narrowing of the research perspective of the researchers formulating this type of accusations. These scholars simply did not see or ignored certain facts and conditions.

First, the French questioned the guarantees in the event of a conflict with the USSR, and then also in the event of a conflict with Germany.

First of all, that Piłsudski was aware of the weakness of Poland. He indeed did not perceive it as a superpower, as some of his successors did, and therefore was realistic about the fact that Poland was not able to change the international order.

Secondly, Piłsudski's German policy was closely related to his Soviet policy, and his aim was to balance between Moscow and Berlin. Most researchers are not aware of how far the Polish-Soviet rapprochement went in 1933 (in July in Warsaw, Beck spoke with Stalin's envoy Karol Radek about the cooperation of Poland and the USSR in defending the "corridor")⁴⁰.

Thirdly, Poland was perceived as an aggressive state that could resort to war in its foreign policy, the most famous example of which was the alleged threat of a "preventive war" against Germany in 1933. From today's perspective, everything indicates that it was a bluff from Piłsudski because there is no evidence that Poland wanted to attack Germany at that time. Despite this, German historians are still promoting the thesis of preventive war.

Fourthly, it should also be pointed out that the military Polish-French alliance – of fundamental importance for Poland's security – has been weakening since 1924.

First, the French questioned the guarantees in the event of a conflict with the USSR, and then also in the event of a conflict with Germany. In the early 1930s, they made the subject of the Polish-German border part of the agenda for German-French relations. In the first months of 1933, it was French diplomats who persuaded Berlin to take action against Poland.

To sum up, probably, the aim of the thesis about revisionism of Polish foreign policy is to hide the fact that constituted a fundamental element of the policy of the most important powers of those times, and that Central Europe was to become its victim. For those who claim that Poland was co-responsible for the outbreak of World War II, let us once again recall the actual history. In 1933 Hitler began to make strenuous preparations for the war against the USSR. His goal was to create a coalition in which Poland, among others, would play a major role. The latter, not agreeing to participate in the anti-Soviet alliance, thwarted Hitler's intentions. It sought instead to maintain the *status quo* on the continent and, therefore, consistently refused to ally with Germany or the Soviets. The leader of the Third Reich had to change his plans, decided to attack Poland, and formed a short-lived alliance with his main enemy, the Soviet Union. The main reason for the outbreak of World War II was, therefore, Germany's desire to rule over Central and Eastern Europe. However, there would be no success for Hitler in the 1930s without the consistent policy of concessions from France and Britain. It is remarkably ironic that 80 years after the outbreak of war, it is still necessary to prove that the superpowers, above all Germany, and then the Soviet Union, Italy, France, and the United Kingdom, are to blame for it.

⁴⁰ See B. Musiał, J. Szumski (ed.), *Genesis of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Facts and propaganda*, Warsaw, 2012, p. 118.

TELL US WHO YOU ARE

DANIEL POGORZELSKI

Renowned Polish-American author and poet John Guzlowski shares with us his struggles and ultimate reconciliation with his Polish identity in this interview with Daniel Pogorzelski, a writer and editor at ForgottenChicago.com.

TELL US WHO YOU ARE

Everything I can ever say about who I am always has to go back to my parents. They were both Polish Catholic farm kids when the Germans invaded Poland. My dad lived in a small village north of Poznań, and he was captured by the Germans in a roundup in 1940, and my mom – who lived west of Lviv – was captured in 1942 after seeing the women in her family raped and murdered by the German soldiers and Ukrainian militiamen. They were both taken to Germany as slave laborers and were there at the time of liberation. For the next 6 years they were Displaced Persons, or DPs, living in a refugee camp. That's where my sister and I were born.

WE CAME TO THE US IN 1951 AND SETTLED IN CHICAGO

I grew up there, went to school there, and finally left Chicago to go to Graduate School at Purdue University, West Lafayette, where I received a Doctorate in American Literature. Moreover, I taught at Eastern Illinois University from 1980 to 2015. Beginning even before that, however, since the late 1970s, I have been writing about my parents and their experiences as slave laborers and DPs. My most recent book about them is titled 'Echoes of Tattered Tongues'. It won both the Eric Hoffer/Montaigne Award and the Ben Franklin Award in 2017. Furthermore, I recently have also started writing a column for 'Dziennik Związkowy', the oldest Polish daily



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MY FAMILY CAME TO AMERICA IN 1951 AFTER 6 YEARS IN A DP CAMP IN GERMANY. WE SETTLED IN CHICAGO. THIS PHOTO WAS TAKEN THERE IN 1959. MY PARENTS, SISTER AND I ARE AT A WEDDING RECEPTION.

newspaper in America, and finally, I am also currently writing a series of mystery novels set in the Polish neighborhoods in Chicago, where many Polish immigrants and DPs settled. The series is called ‘The Hank and Marvin Mysteries’.

HOW DOES WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH FIT INTO YOUR WORK?

My parents used to say that the war had no beginning and no end; that it was with them every day. I feel this way too. Almost everything I have written as an adult in some way is concerned with the war. When I was primarily a university professor, I wrote scholarly work about writers who wrote about what Poland was like before and during and after the war. When I started writing poetry and fiction, it centered thematically almost exclusively on the war and the way it affected my parents and other people, both Polish and non-Polish.

If it weren’t for the war and how it affected people like my parents, I don’t think I would be a writer.

WHO WERE THE “DISPLACED PERSONS” YOU SO OFTEN WRITE ABOUT?

The DPs? They were the people who originally were taken to Germany by the Germans to work as slave laborers there.

Estimates vary, but most historians now agree that there were about 12 million slave laborers in Germany at the end of the war. I think that about 1.5 million of them were Poles.

At the end of the war, some of them returned to their home countries, but some did not. My parents were afraid to go back because of the Communists who had taken over the country. Why were they afraid? When my dad tried to go back, he was shot at by the Reds. As my uncle was finally returning back to Poland on a UN sponsored train after 3 years in a concentration camp in Germany, the Russians arrested him and sent him to Siberia where he died.

DPs who did not or could not return to their own countries had to wait for some other country to say, “You can come here.” However, most countries didn’t want to take DPs. The US finally agreed to take 275,000. My family was one of the families that was allowed in. To come to the US, we had to find someone to sponsor our passage over, and then we had to work for a year for that person to pay off our passage. An Italian-American farmer outside of Buffalo, New York, paid for our passage. We all worked for him for one year. My parents worked for him, and so did my sister and I. She was 5 years

old, I was 3. My mother tells me that I begged her to go back to the DP camps in Germany because the life in America was too hard. My mother replied, “This is America, and here’s where we stay.”

One of the other things that made being a DP in America arduous was that we were treated like people who Americans didn’t want to see in their country. We were told that the letters DP stood for “dirty Polack,” “dumb Polack,” and “drunk Polack.” When I was a kid growing up in America, people would frequently tell “dumb Polack” jokes. You’d hear them on the street and on TV and the radio. The jokes were told to make us feel like we were stupid, subhuman. They reminded my father of the way he was treated by the Germans in the slave labor camps.

America has never been a country that welcomes immigrants.

YOU DEVOTE A SIGNIFICANT PART OF YOUR WORK TO DESCRIBING THE NEIGHBORHOODS IN WHICH YOU GREW UP. GIVE OUR READERS A SENSE OF WHAT THIS COMMUNITY WAS LIKE

After our first year in America, my parents decided to move to Chicago. They were told that it had a large Polish population and that there were plenty of good paying factory jobs there.

The people who told us that were right on both counts. We moved into an area called the Polish Triangle in Chicago. There were Polish schools, stores, churches, and people. Everywhere you went in that area, there were signs saying, “We Speak Polish.” My parents loved this. In many ways, it was like being back home in Poland.

And there were jobs; plenty of jobs – good paying jobs. Within 3 years of coming to America, my parents were able to afford to buy an apartment building consisting of 5

units. It wasn’t a great place, but it was *their* home and they owned it.

HOW DOES POLAND AND ‘POLISHNESS’ FIT INTO YOUR WRITING?

For a long time, I didn’t want to have anything to do with Poland and Polishness. To me, Poland was solely about the war and the suffering my parents endured in the war. I didn’t want to have anything to do with that. I wanted to be an American kid focused on American stuff: music, movies, books.

It wasn’t until I was in my early 30s and completely divorced from my Polishness that I started to realize that I could not escape it, and in fact, I came to realize that my parents’ Polishness was something to cherish and write about.

HOW DO AMERICANS WITHOUT ANY KNOWLEDGE OF POLAND AND POLISH CULTURE APPROACH YOUR WORK?

They haven’t a clue. I do about a dozen presentations every year, all over the country, and the reaction is always the same. People don’t know a thing about what happened in Poland during the war and after the war. A lot of people assume I’m Jewish because I’m writing and speaking about the way Germans killed and abused millions. When I tell people my parents were Roman Catholics and that millions of Poles suffered and died in the war, they are surprised, shocked. I’ve even had people come up to me after my presentation to ask me if I was in fact telling the truth about Poland in the war!

I feel that part of my responsibility as a writer is to tell people about what happened to Poland. In fact, one time when I was scheduled to do a poetry reading, I called my mom up and told her I was going to do a reading, and I wanted her to tell me what she wanted me to tell the people in



© FROM PRIVATE COLLECTIONS OF PHOTOGRAPHS BY JOHN GUZLOWSKI

THIS PHOTO WAS TAKEN AT AN AMUSEMENT PARK IN CHICAGO. MY SISTER DONNA AND I ARE SITTING ON A CRESCENT MOON. MY MOM IS STANDING BEHIND, PROTECTING US FROM EVERYTHING.

the audience. She was very forthright. She said, “Tell them we weren’t the only Poles who suffered in the war.” She knew that people didn’t know about what had happened in Poland, and she felt it was my duty to tell them.

NOBEL LAUREATE CZESŁAW MIŁOSZ, IN A REVIEW OF THE BILINGUAL EDITION OF YOUR COLLECTION OF POEMS, *LANGUAGE OF MULES*, WROTE THAT YOUR WORK “ASTONISHED” HIM AND REVEALED AN “ENORMOUS ABILITY FOR GRASPING REALITY.” DID YOU EVER MEET MIŁOSZ?

I never met Czesław Miłosz. He wrote the review late in his life, after he returned to Poland. I did write to him to thank him for his kind review, and he sent me a nice email back.

I hate to have to say this, but what’s especially ironic is that for a long time I didn’t want anything to do with his poetry or his other writings. Miłosz represented for me something I wanted to get away from, Poland and my own Polishness. Growing up in Chicago in the 1950s and 1960s, I felt that my Polishness was in some ways a curse. I was frequently called a dumb Polack and had to listen to innumerable Polack jokes that were meant to make me feel stupid, inferior, subhuman almost. I responded to this by trying to get as far away from my Polishness as I could. In my early 20s, I left Chicago, went to grad school, worked on a PhD in American Literature.

And then a funny thing happened.

I got homesick for Poland and my Polishness. I developed this need, a hunger to know about Poland. I had gotten so far away from it that it was becoming unreal to me. I lived among people who for the most part didn’t know where it was, or what it was, or what it had suffered in the war. I remember one day introducing myself to a new class and having a student ask me if my name was Italian or Spanish. When I said it was Polish, he seemed confused as if I had said I was a parrot or a prairie dog.

I think a lot of this hunger was also fueled by who my parents were. If my parents had been Illinois farm people raising soybeans and corn, or if they had been Italian gelato sellers, I don’t think I would be writing about them. I would be like so many other poets in America: writing about the weather or what it’s like being driving a big car west or east along the I-80. Instead, my parents were Polish people who had been struck dumb and quivering by history, by the Second World War, by their lives in the labor and DP camps.

And to write about their lives, I had to know about their lives. That’s when I started

reading Miłosz's poetry and Reymont's *Chłopi* Tetralogy and Isaac Bashevis Singer's novels and Henryk Sienkiewicz's *Trilogy* and Ryszard Kapuściński's journalistic writings.

Of course, I could never know the Poland my parents knew and had to leave, but I could know the Poland of words and literature, the Poland of sounds and images. And these writers and so many other excellent Polish writers gave that to me—especially Miłosz with his rich sense of recent Polish history, the war, the years under communism, his life as an émigré trying to make sense of a world that he was not born into, a language he never imagined as a small boy growing up.

It's hard to talk specifically in prose of how much Miłosz has meant to me so I would now like to share a poem I wrote about him.

Miłosz

He has stood
At the end of time

And heard the wind
Moving the snow

Hard and cold
cold and hard

And this is what
He learned:

There are voices
In the wind

There are voices
In the snow

They know poetry
Is only a bit of wood

But the shore
Is a long way off

What Polish and Polish-American authors are you friends with, and how do they help you become a better writer?

After I started reading Miłosz and other great Polish writers, I began wondering if there were Polish Americans writing about their experiences, experiences similar to mine.

This was in the late 1970s and early 1980s, long before the internet. Today I would just Google “Polish-American writers,” and I would immediately have a list of at least 100 writers/ Back then it wasn't so easy. It was a matter of slowly discovering these writers. I would find one, and then he or she would lead me to another. What was most interesting for me about this journey was that I discovered there were other Polish-American writers on the same journey.

Who did I find?

Initially, there was Stuart Dybek, John Minczeski, Leslie Pietrzyk, Oriana Ivy, Anthony Bukoski, Leonard Kress, Phil Boiarski, Helen Degen Cohen, Mark Pawlak, and Linda Nemec Foster.

For me the most amazing thing about encountering these writers is that I felt almost immediately a sense of connection with them and with their writing. One of my first writing teachers was Paul Carroll, a professor at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He always told his students that all writers were brothers and sisters. And this is exactly what I felt with these Polish American writers. I felt they were my family, and they encouraged my writing as I encouraged theirs - as though we were all family.

Daniel Pogorzelski ■
September 2019

WARSAW JEWISH COLLECTIONS AND THEIR DESTRUCTION DURING THE GERMAN OCCUPATION

MARIUSZ KLARECKI

The consistent and systematic extermination of the three-and-a-half-million population of Jews in Poland was a conscious policy of Germans. During the German occupation, about 370,000 Varsovian Jews were killed. Losses in works of art and antiques within this group of the city population were certainly very high. Before the war, many rich Jewish families lived in Warsaw. There are no reports of witnesses or sources on which losses in artwork collections could be estimated. Only a few people of Jewish origin who survived the war submitted their

questionnaire of losses to the city Wartime Losses Department. The remainder of owners of antiques and collections were murdered during the occupation¹.

Starting from September 1, 1939, Jewish collectors and owners of artworks and material culture were suffering serious losses. During the bombing

¹ E. Bergman, Żydzi nie tylko na Nalewkach, [in:] W. Fałkowski, *Straty Warszawy 1939-1945. Raport*, the Capital City of Warsaw, Warsaw 2005, p. 197; The National Library Of Poland (BN), H. Bryskier, *Żydzi pod swastyką czyli getto w Warszawie wieku XX*, sign. Rps. III 7938, p. 303-308; N. Davies, *Powstanie '44*, Cracow 2006, p. 168-169.

WARSAW JEWISH COLLECTIONS AND THEIR DESTRUCTION DURING
THE GERMAN OCCUPATION



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RUINS OF THE WARSAW GHETTO. WARSAW, 1946

raids on Warsaw, the headquarters of the Command of the Defense of Warsaw, located in Zamoyski Palace at 67 Nowy Świat St., was the main target. Behind the building, there was so-called “*antiquarian quarter*” concentrated around Mazowiecka,

Świętokrzyska, Nowy Świat, Krakowskie Przedmieście and Traugutta streets². Intensive bombing of this part of the city resulted in major losses in works of art

² S. Bołdok, *Antykwariaty artystyczne salony i domy aukcyjne*, Warsaw 2004, p. 138-139.

The sale of the painting was stopped thanks to the joint efforts of the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage (MKiDN) of Poland and Polish diplomatic posts.

and antiques kept in the antique shops belonging to people of Jewish origin as well.

Nearby residential buildings were destroyed as well. As a result of a five-floor tenement bombing on Czackiego St., Flora Neuman lost her collection. She suffered the most serious losses in paintings. Among destroyed paintings, there were many outstanding works of the greatest Polish painters, e.g. *The Angelus* by A. Gierymski, *Hunt* by J. Brandt, *Cavalry Review on the Saxon Square* by J. Rosen, as well as works of O. Boznańska and J. Malczewski. The collection of 50 miniatures by S. Marszałkiewicz and J.L David had profound artistic value. Paintings and drawings of other Polish and foreign artists kept in the flat were destroyed as well. Furthermore, the collection of handicraft gathered by F. Neuman lost during the bombing included antiques of unique artistic value, such as 48 figures manufactured in Miśnia, two vases from the Belweder manufacture, and a 24-element cutlery, tableware and crockery with the motive of birds and insects from Miśnia as well. High-quality furniture of historic value which had fitted out the flat, including, inter alia, living room furniture set from the times of Louis XV, *empire* style

furniture, and a Gdańsk-style furniture set³, also had undergone destruction.

The entire collection of the industrialist, Edward Natanson, assembled in 1850 by Ludwik Natanson, was burnt during the first bombings of the capital city⁴. Edward Natanson lived in a ten-room flat at 10 Królewska St. He lost 60 paintings by, amongst others, Jan Matejko, A. Gierymski, J. Chelmoński, Juliusz and Wojciech Kossak, J. Fałat, S. Wyspiański, J. Brandt, W. Podkowiński, J. Malczewski, J. Lampi, and M. Bacciarelli, on top of great western European painters, such as J.B. Greuze, F. Boucher, G. Reni, Dutch masters and others, all of considerable artistic value. Further damage included many French pieces of furniture from the 18th century, a Gdańsk-style wardrobe from the same period, as well as handcraft; 18 vases from the Royal manufacture of Stanisław August Poniatowski at Belweder and the collection of “*Saxon porcelain*”, all of which were in the house⁵.

³ State Archive of the Capital City of Warsaw, Municipal Executive, the War Damage Department (hereinafter referred to as APW ZM WSW), sign. 136, nr kw. 4054, p. 263. All losses in works of art were estimated by Tadeusz Neuman at PLN 326,300.

⁴ Ludwik Natanson (1822-1896), Polish doctor of Jewish origin, one of the most active and respected doctors in Warsaw. He especially contributed to the Warsaw dwellers during the cholera epidemic in 1848-1852. He was also known as a doctor of families with high material status, such as Zamoyski family, see: T. Ostrowska, Natanson Ludwik (1822-1896), [in:] *Polski Słownik Biograficzny* (PSB), vol. XXII, Ossolineum 1977, pp. 605-607.

⁵ APW, ZM WSW, sign. 91, nr kw. 15268, p. 74, see: E. Chwalewik, *Zbiory polskie. Archiwa, biblioteki, gabinety, galerie, muzea i inne zbiory pamiątek przeszłości w ojczyźnie i na obczyźnie w porządku alfabetycznym według miejscowości ułożone*, vol.2. Warsaw-Cracow 1927. vol. 2, p. 407; K. Estreicher, *Straty Kultury Polskiej. Katalog strat kultury polskiej pod okupacją niemiecką 1939-1944*, London 1944, [in:] *Straty kultury polskiej pod okupacją niemiecką 1939-1944 wraz z oryginalnymi dokumentami grabieży*, Cracow 2003, p. 395; A. Tyczyńska, K. Znojewska, *Straty wojenne. Malarstwo polskie. Obrazy olejne, pastele, akwarele utracone w latach 1939-1945 w granicach Polski po 1945*, vol. I, Poznań 1998, pos. 39, 89, 134, 236. The aggrieved estimated the loss in the collection of paintings at PLN 350,000.

As a result of the bombing in September 1939, Jan Leopold Kronenberg Palace located near the “*antiquarian quarter*” at 4 Małachowski Square had completely burnt down⁶. It is known in detail what the industrialist lost in the fire of the palace in 1939 as Jan Leopold Kronenberg added to a questionnaire “*an attachment to the losses suffered in 1939 during the Siege of Warsaw in the flat at 4 Małachowski Square*”⁷. In the attachment, he listed the following paintings: *Śreniawita's horse*, *Białonóżka*, *Battle scene* by Juliusz Kossak, *Night* by J. Chelmoński, *Winter landscape* by J. Weyssenhoff, *Foragers* by J. Rosen, *Circassian* by J. Brandt, two family portraits presenting Mrs. Popielewska and Mr. Winiarski, a portrait painted by J. Lampi.

Moreover, carpets, silver, crystals, and porcelain, as well as an interesting collection of antique furniture were burnt. The aggrieved enumerates the loss of two bedroom sets in the *empire* style ‘from the period’, *empire* style dining set made of walnut wood ‘from the period’, living room set in the style of Luis XVI ‘from the period’ and other valuable pieces of furniture, including an antique rosewood desk⁸ in the style of Luis XV.

One of the paintings from the collection of Jan Leopold Kronenberg, *Rest in the Tatra Mountains Lodge* by W. Gerson, was auctioned in the Sotheby's auction house in London in January 2004. The sale of the painting was stopped thanks to the joint efforts of the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage (MKiDN) of Poland and Polish diplomatic posts. Later, the Kronenberg Foundation entered negotiations with the owner of the painting, an individual from the Republic of South Africa. The masterpiece was successfully regained, and, in June 2010, the Foundation placed it in the collection of the Royal Castle in Warsaw⁹.

Many known antique dealers, such as Abe Gutnajer or Jakub Klejman gathered great collections and developed famous and respected brands in the antiquarian market. The beginning of the war and the Nazi occupation had a dramatic impact on Jewish people's lives as well as their collections. After the incursion of Hitler's army into Warsaw, the first year of the occupation saw persecutions, repressions, devastation of Jewish shops, as well as evictions and transfers to the area which would become the ghetto. Both the antique shop and the flat of Abe Gutnajer at 16

⁶ Kronenberg Palace was burnt inside, but the front elevation was maintained in a good condition until the end of the war – see: L. Sempoliński, *Warszawa 1945 - fotografie*, Warsaw 1975, il. 156, p. 180. Photo of the burnt Kronenberg palace – see: *W obiektywie wroga. Niemieccy fotoreporterzy w okupowanej Warszawie, 1939-1945*, Warsaw 2009, p. 120 and the aerial photo of this object, p. 128.

⁷ APW, ZM WSW, sign. 119, nr kw. 22297, no pagination. The monumental palace was erected at the request of Kronenberg family in 1869, designed by Hitzig. – see: T.S. Jaroszewski, *Dzieje pałacu Kronenberga*, Warsaw 1972; J. Zieliński, *Atlas dawnej architektury ulic i placów Warszawy*, vol. 10, Warsaw 2004, p. 61. Leopold Jan Kronenberg was born on February 14, 1891, in Warsaw, died in Los Angeles in 1971. Kronenberg in his questionnaire described the loss of his whole family. His wife was killed by a bomb on September 6, 1944, his daughter was killed during the Warsaw Uprising, his son died as a partisan in November 1945.

⁸ Edward Chwalewik in *Zbiory Polskie* mentions

the collection of Kronenberg family, listing mainly extensive archives and paintings, such as: *Łazienki* by Canaletto, *Aquarelle scenes of Warsaw* by Z. Vogel, *Interior of Łazienki* by A. Gryglewski and “family portraits, collection of miniatures, Polish antiques” – E. Chwalewik, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 397-398. Karol Estreicher in a book *Straty Kultury Polskiej* published during the war also enumerated Kronenberg's collection damaged during the bombing and fire in 1939 in Małachowski Square. The collection included paintings of foreign artists, such as: 17th-century Dutch painter J. Jordaens, signed with A.H. monogram, *A girl feeding birds* by A. Gierymski, *Starry night* by J. Chelmoński and *Theatre in Łazienki* by H. Siemiradzki – K. Estreicher, op. cit., p. 393. see: *Straty Wojenne. Malarstwo polskie*, Poznań 1998, op. cit., pos. 71.

⁹ See: A. Tyczyńska, K. Znojewska, *Straty wojenne. Malarstwo polskie. Obrazy olejne, pastele, akwarele utracone w latach 1939-1945 w granicach Polski po 1945*, Warsaw 2012, vol. II, poz. 372; A. Tyczyńska, K. Znojewska, *Straty Wojenne. Malarstwo polskie*, vol. I, op. cit., pos. 71.

Especially in the first months of the occupation, people of German origin already living in the city before the war participated in the looting.

Mazowiecka St. were destroyed and burnt during the Warsaw bombing in September. Neither did the second antique shop of Gutnajer at 11 Mazowiecka St. withstand the bombing.

Though the bombing destroyed Abe Gutnajer's antique shop, it was reconstructed and subsequently closed, with the goods gathered in the shop returned to their owners – all before his relocation to the ghetto in October 1941. After the relocation of the Gutnajer family to the ghetto, Edmund Mętlewicz became their trustee in the antique trade and the entrusted antiques were being sold in befriended “Skarbiec” and “Miniatura” antique shops. The origin of the antiques handled by Mętlewicz is not clear, but they could have been sold by Jewish families before their relocation to the ghetto. However, it is known that the money from the sale of antiques was given to the original owners living in the ghetto¹⁰. The circumstances of Abe Gutnajer's death are not obvious. He was probably murdered on July 22, 1942, in the flat at 26 Chłodna St. in the ghetto. On the day of the murder, Abe Gutnajer was operated by a well-known Warsaw specialist in pathophysiology and pathomechanics, Prof. Franciszek Raszeja. That day, the doctor, who operated together with his

assistant, received a special pass to the ghetto. When the German soldiers entered the flat, they killed all present flat dwellers together with people performing the operation. Many years after the war, in 2006, in the Christie's auction house in London, a 17th-century painting probably painted by the Dutch artist P. de Grebber (1600-1652/4) was sold. The painting presented a profile of a reading boy. Before the war, the painting belonged to Abe Gutnajer and was taken by him to his flat in the ghetto. Włodzimierz Kalicki, the author of the article about the history of the painting, suggests that the break-in and the murder of Abe Gutnajer and the other people in the flat was probably a robbery homicide. Almost the entire family of Gutnajer was murdered in 1943 in the Treblinka extermination camp¹¹.

Humiliation and repressions of Jews started just after the beginning of the Warsaw occupation by Germans. At first, they were burglarizing flats under the pretext of searching for weapons or radio. Entire flats were being looted and valuables, money, paintings, carpets, clothes and food were being taken. Especially in the first months of the occupation, people of German origin already living in the city before the war participated in the looting. Stealing of valuables was usually assisted by Wehrmacht soldiers or SS officers¹².

¹¹ With relation to the mysterious death circumstances – see: S. Bóldok, op. cit., p. 229; W. Kalicki, *Świadek tylko czyta*, Gazeta Wyborcza, 21.04.2008, no. 15/774; B. Engelking, J. Leonciak, *Getto Warszawskie. Przewodnik po nieistniejącym mieście*, Warsaw 2001, p. 666. In March 2006, an anonymous owner brought a painting *Young man reading* by the Dutch painter Pieter der Grebber (1600-1652/54), which belonged to Abe Gutnajer into the London branch of the Christie's auction house. It was discovered by experts from Art. Lost Register, and the Polish MFA joined the negotiations. The painting was sold on April 25, 2008, for 46,100 pounds. The profit was divided into two parts between the seller from Latvia and Abe Gutnajer's heirs.

¹² C. Łuczak, *Polityka ludnościowa i ekonomiczna*

¹⁰ S. Bóldok, op. cit., pp. 229, 233, note 41.

People of Jewish origin were treated differently – they were being openly robbed without any pretext. Flats were being broken into both by day and by night. Even furniture was being taken by the plunderers¹³. At the end of September 1939, Aleksander Enholc was robbed by German soldiers who broke into his flat in Słowackiego St., where the Polish Bible from 1577, known as *Leopolitiska*, estimated at 10,000 pre-war zloty, was among the stolen valuables. Several English books were stolen from the aggrieved' book collection as well. The owner described them as "*rara avis*"¹⁴.

A vast collection of Rafał Schermann was stolen to furnish the flats and offices of the German occupying Mayor of Warsaw Ludwig Leist and his subordinates. Schermann was a world-famous parapsychologist and graphologist of Polish origin who in 1936 returned to Poland from the United States. In the article in "As" magazine from 1939, there is a photograph of Schermann surrounded by his impressive collection. He allegedly possessed 400 paintings by, inter alia, Rembrandt, Velasquez, Teniers and van Eyck, with authenticity certificates. In the picture, there is a chest of drawers with a collection of 3,300 fancy bells. He gathered about 350 antique clocks and watches of different kinds. Additionally, he kept 100 snuffboxes and ancient findings in drawers. At first, he deposited his whole collection in a flat at 16 Karmelicka St. in Cracow. A year before the outbreak of WWII, he decided to move to Warsaw to a flat at 19 Koszykowa St. In August 1939, just before the outbreak of the war, the graphologist went to the Soviet

Union, leaving his collection in his flat in Warsaw. Rafał Schermann, as well as his extraordinary collection, are missing. It is rumored¹⁵ that the collection was seized in December 1939.

A decree issued by the occupiers in December forbade the Warsaw Jews from changing flats, and in April 1940 the establishment of the ghetto started. All people of Jewish origin coming to Warsaw were allowed to live only within a designated district. In October 1940, Warsaw Jews were forced to move to the ghetto. All dwellers of the Aryan origin had to leave the area of the ghetto. The day after the deadline set by the chief of the Warsaw district, on November 16, 1940, the ghetto in Warsaw was closed. 138,000 Jews were in the forced resettlement and moved to flats left by 113,000 Warsaw dwellers of the Aryan origin¹⁶. Living conditions in the ghetto were egregiously difficult. Huge overcrowding, of 6-7 people for a room in the beginning, rose to 8-10 people. The streets were disturbingly congested. At the early stage, about 360,000 people were located in a Jewish district of about 307 ha. This number quickly rose to 450,000 when the people displaced from outside Warsaw joined the district. The ghetto was divided into, so-called, Large and Small Ghettos. They were connected with a footbridge over Chłodna St. The Large Ghetto, located in the northern part of the territory, was inhabited mainly by the poor. The territory

hitlerowskich Niemiec w okupowanej Polsce, Poznań 1979, p. 250.

¹³ J.S. Majewski, *Śródmieście i jego mieszkańcy w latach niemieckiej okupacji: październik 1939 - 1 sierpnia 1944. Dzień powszedni*, [in:] W. Fałkowski, *Straty Warszawy 1939-1945. Raport*, The Capital City of Warsaw, Warsaw 2005, p. 71.

¹⁴ APW, ZM WSW, sign.. 159, nr kw. 9992, p. 978.

¹⁵ Illustrated Weekly Magazine „As”, 5 March 1939, p. 14-15; Robert J. Kudelski, *Zrabowane skarby. Losy dzieł sztuki na ziemiach polskich w czasie II wojny światowej*, Cracow 2012, p. 34.

¹⁶ J. Adamska, J. Kaźmierska, *Getto warszawskie opisane przez hitlerowca*. „Kronika Warszawy” 1983, nr 1/53, p. 70 as cited in: E. Bergman, *Żydzi nie tylko na Nalewkach*, [in:] W. Fałkowski, op. cit., p. 197; see also: K. Dunin-Wąsowicz, *Warszawa w latach 1939-1945, Dzieje Warszawy*, vol.5, Warsaw 1984, p. 282. M. Getter claims that the whole resettlement action touched about 220,000 people, see: M. Getter, *Władze niemieckie okupowanej Warszawy*, [in:] W. Fałkowski, op. cit., p. 215.

of the Small Ghetto located to the south of Chłodna St., near Śliska and Sienna Streets, was smaller and the population density was lower. There, the flats of wealthier Jews were located¹⁷.

Leaving their companies, shops and manufactures outside the ghetto was a great loss for the Jewish entrepreneurs. The issued proclamation ordered all entrepreneurs to gather at a given place and time. Men, escorted by the police, were taken outside the ghetto and were told to open their shops to make inventories in the presence of the Chamber of Commerce representatives. After the whole day of waiting for the officials, in the evening, the police came back to take over the keys and took the owners back to the ghetto. A similar situation happened to the property owners, who, not being able to manage their business from the ghetto, were entirely deprived of their incomes. The Jewish community was buying the works of many painters and sculptors living inside the ghetto to help them. Such a financial aid helped the Jewish artists to maintain dignity in the face of the increasing threat of starvation¹⁸.

To rescue their flats and places of employment, Poles were trying to negotiate with German authorities about the change of the ghetto boundaries. Collector Stefan Talikowski recalls that when dwellers of Elektoralna Street found out that it was going to be included in the ghetto, they asked an influential counsel from Berlin to exclude Elektoralna Street from the ghetto territory. The counsel who was supposed to represent the street dwellers ordered

them to collect signatures of owners of all small factories, manufactures and shops located in this street and to provide the number of the employees. Entrepreneurs and residents of houses in Elektoralna St. organized a donation and, for instance, the owner of the Fraget factory joined the action. Dwellers of Elektoralna St. prepared a special plan of the district with the proposed boundary of the ghetto according to the guidance of the counsel. All efforts of the Elektoralna St. dwellers, despite the apparent involvement of the German counsel who took the money, turned out to be fruitless. The flat of Stefan Talikowski was included in the ghetto in November 1940. Foresightedly, Stefan Talikowski earlier exchanged flats with Dr. Mamrot – a Jewish dentist who lived in a tenement at 6 Chłodna St., located vis-à-vis the Charles Borromeo Church. Unfortunately, this tenement was included in the ghetto a year later¹⁹.

One can imagine the disorder in the city caused by such a huge resettlement action. The transport of furniture had to be organized and generously paid. A housing office established by Germans gave Talikowski's family a six-room flat at the corner of Sienna and Sosnowa Streets. Frequent relocations were not easy for the family. Furniture from the 13-room flat was packed into two huge vehicles with a capacity of a railway wagon each. The Hartwig transport company sent 10 men to bear and 2 men to pack the objects. Talikowski notes: "When they tried to move the cupboard in the dining room, it turned out that it is as long as the whole wall, it was made of solid oak wood and richly carved, it could be divided only into two parts, up and down, 8 people

¹⁷ E. Bergman, *Żydzi nie tylko na Nalewkach*, [in:] W. Fałkowski, *Straty Warszawy 1939-1945. Raport*, The Capital City of Warsaw, Warsaw 2005, p. 197; BN, H. Bryskier, op.cit., p. 156- 157; K. Dunin-Wąsowicz, op. cit., p. 286.

¹⁸ H. Szerszewska, *Krzyż i mezuz*, Warsaw 1993, p. 46-47; L. Tyszk, *Wspomnienia z warszawskiego getta*, Biuletyn ŻIH, Warsaw, 1974, nr 1 (89), p. 116, as cited in S. Bódko, op. cit., p. 171.

¹⁹ BN, S. Talikowski, op. cit., p. 397. The following change of the ghetto boundaries took place on September 26, 1941, and the relocation of several dozen of the included territory dwellers ended on November 8, 1941. - M. Getter, *Władze niemieckie...*, op. cit., p. 215-216; K. Dunin-Wąsowicz, op. cit., p. 282-283.

lifted it and carried from the first to the ground floor”²⁰. Many less valuable pieces of furniture were given to befriended neighbors or otherwise sold.

Wealthier Jewish families which could not take all their goods deposited them. Pianos, furniture, carpets, paintings, crystals and other expensive goods were placed in their friends’ flats from the wealthy intelligentsia and aristocracy living on the other side of the wall. Poorer Jews were giving their goods to caretakers, co-workers and other house dwellers. Sometimes, well-paid transports with Jewish goods were not arriving at their destinations. This may have been caused by pure carelessness or a coincidence which resulted in takeovers of the carrier by Germans²¹. This is how the carriers were cheating their clients and appropriating the Jewish wealth. When it happened, the aggrieved could not even appeal for justice as he could not leave the ghetto. There were cases when the objects which reached the receiver were not willingly given back. Valuables and works of art were being hurriedly sold at a lower price. Accumulated cultural material of many generations was disappearing in this way, but on the other hand, this is also how a part of it had survived via redistribution to other Polish cities. Nevertheless, a seriously large part of valuable works of art and antiques was destroyed and burnt during the Warsaw Uprising or transported by the occupants in the following months.

Before the outbreak of the war, Zygmunt Heilpernia lived in a mansion on Aleja Róż Avenue. He was observing the repressions of Jewish Warsaw dwellers from October 23, 1939. On August 19, 1940, “*I was unexpectedly forced by the occupants to*

Accumulated cultural material of many generations was disappearing in this way, but on the other hand, this is also how a part of it had survived via redistribution to other Polish cities.

leave my flat and furnishing within several hours, they allowed me to take only... underwear” – he recalled. The collection of the aggrieved contained mainly the elements of the mansions’ artistic furnishing. Heilpernia was then forced to live in the ghetto at 5 Orla St., “*where looting continued until half of August 1942. They were stealing valuables, jewelry, land bonds, silver, money, bed linen, securities, shares, clothes, cameras, food, they left nothing*”. In the middle of August 1942, Zygmunt Heilpernia was forced to leave his flat in Orla St., barely surviving. In the following months, he was forced to change his place of living over 20 times “*until he lost all [of his wealth], saving only photographs*”²².

Andrzej Rotwand used an interesting idea to hide his collection. The idea to construct a locker under his house at 8/10 Chocimska St. was given to him by his friend, Władysław Michalski, a collector and architect as well, who earlier made a similar locker under his own house. Rotwand deposited more precious paintings in the National Museum, sculptures and handcraft, where in turn, he hid under his house. His collection of

²⁰ BN, S. Talikowski, *Kronika rodziny Talikowskich – Talikowiczów*, BN, sign. akc. 11061, p. 397.

²¹ BN, H. Bryskier, op. cit., p. 156- 157.

²² APW, ZM WSW, sign. 46, nr kw. 3832, p. 395.

The locker under the house was not discovered by Germans and looters and remained untouched.

Polish paintings only consisted of over 150 paintings, including many masterpieces. The pre-war art collection gathered mainly by Andrzej's father – Stanisław Rotwand, was considered as one of the greatest private collections in Poland. The collection of paintings disappeared during the Warsaw Uprising. The locker under the house was not discovered by Germans and looters and remained untouched. Only rainwater which entered the trench caused minor damage. Andrzej Rotwand survived the war hiding from persecutions. His wife, Maria Rotwand provided him with a proper hiding place and care. After the war, in the questionnaire of losses Andrzej Rotwand included a list of 153 paintings and 6 sculptures "exported or destroyed by Germans". His overall loss was estimated at PLN 41,200. The entire collection of paintings was probably exported by Germans in the same transport which carried paintings taken from the National Museum of Warsaw. After the war, some elements of Rotwand's collection were found among paintings belonging to the National Museum of Warsaw found in Germany. Subsequently, the paintings were kept as a private deposit in the National Museum. Many of them have decorated the Gallery of Polish Painting for many years (e.g. *Death of Ellenai* by J. Malczewski, *Alarm* and *Skirmish* by J. Brandt). Some paintings went to the Rotwand's flat. A major part of the regained collection of paintings together with property rights to missing works of art were sold in 1995 by a widow Maria Rotwand²³.

²³ APW, ZM WSW, sign. 147, nr kw. 6967, p. 896, zał.

The owner of the "Sirius" machine factory, Józef Jakobsfeld, was arrested for the first time on October 17, 1939. During his imprisonment, the 60-year-old man was severely beaten – "when I left the prison, I had to undergo treatment and I stayed in bed for 3 months". During the sweep on August 22, 1942, he was beaten again "they were beating in the head, I could not speak". The entrepreneur was hiding for six years and paying for subsequent hiding places. Jakobsfeld paid for the freedom of his daughter Alicja, imprisoned in Pawiak in 1942, and paid for rescuing his son and daughter-in-law's lives. Racial persecution was accompanied by the seizure of property. In August 1940, a factory and a flat in Żłota St., including movables, were seized "even with the provision for Schmittburg and exported by him. He left blank walls". In the industrialist's flat, there were paintings by, amongst others, F. Żmurko, W. Hoffman, W. Wodzinowski, F. Wyrzykowski; additionally "a set of Chinese porcelain – a present from General Zajaczek and different souvenirs from the times of Stanisław August Poniatowski" as well as other artistic objects²⁴.

A Dr. of Psychology, Róża Baumgarten, who before the war lived in Koszykowa St. on her own, was forced to move to the ghetto in Ogrodowa St. same as all Warsaw dwellers of Jewish origin. In the ghetto, she was forced to work arduously in Schulz's factory on Nowolipie St. During the liquidation of the ghetto in 1943, together with other Jews, she was put into a train wagon transporting people to Auschwitz (Oświęcim) for death.

do kw. see: K. Estreicher, op. cit., p. 399.

²⁴ APW, ZM WSW, sign. 75, nr kw. 1111, p. 494. „Sirius” machine factory was located at 51 Zamojski St. During the bombing on September 8, 1939, it burnt. In the years 1940-41, the entrepreneur reconstructed the factory and fixed part of machines. His daughter Alicja Jakobsfeld was hurt in 1939 during the bombing. Józef Jakobsfeld's wife died, his brother Gustaw was shot and his wife Cecylia was taken to Treblinka. His father-in-law

Henryk Bergson died in the ghetto.



WOJCIECH GERSON'S PAINTING "REST IN A TARZAN SHELTER" WARSAW, 01 JUNE 2010

She managed to escape to the Aryan side “*just before the final burning of the ghetto*”. During the resettlement in 1940, she lost the entire artistic furnishing of her flat, including a collection of paintings represented by such artists as J. Fałat, J. Stanisławski, H. Szczygliński and others²⁵.

Before the war, Mieczysław Michelson-Walicki, a Jewish merchant, lived on Ujazdowskie Avenue. In 1940, the Germans deprived him of two big paintings by Józef Ryszkiewicz. One of them – *Death of a victualer* was about 20 square meters in size and its value was over PLN 25,000. The second painting was 8 square meters in size and was valued by the author at PLN 10,000. Additionally, 11 Persian carpets were taken from the flat, 30 square meters each and their value was estimated at PLN 45,000. Another Jewish merchant, Andrzej Weintal, in 1942, lost all movables taken from his flat, including paintings: *Sailboat* by M. G. Wywiórski, *Disappointed woman* by W. Wodzinowski, *Ulan and a Girl* by W. Kossak, bronze

sculpture „*Gladiator*” and a period English clock.²⁶

One of the methods to preserve the goods before moving to the ghetto was to sign them over to neighbors or friends of the family. Monika Żeromska describes the case of Mortkowicz couple who in 1940 signed their business over to Monika’s mother, Anna Żeromska to save their publishing house and a bookshop from Germans. The legal document was predated by three years and according to it, the company’s assets were signed over to a widow of a writer to cover the debts of the publisher. Before the war, Mortkowicz’s company was publishing books of Stefan Żeromski. Hence, Anna Żeromska deposited some books from the vast collection of Mortkowicz family among her friends. During the occupation, the bookshop business was profitable. It employed several people and maintained two Jewish families, Mortkowicz and Beylin, which were hiding near Warsaw. Part of the money was also given to “*the constantly following racketeers. After taking the extorted money, they were leaving, but it was obvious that they would come back in a few days. So it was necessary to look for another place to hide. Monika [Żeromska]*

²⁵ APW, ZM WSW, sign. 142, nr kw. 5468, p. 910. Róża Baumgarten was working in Schulz factory from July 22 to December 3, in 12-hour mode, sewing uniforms for German soldiers. According to her, she was placed in barracks. Difficult working conditions caused „severe heart deficiency and hearing disorder”.

²⁶ APW, ZM WSW, sign. 205, nr kw. 1112, p. 564.

Moreover, Leśniewska's business contributed to saving the lives of many Jews.

*was the one who organized new places, at first with the help of her current husband, Bronisław Zieliński, later thanks to her own contacts with the AK*²⁷.

Sometimes, there were more mediators for fear of denouncing a Jewish business by Germans. A. Ryszkiewicz recalls the antique business of N. Sakiel located in Lilpop's house at 7 Mazowiecka St. Most likely, Zofia Leśniewska was the trustee of Sakiel's interests as in 1940 she opened an antique shop in the same building. The shop specialized in handcraft and was named "*Zofia Leśniewska and Company*". Leśniewska's shop was definitely one of the biggest and best-equipped antique shops on Mazowiecka St. Many classy Nazi soldiers, including Governor-General Hans Frank, were supposed to be the shop's clients. In the ghetto newspaper "*Gazeta Żydowska*" (Jewish Journal) Sławomir Bołdok found an announcement with information: "*Art Gallery – Z. Leśniewska and Co. [...] through its representatives in the Jewish district purchases paintings, designer furniture,*

carpets, works of art and antiques [...] we pay the full price immediately in cash".

This piece of information shows how Leśniewska was acquiring works of art and antiques to her shop. The authors of the book "*Getto Warszawskie*" claim that Leśniewska's business was a cover for organizing escapes of Jews from the ghetto. They also mention Leśniewska's associate, Weinstein, who together with his wife was organizing help for the ghetto refugees. Therefore, Leśniewska's antique shop played an important role in trade contacts between the 'Aryan' side and the ghetto which resulted not only in her income but also in the financial help for people in the ghetto. Moreover, Leśniewska's business contributed to saving the lives of many Jews. Natan Sakiel, thanks to receiving a title of an honorary consul of one of the South America states, avoided being closed in the ghetto²⁸.

Helena Szerszewska in her reminiscences described one of the antique shops in the ghetto which was rather a little shop with various items. It belonged to the pre-war antique seller from Świętokrzyska St. – Kleisinger: "*There was a small display with several old plates, two silver sugar bowls, a cord of amber, a Turkish shawl. And an ivory miniature and a chessboard with figures [...] there was nothing to look at. But I was stopping and staring at those unwanted things, so incompatible with the surrounding harsh reality of the ghetto*"²⁹.

Persecuted Jews were being rescued by Poles who risked their own lives and entire

²⁷ M. Żeromska, *Moja ulica Mazowiecka*, Rocznik Warszawski, r. XXV, 1995, Warsaw 1996, p. 225; Ibidem, *Wspomnień ciąg dalszy*, op. cit., p. 42, 76, 94, 103. Chwałewik described the collection of J. Mortkowicz who lived before the war at 5 Okólnik St. see: E. Chwałewik, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 406. There is a preserved letter in which Marshal Józef Piłsudski thanks Jakób Mortkowicz, as in e.g. *Zbiory Polskie* – E. Chwałewik: „Books published by You honour the Polish publishing art” – a photo of the document [in:] J. Olczak-Ronikier, op. cit., p. 195. J. Olczak-Ronikier, *W ogrodzie pamięci*, Cracow 2001, p. 270. After her return to Warsaw, the mother of J. Olczak-Ronikier in a letter to her family in New York wrote: „Library, the Old Town are a pile of rubbles and ashes. No book was preserved...” Ibidem, p. 298.

²⁸ A. Ryszkiewicz, *Handel dziełami sztuki w okupowanej Warszawie 1939-1944*, [in:] *Kryzysy w sztuce, Materiały sesji Stowarzyszenia Historyków Sztuki w Lublinie*, Warsaw 1988, p. 227; S. Bołdok, op. cit., p. 277, 327; M. Żeromska, *Moja ulica Mazowiecka*, Rocznik Warszawski, XXV, 1995, Warsaw 1996, p. 208.

²⁹ H. Szerszewska, *Krzyż i mezuza*, Warsaw 1993, p. 62. The antique shop in the ghetto was located in Śliska St.; S. Bołdok, op. cit., p. 169.

belongings. Hiding Jews could receive the largest financial help from the Council to Aid Jews (Żegota). they spent over PLN 37 million and USD 50 thousand for this purpose in 1943-1944 alone. After the closure of the Jewish district, about 20 thousand people were hiding in Warsaw, 4 thousand were aided by Żegota³⁰. Ludwik Munk, engineer and contractor, was hiding in a three-room flat in Berezyńska St. In 1940, as a result of a denunciatory note, the flat was taken over by Gestapo but the persecuted Jew managed to escape. The man lost his valuables, including 22 paintings of J. Fałat, S. Filipkiewicz, F. Ruszczyc, J. Pankiewicz, L. Gottlieb and others. Moreover, his handcraft was seized as well: Persian carpets, old porcelain, glass, silver and cabinet furniture, “*very valuable antiques*”³¹.

Adam and Aniela Uziembło were two of those Poles who helped the Jews preserve their valuables and works of art. Jewelry and money hidden in pouches were given in parts to the owners when necessary. “*There were also works of art, Zak’s paintings, among others. These were damaged during the Warsaw Uprising. But there were mainly small things*”. The Uziembło couple describe also the cases of takeovers of Jewish companies by trusted Poles. Sometimes, Jews in the ghetto were able to perfectly manage their businesses on the ‘Aryan’ side of the wall. In their diary, Adam and Aniela Uziembło describe a Jewish family which perfectly managed to sell furniture from their old flat in Cracow³².

Before the outbreak of the Ghetto Uprising, impoverished Jewish families had no valuables. Works of art and

A terribly large part of artistic objects belonging to Jews was stolen and destroyed by the German occupants.

antiques were sold in the first place to buy food and medicines to survive. Residents of the ghetto who had remaining valuables in their flats were especially exposed to invasion and robbery by policemen or soldiers. They were taking mainly works of art, carpets, chandeliers, jewelry, valuable furniture and other goods. Zofia Wróblewska describes another terrifying possibility of Jews in the ghetto to escape their tragic fate: “*Sabina started to persuade people to sell everything... What? – chandeliers, paintings, a cupboard. Then, buy a lot of food, eat dinner together and take cyanide. Nobody thought then that this was, in fact, the most dignified solution*”³³. The history of the artistic objects which were being sold in exchange for food to the “*other side of the wall*” ended a year later together with the destruction of the rest of Warsaw.

During the pacification of the ghetto, a huge area of the city was destroyed. A terribly large part of artistic objects belonging to Jews was stolen and destroyed by the German occupants or brought into the circulation of the antique market in the Aryan side. Due to the total destruction of the ghetto and seizure of even the smallest objects during transportation to death camps, preservation of valuable antiques was not possible. Alongside with the Jewish community, people killed included those connected with culture and art,

³⁰ W. Borodziej, A. Chmielarz, A. Friszke, A. K. Kunert, *Polska Podziemna 1939-1945*, Warsaw 1991, p. 247.

³¹ APW, ZM WSW, sign. 93, nr kw. 14772, p. 86.

³² BN, A. Uziembło, *Kanwa i na kanwie*, sign. akc. 14619, pp. 64-65.

³³ BN, Z. Wróblewska, *Póki my żyjemy*, sign. akc. 14055, p. 3.

and also enthusiasts, including antique sellers and collectors. Most of them, after being gathered at Umschlagplatz, were transported to the Treblinka death camp. The rest died or was murdered during the uprising³⁴ which broke out in the Jewish district on April 19, 1943.

Only a few managed to survive the war. Marian Fajertag-Dąbrowski, owner of the antique shop “*Museion*” at 1 Warecka St. was one of them. Artistic objects in his antique shop were partly damaged during the bombing in September 1939. In the same year, when Germans invaded Warsaw, the antique shop was robbed by the occupants. In 1940, Fajertag-Dąbrowski’s business was probably seized due to the Jewish origin of the owner. The aggrieved wrote: “*in 1939, brilliants and pearls worth about PLN 100,000 were stolen*”. In the attachment to his questionnaire, he presented an impressive inventory of his shop consisting of 278 paintings of remarkable Polish painters as well as 67 miniatures. The list included losses in porcelain and furniture also. The antique seller possessed a detailed inventory of lost collections as he included in the questionnaire a note: “*Briefly enlisted works of arts are very extensively described in my catalogue which I can present at any request*”³⁵.

Dr. Jakub Klejman, a graduate of the medical department in Paris also survived the war. He devoted his whole life to antiques. Before the war, he opened an Art Galery at 1 Mazowiecka St. in Warsaw and became one of the most appreciated antique dealers of the times: “*he possessed such a knowledge of works of art, especially paintings, that he was an indisputable authority*” in the matter. In pre-war

Poland, an antique dealer was providing works of art to museums, ministries and representative governmental buildings. When the war broke out, Klejman closed his antique shop. He was hiding outside the Jewish district in a flat and conservation workshop of Henryk Kucharski at 5 Oboźna St. This place was a former workshop of a painter Wojciech Gerson. To make a living, he was selling paintings in art galleries “*Skarbiec*” and “*Miniatura*”. Stefan Talikowski recalls that during the occupation, Klejman was holding long social meetings which could have ended in a tragedy. Fortunately, Jakub Klejman survived the war and was one of the first to open his own antique shop in 1945 in Szpitalna St. which lasted until 1950. He probably moved to England and then to the United States where, according to Talikowski, “*the most respected specialists in art were consulting him and wanted to hire him*”³⁶.

No antique shop survived the destruction of the ghetto. No Jewish antique dealer, except for J. Klejman, decided to reconstruct his business in post-war Poland. Antique objects shared the fate of the city. Few people returned to ruined houses and shops after the war and such as Klejman managed to save remnants of the antique treasures from the rubble. After the war, J. Klejman’s antique shop in Szpitalna St. was visited by an owner of the antique shop “*Skarbiec*”. According to her, Klejman said: “*Mrs Żalińska, you sold my paintings for a great price – And what have you done with the money? – I asked – I bought paintings from an old school. They all burnt during the Uprising*”³⁷.

Mariusz Klarecki ■
September 2019

³⁴ E. Bergman, Żydzi nie tylko na Nalewkach, [in:] W. Fałkowski, op. cit., p. 197; BN, H. Bryskier, op. cit., p. 303-308; N. Davies, op. cit., pp. 168-169.

³⁵ APW ZM WSW sign. 147 nr kw. 6952, p. 834, zał. do kwest., pp. 835-836.

³⁶ BN, S. Talikowski, op. cit., p. 408; S. Bołdok, op. cit., pp. 169, 305.

³⁷ W. Czernic-Żelińska, Salon Sztuki „Skarbiec” w Warszawie. Kalendarz działalności w latach 1940-1950, RMNW, X, 1966, p. 486.

WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP?

MATEUSZ KUBIAK

The 10th anniversary of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) celebrated in 2019 is not only the time for summaries but also for discussions regarding the form of further cooperation between the EU and its eastern neighbors. Even though there is a prevailing belief that the initiative launched by Poland and Sweden should be developed further, both among the addressees of the EaP and the EU members, there are serious discrepancies in the visions of further integration. In the face of no prospects of presenting the Eastern Partnership members with a possibility to access the EU, the significance of the sectoral cooperation, e.g., construction of the infrastructure or liberalization of markets, increases considerably in relevance.

Dramatic plot twists marked the decade of the Eastern Partnership's history – it is sufficient to recall the Ukrainian

Revolution of Dignity and the overthrow of Viktor Yanukovych, or an unexpected decision of the Armenian authorities to shift from the alliance with the EU to the Eurasian Economic Union developed by Russia. Nevertheless, the past decade includes the enhancement of the cooperation between the European Union and the EaP states and co-action in many sectoral policies as well. So what has been achieved so far, and how should further needs of the EU neighbors be defined? And is it possible to reconcile the interests of the EU states with expectations of the addressees of the Eastern Partnership?

BALANCE OF THE DECADE

Results of the Eastern Partnership ought to be assessed through the prism of the fundamentals for this EU policy principle of “differentiation” as what may be considered as the success of the EaP in the case of Belarus or Azerbaijan (notably, Armenia is deliberately not mentioned




EU-COMMISSIONER FOR EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD AND ENLARGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS, JOHANNES HAHN (L) SPEAKS AT THE 10TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP (EAP) HIGH-LEVEL CONFERENCE IN BRUSSELS, BELGIUM, MAY 14, 2019

here), may be of much smaller, or even zero significance in the case of states such as Georgia, Ukraine or Moldova. Today, these differences are even bigger than a decade ago when the Eastern Partnership was formed.

When it comes to the group of the so-called “EaP’s top states” – Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova – it is necessary to stress the exhaustion of the recent program of cooperation at the political level. All countries aforementioned have already managed to sign European Union Association Agreements (AA) and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA), as well as introduce the short-stay visa-waivers. Of course, a lot may be questioned in the matter of implementation of particular records. The stability of the pro-Western course of Moldova is raising concerns as well. However, it is a fact that in the case of the said group of the EaP members, the expectations go

further than the EaP’s agenda projected: Kiev, Tbilisi and – to a lesser extent – Chisinau are already applying for the EU membership. It suffices to say that, for example, in July 2019, Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili proposed to open the accession negotiations with no preconditions, and, in the past, Ukraine threatened with blocking a joint declaration at the EaP summit as it lacked the issue of prospects for the EU membership.

In contrast, Azerbaijan and Belarus remain much more skeptical about the sense of the complex integration with the European Union and participation in the EU policy of the Eastern Partnership. In practice, authorities in Baku and Minsk treat the EaP’s offer selectively and are instrumentally picking the elements convenient for them. As a result, the prospects of the development of cooperation between Azerbaijan, Belarus and the EU should be considered mainly



in the context of selected sectoral policies, not as possible integration at the strictly political level.

Armenia, whose case is the least obvious of all six EaP member states, is the last addressee state of the Eastern Partnership. It is necessary to underline that yet during the previous governance (before the change of leadership in Spring 2018) and the presidency of Serzh Sargsyan, Yerevan was actively aiming to sign the Association Agreement with the EU. Eventually, Armenia abandoned this goal in 2013 under the pressure of Russia which has been gathering instruments for exerting influence on the authorities in Yerevan for years. As a result, Armenians were also forced by Moscow to enter the Eurasian Economic Union which, in fact,

The prospects of the development of cooperation between Azerbaijan, Belarus and the EU should be considered mainly in the context of selected sectoral policies.

does prevent them from the liberalisation of trade with the EU. Nevertheless, in 2017, Armenia managed to sign a Comprehensive economic partnership

The Eastern Partnership

Goals and benefits



agreement (CEPA, still ratified in the EU states). Even though it does not provide for, e.g. the establishment of a free-trade area, in practice, it is in essence an equivalent of the Association Agreement prepared for Armenia and in case of its implementation – it should result in a relevant integration of Armenia with the EU.

SEARCHING FOR POLITICAL INCENTIVES

Despite formal consensus about the necessity of the Eastern Partnership's existence, there is no doubt that it is seen in various ways by the EU members as well. This situation is not surprising considering the discrepancies between European perceptions of, for instance, political processes happening in the region. Differences in perceiving the international environment, including the role of the Russian Federation in the region of the former Soviet Union, have to influence the willingness of the states to bear the cost (including political ones) of involvement in the development of the Eastern Partnership.

The main point, which is definitely dividing the EU states, is the further development of the Eastern Partnership's political dimension and the possible eastern enlargement of the EU in the future. Naturally, the official union policy of the EaP has never provided for the promise of membership. But the fact is that in the face of Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Georgia, Ukraine and possibly Moldova, this issue is inevitable and sooner or later it will have to be addressed by the EU. Further postponement of official statements regarding the possible enlargement of the European Union will increase frustration among part of Eastern Partnership member states: a similar situation has been happening for several years in the case of Georgia's accession to the North Atlantic Alliance.

How can we mitigate the potential threat of discouragement of the Eastern Partnership members today, in the face of prevailing lack of political willingness to enlarge the European Union to the East?



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A VIEW OVER THE EU EASTERN PARTNERSHIP SUMMIT IN BRUSSELS, BELGIUM, NOVEMBER 24, 2017

What kind of political encouragement should be sought for to keep the EaP's program attractive also to "ordinary citizens" in countries such as Georgia or Ukraine?

One proposal has been formulated in recent months by Polish diplomacy, which presented the idea of extending the Association Agreements and reinforcing the institutionalization of the Eastern Partnership. Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jacek Czaputowicz, in particular, appealed to consider the establishment of a kind of Eastern Partnership's secretariat together with the introduction of the rotating presidency within the EaP. In theory, these actions should bring the eastern EaP partners closer to the decision-making processes in Brussels and increase their sense of belonging to

the EU community. These ideas seem to be necessary, but at the same time, even in just a few years, they will not be sufficient to fill the gap left by the lack of the slightest prospect of the European Union membership.

PROSPECTS OF THE SECTORAL COOPERATION

Another field of integrating with addressee countries of the Eastern Partnership is the sectoral cooperation. Naturally, for the most ambitious EaP members, this will not substitute for the possible EU membership. However, in theory, its development remains vital – it aids providing stability in the region as well as gives real business opportunities for EU capital too. What is more, the agenda of the sectoral cooperation within the Eastern Partnership has already been

The EU will be able to get involved more actively in the financial support for the infrastructural projects aiming to integrate the states in the region.

highly developed, and in contrast to the mentioned political cooperation, it will not be exhausted too soon.

It is impossible to focus on all possible fields of the sectoral integration within the Eastern Partnership. However, the energy industry and transport may be considered especially pertinent (which is important – also for the public opinion within the EaP states). In both cases, there is still great potential for market reforms or investments in infrastructure. These are strategic sectors crucial for the development of the states, which influence the living standard of the “ordinary citizens” also, as they are of major importance for the prospects of the trans-boundary cooperation in the region.

If only a willingness of the EU member states occurs, the EU will be able to get involved more actively in the financial support for the infrastructural projects aiming to integrate the states in the region. Of course, such aid – e.g., for the construction of gas interconnectors, electro-energetic connections, or trans-boundary transport corridors – would have to be encumbered with many conditions. According to the

“*more for more*” rule, beneficiaries of possible EU funds would have to ensure the liberalization of their markets by adopting the EU regulations. Otherwise, the transposition of the EU standards, for example in the energy industry, can cause many problems, which is already visible in the case of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. And every further encouragement can additionally stimulate these processes.

Of course, this vision is rather optimistic – it does not include many objective factors, such as influences of oligarchs or the Russian Federation on particular sectors in the EaP member states, and subjective, such as lack of willingness of many EU member states to provide considerable funds for the needs of their eastern neighbors. The fact is, however, that the members of the Eastern Partnership are talking about such financial support, and this fact only should spark off a debate whether we are able to address these expectations.

The European Union is now facing the necessity to find a response to the open question about the future of the Eastern Partnership after 2020 at the level of both political and sectoral cooperation. From the perspective of the Central and Eastern Europe countries, it is rather obvious that the worst that can happen to the EaP policy at the current stage would be stagnation and preservation of the current offer without any extension. This may be a cliché, but it is worth stressing that geopolitics abhors a vacuum, and if the citizens of the Eastern Partnership member states are to remain enthusiastic about the European idea, they will expect further cooperation and consequent results.

Mateusz Kubiak ■
September 2019

AMERICAN-CHINESE RELATIONS IN THE TRADE WAR CONTEXT

MARTA KĘDZIELSKA

What are the causes of the current tension between Washington and Beijing? Why have the American President's advisers opted for strengthening the relations with China for years? What does the return to the tianxia concept mean?

The economic growth of the People's Republic of China is surely the most important geopolitical event in the 21st century. It is no wild speculation to argue that an increasing number of scientists, experts and publicists realized the presence of a dragon, which had been previously treated as a lizard by the West. The phenomenon of the enormous progress of China in Graham Allison book *"Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides' Trap?"*, which provides an analysis of

geopolitical relations between the United States and China. He asked openly whether the conflict between these two countries is inevitable, as according to arguments, it even seems *essential*. The American researcher formulated the concept of Thucydides' Trap through which he described the dynamics of competition for power between an old ruling power and a young candidate for domination. He describes it on the example of the Peloponnesian War and the rivalry between Athens and Sparta. However, such relationship



US PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP SHAKES HANDS WITH CHINESE PRESIDENT XI JINPING DURING A MEETING ON THE SIDELINES OF THE G-20 SUMMIT IN OSAKA, JAPAN, JUNE 29, 2019

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occurs not only at the national level but also in other circles, such as families or companies. Allison writes: “*the defining question about global order is whether China and the U.S. can escape the Thucydides’s Trap. Most contests that fit this pattern have ended badly. Over the past five hundred years, in sixteen cases, a major rising power has threatened to displace a ruling power. In twelve of those, the result was war*¹.” However, Allison’s book does not aim to exacerbate the current situation but to set a path helping to avoid an armed conflict.

Most of the experts specialized in international relations with China

¹ Graham Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?*, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017, p. 17.

follow the same reasoning. They are all aware that the military conflict between the United States and China would be definitely destructive for the whole world. Kevin Rudd, the former Prime Minister of Australia, who developed bilateral relations of both countries merits particular attention. He is one of the Western politicians with the best understanding of the Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo). Moreover, his ability to speak English and Mandarin significantly helped him to develop the American-Chinese diplomacy. In his famous lecture for TED, he excellently explained the Chinese mentality: “*The Chinese to this day believe that the United States and the West do not accept the legitimacy of their political system because it’s so radically different from those of us who come from liberal democracies. And believe that the United*

*States to this day is seeking to undermine their political system. China also believes that it is being contained by U.S. allies and by those with strategic partnership with the U.S. right around its periphery. And beyond that, the Chinese have this feeling in their heart of hearts and it their gut of guts that those of us in the collective West are just too damn arrogant*². This means that in international relations, the Chinese do not want to be preached and looked down on or educated on the rules of liberal democracy functioning. They are characterized by the disapproval of the Western dictate, especially the USA. This is expressed in the saying: “What is Chinese is the essence, what is Western is a complement”. For the last five thousand years, the Chinese were ruling on their own and they do not need an older brother to hold their hand. The acceptance of the domestic policy of the Middle Kingdom is a condition of any international relations with this state. The Chinese do not want to interfere with the domestic affairs of their partners, and they expect to be treated in the same way.

As the book of Graham Allison is a starting point for further discussions about the relations between the United States and China, it is necessary to pose a question, who woke up the American researcher from his geopolitical nap? Allison’s consideration of China was induced by his interview with the first Prime Minister and the founding father of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew. This short, but great text was published as “*Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the US, and the World*”. It is available in the Polish language version as well, even though in Poland, Lee Kuan Yew is almost completely unknown. The introduction to this paper written by Henry Kissinger begins with words: “*I have had the privilege of meeting many world leaders over the past*

half century; none, however, has taught me more than Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s first premier and its guiding spirit ever since.”³

Yew, being a Chinese educated in the Anglo-Saxon tradition at the University of Cambridge had a unique understanding of both civilizations: Chinese and American. This is the reason why he served as an adviser to all presidents of the United States, from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama, as well as many leaders of China. He was also a friend of Deng Xiaoping.

Lee Kuan Yew assessed the American-Chinese relations in the following way: “*This is not a cold war. The Soviet Union competed with the USA for global supremacy. China acts only as China, in its own national interest. It is not interested in changing the world*”. According to the Grand Master from the East, relations between the two countries will be marked by a struggle for influence but dimmed in the case of China as it needs the American market, technology and access to education in the USA for its own development. He also points out that there is no ideological conflict between the states as China enthusiastically embraced the free market and made use of globalization as well. Mutual relations are stabilized by trade dependence and a huge need for cooperation. We saw the evidence of this mutual relation during the G20 summit in Osaka when Donald Trump declared the end of the trade war and the end of the ban imposed on the cooperation with Huawei. Larry Kudlow, an economic adviser to the White House, immediately dampened the enthusiasm of the public opinion favoring this by commenting on Fox News that Huawei would not be granted an amnesty, the boycott of products of the Chinese tycoon would not be ceased, and the consent to sell American products is only

³ Graham Allison, Robert D. Blackwill and Ali Wyne, *Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the United States, and the World*, MIT Press, 2012, p. 7.

² <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8XQ1onjXJK0>



AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT SHIP USS WASP (LHD 1) TRANSITS THE WATERS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA. WASP, FLAGSHIP OF WASP AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP, IS OPERATING IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION TO ENHANCE INTEROPERABILITY WITH PARTNERS AND SERVE AS A LETHAL, READY-RESPONSE FORCE FOR ANY TYPE OF CONTINGENCY, SOUTH CHINA SEA, MARCH 29, 2019

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temporary. However, the declaration of the President of the USA is valid and was not a gesture of compassion for all users of Huawei devices in order not to deprive them of access to Google tools. This is the effect of cold calculation of gains and losses of American companies for whom the loss of the Chinese clientele would result in an enormous fall of income. American and Chinese economies are, after all, very tightly interconnected.

‘CHIMERICA’

The current situation is the aftermath of changes in American-Chinese relations which happened in the ‘70s during the presidency of Richard Nixon. Henry Kissinger was the architect who led to the economic and partly political opening of the United States to China. This aimed not only to win influences in China against the Soviet Union but

also to enhance the economic interests of the USA. The formation, called by some economists “*Chimerica*”, is the current result of years of enhancing the economic relations between both countries. After the temporary isolation of China which happened after the Tiananmen Square massacre, the Administration of Bill Clinton decided to separate the human rights issues from trade relations. Until the end of his presidency, the most favored treatment in trade was applied to Beijing. After 1992, China gained 282.6 billion dollars from foreign investments. Then, China unprecedentedly opened to the world and entered the process of globalization. As a result, in 1978-2012, the average annual growth in the Middle Kingdom amounted to 9.8 percent. American companies took advantage of the Chinese economy’s transformation. In the ‘90s, Americans relocated most of their factories to China to lower the costs of production. Until now, almost all of the biggest brands – such as Adidas, AT&T, Apple Computer, Avon, Coca Cola Foods, FedEx, General Motors, Gentek,

Gerber Foods, Gillette Company, Johnson & Johnson, Starbucks Corporation, Whirlpool Corporation, Ralph Loren, to name a few – are producing goods in China. The list is endless. Many European corporations acted alike. This means that in order to achieve a lower cost of production, technologies, tools and know-how were exported to China. Workers were trained and hired there. The relocation of factories entails not only the relocation of manufacturing technologies but also their development. Workers in China developed new skills and are still enhancing them. It is not a secret that the Chinese use the method of copying and reproducing technological solutions, products, new technologies or even programs and applications. Western companies have given the Chinese capabilities and knowledge which were copied and further enhanced by them. Stealing has become a method of collecting new information and this is not kept in secret. In 2014, Director of the FBI James Comey admitted: *“The amount of theft that’s going on is simply staggering. There’s only two types of big corporations in America. Those who have been hacked by the Chinese, or those who don’t yet know they’ve been hacked by the Chinese”*⁴ – he summed up. The results of the investigation carried out by the American CBS program also leave no doubt. The Chinese technological espionage cost American companies hundreds of billions of dollars. This is how the West created its greatest competitor by itself.

Only today, Americans have come to realize that they were lured by the desire to capture the huge Chinese market. Every administration of the USA since the ‘70s was convinced that the Chinese economic development equaled to

This is how the West created its greatest competitor by itself.

the growth of the American GDP. Indeed, when it comes to the numbers, everything added up. Bilateral trade income in 1986 amounted to 8 billion dollars and within 30 years it rose to 578 billion. However, actions taken by the United States turned out to be very short-term orientated and focused on the interim profit. China has become a cheap exporter, the factory of the world and an extremely absorptive market which was a wonderland for big corporations. But nobody predicted that Chinese producers would use the possessed knowledge and skills to develop their own companies and solutions making the West entirely dependent on them. According to the author of the book *“The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of Rising Power”*, American political scientist Thomas Christensen, *“since the Chinese reform era began in 1978, no global actor has done more to assist China’s rise than the United States”*⁵. American economists started to understand this problem. The assessment of Peter Navarro, one of the main advisers of President Donald Trump, expressed in his book *“Death by China. Confronting the Dragon – A Global Call to Action”* is especially crucial. We can observe the influence of this publication in the subsequent stages of the current trade war. *“Not coincidentally, as China has systematically hollowed out American manufacturing base, its economy has grown at the astonishing rate of 10% annually. In contrast, over the past decade, the U.S. economy has expanded at*

⁴ as in Graham Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?*, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017, p. 17

⁵ Thomas Christensen, *The China Challenge. Shaping the Choices of Rising Power*, W.W.Norton&Co, New York-London, 2015, Prologue.



G20 LEADERS ATTEND SESSION 3 AT A G20 SUMMIT MEETING IN OSAKA, JUNE 29, 2019

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a rate of only 2,4%. Note that this paltry 2,4% growth rate during the 2000s is fully 25% below American's historical growth rate of 3,2% between 1946 and 1999. (...) That 0,8% differences equates to a failure to create almost million jobs a year and, cumulatively, over 10 million jobs over the last decade⁶.

Among the American administration, especially experts and advisers on relations with China, such as Henry Kissinger, Henry Paulson, or Michael Pillsbury, there was a belief that economic liberalization and opening to global markets would go in par with political liberalization of China. This was the biggest mistake in the assessment of the Chinese civilization – all mentioned specialists admit. The support for the authorities ruling in the Middle Kingdom reaches 80 percent which is higher than in any western country. The Chinese trust their leaders and are driven by a

common target which is the development of the state and enrichment of the society. They do not think that western political solutions are better in any way or more proper for China. Lee Kuan Yew understood this matter properly: “China is not going to become a liberal democracy; if it did, it would collapse. Of that, I am quite sure, and the Chinese intelligentsia also understands that. If you believe that there is going to be a revolution of some sort in China for democracy, you are wrong. Where are the students of Tiananmen now? They are irrelevant. The Chinese people want a revived China⁷”.

THE CENTER OF THE WORLD

Traditionally, there are five directions in China: north, south, east, West, and... center. The center is China, which is “*everything under the Heavens*”. In contemporary China, Confucian traditions are clearly reviving. Many

⁶ Peter Navarro, *Death by China. Confronting the Dragon – A Global Call to Action*, Pearson Education, New Jersey, 2010, pp. 52, 53.

⁷ Graham Allison, Robert D. Blackwill and Ali Wyne, *Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and the World*, MIT Press, 2012, p. 14.

thinkers come back to the traditional system and concept *tianxia* – ancient belief implanted in the Chinese mentality that they constitute the center of the world and all foreign grounds are barbaric and crude. China is the only and true civilization and their cultural superiority is unquestionable. No other country can equal China. Chinese intellectuals, for example, philosopher Zhao Dingyang from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, are more and more frequently using this concept. For hundreds of years, the Middle Kingdom has functioned in the *tianxia* system. This system assumed the existence of a rigid center – China, and the existence of other subordinate elements located around China which used to pay the tribute for care and good relations. The Middle Kingdom had cultural supremacy over neighboring countries, however, it was not focused on conquering them, but on gentle influencing through values, morality and order. This is well explained by Dr Jacek Bartosiak in his work *“Pacyfik i Eurazja. O wojnie”* (*Pacific and Euroasia. About war*), stating “*there was no Westphalian system known by the West since the Thirty Years’ War in the 17th century providing for the sovereignty of states functioning in power relations, stabilizing each other and looking for alliances to balance the system*”⁸. China lost its dominating position in the 19th century, eventually after the First Opium War in 1839-1842. In the whole history of China, it is a very short period.

The Chinese believe that they have the right to dictate their will to their neighbors comes from the *tianxia* system. Analyses of the current relations between the United States and China point to two hot spots. These are the situation in the Korean Peninsula

The Chinese believe that they have the right to dictate their will to their neighbors comes from the *tianxia* system.

with the unpredictable policy of Kim Jong-un (China does not want the unification of Korea for many strategic reasons) and open disputes in the South China Sea. Freedom of navigation, especially in the most frequently used world communication routes: in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, protected by the US navy, is one of the main rules of the current order, sanctioned by the United States. However, China is trying to force the US Navy’s ships out of these waters. According to Bartosiak, as a response to similar actions, Americans are trying to develop and implement a concept of the air-naval war which aims to restore the American control over the communication routes leading to the allies in the region and assure freedom of navigation. However, Beijing is frequently mentioning the establishment of the two-hundred-miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea. It would result from the need to develop the maritime power of China and the necessity to make investments in the world to protect their economic and strategic interests, which in practice would prevent the US Navy from sailing in the EEZ territory. The most popular effect of this conflict known to the public is the construction of artificial islands by China on which the airport and harbor infrastructure is being developed to increase their power projection in the region.

⁸ Jacek Bartosiak, *Pacyfik i Eurazja. O wojnie*, Wydawnictwo Jacek Bartosiak, Warsaw, 2016, p. 308.

In order to stop the expansion of China in the South China Sea region, Americans are trying to enhance the alliance with Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. However, the Philippines is the only country that has officially signed the alliance with the USA. It has lasted since 1961 but was only confirmed on January 12, 2016, by the Supreme Court in Manila. The pact allows the Americans to access the infrastructure on the islands while the USA's strategy provides for the enhancement of allied airborne capabilities. The East China Sea has also become the arena for the American-Chinese increasing strategic competition where Japan as the American ally, is playing an important role. *"China, Japan, and the USA as well treat this water area as a place of a potential marine-air confrontation which is visible in maneuvers, exercises and demonstrations of power so frequent after 2012. To prove that, on December 25, 2015, the cabinet in Tokyo accepted the increase in the 2016 defense budget"*.

The situation in the South China Sea has its origin conveyed directly in the geostrategic ambitions of the Middle Kingdom. Xi Jinping is aware that the establishment of a maritime Silk Road is fully dependent on having control over these waters. The Chinese are not aiming at an armed conflict as their strategy for years entailed the avoidance of war. However, the control over sea routes conditions the development of trade which remains the highest priority for China. According to Allison: *"As long as developments in the South China Sea are generally moving in China's favor, it appears unlikely to use military force. But if trends in the correlation of forces should shift against it, particularly at a moment of domestic political instability, China could initiate a limited military conflict"*⁹.

⁹ Jacek Bartosiak, *Pacyfik i Eurazja. O wojnie*, Wydawnictwo Jacek Bartosiak, Warsaw, 2016, p. 573.

¹⁰ Graham Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?*, Houghton

There is no sense in guessing what may happen. The situation is dynamic. The key matter is to understand the scale and significance of the leap that China has made since the times of Mao to the governance of Xi Jinping and the awareness of the Chinese, global political, economic, cultural, and military impact. This is suggested by the combination of a 1350-million-people (that is 1.35 billion persons) population of China with a great pace of economic development, which led to the establishment of a superpower within less than 30 years. Everyone who visited at least one Chinese city understands it. The number of citizens and the scale of development amazes and overwhelms at the same time. The ambitious plan of Xi Jinping announced in October 2017 during the 19th meeting of CPC provides for the formation of a *"moderate welfare society"* until 2021 and the creation of a modern, innovative state until 2035. Xi Jinping's plan is prepared in detail and looks to the future as the Chinese, in contrast to the Europeans, create plans for generations. Until 2049, China is to become a modern power with a strong economy as well as services, industry and technology. Xi Jinping also talked about the influence of Chinese culture on the rest of the world. What would this influence be like? Can the world operate in the bipolar American-Chinese system? It is difficult to define yet. But for sure, China is the new, ambitious power divested of the western malaise which wants to struggle for its position in the world. Therefore, changes are inevitable and will be succeeding before our eyes. The new global order is being established right now.

Marta Kędzińska ■
September 2019

Mifflin Harcourt, 2017, p. 153.

THE PARADOXES OF AUTONOMY

ROBERT RAJCZYK, PhD

Macau and Hong Kong are former European colonies in Southeast Asia. Both territories have held the status of the special administrative regions under Chinese sovereignty since 1999 and 1997, respectively. This means that, except for their foreign and defense policies, they are self-governing bodies, albeit on the blessing of Beijing. Macau, a former Portuguese colony, is famous for the tourism and entertainment industry, while Hong Kong, which in the past remained under British rule, boasts the reputation of one of the world's top financial centers. In Hong Kong, people take to the streets to demonstrate, contrary to neighboring Macau that is not beset with a comparable problem at all. Some Chinese nationals from mainland China pump money into the gambling industry, the sole place in China where casinos are legal. Macau's local authorities implemented

mandatory patriotic education in schools and made a decision to bar non-Chinese judges from any cases involving national security issues¹. Macau people take part in the elections less willingly than their Hong Kongese peers, while Portugal — since it toppled the dictatorship in the Carnation Revolution of 1974 — made it clear it was doing nothing but just administering the Chinese territory that came under the profound influence of the Communist Party of China (CPC).

June 30, 1997. At dawn, according to tradition, the British flag of Hong Kong is hoisted atop a pole right in front of the governor's residence. Chris Patten, who serves as the 28th governor of Hong Kong, goes around the square with the pole on it for the last time in this role. Starting tomorrow, his duties will be assumed by

¹ Based on Portuguese law, Macau's jurisdiction allows judges of foreign origin to be appointed.



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130 000 PEOPLE JOINED THE PARADE ORGANIZED BY THE CIVIL HUMAN RIGHTS FRONT TO OPPOSE THE PROPOSED EXTRADITION LAW AMENDMENT, WHICH WOULD ALLOW CHINA TO EXTRADITE PERSONS IN HONG KONG FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF CHINA'S LAWS. HONG KONG SAR, APRIL 28, 2019

the Chief Executive, newly appointed by Beijing, while across the Admiralty district of Hong Kong flags of the People's Republic of China will flutter and a new banner of an already-Chinese Hong Kong. Illustrated as a symbol of the local population, the banner — modeled on the Chinese one — features a Bauhinia flower with the five red stars found on each of the petals. On July 1, 1997, Chris Patten, accompanied by Charles, Prince of Wales, and heir apparent to the British throne, who came to the handover ceremony on behalf of Queen Elizabeth II, sails away from the city on the royal yacht *Britannia* as the “*Rule, Britannia!*” anthem is playing in the background — ending 156 years of British rule in the territory.

In the language of its indigenous population, the name “Hong Kong” means “*fragrant harbor*”. But for every subsequent empire that held the city in its clutches, it had a slightly different scent. For the British, the aroma was a hint of its colonial superpower status

and an exotic overseas colony, though, for the People's Republic of China, it has been malodor of rebellion. Over the past twenty years of Beijing's dominance over Hong Kong, its residents have yet again taken to the streets to protest, each time seeking to preserve the city as a stronghold of democracy. Protests that swept across Hong Kong in 2012, 2014, and 2019 have always been politically motivated. The first rally sparked off against a proposed curriculum that embraced political features of mainland China. The second of which, often called the Umbrella Revolution, was intended to address the Hong Kong local electoral system, imposed by Beijing. This year's rally, culminating with nearly 2 million residents having flooded to the streets on June 9 (considering that Hong Kong has a population of 7.4 million people), is the climactic expression of disapproval of the pro-Chinese administration's efforts to put forward a proposed amendment on an extradition law, seen by some as a measure to crack down on uncomfortable political

opponents. And the number of these is still growing in the Pearl River harbor.

The Umbrella Movement, named after the umbrellas that shielded demonstrators from the hot sun, had brought to local power some candidates that stood up to defend universal suffrage, a solution agreed on with the United Kingdom². The Chief Executive of Hong Kong — being equivalent to the post of a Prime Minister elsewhere — takes their oath to the Chinese authorities and is chosen by Hong Kong residents out of other candidates approved by the Communist Party of China³.

Earlier, the governor arrived from London aboard a British Airways jet — as the nominee of the British monarch — while any plausible discussions over their candidacy took place inside the UK's Foreign Office, far from the colony's inhabitants. Notwithstanding this, no one seemed to complain about a lack of consultation as the United Kingdom stimulated an unfettered development — based on the freedom of expression and remaining democratic values — of the Kowloon Peninsula, Hong Kong island, and the New Territories. Owing to such efforts, 'the fragrant harbor' has become one of the Four Asian Tigers; countries that boast the world's largest number of buildings higher than 150 meters and a GDP per capita five times higher than Poland's. It served the role of a bridge

between communist China on the one hand, and the democratic West on the other.

The situation started to change in the late 20th century. To mark the CPC's centenary in 2021, China, which has begun to gather stream while assuming worldwide importance, has considered it a matter of honor to unify all Chinese lands seized by foreign forces back in the 19th century. Back then, a *"one country, two systems"* formula emerged, originally developed, however, with Taiwan in mind. The years 1984 and 1987 saw, for their turn, declarations signed with Great Britain and Portugal to hand over these two colonies back to China. This took place on July 1, 1997, and December 20, 1999. Under Hong Kong's and Macau's basic laws, or their constitutional documents, adopted by the National People's Congress (NPC), both colonies were provided guarantees for maintaining their autonomy for a half of century, except for their foreign and defense policies. The first fifteen years did not indicate any changes were to take place sometime soon.

After Xi Jinping rose to power in Beijing, the situation saw a tilt towards his longed-for policy of *"a great renaissance of the Chinese nation"*, intended to happen through, inter alia, establishing China's Social Credit System; a mechanism that aimed to foster social ties once completely swept away by the cultural revolution. But what stands out as its key factor is an ambition to shape Chinese prosperity, with the strategy of both increasing China's domestic consumption and exporting surpluses. The latter could materialize owing to the Belt and Road initiative. This political and economic project designed to strengthen and expand China's zone of economic influence worldwide has also particular focus on Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans (as part of the

² On the tide of rallies, there emerged political parties seeking to advance autonomous – or even secessionist – slogans. However, a few Hong Kong's Legislative Council deputies lost their seats under a decision of a local court in the aftermath of their refusal to take an oath of allegiance to China.

³ Macau's local government structure is headed by the Chief Executive, who is appointed by China's central government after getting a green light from a committee that consists of members endorsed by social organizations. The Legislative Assembly is a body comprising both directly elected legislators while other members are elected in indirect suffrage and appointed by the head of administration.



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UMBRELLA REVOLUTION, HONG KONG OCTOBER 2, 2014

16+1 format), as well as, first and foremost, Africa.

Xi Jinping, for whom it is evidently politically inconvenient to pursue Deng Xiaoping's idea of collective leadership, remains increasingly committed to solidifying his political position. What rose as the culmination of Xi's deviation from the principle, formulated in an effort to prevent the emergence of a Mao Zedong-like dictatorship, was a 2018 constitutional amendment removing term limits for the chairman of the Communist Party of China, or the *de facto* state's president. During a six-year rule that preceded the constitutional amendment, Xi purged all opposition within the party under the guise of an anti-corruption campaign, a fight whose origins date back to the time of the Chinese Empire and the founding of China's first republic⁴. Struggle against

corruption has even become a theme of a popular Chinese TV drama series 'In the Name of the People', to a great extent bankrolled by the Supreme People's Procuratorate (SPP).

It would be yet a mistake to believe that the process of consolidating power in the hands of one man is coming to an end. After all, the Communist Party of China has a total of more than 90 million members. With such a sizeable membership, the Communist Party of China is not an undivided monolith, and tensions running high between its numerous factions *do* resemble Western-like inter-party rivalries. There are also worried voices of dismay, mainly from the former party and state leaders, stressing that Xi had made a considerable mistake, both political and economic, upon declaring a trade war with the United States. Xi Jinping's actions can be also interpreted as sailing away from

⁴ The period between 1911 and 1949.

Deng Xiaoping's "28-Character Strategy". This boils down to China's pursuit to consolidate its power as a state as well as strengthening the projection of its power on the global scale, revealing neither efforts nor the state's intentions in this regard. Conspicuously enough, attesting to such is also the willingness to dispute assertively the Spratly Islands, an archipelago in the South China Sea where China operates according to *fait accompli* tactics.

Hong Kong's "troubles" do not serve Xi Jinping's image that has been shaped over the past recent years, depicting him as a capable politician and a global statesman. How the issue should be tackled is in effect a 'litmus test' for Xi Jinping's leadership while serving as an occasion to secure support from "hard-headed" communists in the twenty five-member Central Politburo of the Communist Party of China, of whom seven people hold posts in the Politburo Standing Committee, or an executive committee.

A certain paradox is that Hong Kong's autonomy has become "a pain in the neck", but mostly for some of China's senior policymakers. Mainland Chinese, for their part, seem satisfied with all the benefits offered by the special autonomous region. As many as 28 million tourists, or 75 percent of all visitors, leave a lot of money in the city in a move that yet gives a headache to its residents. Tourists' conduct stands in stark contrast to local traditions, as shows the example of their behavior in public places⁵. Moreover, mainland Chinese individuals and entities invest in the real estate market, a move that has contributed significantly to skyrocketing the already-high prices, shattering most of the inhabitants' dreams of an own

apartment and making it a far more distant dream than that at the time under the British rule. Furthermore, mainland Chinese women on enormous scales decide to go to Hong Kong to give birth to their new-born infants, which is not only due to the infant mortality rate being six times lower than in China, but – first and foremost – it also paves the baby's way for being granted resident status with the right of free 12-year education or to hold a Hong Kongese passport whose power — counted as an index according to the number of countries it can access without an visa in advance — is much greater than China's⁶.

Hong Kong residents differ from their mainland peers. While people living in the harbor on the Pearl River generally speak Cantonese, those inhabiting other parts of China communicate in Mandarin. A mere 3 percent of Hong Kong residents feel Chinese, and a social study shows two-thirds of the local population identifying themselves with regional identity. Mandatory patriotic education was implemented to the school curriculum in a bid to reverse this tendency. And then appeared a teenage activist Joshua Wong who, through Internet communication channels, called on his peers to boycott the class. The form in which local rallies are being held keeps evolving, from the initial boycott of a controversial school class, through blockading of the city's Central business district and its commercial arteries, to rallies whose atmosphere is sometimes far from peaceful. Protestors vandalized the Chinese government's liaison office and earlier had stormed the Legislative Council, causing damage in its headquarters. Police's pursuits for quelling the riots, alongside sentencing leaders of the 2014 Umbrella Movement,

⁵ It is about breaching the ban on eating in the Hong Kong subway or satisfying the youngest children's physiological needs on the sidewalks.

⁶ <https://www.passportindex.org/comparebyPassport.php>



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UMBRELLA REVOLUTION, HONG KONG OCTOBER 2, 2014

including Wong, to prison terms of up to a few months, drifted demonstrators away from their former strategy, pushing for a new one instead⁷.

Firstly, it is worth noting that there is no strict leadership, while demonstrators who decide to speak with the media cover their faces with sunglasses and surgical masks. In shops where demonstrators buy helmets, protective clothing, and protective foil against pepper gas used by the police, they pay in cash. Also, they managed to develop their own gesture-based system of visual communication, used when in the crowd. The protests further moved to Hong Kong's international airport

in an attempt to arouse the interest of foreigners in the fate of the city under the Chinese rule, at times in a very much insistent manner. Hong Kong demonstrators block subway trains, persistently pressing the emergency button on board, causing delays. Two months of protests going on in Hong Kong worsened the daily life of the city's residents dramatically. In an interview for a Hong Kong-based daily South China Morning Post, Singaporean real estate agents said that the number of Hong Kong residents people interested in purchasing real estate in the Lion City had risen by one-third over the past eight weeks.

But the authorities do not give the game away and have no intention to neglect the problem, possibly inspiring local thugs, labeled "*titushky*", to come to the fore. These are members of local

⁷ Three leaders, among whom Wong, 20, were sentenced to from 8 to 10 months in prison, yet not for taking part in the protests but de facto for hooliganism, which made them first-ever political prisoners in China's Hong Kong.

gangs who stormed both commuters and young people dressed in black, or the color adopted by demonstrators, at a subway station. Interestingly, they all wear white. China's "screw-tightening" efforts in Hong Kong has de facto been going on since 2010. City-based editors are grappling with mounting pressure from local administration while their journalists sometimes fall victim to physical assaults by "unknown perpetrators". Newspaper owners either sell them to more agreeable entrepreneurs or hire journalists that prove more prone to apply self-censorship than their colleagues, accustomed to freedom of expression standards at work. Neither do followers of Falun Gong lead an uneasy life, though — compared to what takes place in mainland China — they are not persecuted in any way. Printing books that are forbidden in other Chinese regions is possible in Hong Kong — but may be burdened with consequences. Four years ago, a group of Hong Kong booksellers who sold publications eyed by mainland China as "subversive" suddenly disappeared. They were "accidentally" found in China after only a few months later and publicly repented of their earlier activities.

Beijing sees Hong Kong as an ungrateful child that is unable to distinguish all efforts made by its mighty guardian. Hong Kong's local financial elites, including those that settled in the city in the post-1997 period, show gratitude to Beijing for being capable of enriching themselves by getting access to the Chinese market. Efforts are also being taken to gravitate the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau closer to mainland China. Part of a train station located in the downtown area, linked with mainland China by a high-speed train, was incorporated into China while the

two territories received a link to the continent through a 45 kilometer-long road bridge, a solution that shortened travel time between Hong Kong and Macau, which were previously mostly connected by ferry. Dubbed until recently a bridge between the worldwide economy and a developing China, Hong Kong is losing its current position gradually. Though the city remains a world's leading financial center, it accounts for a mere 3 percent of China's GDP. Located nearby and referred to as one of the world's biggest ports, Shenzhen and Shanghai — with their stock exchange — have in fact taken its dominant position. In their pursuit of attracting investors, Chinese firms have in the past moved their premises to Hong Kong. Now it serves as a place from where international companies are doing their best to make an entry into the Chinese market. A World Bank ranking showed that in Hong Kong, it is twenty times as easier to do business than in mainland China.

Hong Kong's worsening social and political situation has prompted young people, of whom a majority of protesters do not remember life under the British rule, to emigrate to democratically-led Taiwan, whose leader has offered asylum to Hong Kong protestors, yet ignoring China's law pertaining to 'no asylum'. The events taking place in close vicinity to Hong Kong are for some Taiwanese — who do not display a particular pro-Chinese leaning — evidence of the 'one country, two systems' formula's practical dimension while sending worldwide a signal of how peculiar China's attitude is to fulfilling international obligations. A spokesperson for Beijing-based Ministry of Foreign Affairs referred to the Sino-British handover deal of 1984 as "*a historical document that no longer had any practical significance*". Therefore it is not known whether the 'one country,

two systems' principle will remain in force after Hong Kong's autonomy expires in 2047, as stipulated under the Chinese-British agreement, or it is gradually ceasing to be in force through the use of "salami-slicing tactics", that is; eliminating Hong Kong's autonomous status, piece by piece.

Moreover, it is not farfetched to argue that limited but worrying resemblances between Tiananmen and the developing situation in Hong Kong could be inferred. At the least, some lessons learnt are worth scrutinizing, albeit taking into consideration the different contexts, hindsight, times, and so on.

The *first* similarity is the expansion of participating protesters, and with them, a larger list of demands. In 1989, peaceful student-led call for democracy spread to other cities of China, running the risk of destabilizing the political system. In 2019, the first Hong Kong protesters stood against the extradition bill, yet have since also again demanded democracy, even references to secession. One ought to wonder how this rings in the ears of the CPC members, which staunchly emphasizes on the country's unity.

The *second* similarity is a half-hearted attempt to meet protesters expectations. These are met with an increasingly stern warnings from the CPC. Chief spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense Wu Qian said that Hong Kong rallies "*absolutely cannot be accepted*", hinting the possibility of a military intervention by a Chinese garrison, already on the spot, especially given that the constitution of the Special Autonomous Region allows Hong Kong's leaders to submit such a request to Beijing officials. In his remarks, Mr. Qian added that the demonstrators "*have invited the wolf into their home,*

and their actions are orchestrated by foreign-based anti-Chinese forces".

The *third* similarity is timing close to a significant date. In May 1989, where protests are already a month long, Mikhail Gorbachev visited Beijing. Such a state visit was the first in 3 decades, normalizing relations after the Sino-Soviet split. With a state visit come several journalists, which then exposed the protests and caused embarrassment. Surely no one expected a military crackdown close to October 1, 2019 for the same reason that it would not look too good. Whilst that date has passed, media attention on Hong Kong has not.

The *fourth* key similarity, and perhaps the most worrisome, is the accusation by the CPC that the protests are not authentic expressions of disapproval of genuine problems, but the works of foreign intelligence agencies seeking to discredit the CPC. They referred to this as 'black hands' in 1989, and they did so again in 2019.

Before the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests unfolded, little had indicated the possibility of military intervention. In May 1989, martial law was declared, and in June 1989, the military moved in. A plausible military intrusion in Hong Kong would, in turn, call up a clear association with the 1989 events. Hence, what stands out as a far more plausible scenario, however, is responding to the crisis with a range of political tools, though it cannot be ruled out that Beijing will react forcefully in the case of the tensions running high and getting out of control of law enforcement agents who are already using tear gas and rubber bullets to quell the groups of protesters. Perhaps the Hong Kong police will soon get help from the Chinese People's Armed Police Force — or mainland China's riot police — as after all, both them *are*



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PRO-DEMOCRACY ACTIVIST JOSHUA WONG IS HELD BY A POLICEMAN DURING A CONFRONTATION AFTER TAKING PART IN A MARCH TOWARDS THE WEST KOWLOON RAIL TERMINAL AGAINST THE PROPOSED EXTRADITION BILL IN HONG KONG, JULY 7, 2019

carrying out joint drills in the Canton region, just across the border.

Intriguingly, developments in Hong Kong *also* pose a PR problem for the democratic-leaning West, as well as European firms that are present there. Perhaps a solution to Hong Kong's hardships would be political independence, modeled on the Baltic States close to the demise of the Soviet Union. Back then, there were no indications that the mighty power would allow three of its republics to detach with virtually no bloodshed, except for, unfortunately, tragic events at the foot of the Vilnius TV tower. Because honor, and "*saving face*", is known to be of crucial importance for hierarchical customs associated with cultures in East Asia, deploying mainland militia to quell pro-democratic protests is not such a

PR catastrophe as engaging troops. An intervention of Chinese police officers could be depicted through the lens of propaganda as a regular action taken in a bid to restore public order.

However, what counts most in the case of Chinese communists is a message on the party's effectiveness and its unquestionable leadership. After all, this is why Beijing is so touchy about Taiwan's independence and U.S. aid there. If there is a solution to the ongoing conundrum in Hong Kong to attain Beijing's agreement, it likely will have to allow Beijing to 'save face', at the very least, domestically, where a policy envisioning a unified China is dogmatically pursued.

Robert Rajczyk ■
September 2019

2019 EUROPEAN ELECTION AND ITS OUTCOMES

TOMASZ GRZEGORZ GROSSE, PROFESSOR

This year's elections to the European Parliament brought about a number of changes in the shape of EU policy. The most important of them is probably the shifting of the entire spectrum of Euro-enthusiastic forces to the left. Despite the high turnout and the awakened ambitions of MEPs, it quickly became clear that it is the Member States that continue to have the most to say on key issues such as filling the key EU posts. The problem is, therefore, that the intergovernmental logic in the EU dominates over the parliamentary one – and is even trying to use political factions in the European Parliament to pursue national interests.

EP ELECTION RESULTS

In the European election held in May 2019, the European People's Party (EPP) won the most seats – 182, followed by the left-wing Socialists and Democrats (S&D) – 154. The third force in the EP is the Liberals (former ALDE, now 'Renew Europe') – 108 seats, and the fourth – Greens (75). The factions considered Eurosceptic will hold onto the

following number of seats – Identity and Democracy (73), European Conservatives and Reformists Group (62), the 5 Star Movement and the Brexit Party (43), and the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (41)¹.

¹ 2019 European election results, European Parliament, <https://www.election-results.eu/> [Accessed on: 27.06.2019].



**CHARLES MICHEL, PRESIDENT-ELECT OF THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL,
FINLAND, OCTOBER 14, 2019**


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The elections revealed a very strong division between Euro-enthusiastic groups supporting the process of unification of EU countries, and Eurosceptic factions, critical of the integration processes and proposing an alternative direction of its development. These two separate groups dispute over the vision of European integration (more centralized and transnational versus the more decentralized and flexible – leaving more autonomy for nation-states), as well as European values (liberal and left-wing versus conservative and Christian Democratic).

In European Elections, the parties of the previous mainstream were the most successful. Eurosceptic groups,

however, have increased their number of seats in the EP. In addition, the two largest mainstream parties, which so far, following the German model, having on numerous occasions formed a great coalition in the European Parliament, have significantly lost many seats they had had before. Both EPP and S&D have lost around 30 seats, respectively; together, they have lost nearly 70 MEPs. In both factions, the representation of German members significantly weakened. The consequence of the loss of these parties was that it was impossible to form a majority in the EP based on the two largest groups. In this way, the Euro-enthusiastic coalition intending to have the greatest influence on policy and legislation in European Parliament, had to seek support

European Union Elections 2019



in two other formations: Renew Europe (the former Liberals) and the Greens. The mere fact of greater fragmentation in the Euro-enthusiastic camp translated into serious difficulties in filling the highest posts in the EP and in other institutions in the EU.

An additional factor was the political plan of the French President Emmanuel Macron, who intended to weaken Germany's position in the European institutions in these elections. Until now, the largest faction, the European People's Party, has been a very effective tool for German politics. For many politicians and national parties, its meaning was more pragmatic than programmatic. Its influence is best reflected in the fact that after the previous elections in 2014 it filled not only the position of EP President (although only from 2017) but also all other key positions in the EU – the leadership of the European Commission (EC), the European Council

and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The European People's Party was known for its great discipline and enormous influence of the German Christian Democrats, and was therefore considered to be an instrument of influence for Chancellor Angela Merkel². Therefore, it was sometimes referred to as the “vehicle” of German politics in the EU. In addition, the influence of this faction was complemented by an alliance with the Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament. In this left-wing group, the main role was played by the German Social Democrats – associated with Merkel's coalition in Germany. All of this gave Merkel significant influence and high effectiveness in politics at EU level.

Macron's first goal was to weaken the position of Germany – above all, the

² A. Barker, V. Mallet, G. Chazan, *EU jobs race hit by Merkel – Macron friction*, Financial Times, June 14, 2019, p. 9.

“German vehicle” which was all about its domination of the European People’s Party in EU politics. Secondly, it was aimed at selecting its own vehicle to implement French political goals in the EU.

In effect, Macron managed to succeed in weakening the European People’s Party. Not only has it significantly reduced its previous EP influence, measured primarily by the number of MEPs, but, more importantly, it effectively weakened the right-wing rhetoric of EPP representatives. The intention of the conflict over Viktor Orban’s party (Fidesz) during the campaign and the suspension of rights of this political group was to show the pro-European nature of the European People’s Party and Manfred Weber’s uncompromising attitude towards defending European values. However, it has contributed to the EPP ceasing to refer to right-wing and conservative principles, while at the same time adopting liberal rhetoric on European values and, when it comes to chosen moral disputes, even taking on left-wing views. This not only reduced its electoral attractiveness for the right-wing electorate but also put left-wing and liberal politicians and liberals in ‘truly’ pro-European positions. It thus gave the electoral initiative to the Euro-enthusiastic left and the liberals, who were increasingly concentrated alongside Macron’s party. It is no coincidence that the new liberal faction was named ‘Renew Europe’ after the elections and that the dominant role in its ranks is played by politicians from the French party *La République En Marche!* (REM), now ruling in France. In addition, within the Socialist and Democrat party, the position of German Social Democrats weakened after the elections. Spanish Socialists, on the other hand, who are in close relations with the French president’s milieu, gained ground.

With these strategies, Macron was trying to build a strong leadership center for the future coalition of Euro-enthusiastic forces in the EP alongside the former liberal and socialist factions. At the same time, he wanted to weaken the previous political and programmatic significance of the European People’s Party. He sought, in consequence, to strengthen the French influence and weaken the German one in the EP, and, simultaneously, in the entire EU balance of power – because, at the moment, the post-election game also involved filling key positions in other EU bodies, not only in this institution.

Another consequence of these actions was a clear shift in the European mainstream towards the left and the liberal ideas. What was symptomatic for the whole formation was the case of the Polish Civic Platform (PO), which is one of the largest national parties forming the European People’s Party. Until the elections, it was part of a coalition with left-wing parties (including Democratic Left Alliance, Feminist Initiative, Polish Social Democracy, Freedom and Equality), which clearly shifted its electoral narration to the left-wing direction. At the same time, it weakened the European election result of the European People’s Party, as the political capital of the largest opposition party (PO) was divided into smaller groups, representatives of which also joined other factions in the EP. The Polish example is very characteristic of the shift of the Euro-enthusiastic mainstream towards the left.

MAIN RESULTS OF THE EP ELECTIONS

Firstly, the elections weakened the mainstream right, the European People’s Party, which, by rhetorically approaching the left and the liberals, passed the domination in the EP to the Eurosceptic groups, the orientation of most of which is clearly conservative and



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JOSEP BORRELL, NOMINEE FOR THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY, LUXEMBOURG, OCTOBER 14, 2019

The credibility of the new right-wing in the EP can be further enhanced by referring to a different vision of European integration from the one proposed so far by left-wing and liberal environments.

Christian Democratic. This is a potentially significant opportunity for these groups in the long term. It may involve the expansion of influence in the electorate, namely occupying the arena formerly belonging to the groups forming the European People's Party. This faction may become even smaller in the future or even

fall apart. Moreover, the described changes may lead to a break with the stigmatization of "Eurosceptic" and "populist" groups in favor of terms referring to their Christianity, conservatism, or broadly understood right-wing ideas. The credibility of the new right-wing in the EP can be further enhanced by referring to a different vision of European integration from the one proposed so far by left-wing and liberal environments.

Secondly, we should expect that the political pressure from EP will be increasing – against countries which, in the opinion of left-wing circles, allegedly violate European values, although they often simply try to defend their own Christian and conservative agenda. This applies in particular to the dispute over the rule of law and other European values.

Moreover, the EP will probably seek to increase the scale of European redistribution (especially within the eurozone), introduce protectionist solutions, including those moving away from neoliberal solutions on the internal

market, and intending to increase tax harmonization and minimum standards for social services across the EU.

In addition, it is to be expected that the ambitions in the area of climate policy will strengthen. This is related to the success of green groups in some Western European countries, mainly in Germany.

Furthermore, a stronger criticism of the USA and transatlantic relations are likely, especially during the period of Donald Trump's administration. The countries that are too pro-American and are afraid of deepening cooperation in European defense policy so that it does not harm NATO's role in Europe will also be stigmatized.

Besides, the EP's position on Brexit and relations with the United Kingdom could be tightened up – serving, for instance, as a method of combating Euroscepticism ideologically. This will be at the expense of seeking the most pragmatic bilateral relations, for instance between the EU and the United Kingdom. This is all the more so as the EP elections in the UK also strengthened its position in favor of a tougher and uncompromising approach to the EU.

Additionally, a strong rivalry appeared in the European Parliament, not only between the Euro-enthusiastic mainstream and Eurosceptic groups, but also within the mainstream itself, especially between the “German bloc” and the “French bloc.” This situation was barely visible before. The Franco-German disputes and disagreements between their allies, have so far mainly occurred in intergovernmental institutions. Fractional disputes are currently being moved to the Council of the European Union and the European Council. National disputes, on the other hand, especially within two blocs centered around the dominant states, are

National interests will be more important than the approaches of the European factions.

now occurring in the EP, as evidenced by the blocking of the French candidate for the new Commission, Sylvie Goulard. The outcome of the latter is affecting the divisions within the mainstream. The logic of the dispute between France and Germany leads both sides to seeking allies in other EP factions or other countries – in intergovernmental institutions.

It should be noted, however, that the future of many substantive aspects of EU policies depends more on intergovernmental institutions policy than on political conditions in the EP. This means that national interests will be more important than the approaches of the European factions. Many disputes within intergovernmental institutions go beyond parliamentary divisions, for instance the one between Euro-enthusiasts vs. Eurosceptics, or between more left-wing or right-wing governments. The role of political groups in disputes within intergovernmental institutions will probably be even less important than it used to be before the 2019 elections. This is mainly caused by the weakening of the European People's Party.

There is one very symptomatic example of all phenomena described. With regard to the future of the eurozone, the French and Spanish governments have clearly expressed their Euro-enthusiastic positions. The “Eurosceptic” Italian government also had similar expectations of increasing redistribution in the monetary union. On the other hand, the



**URSULA VON DER LEYEN,
NOMINATED PRESIDENT OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
BELGIUM, OCTOBER 18, 2019**

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greatest skeptics of the French proposals and those supported by other countries of Southern Europe are the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, and the countries of Northern Europe, regardless of their political affiliation in the EP. The line of disagreement over reforms in the eurozone surpasses both division into euro-enthusiasts vs. Eurosceptics and membership of the EP's political families (for example, the biggest opponent of the French proposals to reform the monetary union – Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte – belongs to the same political group in the EP as President Macron's party, the group re-established by the French leader).

“GAME OF THRONES” AT THE EU

Power in the EU is based on the institutions, the filling of key functions in the EU structures, and the use of political factions from EP to pursue objectives at EU level. That is why the results of the EP elections and the related distribution of key posts in the EU institutions were so important. It turned out that France and Germany, as well as their national interests, are the most important players in the game for institutions.

On the formal level, the EP approves the candidacy of the head of the European Commission, and then the list of candidatures of the Commissioners of the institutions. It may also interview them and suggest changes to some of the most controversial proposals. Nevertheless, the Member States and the coalitions between them, and to a smaller extent the logic of the political factions, have the most significant influence on filling chosen EU posts.

The arguments relating to European elections were rather an additional support for these intergovernmental negotiations and an attempt to impose legitimacy-orientated logic, which was supposed to make the game easier for

some countries. For example, Germany supported its candidate for the position of the head of the European Commission – Manfred Weber. The country based on the informal “*Spitzenkandidat*” mechanism, *according to which the candidate of the largest group in the new European Parliament was to take up this position in the European Commission. Macron's tactic was to discredit Weber (as incompetent, weak, and so on) and to disown the of “Spitzenkandidat” tradition, as a non-treaty one and as limiting European Council in its sovereign decisions. This is why prominent German politicians have accused Macron of not only being anti-German but also of destroying European democracy*³. Furthermore, Macron tried to build an alternative to a “German vehicle,” i.e., the – European People's Party (EPP) – the composition of EP factions that will question the EPP's dominance in EU politics to date. It should be added that the European People's Party has eight votes in the European Council, and the emerging outline of the left-liberal alliance – 15. However, this new “liberal vehicle” was only under construction and, therefore, did not have much meaning for the logic of the European Council designations. In this way, the fractional logic supported – if anything – Germany rather than France.

In the first phase of the dispute over the position of head of the European Commission, the “*spitzenkandidat*” of the European People's Party (Manfred Weber) and the discredited candidates of other factions (Frans Timmermans, Margrethe Vestager) were lost. The French President even said that all three leading candidates had been eliminated⁴. Alternative

³ J. Mischke, *Senior MEP accuses Macron of being 'anti-German'*, Politico, 24.06.2019, <https://www.politico.eu/article/senior-mep-accuses-emmanuel-macron-of-being-anti-german-daniel-caspary/> [Accessed on: 27.06.2019].

⁴ D.M. Herszenhorn, F. Eder, M. de la Baume, R. Momtaz, J. Barigazzi, *How Merkel's plan for EU top jobs fell apart*, Politico, 1.07.2019, <https://www.politico.com>.

applications were then examined, in particular the back-up EPP candidates. At the same time, there was a threat that the blockade of the German candidate might translate into a consistent blocking of the French for the most important positions.

In the second part of the negotiations, a Franco-German agreement was reached with the support of the Dutch and Spanish governments during the G20 summit in Osaka. It was based on the candidacy of the socialist Frans Timmermans as head of the Commission. In this way, the institution of the “leading candidate” was reactivated, although in a modified version matching the current political needs (the faction of Timmermans did not win the elections, so according to the original assumptions of the “*spitzenkandidat*” mechanism he should not take up the post of the head of the EC). This was conducted rather as a tribute of Angela Merkel for her coalition partner – German Social Democrats. It also aimed to break up the alliance between Renew Europe and Socialists and Democrats. In addition, the package provided for Weber’s transfer to the head of the EP for a full term of office. Some diplomats suggested that Timmermans’s proposal meant to be a failure from the very beginning and was intended to pave the way for the next negotiation deal⁵. Indeed, this agreement has been blocked by the Visegrad Group, Italy, and some countries linked to the European People’s Party, including Croatia and Latvia. This stage was marked by a rebellion in the ranks of the EPP and by the growing emancipation of Central Europe, which at this stage effectively stopped the candidacy of Timmermans, seen as unfavorable for the region. Moreover, Central Europe (particularly the Visegrad

Group) was able to maintain its unity in very important negotiations – despite repeated attempts to break up their common front (for example Slovak PM belonged to the same European political family as Timmermans).

In the third stage, Ursula von der Leyen, considered to be closely related to Merkel, was proposed as the next candidate. To some degree surprising, this German nomination, as well as other accompanying nominations, received broad support from the European Council, including the countries of Central Europe. Something that was difficult or even impossible to push through at first, the German option in the Commission, became a fact in the third round of negotiations. Without the battle for Timmermans, there would not have been such a quick conclusion to the negotiations. This is undoubtedly a success for Germany and Merkel. France, however, won even more. Christine Lagarde will be President of the European Central Bank. Moreover, this is how the French led to the blocking of the German candidate Jens Weidmann, known for his criticism of Mario Draghi’s unconventional monetary policy. Lagarde will not only continue the monetary easing line of her predecessor but will also encourage European politicians to increase fiscal expansion in the event of another crisis. It is also possible that she will agree to finance this expansion within the framework of monetary policy. The success of Paris is also its nomination for two other posts. Spanish socialist Josep Borrell will take up the post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs, while Charles Michel, a member of Renew Europe, will be the new President of the European Council.

CONCLUSIONS

Firstly, both the governing coalition in the EP and the arrangement of positions in the EU are proof of the post-election shift of the Euro-enthusiastic elites to the left. This

[eu/article/how-angela-merkel-plan-for-eu-top-jobs-fell-apart-spitzenkandidat-summit/](#) [accessed on 27.07.2019].

⁵ A. Barker, M. Khan, *Timmermans emerges as favorite to take over from Juncker*, Financial Times, 29 June – 30 June 2019, s. 4.

marks the end of the era of dominance of EPP politicians in the EU institutions. It is also no coincidence that the candidacy of Timmermans – although controversial for Central Europe – has been put forward in relation to more general political processes in the EU. In addition, the new group of people at the top EU posts were enthusiastic about integration. For example, von der Leyen is in favor of the introduction of the ‘United States of Europe’ and the creation of a federal army for all Europeans⁶.

Secondly, the post-election reality proves the superiority of the European Council and the logic of national interests in EU policy. Macron overthrew the “Spitzenkandidat” mechanism that had been respected since 2014 because he saw it as more conducive to German than French European goals. Although many politicians in the European Council referred to the results of the last elections and the mechanism of the “leading candidate,” these were arguments intended to push through their particular interests, and not the leading logic of making personnel decisions. The EP is rebellious, as evidenced by the rejection of the governments’ suggestions on the President of this institution. As a result, the candidacy of the only representative of Central Europe for a high office, a Bulgarian Sergei Stanishev, was lost. Moreover, the nomination of von der Leyen will probably lead to a reduction in the Commission’s autonomy towards intergovernmental institutions and thus increase the influence in EU policy of the largest Member States.

What is more, the key to power in the EU is filling key functions in its institutions as well as using political factions from the European Parliament to pursue

The Franco-German disputes constitute an opportunity for the [Central European] region to pursue its own interests more effectively.

objectives at EU level. It turned out that France and Germany, as well as their national interests, are the most important in the game of institutions. This confirmed the dominance of the Franco-German’ engine in the EU. However, there was also a visible competition between Paris and Berlin, and both countries were looking for allies, both in other countries and in other political families.

In addition, the new institutions are dominated by politicians from the western part of the continent. Indeed, Central Europe has stepped out of the shadows of Western Europe, blocking in solidarity the candidacy of Timmermans. However, this was only a partial success because the Dutch will be Vice-President of the new Commission. Moreover, the negotiation effort of Central Europe has not led to the introduction of its own representatives into the most important positions, but rather to the success of Germany and France. However, cooperation in this region is being increasingly translated into a common policy at EU level, which is likely to deepen in the future. Furthermore, the Franco-German disputes constitute an opportunity for the [Central European] region to pursue its own interests more effectively.

⁶ Z. Weise, *Ursula von der Leyen: In her own words*, Politico, 4.07.2019, <https://www.politico.eu/> [Accessed on 27.07.2019].

Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse ■
September 29, 2019

THE EUROPEAN UNION WILL BE BETTER OFF WITHOUT FRANS TIMMERMANS

PIOTR BAJDA, PROFESSOR

One can assert, without too much doubt, that during the post-electoral phase, in which the European community fills in the most important EU positions, a political storm had passed that turned many otherwise intricately arranged tables upside down. Albeit we are unlikely to fully recognize all the consequences these events have induced just yet; we can define some of the most important results of our decisions.

An initial point of all the commotion was the set of decisions made by President of the European Council Donald Tusk and the leaders of four European countries (Germany, France, Spain and the Netherlands) on the margins of the G20 summit in Osaka, Japan. This informal, and clearly beyond-the-treaty group met outside the official EU calendar, far from Brussels, and jointly allocated the key positions for the new term of office of the European Parliament and the European

Commission. Other EU members were informed *post factum* and, confronted with a *fait accompli*, were left with only the responsibility of authorizing the said already-made vital decisions. The central feature of the so-called Osaka ‘*pact of five*’ was entrusting the Dutch socialist Frans Timmermans with the role of the President of the European Commission.

The decision taken by the most dominant European politicians seemed to prejudge the matter, and yet this very intricate plan incited defiance of absent decision-



**FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT OF EUROPEAN
COMMISSION FRANS TIMMERMANS,
BELGIUM, OCTOBER 23, 2018**

makers, which could be an important signal, indicative of new times in the EU. Those as mentioned earlier five European leaders in Osaka were convinced that after the European elections, little had changed, and their decisions would be almost automatically accepted by other members of the European Community, as it was often previously the case. Indeed, there were grounds to think as such – the first hours of the July’s European Council summit did not prognosticate any dramaturgy; they were practically a routine repetition of preceding instances, i.e. several rounds of heated discussions, a few breaks, unofficial arranging of common positions, promises to the undecided, and the highly anticipated negotiation finale. It could be argued that at the beginning of that summit, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki with the Head of Hungarian Government Viktor Orban were alone in their doubts on whether Timmermans was really the optimal candidate for the head of the European Commission.

Nevertheless, it was the attitude of the Polish Prime Minister, supported by the

The decision taken by the most dominant European politicians seemed to prejudge the matter, and yet this very intricate plan incited defiance of absent decision-makers, which could be an important signal, indicative of new times in the EU.

Hungarians, which avidly caused a rather unexpected twist. It aptly gave others a signal to protest against this manner of making decisions through bypassing treaty bodies and the intergovernmental dimension of the community. Most



PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION JEAN-CLAUDE JUNCKER, PRESIDENT OF FRANCE EMMANUEL MACRON, AND PRESIDENT OF EU COUNCIL DONALD TUSK, ATTEND A MEETING DURING THE G20 SUMMIT IN OSAKA, JUNE 29, 2019

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significantly, the Visegrad Group appeared again on the European forum as a compact block of resistance to such imposed decisions. It is worth emphasizing that the unity of V4 against Timmermans' candidacy was not obvious. The Prime Ministers of the Visegrad countries represent the circles sitting in various European political groups: Poland's Law and Justice forms the core of European conservatives and reformists, Hungary's Fidesz is in the main European People's Party faction, the Czech Republic's ANO is in the liberal group, and Slovakia's Smer-SD is part of the European socialist family. Notwithstanding such a diverse political mixture, they adopted a joint position pertaining to the President of

the European Commission. Especially for the Slovaks, persevering in resistance to the imposed decisions had to have been difficult, yet at the end of the day, they opposed the socialist's candidacy.

We do not know this for certain at the current stage, but it is most probable that during these negotiations, the smaller EU countries have been met with various forms of pressure or unique persuading offers to handle matters which are important to them, in exchange for supporting Timmermans. It is not farfetched to imagine that Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš could have been met with a suggestion that sounded like problems regarding settling the European subsidy for Stork Nest, the congress center, being built by his firm could just "be dealt with." Meanwhile,

the Slovak delegation could have heard that corruption problems or ambiguities related to the post-murder prosecutor's investigation in 2018 of the investigative journalist Ján Kuciak do not constitute grounds to doubt the Slovak rule of law. Despite these tempting perspectives, Prime Minister Babiš explicitly stated that Frans Timmermans is a man who divides, not unites and that the Slovaks, seeing the chance to build a blocking minority, did not break out of the new coalition until the last moment. The Visegrad Group alone is not enough to block decisions taken on the European forum under the qualified majority procedure, which are unfavorable from the point of view of Central European countries. Still, the signal sent by V4 was picked up by others. Italy joining the group blocking Timmermans' choice was most pivotal. Rome, offended by their omission in negotiations on the allocating EU positions, could have decided that by impeding the Osaka pact, it would convey its aspirations and position as one of the largest and most consequential EU countries.

The unity of V4 meant that other states, namely with Lithuania and Estonia at the forefront, decided that it was worth joining this bloc. After the European Council summit, the comments often accentuated that the nail in the coffin was the resistance exhibited by some Prime Ministers of EU countries represented in the Christian Democrats' group from *outside* of Central Europe. In all, it is possible to reconstruct the course of events that led to the spectacular defeat of Frans Timmermans and the whole idea of imposing decisions by an informal leadership group.

Even more intriguing is the attempt to identify the initial effects of these events, which in the long term, may have an impact on the functionality of the new

The unity of V4 meant that other states, namely with Lithuania and Estonia at the forefront, decided that it was worth joining this bloc.

European Commission chaired by Ursula von der Leyen.

Perhaps the first self-fulfilling conclusion drawn may be that the rebellion of Prime Minister Morawiecki, supported by V4 and later by other countries, restored the order of things in the European Union. Rejuting the bundle from Osaka meant that it was within the basic EU intergovernmental format that the most important decisions were made, and not solely the arrangements made by the informal group were authorized. Restoring the proper role of Member States, in the long run, seems to be one of the necessary conditions for the successful reform of the European Union, it cannot be done contradictory to governments elected in free elections and having a sufficiently strong social mandate. In addition, the July events in the European Council may be a helpful lesson for the future, showing the new European Commission that the Member States do not intend to let themselves be treated as subjects. We can hope that this experience will lead to internal limitation by the new leaders of the Community institutions in attempts to impose their will against others and to expand their own competences against EU treaties, which unfortunately was a common practice of the outgoing European Commission.

The second, no less important, result of July's events is the strengthening of the position of Central European countries, which by many Western European capitals are still treated as new and not yet Europeanized members of the community. The concentration of the blocking minority around the Visegrad Group, regarded in terms of the nucleus of Central European cooperation, was a strong signal for the region's empowerment and declaring aspirations to be treated as one of the key actors in shaping European policy. Additionally, the success of the V4 may mean that in the future, especially small EU countries will seek opportunities to build broader coalitions around the Visegrad Group. It will be crucial whether the Visegrad Group countries make joint decisions to use the V4 format more often to consolidate supporters of decisions going against the largest capitals or Community institutions. Such an

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alternative decision-making center can be particularly attractive for small European Union countries, which were often forced to make decisions against their interests. The example that this dictate can be broken can be attractive and contagious for the future.

Timmermans' defeat may have one more positive consequence. For future leaders of the European institutions it will be a warning, and they would think twice before attempting to actively engage in political struggles in a particular member country, ostentatiously advocating one of the opposition parties to the dispute. It should be expected that European Commissioners can be more restrained in their acts of demonstrative support for specific political environments. Timmermans's actions against the governments in Poland and Hungary additionally had something perfidious about them; the Dutch politician did not hide that he was well-aware of applying double standards – different towards Warsaw and Budapest, and different towards the other Member States, in which he believes more European elites are in power. Illustrating this best was Timmermans selling journalists questions about his assessment of the brutality of the French police pacifying protests of the “yellow vests” movement. What, however, can be considered a sign of justice is that these actions did not bring him to the top of the European Commission, but have become one of the main reasons for his defeat. Instead of becoming a star in European salons, an effective fighter for democracy, and the rule of law, he became perceived as a politician in its full toxic sense.

Even if Timmermans remains one of the EU commissioners, his influence will be substantially more limited than previously, and he will certainly be removed from matters concerning the rule of law. This



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**PRIME MINISTER MATEUSZ MORAWIECKI AND NEWLY NOMINATED
PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION URSULA VON DER LEYEN
DURING THE MEETING IN THE CHANCELLERY OF THE PRIME MINISTER,
WARSAW, JULY 25, 2019**

gives a chance to normalize relations between Warsaw and Brussels for the benefit of the entire European Union. Each of the more intelligent and diplomatically savvy politicians who aim to build their career in the European institutions will analyze this story and draw appropriate conclusions from it. One could consider that we can already observe the first who drew a moral from this story. The new head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, for her second foreign trip (after France, because talks in Germany are difficult to treat as a foreign visit) chose Warsaw. She had sent a few very significant signals before, like the one which was referring to Poland having received over a million Ukrainians, or the mentions regarding the rule of law as a criterion for assessing each of the EU countries. Of course, the President of the European Commission will have to balance between

The new head of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, for her second foreign trip chose Warsaw.

different environments, sometimes assessing the situation quite differently or with other goals. However, many signals show that there is a chance for a more balanced European policy, conducted on the principles of compromise and negotiation. In addition, the experience of Ursula von der Leyen as the Minister of Defense gave her a chance to form a more realistic and acute understanding of the threats associated with the activities of the

An additional effect of the election of the German Minister of Defense now as the head of the European Commission will be the more direct responsibility of Germany for the fate of the EU.

Russian Federation in the international arena. Hence the announcement of the future head of the European Commission that the EU will conduct some dialogue with Russia. However, it is only for time to show whether she will be more temperate towards the progressive agenda, implemented in recent years by various European institutions and liberal-leftist environments.

An additional effect of the election of the German Minister of Defense now as the head of the European Commission will be the more direct responsibility of Germany for the fate of the EU. So far, Berlin has been very effective in achieving its goals, taking advantage of the situation that representatives of other countries were at the head of the EU institutions. The fact that the European Commission is being led by a German politician will force one to act unmasked or with self-restraint, so as not to strengthen the feeling that Berlin is realizing its goals with the help of the EU, sometimes even against the interests of the community. Indubitably, such a litmus test for the new European Commission will be

the Community energy policy and the position of EU authorities towards trying to make Europe dependent on the supply of Russian energy resources, with the Russian-German Nord Stream 2 project at the forefront. Perhaps that is why the authors of the article in Politico supposed for that Angela Merkel, the July European Council was the greatest humiliation she had experienced in the history of her office as German chancellor¹.

To sum up – it can be deduced that the future endeavors of the new European Commission should be viewed with small optimism. There is a chance that Central Europe will not be so ostentatiously overlooked, and Poland and Hungary will cease to be full-time candidates for playing the role of black sheep and whipping boys. If, for the change of the climate of relations within the EU, the Central European region will have to pay the price in the form of the lack of its representatives at the most important Community offices, this is a rather acceptable cost. The Osaka Pact also did not offer any serious place for a representative of our region, which, in some analysts' comments, was the result of a low assessment of the results of Donald Tusk's actions as the President of the European Council. Bearing in mind the challenges facing the EU, the Central European region, even in the context of the violation of international law by the Russian Federation, instead of "a second Tusk", it is better to have a more united community, able to cooperate at intergovernmental level and to respect each other.

Piotr Bajda ■
September 2019

¹ <https://www.politico.eu/article/how-angela-merkel-plan-for-eu-top-jobs-fell-apart-spitzenkandidat-summit/?fbclid=IwAR1a-N1vqR5n7iwj7QQoeSHWI XeWvPQ8pwOvCBHpouX9WTm3TFzI2j09NI0>

V4 IN CHANGEFUL ESPIONAGE

ALEXANDER WIELGOS

Albeit intelligence sharing is a praised notion, leverage-eliciting information is still exchanged for something else. Emphasis is growing on the cyber and private outsourcing angles. As smaller countries can play disproportionately larger roles, it is an imperative for the V4 to keep up, and to do so symbiotically, together.

It aptly plays into the *'two-level game theory'* environment of states, each juggling internal divisions at the same time as divisions between states. Friends and adversaries of the V4 are observing this, and observing others doing the same. And what is seen is that, at the official level, the V4 states still do not yet entirely see certain entities the same; namely Russia, but others too. It is an impediment despite otherwise remarkable political and diplomatic cohesion.



LEFT TO RIGHT: SLOVAKIAN PRIME MINISTER PETER PELLEGRINI, CZECH PRIME MINISTER ANDREJ BABIS, POLISH PRIME MINISTER MATEUSZ MORAWIECKI, AND HUNGARIAN PRIME MINISTER VIKTOR ORBAN POSE FOR A FAMILY PHOTO DURING THEIR INFORMAL MEETING OF THE HEADS OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE IN BUDAPEST, HUNGARY, JUNE 13, 2019

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In October 2019, a Slovakian cybersecurity firm, ESET, unmasked an espionage operation¹, ongoing since about 2013. ESET refers to the perpetrators as the ‘Dukes’, linked directly to the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation, or SVR. As recently as June 2019, the Dukes infiltrated the networks of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of two Central European states and one EU state, including the network of said EU state in its Embassy in the US. There may be more than detected thus far.

ESET refers to this intrusion as ‘*Ghost Hunt*’. After a period of seeming quiet, the Dukes returned with a recalibration of malware to evade uncovering. Some of their ploys include: occupying lots of space with code to hide communications, a smaller malware to sneakily install a programme using information from

social media, and subtly changing pixels in graphic images to convey messages. The malware relays information, can last years, and continue despite device changes.

Furthermore, as mentioned in a following *The Warsaw Institute Review* (WIR) article² of this edition, the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Prague is a hub for intelligence officers³ using diplomatic cover as well as conducting cyber-offensive operations in the Central Eastern European region. Guesses suggest something like 40% of diplomatic personnel in said Embassy could have a more clandestine nature. The Czech Counter-Intelligence Service, BIS,

¹ Andy Greenberg, *Stealthy Russian Hacker Group Resurfaces With Clever New Tricks*, Wired, 17.10.2019

² Martin Svárovský, *US military presence in Poland from the regional perspective and potential Czech contribution*, The Warsaw Institute Review, 29.10.2019, p.95

³ Ian Willoughby, *Czech Agencies Smash Spy Ring Operated by “Very Aggressive” Russians*, Radio Prague International, 21.10.2019

uncovered and dismantled a spy ring in 2018, which attacked its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was also used for aggressive disinformation campaigns. Though BIS understands well it is unwise to be certain that all threats from this activity are mitigated. Tactic changes are likely.

ESET's recent findings may or may not be related. The Dukes have been called 'Cozy Bear' or 'APT 29' as well, designated as an 'Advanced Persistent Threat' by cybersecurity firms. If it rings a bell it is because they are a relatively more sophisticated but lesser known group which accompanied the daring 'Fancy Bear', or 'APT 28', in breaching the Democratic National Committee of the US in 2016.

The Dutch Intelligence Agency, AIVD, was able to hastily alert the NSA-liaison at the US Embassy in the Hague of this attack, as well as another intrusion into US State Department. Earlier, in 2014, AIVD had gained access to a building⁴ close to the Red Square, possibly from the journalism department at 9 Mokhovaya St. of Moscow State University. Little did they know, that from this they would be monitoring the APT activity, even taking photographs of people visiting from the security camera. This enabled AIVD to identify them agents of the SVR, though other cyber security specialists believe the tracks go to the Federal Security Service, the FSB.

Besides intrusion, leaks are particularly relevant to harmfully altering the functionality of diplomacy. In July 2019, confidential cables of UK Ambassador to the US addressed to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office were leaked⁵. In

⁴ Huib Modderkolk, *Dutch agencies provide crucial intel about Russia's interference in US-elections*, de Volkskrant, 25.01.2018

⁵ Isabel Oakeshott, *Britain's man in the US says*

How well they do unofficially will be one of the determinants of the V4's position on the geopolitical chessboards.

them, the UK Ambassador's description of a rather negative assessment of the incumbent US Administration led to his reallocation to a different positing.

What the aforementioned give insight to is the value of secrets.

CHANGEFUL ESPIONAGE

Forasmuch the V4's contribution to European security is needed to excel not only on the official levels, how well they do unofficially, will be one of the determinants of the V4's position on the geopolitical chessboards.

The *first* insight would be that, because the UK Ambassador's leaks highlighted the existing risk of such feats, as a Foreign Policy article⁶ argues, a plausible effect is self-censorship. An Ambassador's honest views of developments in the state in which she or he is posted is vital in formulating the appropriate approaches. Uncertain whether this leak was deliberate or enabled by a hack, but because it cannot be ruled out, diplomats elsewhere noted the warning. Information is harder to obtain if it is purposefully omitted.

Trump is 'inept': Leaked secret cables from ambassador say the President is 'uniquely dysfunctional and his career could end in disgrace', Daily Mail, 06.07.2019

⁶ Robbie Gramer, *Diplomats Fear Chilling Effect of British Ambassador's Resignation*, Foreign Policy, 09.07.2019

A *second* insight is that, whilst deepened intelligence sharing within EU and NATO is praised as a notion, the happenings would suggest that the nature of this resembles in some ways almost that of a market place. The incentive of collecting secrets is that they can give leverage in both intelligence circles as well as political or diplomatic ones⁷. Besides cake and flowers, AIVD and its military counterpart, MIVD, met with the NSA and then-Director of National Intelligence of the US. In exchange for access of their uncovering, AIVD and MIVD received information on breaking into mobile phones of some high-level Russian intelligence officers, as well as a hint that, they like to do a quick internet search for any indication their next attack could be anticipated.

It can go further and more formalised. In 2007, Estonia was targeted in a nationwide cyberattack. Plausibly state-sponsored by Russia, in retaliation over political disagreement. Having made strides in digitisation, e-Government services, banks, voting, etc., the attack unveiled its vulnerabilities. Naturally, Estonia decided it was having none of that, its friends (including all V4 states) agreed, and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence was established in Tallinn, referred to just as the 'NATO K5'. Since then, Estonia has significantly accelerated its excel in intelligence, cybersecurity, and diplomatic circles.

Third, is the steadily increasing role of private firms. Similar to private military corporations, security contractors, and mercenaries playing increasingly larger roles in conflict zones. Retiring intelligence officers carry with them skill and know-how.

⁷ Mark Galeotti, *Size Doesn't Matter for Spies Anymore*, Foreign Policy, 31.01.2018

Ex-CIA intelligence officers established consultancy firms, and were hired by UAE government officials⁸ to build their intelligence capabilities right from its very foundations. It conveys the extents to which the years of accumulated experience and training in the field can be made use of, and lucratively at that.

If not guiding and training the intelligence agencies of other governments, states can hire internet mercenaries to license their savvy instruments. Indeed, the private angle would seem able to overcome otherwise politically incompatible partnerships. Saudi Arabia had purchased services from a private Israeli firm, NSO Group, with a sophisticated array of surveillance tools⁹ and their signature 'Pegasus' feature. NSO's clientele includes the government of Mexico aiming to pursue cartels effectively. Sure, WhatsApp messages are encrypted, but a mechanism¹⁰, revealed in May 2019, could be installed by a missed call or received message, which then erases itself, and then proceeds to copy messages before encryption or after decryption. Not to worry, the loophole has since been addressed. Probably.

Like most government-enterprise revolving doors, these entities can act as an extension of the state, and can also be hired to simply carry out specific tasks on their behalf with a solid degree of deniability. DarkMatter, a UAE firm, competes with NSO's software, but is geopolitically motivated against Global

⁸ Jenna McLaughlin, *Deep Pockets, Deep Cover*, Foreign Policy, 21.12.2017

⁹ Mark Mazzetti, Adam Goldman, Ronen Burgman, Nicole Perloth, *A New Age of Warfare: How Internet Mercenaries Do Battle for Authoritarian Governments*, The New York Times, 21.03.2019

¹⁰ Mehul Strivastava, *WhatsApp voice calls used to inject Israeli spyware on phones*, Financial Times, 14.05.2019

Risk Advisors, what could be argued as a counterpart of Qatar.

Fourthly, as everyone is already well aware, is the changing technological advances that are both a cause and a symptom of the other insights. Human intelligence – *HUMINT* – is valuable because more than just secrets, it also gives intuition into a state's intent¹¹. The traditional go-to, costly, time consuming, and now, much more risky. Preparation requires identification of a tenable recruit, training, a plan to go in, a contingency plan to get out, formulating an identity that suits addresses, bank accounts, relatives, ensuring shadows to catch some followers, and much more, all of which are commodities up for trade. A Canadian architecture student in Moscow, who was seen chatting at the US consulate in Hong Kong about 3 years back on social media, has a phone which can be traced to sudden stops at benches in parks or going dark in the metro for a couple hours¹².

Other methods including using a freshly employed officer or a one-time asset, depending on the scope of the operation. The aim is so that the 'asset' being recruited by a 'handler' does not fully grasp the significance of their actions, or the things divulged. In 2018, it was revealed that the driver employed by a US Congresswoman steadily fed information¹³ to the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco, for about 20 years. Possibly nothing classified. However, trends, attitudes, atmosphere, and intent, may be just as useful. Supposedly, during a family visit in Asia, the driver

Small pieces on this chessboard can begin to cast large shadows.

was approached by a charismatic individual who befriended him, which turned out to be from the PRC Ministry of State Security¹⁴.

Such feats risk an international scandal should an intercept occur – we all have heard some unsettling headlines like this here and there. This is less appealing to small states which are more vulnerable to retaliation. It is not farfetched to argue that it is becoming more and more difficult for Western states to spy on increasingly authoritarian, closed states, such as Russia and China. The reverse, however, would seem to face less obstacles. Therefore, it has probably crossed people's minds that activities of Chinese and Russian intelligence for hints of sources and methods could be monitored, but from an at least neutral city, such as London or Paris, rather than directly from Beijing and Moscow¹⁵, and vice versa.

Signals intelligence – *SIGINT* – traditionally requires massive and expensive equipment, but as smaller aspiring entities have shown, be they from government agencies or outsourced firms, small pieces on this chessboard can begin to cast large shadows. Paradoxically, intelligence activities in Western states, including the V4, may find it beneficial to reveal more to remain relevant and credible, with ample

¹¹ Ali Younes, *Gina Haspel's CIA looks to recruit more foreign spies*, Al Jazeera, 27.09.2018

¹² Edward Lucas, *The Spycraft Revolution*, Foreign Policy, 27.04.2019

¹³ Marc Thiessen, *Explain the Chinese spy, Sen. Feinstein*, The Washington Post, 09.08.2018

¹⁴ Matier & Ross, *Feinstein had a Chinese spy connection she didn't know about — her driver*, San Francisco Chronicle, 01.08.2018

¹⁵ Edward Lucas, *The Spycraft Revolution*, Foreign Policy, 27.04.2019



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justification for the security-orientated necessity of their actions¹⁶, if they wish to refrain from becoming a totalitarian-like police state. Of course, only to the extent this does not jeopardise the operations, a line which is probably dumbfoundingly blurry.

Putting it into context, the reason for engaging at all in these is that it has a very real impact on the relevant geopolitical dynamics. Some extraordinary and tragic stories emerge post factum, like that of the Cambridge Five, Ashraf Marwan, Eli Cohen, and others – Poland has some truly legendary and daring stories too, like that of Witold Pilecki, Krystyna Skarbek, the German Enigma crackers Marian Rejewski et al, amongst many others. Nevertheless, it is the incessant accumulation and consistency of such efforts that have the potential to sway decision-making in a more apt course

¹⁶ Ibid.

of strategy, particularly of a foreign and security policy.

‘TWO LEVEL GAME THEORY’

In 1988, Robert Putnam, a US political scientist and Harvard professor, put forward the generally widely understood, albeit seldomly named, concept of “*two-level game theory*”. In his paper¹⁷, he makes an attempt to aptly theorise the entanglement between domestic politics of a country and their foreign policy. Whilst it is commonly acknowledged that the entanglement exists, it is difficult to anticipate how it varies on when, in what ways, and to which extents¹⁸.

His research suggests, using an example of multilateral negotiations in 1978 that “*first, that the key governments...*

¹⁷ Robert Putnam, “*Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games*”, International Organization 42, no. 3, published 1988, doi:10.1017/S0020818300027697., pp. 427–460

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 427

adopted policies different from those that they would have pursued in the absence of inter-national negotiations, but second, that agreement was possible only because a powerful minority within each government actually favored on domestic grounds the policy being demanded internationally¹⁹.

Without internal divisions in a negotiating side, it is unlikely that the foreign demands would have been met. Yet, without the pressure from the foreign side, it is even more unlikely that the internal division would tilt to favour that same direction²⁰. This is what negotiating sides face in diplomacy, most especially in elements pertaining to security.

OBSERVE THOSE OBSERVING

Furthermore, as any geopolitical development is undergoing – any at all – the relevant international actors are observing it unfold: the decisions being made, the decisions not being made; actions which are initiatory or reactionary; the intentions behind them; its effects in the short term, medium term and long term; risks calculated and miscalculated; things seen and unseen, and by whom; the diversions consuming attention to and more crucial elements subtly evading it; spot-on analyses demonstrating acute understanding, completely missing the point, and all in between; and so on.

Their observations can be illustrated with questions, and here they contemplate: *“how does this affect our interests?”* They are also identifying other actors also observing the same development, and they ask themselves secondly: *“who else is watching this?”* They are considering what conclusions

the other international actors will draw from how they observe this development, wondering: *“those that are watching this, how do they think this affects their interests?”*

Finally, the actors would strive to anticipate the other actors’ reactions to the said development, in pursuit of furthering their own interests. *“Considering how the others might think this affects their interests, how can we take advantage of this?”* follows suit. Naturally, this notion pertains to state actors and non-state actors, international and local alike. It also entails situations between close friendly partners with positive intentions, among neutral entities, as well as between hostile actors with aggressive or malicious intentions.

Furthermore, actors which consider the aforementioned notion would like to carefully consider how known their answers are looking like to other actors, probably as *“what do the other actors think that we are thinking?”* Responses are can be conveyed clearly, ambiguously, deliberately deceivingly – or, most likely, a clever combination of all.

It is difficult to know the precise workings of intelligence agencies and privately-owned entities – nor we should be able to know beforehand – as per the nature of the work. What is conveyed about the status quo via the attacks uncovered by the Slovakian firm ESET and the Czech Agency BIS, carried out by Russia, and the lessons learnt from the other instances, merit scrutiny through these lenses.

As the Foreign Affairs piece²¹ argues, US intelligence agencies are striving to adapt

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 428

²⁰ Ibid., p. 429

²¹ Amy Zegart, Michael Morell, *Spies, Lies, and Algorithms*, Foreign Affairs, 16.04.2019

If one does not maintain a strategy, and tactics to implement it, one becomes vulnerable to those which do.

and maximise use of their advantages. So are Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary adapting to the changeful espionage. Hence the argument for better intelligence sharing, building on top of, or from example, of existing arrangements.

INTELLIGENCE SHARING

Probably the most renowned is the *'Five Eyes'* intelligence alliance between the US, Canada, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, with joint efforts in HUMINT, SIGINT, as well as geo-spatial imagery, defence and security intelligence. The Pine Gap facility in the middle of the Australian outback attests finely to it.

Initially, the UK and US signed a communications intelligence agreement in 1943, followed up by another in 1946 to formalise the WW2-period agreements in this field. In 1948, Canada joined, as well as Australia and New Zealand in 1956, though their precise status would change.

Since then, certain states have been coordinating with Five Eyes in arrangements dubbed *'Nine Eyes'*, or even *'Fourteen Eyes'*. Other highly specific and temporary instances of coordination include a total of 41 countries sharing military intelligence in context of NATO missions in Afghanistan.

Other notable examples include Europol, the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), or beyond the institutions, the *'Club de Berne'*, an informal and voluntary-based intelligence sharing forum of the EU member states, Switzerland, and Norway, set up in 1971. Like its more specialised offshoot, the Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG), both communicate with the EU via the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN), part of the EEAS.

Indicative of such value could be a case in which severing an intelligence alliance is arguably more worrying than a state clumsily leaving a political-economic union. In 2011, Japan and South Korea began steps towards, and formalised in 2016 a military intelligence alliance²²; the General Security of Military Information Agreement, GSoMIA. Purposed to inform one another, two allies of the US, of military activity from North Korea which could be threatening to either.

Though an economic dispute intensified, it was internal pressure in South Korea²³ which prompted the unilateral withdrawal in August 2019, and perhaps a peep at other examples of unilateral withdrawal after-effects. Both sides may be losing sleep over GSoMIA, as Japan and South Korea are currently making efforts to rekindle bilateral relations, but it is not simple.

The *'two-level game theory'* and *'observing observers'* lenses put into context the wider picture of why the increasingly sophisticated tactics to serve a better strategy. To clarify: a *'strategy'* is a direction of policy; and

²² Grace Shao, *South Korea is scrapping a security deal with Japan — here's why it matters*, CNBC, 23.08.2019

²³ Ibid.

a ‘*tactic*’, is a specific means to pursue a strategy. If one does not maintain a strategy, and tactics to implement it, one becomes vulnerable to those which do.

That said, certain strategies of Poland’s multilateral-orientated foreign policies undertaken in partnerships: the *Eastern Partnership* (EaP), formed by Poland and Sweden; the *Bucharest Nine* (B9), formed by Romania and Poland; the *Three Seas Initiative* (3SI), formed by Poland and Croatia; and recently, the *Warsaw Process*, formed by Poland and the US; and although continuously improving, they are certainly worthy of applause. Continuous improvement is grounds for success.

Hence, the argument is that for the V4 the next, correct, and natural step in defensive measures is to at the very least, seriously consider the concept to deepen intelligence cooperation, contemplating the points discussed.

Enhanced intelligence cooperation, not just on the military intelligence front, is necessary because the tactics used against the V4 are not limited to military intelligence. Having a well-developed military intelligence cooperation already, namely via NATO, is a fundamental advantage which minimises the adversaries’ options.

It also pertains to timing, such as the UK and the intelligence sharing adjustments upon the departure, and the upcoming Presidential elections in 2020. In no specific order, the things conveyed – and the things observed – from just the intent of such is a message to adversaries that their previous efforts have been noted, they have been taken seriously, and future efforts will be impeded in multitude. Just as important as the actual capability to exert force in this field, is how the projection of

power is perceived by other actors, because that is what they will act accordingly to. It would be unwise to think the V4 will not be challenged upon taking up such a feat.

The V4 would address this by being more refined. Not just concerning enhanced technical abilities against aggressive actions of Russia, or infrastructure protection with regard to China, but also a subtle yet apparently negative, power hogging German influence in European institutions, which from the perspective of Poland, accompanies a deliberate distortion of history which could indicate perhaps unfavourable intentions.

Moreover, the V4’s role in foreign and security policy in Europe is becoming clearer as it goes ahead upon sufficient alignment on both domestic and international fronts. So rather than waiting to first being better politically aligned, and then deepening intelligence cooperation, it is the other way around: deepening intelligence cooperation will naturally lead to being better politically aligned. Sure, cohesion between each of the V4 states is not immaculately perfect, and it never will be. But as the ‘two-level game theory’ tells us, that is a good thing. Even better, the political cohesion is nevertheless incredibly remarkable, so much so, that it is good enough. Perhaps, meetings at the Prime Minister or Presidential levels may become a tad more interesting.

It is also a clear message to friends, particularly those in existing frameworks, that this is a collection of reliable partners. Argumentation here is in large part an extension of the lines of existing V4 rhetoric. It is an endeavour which is achievable, noting the changing times and the potential of

At the end of the day, it was only Poland to agree to the daring endeavour.

smaller states doing more, small states doing more together makes sense.

This is especially pertinent so that the V4 states find themselves on the right side of the gap between countries successfully adjusting to the changing environments of espionage in all its foreseeable and unforeseeable dimensions with each day that passes. That is not to say, the V4 states are not doing their bit – their efforts are recognisable, both in state intelligence agencies, private cyber-security firms, ministries (e.g. the 5-point plan of the Ministry of Digitisation of Poland, or the CyberMil of the Ministry of National Defence of Poland) – this is an encouragement to the V4 to keep going, and for the V4's friends, to help out, because it is in their interest too.

AT THE END OF THE DAY

In 1990, just preceding the First Gulf War, the CIA had six agents stranded in Iraq²⁴. The US appealed to select intelligence agencies in Europe, including France, the UK, and even the USSR for help. At the end of the day, it was only Poland to agree to the daring endeavour, dubbed '*Operacja Samum*'. A team of Poles went to their previously existing engineering firm in Iraq with half a dozen additional Polish passports. In the backdrop of suspicion from the

Republican Guard, they made precarious way to Turkey with some new company and some maps. As a result, the US helped alleviate half of Poland's national debt, incurred of course, by the PRL.

Poland has demonstrated time and time again throughout its history that it is a reliable partner. The V4, in turn, has also demonstrated time and time again throughout its history that its cohesion has the capacity to make very real, tangible differences on the international arena, and in standing up for the right thing.

The arguments for deepening intelligence cooperation between the V4 states are intricate and intertwined: it is achievable, the timing is pretty good (there is no absolutely perfect time), we like each other enough to set out rules that will be followed, the domestic-foreign intertwining is healthy enough, the enhanced capabilities on a more specific front has much needed added value, joining efforts makes us keep up with the changing times like adjusting to technology and the private sector, as well as, the signal to friends and adversaries being quite clear.

In recent years more so than ever Poland has shown intent to stand up for partners in the Central Eastern European region, but not only here. Doing so it is in the interest of each V4 state, to Central Eastern Europe, and possibly even to the world, providing example to other states seeking cooperation, and to a larger extent, attesting to humanity being able to, and choosing to, prevent conflict and pursue advancement.

Alexander Wielgos ■
September 2019

²⁴ Jan Wojciech Piekarski, *Polski Most Szpiegów: Kulisy operacji dyplomatycznych oczami ambasadora RP*, Wydawnictwo SQN, published 2018, p. 19

US MILITARY PRESENCE IN POLAND FROM THE REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE AND POTENTIAL CZECH CONTRIBUTION

MARTIN SVÁROVSKÝ

The central importance of codified doctrine lies not only in the particular way it can animate and optimize national military forces, but also in the efficient manner by which it can transmit messages to the adversary.

INTRODUCTION

When Russia started military operations in eastern Ukraine and illegally annexed Crimea in 2014, both sides of the Atlantic reacted by force posture changes and economic sanctions. Where the USA changed also its strategic doctrine, Europe has not. The Strategic Concept of NATO remains in place and basic doctrinal documents of decisive European powers witnessed tactical rather than strategic shifts.

New deployment to Poland or the Baltic states reflects the adjustments in the US force posture. The goal of the deployment is to strengthen the resilience of the Eastern Flank of NATO. At the same time, these redeployments fit into the new US global strategy that envisages updates in overall US defense and deterrence architecture.

Wide range of policy recommendations by the US strategic thinkers demonstrate



PRESIDENTS OF THE US DONALD TRUMP AND POLAND ANDRZEJ DUDA DURING A BILATERAL MEETING ON THE MARGINS OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN NEW YORK. BOTH STATESMEN SIGNED A JOINT DECLARATION ON DEEPENING DEFENSE COOPERATION. US, SEPTEMBER 23, 2019

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the fact that the United States took the events in Crimea, eastern Ukraine and the meddling into the US elections altogether as a genuine game changer. Policy reflection of these recommendations is still evolving and so is hence the ultimate shape of the US military presence in Poland.

US DEPLOYMENT TO POLAND AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE NEW AMERICAN STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

THE NEW AMERICAN STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

The latest US National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, or the Nuclear Posture Review, represent a significant shift in American strategic thinking and policymaking. Adversaries, rather than terrorism, are the center of

attention. The US is openly declaring a resolve to approach them from a position of strength and points out the need to rethink the policy of engagement with rivals. The new US strategic doctrine does not see military force just as an instrument of urgent crisis management. It attaches a significant role to the military in pursuing America's national interests. At the same time, the wording of all these doctrinal documents clearly indicates the will to cooperate with partners while handling different security issues from a position of strength. Naturally, Europe is identified as a key partner for the USA.

Some elements of the American strategic doctrine deserve attention since they pose both a challenge and a chance for NATO:

US MILITARY PRESENCE IN POLAND FROM THE REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE AND POTENTIAL CZECH CONTRIBUTION

1. *Peace through strength.* This means tailored sanctions as an effective political tool with coercive potential, arms sales' role in international relations or a substantial increase of the defense budget.

2. *US changes in nuclear doctrine and deterrence architecture.* The United States declare the need to react to the significant development of both the capabilities and the military doctrines of adversaries. It argues for strengthening the integration of the nuclear and non-nuclear military planning with the aim to defeat the subject adversary's strategy.

3. *US skepticism against arms control.* The USA comprehends that arms control is an integral part of Russia's military strategy: to advance its own military position while weakening that of its enemies.

4. *Great power competition, not terrorism, as a primary global issue.* This paradigm changes the US strategy in some particular regions. The National Defense Strategy calls for "dynamic force employment" in an effort to prepare the US military for the transition from focusing on fighting terrorist groups to a possible great-power conflict with about the same force size. It calls for greater agility, more lethality, less operational predictability, higher readiness, irregular deployments, and maximum surge capacity.

THE SITUATION OF NATO AND ITS EUROPEAN MEMBERS

On the other side of the Atlantic, the situation looks much different. NATO has decided not to change its Strategic Concept from 2010. The basic document defining the defense and deterrence posture of the Alliance ("Defense and Deterrence Posture Review", DDPR) is from 2012 and is simply outdated. Albeit, subsequent official texts *do* cover defense and deterrence, such as the Warsaw Summit 2016 Communiqué, or the Brussels Summit 2018 Declaration,

it is at least questionable whether they serve as a distinct actualization of the DDPR.

For instance, in the text of DDPR, the primary role assigned to the tactical nuclear weapons is in disarmament policy. This is in sharp contradiction to Russia's strategy on tactical nukes. No country is considered as an adversary according to the DDPR and NATO seeks "*cooperation on missile defense with Russia*".

This year though, the Alliance adopted two new strategic documents: The "*Political Guidance*" that defines the level of ambition of NATO and the "*Military strategy*" that reflects upon a new character of threats. Both these documents are classified... What a different approach to the "messaging" role of doctrine from the American one!

As for the military aspect, last three summits in Wales, Warsaw and Brussels proved the NATO's adaptability on changed security environment, emerged adversary threat and the new warfare. NATO's military structures work intensively and diligently on the necessary adjustments (deterrence, command and control, readiness and forward presence). Nevertheless, the weak points of the Alliance are somewhere else: first, the fragile political cohesion due to the divergent threat assessments. Second, an insufficient European level of ambition within NATO¹. And third, the pace of the adaptation of NATO.

¹ NATO's current level of ambition is for the entire alliance to maintain the capabilities for collective defense against a near-peer competitor, in what is called a Major Joint Operation-Plus (MJO+), or to conduct concurrently eight less demanding missions, two at the Major Joint Operation (MJO) level and six Smaller Joint Operations (SJO). The problem is, that European capabilities within NATO are weak in terms of Combat support and Combat support service i.e. logistics, life support etc. Most of the NATO combat teams (brigades) are actually European ones. Yet, their readiness and deployability without the US support is rather low.



NATO SUMMIT IN WARSAW. US PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, POLISH PRESIDENT ANDRZEJ DUDA, AND NATO SECRETARY GENERAL JENS STOLTENBERG, WARSAW, JULY 08, 2016

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MODULAR APPROACH TO NATO SECURITY

The Alliance does plan to adjust its whole force structure to strengthen the security of the European theatre. The plan foresees three stages. The first two, covering the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and the entire NATO Response Force, have

their timeline until 2021. The third one, that will entail the force posture change of the entire European Theatre, should be ready by 2024. The same applies to the pace of the defense planning. For instance, the commitments of the Czech Republic from the latest NATO Defense Planning Process envisage the creation of a mid-

armored brigade by 2025 and the full-fledged heavy armored brigade by 2026.

All this is happening against the backdrop of extremely high readiness of the Russian forces. Readiness that is regularly checked in massive scale exercises with a highly problematic scenario. The Alliance estimates that the Russian troops are combat-ready within 1-2 days and within 3-4 days they can conduct limited, and within 8-10 days, major military operations in the territory of Baltic states. This means that the conflict can start tomorrow, regardless of the pace of the NATO multilateral adaptive processes.

How to solve the puzzle of Russian readiness on one side and the rather slow process in NATO on the other? Apart from multilateral initiatives, like the NATO Readiness Initiative, the individual or bilateral solutions are needed. This is what one could call a “modular approach.”

Reaction time is a decisive factor. Deployment in Poland is the key solution. The US forces in Poland have shorter response times for contingencies on the Eastern Flank compared to the forces that are stationed in the United States or in Western Europe. They can start degrading the Russian anti-access / area-denial capabilities and maneuvering to defend threatened points along NATO’s eastern frontier right in the initial phase of the conflict. Poland’s geographic depth would leave the U.S. forces less vulnerable to an initial salvo by Russian area-denial capabilities than if they were positioned in the Baltic states. Such forces could hold Kaliningrad at risk, particularly if accompanied by capabilities designed to counter Russian artillery advantages over NATO units, such as multiple launch rocket systems or high-mobility artillery rocket systems. Their effectiveness will be multiplied by the substantive increase of

All this speaks in favor of deploying additional US capabilities to Polish territory.

the readiness and aforementioned shorter response times of the Polish army.

Western Europeans must widely accept this modular approach. It is in full harmony with the Article 3 of the Washington Treaty. The Czech Republic with its experience from difficult NATO debates accompanying the ballistic missile defense plan on its territory, should be supportive of Poland. In 2008, the U.S. Secretary of State and the Czech Foreign Minister signed an agreement on hosting a radar base for a planned U.S. missile-defense system. Only later, after the Alliance took its time to discuss implications of the project for the defense of the Alliance and to resolve diverging opinions as to “how”, the system was “NATO-ized”.

THE US MILITARY PRESENCE AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE RESILIENCE OF POLAND AGAINST EXTERNAL THREATS

The military presence of the United States in Poland is in the interest of Poland, the region of Eastern Flank, as well as in the interest of the United States. The New American strategic doctrine says the US needs Europe for the deterring of Russia, one of the four main adversaries of the United States.

The resolve of Poland, its commitment to contribute to regional stability, burden sharing and making the deployment cost-effective for the US government, strength of its own armed forces, support of the

public and its adjacent position to the most vulnerable part of NATO – all this speaks in favor of deploying additional US capabilities to Polish territory. Hosting the US forces on very high readiness as well as an increase in readiness of its own army might also prove valuable for contingencies beyond the borders of NATO.

FUTURE MODALITY OF THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN POLAND; ROTATIONAL AND/OR PERMANENT

The current U.S. posture in Poland includes a mission command element, an Armored Brigade Combat Team on a rotational basis, a Stryker infantry battalion serving as the Poland eFP battalion, limited combat support enablers, a US aviation Detachment and a sustainment task force. The number of U.S. troops in Poland is on annual average about 4,500.

American strategists have been advocating for an enhancement of this posture for quite a while. Discussion focused on the combination of the division headquarters in Poland and the corps command headquarters in Germany, a permanent placement of long-range artillery, air and missile defense, prepositioned hardware stocks or an armored brigade combat team boosted by fire and combat support. The question whether these enhancements will consist rather of strengthened rotational presence with prepositioned equipment, of a more permanent presence or of an enormous boost for readiness and capabilities of the Polish army, is still open.

The composition of the enhanced military presence in Poland must correspond to the new American doctrine, mainly the National Defense Strategy. It is crucial for the Congressional approval of the necessary funds. Concrete tactical considerations within the new American

doctrinal approach are still evolving. The emphasis on the rotational character of the US deployment has its advocates, such as gen. B. Hodges or Air Force Lt. Gen. Tod Wolters, U.S. European Command. The others, like gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, Wolters's predecessor, advocate rather a mix of enhanced permanent and rotational presence.

Recent declaration of the presidents Trump and Duda suggests that we will probably be witnessing some mix of all the three above mentioned components²:

The final shape will be known after further US-Polish negotiations that might last up to one more year. Looking closely at the presidential declaration, four tactical elements seem particularly worth noting:

1. An open question about naval component. The presidential declaration does not refer to this. Yet, the “*US dynamic force employment*” counts on an increased naval posture. The situation in the Baltic Sea presents a particularly interesting opportunity. NATO naval forces, including the Polish ones, already have both numeric and capability advantages over the Russian assets. They are able to challenge the Russian improvements in A2/AD capabilities that threaten the ability of surface and aviation forces to operate freely.

2. Another interesting point is the establishment of a U.S. Air Force MQ-9 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance squadron in Poland. The United States intends, the presidents claimed, to share information derived from this squadron's operations, as appropriate, in support of “*our defense objectives*”. It is remarkable because it fits

² <https://www.president.pl/en/news/art,1069, joint-declaration-on-defense-cooperation-regarding-us-force-posture-in-the-republic-of-poland.html>.

to general US strategic thinking, counting on autonomous unmanned aircraft for overcoming existing Russian A2/AD capabilities.

3. An open question of further shifts (after the command structure) of forces from Germany to Poland. Experts like gen. Breedlow or former NATO DSG Wershow do not recommend this. According to them, further enhancements should largely build on the significant US capabilities already deployed in Poland and could be complemented by capabilities from other NATO Allies.

4. Integration of the Polish “*Homar*” program into the US enhanced force posture on the Polish territory. Poland, similarly to Romania, is going to purchase a Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) with the range of 300 km. American strategists are of the opinion that investment in the capabilities and capacity of long-range fires could undermine Russian advantage in fires capabilities. Programs to further develop long-range precision fires for the multiple launch rocket system up to 500 km have a significant role in these considerations.

NATO CONTEXT

Mandate of the Congress encourages the administration to take into account political consequences for NATO. Polish diplomacy is well aware of the importance of the Alliance context. Positions of the key European Allies, besides the stance of the NATO structures as such, might play an important role. Recent Polish top-level meetings in Brussels as well as the language of the presidential declaration stressing the importance of the NATO context, are symptoms of this awareness. The support of the Czech Republic and other Allied countries on the Eastern Flank within the expected NATO debate

on the US deployment to Poland should be regarded as relevant. US deployment to Poland is about their security.

THE MEANING OF THE US AND NATO PRESENCE IN POLAND FOR THE RESILIENCE OF THE EASTERN FLANK OF NATO

For countries most exposed to the Russian threat, strengthening of the defense and deterrence posture of NATO is among their highest priorities. Indeed, the best way to defend our states is to secure a state of affairs in which the enemy will not launch an attack. We have to ask ourselves whether our present contribution to the deterrence in the Eastern flank of the Alliance is sufficient. A potential enemy of the Alliance will not come to believe our resolve by simply reading NATO's Strategic Concept. The whole picture comprises of military doctrines and preparedness of individual NATO members.

THE WORST POSSIBLE SCENARIO ON THE NATO'S EASTERN FLANK

The most relevant crisis scenario on the Eastern Flank is a possible Russian attack on the Baltics. Russia has capabilities needed for its realization (the actively built Anti-Access/Area-Denial concept covering the whole Baltics; sufficient firepower of armored brigades; elite parachute division in the Pskov Oblast; regular exercises).

We have to analyze the question of why Russia would conduct an attack, even though it knows that its fight with NATO in the Baltics would eventually be lost. There are various factors in Russian reasoning, such as the relative considerable stability of Russian regime or an opportunity to boost extreme Russian national pride, and in its view an elevation of its position on the international arena, by means of a quick overrun of the Baltic states and a subsequent agreement with the West, similar to the “*six-point peace plan*” of the

An attack under the Article 5 threshold could be even more dangerous for the Alliance than a conventional attack above it.

Russo-Georgian War in 2008. By launching a risky venture in the Baltics, Russia would assert its position in the international arena even more than in Syria. The Baltic states would be given a lesson and a clear message would be sent to all other countries thinking about NATO membership: “Even though the membership in NATO will provide you a guarantee of aid (Article 5 of the Washington Treaty), it will not prevent you from ever being attacked.”

In such a scenario, the Alliance would be confronted with the necessity to carry out an operation liberating the Baltic countries. Even in the best course of action, the liberation operation would require certain time to gather forces. Some military simulations estimate this time to be 35 days. The closure of the Suwalki Corridor by Russian forces would create a *very* difficult obstacle for the Alliance to overcome. These factors, plus the eventuality of Russian limited nuclear de-escalatory strikes, the long range hi-precision strike danger would make any counteroffensive from NATO likewise very difficult.

Additionally, the liberation operation would demand launching strikes against targets (surface-to-air, surface-to-surface) that are located in close proximity to the Baltics, i.e. on Russian soil. It poses a risk of further escalation and increases the

political sensitivity even more. Russia’s offer of a “political solution”, during the course of a conflict, would give a further spin to an extreme political challenge for NATO’s political cohesion.

The probability of this scenario is not high. Nevertheless, we must be prepared for even a low-probability scenario. The legitimacy of working with such scenarios is evident by simply looking at the current numbers of Russian forces in the region or at their, regularly practiced, readiness.

There are other possible modalities of a potential attack, as it can be waged sub-strategically (via the cyber domain; singular or limited attacks on vessels or aircrafts or on important railroads), accompanied by massive (dis)information campaigns. From the political point of view, an attack under the Article 5 threshold could be even more dangerous for the Alliance than a conventional attack above it. It can fuel extreme sensitive political discussion about what should be the appropriate reaction.

In any case, the argument of “doves”, meaning that when considering an attack against the Baltics, Russia must reckon with the possibility of a “devastating conventional defeat”, which discourages it from attacking, does not seem plausible. It is hard to believe that the Western political representation, much less the public, would accede to such thing as inflicting a “devastating conventional defeat” on Russia.³ On the contrary, there would be an enormous pressure calling for closing a deal with Russia (in the manner of the six-point peace plan of the Russo-Georgian war) already during the liberation operation. Russians must know this very well, therefore the political vulnerability

³ A truly “devastating conventional defeat” would mean the NATO forces would keep going 100 km further after liberating the Baltics and would seize some land from Russia – as a punishment and as a clear proof of Russia’s defeat.



**TREE PLANTING CEREMONY COMMEMORATING THE B9
AND THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF NATO, WARSAW, APRIL 4, 2019**

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of the West will play a much bigger role in Russian calculations than the possibility of a “devastating conventional defeat”.

THE RESPONSE OF THE WEST COMES FROM THE EASTERN FLANK ITSELF

If these adventurous thoughts *are* indeed in the minds of Russian strategists, we must ask ourselves whether we are able to reduce their attractiveness. Polish as well as US forces on very high readiness on the Polish soil help with this, together with the armed forces of the Baltic states. The Baltic states and Poland form a single operational space connected with the vulnerable Suwalki Corridor. It is prudent to assume that the territories represent a single integrated operational-

strategic challenge in the Russian eyes as well.

Baltic armed forces are continuously and consequently expanding their heavy forces. All three of them have made purchases that considerably boosted their military capabilities. Especially the progress in building heavy armored units and self-propelled artillery is of great importance. On top of that, regardless of their size, armies of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia are well-trained, and their staff is characterized by patriotism and high motivation.

Thus, the three Baltic countries and Poland are increasing their contribution to the Alliance’s deterrence capabilities.

While assessing the Czech contribution to NATO's defense and deterrence capabilities, we have to distinguish between assurance measures and deterrence measures. Czech Army must focus more on high readiness and deterrence capabilities. The deployment of a mortar platoon to the eFP battalion in Latvia or mechanized company in Lithuania on stand-by regime are such examples. Yet, a plan to build a new airborne regiment, as the Czech General Staff plans, can have its reasons as well. Yet, it will have a deterrence meaning only if it is trained and equipped for snap contingency in the Baltic territory. Similar applies to the Czech participation in the building of follow-on forces within German "Nation Framework Concept". Robust follow-on forces of NATO are needed, but the very topical issue for our security is the readiness and the deterrence on the frontline.

THE IMPACT OF THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN POLAND AND THE NEW AMERICAN DOCTRINE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC. RECOMMENDATION FOR THE CZECH FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY.

The Czech Republic has adopted many aspects of NATO's Adaptation into its own strategic documents, planning and capabilities development. Nevertheless, for the Czech Republic supporting the new US strategic doctrine means complementing NATO obligations with bilateral and multilateral arrangements, in line with the 'modular' approach explained above.

When it comes to the 'forward deployment' and 'high readiness/fast reinforcement' aspects of the US strategy, the obvious option is a forward positioning in Poland, in close cooperation and regular exercising

with Polish and US forces. The Czech Republic earmarks the 7th mechanized brigade for the collective defense task and for this purpose it is affiliated with the Multinational Division North-East Headquarters in Elblag. This affiliation currently encompasses only a provision of exercise plans for the brigade as a member of a larger multinational formation. However, the level of cooperation could be upgraded substantially to an actual rotational deployment of the brigade's battalion-sized task force in the Elblag's area of responsibility, with essential combat support and combat service support. Besides an actual rise of the number of troops in the area, thus directly contributing to the need to deploy more forces in the area for deterrence, regular rotation of the task group to its home brigade would also greatly expand the brigade's knowledge of the area and main reinforcement routes, thus also contributing to the credibility of NATO's reinforcement approach. Such a measure would certainly be very costly, but given the planned increase of the Czech defense budget, the priority of the collective defense task, and the likely future redeployment of forces from crisis management operations, the necessary resources should be found.

Other options include increase in exercises in the Eastern flank. The new airborne regiment (to be set up from 2020) could also contribute to this task. The new unit is intended for rapid deployments to address quickly emerging crises. The Czech Republic plans that this unit will be ready for deployment in a matter of hours. As aforementioned reasons depict, this ability ought to be frequently exercised on the Eastern flank, joining other multinational units operating in the area. Special Forces of the Czech Armed Forces are, too, expected to be

employable in full spectrum of conflicts, including those of high intensity. Since Special Forces has no practical experience with these scenarios, they could exercise regularly with its US and Polish counterparts – some analysts have even proposed for the US 10th Special Forces Group activities with the Polish Special Forces Command in Krakow to be made a permanent training platform for SOF of Polish and Baltic countries. Czechs could join such an effort and jointly exercise the employment of SOF in high intensity scenarios.

In addition to supporting deterrence through the forward deployment and high readiness/reinforcement, Russia's possible attack would count on the inability of the Alliance to agree on a swift and overwhelming response. Kremlin has been stoking the indecisiveness of NATO as a whole and individual Allies through the non-military aspects of the hybrid warfare. This is something that Moscow has been doing for years: supporting anti-NATO and pro-Russian parties and pressure groups, using economic projects to bind influence groups or whole governments to itself and attempting to delegitimize opponents. Such a long-term campaign alone could significantly affect resolve of some Allies. And it is likely that in the event of a Russian military adventure against the Eastern flank of NATO, the non-military aspect would play a significant role, precisely to prevent fast and resolute decisions – protests by Russian sympathizers, blockades of reinforcing troops and many more.

Deterrence can be built up against hybrid campaigns by credible attribution of the source; naming and shaming; the proportionate responses showing that hybrid attacks will be consistently answered and in a collective and united way.

Russian intelligence is very active in Prague and makes effective use of diplomatic cover.

Here, the Czech Republic also has an important role to play. It is a known fact that Russian intelligence is very active in Prague and makes effective use of diplomatic cover – the Russian Embassy in Prague is by far the largest in terms of diplomatic personnel and it is confirmed in public reports of Czech intelligence agencies that a substantial number of this personnel are intelligence officers. It is also believed that Russian intelligence uses Prague as a hub for its operations in the region of central Europe. Czech services should therefore step up their efforts to uncover and disrupt Russian malicious activities and degrade Russian influence network, making its effective use in a crisis with NATO less likely. Likewise, a rather robust Czech institutional base for combatting cyber and information threats should prioritize working against Russian hybrid threats and the military Cyber and Information Operations Command should also focus its activities on exercising operations in support of national and Allied effort in the Eastern flank.

And one, rather daring option that would address both aspects of deterrence (forward deployment + reinforcement, and preventing Russia's non-military disruptions) is to make the 7th mechanized brigade (and possibly other force elements, such as a Gripen air defence detachment) to be put on alert and ready to start the movement to Poland automatically based on certain

Russian threat indicators. A bilateral defense agreement with Poland would be concluded that would specify events which would trigger putting the brigade on alert – such as full mobilization of Russian Western Military District, and the brigade's movement to reinforce the Eastern Flank – for example after the first land military incursion into NATO's territory. Since this would be agreed by the sides and mandated by the parliaments in advance, Russia would not be able to disrupt at the time of NATO's contemplation of a counter-attack. In line with 'modular approach', this has to be later coordinated with NATO collective defence plans.

CONCLUSION

Year 2014 meant a genuine change for the United States. Its main doctrinal documents call Russia a competitor with revisionist ambitions. No change in this is expected any time soon. Some experts even call the current situation "Cold War II". We, the Europeans, do not only need to thoroughly analyze the new American doctrine, but we also need a frank strategic debate on political level to determine whether this trend in the US foreign policy represents an opportunity for Europe, or not.

Coherence of the Alliance and complementarity between NATO and US armies are of paramount importance for the Eastern Flank. While the NATO eFP battle groups and the US rotational brigade combat team both have warfighting capabilities, they lack a comprehensive and coordinated battle plan between NATO and the United States, as well as adequate enablers—including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; air and missile defense; and long-range fires. A Russian conventional attack on a very short warning could defeat these forward-deployed NATO and US forces before

reinforcements could be brought to the theatre. Increasing the capabilities of NATO ground forces in Europe—through an enhanced U.S. presence, boosted readiness of European NATO forces and large-scale exercises—will strengthen the Alliance's ability to deter Russia.

United States may also seek a few European partners to participate beyond their contributions to the US-led NATO eFP battle group in Poland. Allies could contribute to the force posture in Poland in several ways: increased rotational presence (e.g., the UK, Germany, or another ally could deploy forces with the current US rotational BCT), deployment of enablers, deployment of special forces units, and deployment of their own aviation and naval detachments to support exercises and training. Such eventualities should be debated with greater urgency in the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic is encouraged to welcome and support the US presence in the region. As shown above, there are several options how to contribute to the Polish-US effort.

As for the regional context, the countries most exposed to the Russian threat need to become "agenda setters" on the global scale. One of the strategic issues that might be addressed by them is the growing doctrinal gap between Europe and the USA. Namely, the format that is the "Bucharest Nine", gathering these countries, provides a good platform for such European strategic and doctrinal debate. The aim of it is to come up with a constructive agenda for the transatlantic bond and for the Eastern flank of NATO while keeping the political cohesion and solidarity of the Alliance.

Martin Svárovský ■
September 2019

THE POSITION OF THE V4 IN TERMS OF SECURITY CHALLENGES THREATENING THE EUROPEAN UNION

DÁNIEL FÓNYI

INTRODUCTION

Following the migration crisis period, the Visegrad countries have formed a close union to protect their interests. However, the work within the V4 had become more intensive even before the 2015 events. Today, through cooperation within the organisation, over 100 meetings and consultations are held each year by involving experts and decision makers of the four states, ranging from security policy to energy to economic affairs. In this article we focus on two issues: firstly, the position of the V4 on key issues affecting the European Union and, secondly, the measures taken by the V4 countries in this regard, with particular focus on only the most significant security challenges.

ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES IN THE MOST IMPORTANT AREAS

MILITARY SECURITY

Following accession into the EU in 2004, the issue of military cooperation within the V4 had largely been a Cinderella issue mainly in terms of plans, though after 2010 there has been a noticeable shift. This is due to the fact that the global security environment has also changed: on the one hand, the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union has opened the way to deepening military cooperation, and with the election of Donald Trump the United States increasingly calls for a more proportionate burden-sharing within NATO. Finally, Russian aggression



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CELEBRATION OF THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF ACCESSION TO NATO. POLAND, THE CZECH REPUBLIC, AND HUNGARY JOINED NATO ON MARCH 12, 1999. SLOVAKIA JOINED THE ALLIANCE IN 2004. WARSAW, MARCH 10, 2019

The V4's deepening of military cooperation is also motivated by fears that Washington could further reduce its presence in Europe, as Washington increasingly focuses on the Pacific.

against Ukraine has shed new light on the possibility of a conventional armed clash in Europe. The launch of Pesco demonstrates the EU's determination.

The V4's deepening of military cooperation is also motivated by fears that Washington could further reduce its presence in Europe, as Washington increasingly focuses on the Pacific. It

also raises concerns that Donald Trump, elected in 2016, has made NATO-sceptical statements. Relations with NATO and the United States are of critical importance for the V4, as these two entities are still the most prominent guarantors of their security in the international arena. It should be emphasised that military cooperation within the framework of the V4 is not aimed at replacing cooperation within NATO, but rather at fulfilling alliance obligations more effectively through cooperation.

One of the most spectacular achievements of the Visegrad countries in the area is the formation of the Visegrad Battlegroup, proving the V4's ability to contribute significantly to the security objectives of the European Union and NATO, whilst demonstrating their commitment to the United States. The military unit, being in service for half a year since 1 January 2016, consists of 950 Polish, 750 Czech, 400-Hungarian and 400 Slovakian soldiers. Some experts have voiced opinions suggesting that this is not even the most

THE POSITION OF THE V₄ IN TERMS OF SECURITY CHALLENGES THREATENING THE EUROPEAN UNION

significant achievement of the Visegrad countries; it would be the document of the “Long Term Vision of the Visegrad Countries on Deepening their Defence Cooperation and the Framework for Enhanced Visegrad Defence Planning Cooperation” issued in March 2014, and related to the establishment of the Visegrad Battlegroup, which has set goals and ambitions for defence cooperation for the first time since the existence of the V₄.

Coordination of the defence planning, the exchange of the necessary information and the deepening of joint training commenced since 2010. Under the auspices of the cooperation, a larger joint military exercise is conducted each year, as well as smaller ones, if circumstances permit. To illustrate NATO's appreciation, the Counter Intelligence Centre of Excellence was opened in Krakow. During its implementation phase, not only the strengths of the V₄ were revealed, however, but its weaknesses were also exposed when disputes arose between the parties, for example, regarding the appointment of the staff of the institution. The centre of excellence will play an increasingly crucial role in curbing the effectiveness of Russia's preferred disinformation operations in the future. Recently it has become common for V₄ soldiers to cooperate closely in international missions for reasons related to both cost saving and organisational development: for example, close cooperation was exhibited in Kosovo by Czechs and Slovaks; in Cyprus by Hungarians and Slovaks; and in Iraq by Poles and Slovaks.

At the same time, it should be emphasised that military cooperation is still far from optimal, it is therefore advisable for the Visegrad countries to further deepen their cooperation in the coming years. Several cases can be cited to illustrate this: for example, in 2013, a decision was made to set up the Visegrad Group Military

Education Platform, but little progress in the realization thereof was made in the following years. In addition, after 2010, the Visegrad states decided to acquire mobile 3D radars and jointly upgrade their helicopter fleet, however, these had partly failed.

Achieving the 2 percent GDP ratio commitment to NATO is still uncertain: in the case of Poland, defence expenditure is just about barely meeting this target, but it is under constant pressure. Hungary has recently increased its expenditure. The Hungarian government has announced the “*Zrínyi 2026*” Defence and Military Development Program, in the framework of which, Hungary is set to acquire modern equipment, and with this, Budapest has pledged to continue growing its defence budget in the coming years. Thus, military cooperation within the framework of the Visegrad Cooperation is unabatedly a promising policy that can be capitalised on to achieve more with less financial investment.

RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

Following the Georgian clash and the Russian-Estonian cyber war, relations between the EU and Moscow began to normalise temporarily, but due to the interventions in Ukraine and Syria, and the broken relationship between the United States and Russia, the relations between the European and Russian political elite has deteriorated. Moreover, the V₄ are divided on this issue: albeit it is true that during the crisis in Ukraine the states of the bloc concurred with the central resolution of the EU and NATO and called upon Moscow to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine, beyond that, however, fractures can be identified. For example, Poland has taken a confrontational stance against Russia, advocating the introduction of economic sanctions. The Czech Republic has taken a similar stance on the issue, though a

Following the Ukrainian revolution, the Visegrad countries immediately conveyed their substantial support.

slightly more lenient one than Poland. Slovakia and Hungary, by contrast, do not regard Moscow as a hostile power with which no positive relationship could be maintained, especially if it is economically justified. Hungary has attempted to appear neutral on the issue, which is also necessitated by intensified energy cooperation with Russia regarding the expansion of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant.

As a result of the existing disagreement between the said parties, relations with Moscow do not really appear at the V4 official level. However, it is precisely the 'omission' of Russia that impedes the Visegrad Cooperation from gaining more international influence. Strengthening Ukraine from the Visegrad countries' point of view is essential, given that the country functions as a kind of 'shield' for the bloc against Russia, which poses a threat to the region through its unpredictable foreign policy. Following the Ukrainian revolution, the Visegrad countries immediately conveyed their substantial support: in 2014, the V4 ministers of foreign affairs jointly visited Kyiv, promising to help Ukraine implement the reforms after the change in government. The importance of the country to them is depicted by the fact that it is one of those that has benefitted the most from the Visegrad Development Fund in the last decade. During the Slovakian Presidency of the V4, relations

between the bloc and Ukraine began to improve again. During the Hungarian Presidency of the V4, the deterioration in the relationship with the Ukrainian leadership was due to the situation that in 2017, Ukrainian legislature adopted an Education Law that restricts the use of minority languages in the education system, and more specifically in secondary and higher education. In addition to the violation of rights and the diminution of minority rights, it is feared that this measure of Kyiv will make the country more unstable. There was an obvious lack of consensus within the V4 on this issue, and the parties stressed the need to find a compromise, but on the whole the Visegrad countries did not manage to uniformly act within the EU regarding the Education Law.

ENERGY SECURITY

For the EU, the prioritisation of energy security issues was elevated when relations with its main source of import, Russia, deteriorated as a result of the events in Ukraine. It should be emphasised that energy policy was already at the forefront of the attention of the V4 before 2010, which is not surprising considering that the countries of the bloc are highly vulnerable to import changes. The importance of this issue is well illustrated by the 2018-2019 Slovak Presidency of the V4 identifying this as a strategic area. Under such auspices, three major initiatives can be recognised: supporting projects that strengthen energy independence, closer cooperation on renewable energy sources, and developing the North-South energy corridor. The Visegrad countries have shown signs they believe that nuclear power plays a key role in improving energy independence. In this regard, the Visegrad Initiative for Nuclear Cooperation should be highlighted, for example, in the framework of which the states are deepening the nuclear energy cooperation and conduct researches

on helium-cooled reactors. The Czech Republic provides the necessary helium technology, Slovakia the design and safety control know-how, Hungary the knowledge of nuclear fuel, and Poland its experience of material science.

In the field of energy, the V₄ coordinate formally and informally. A major step forward was the setup of the Permanent Forum of Energy Regulators in 2016, in the framework of which, two meetings were held in 2017 with representatives of the bloc's regulatory bodies. Several conferences on energy security have been and continue to be held by Visegrad countries, and an energy think tank has been launched recently with the financial support of the Visegrad Fund. In order to develop the North-South Corridor, the gas transport infrastructure of Slovakia and Hungary has been connected, and the work between Poland and Slovakia also commenced last year. There is also an undergoing plan for the connection of the Polish-Czech gas pipeline.

Furthermore, the Visegrad countries are increasingly paying attention to liquified natural gas (LNG) as an alternative to traditional sources, which is increasingly valued globally. It should be recalled that over the last decade there has been a slow but steady rearrangement in the global energy market due to technological advances. The United States has moved from an energy importer to an exporter in Europe as a result of shale oil and shale gas extraction. V₄ countries have been lobbying the EU to support the expansion of the Central European liquid gas infrastructure, both financially and politically. As an example, it ought to be emphasised that by connecting the Polish-Slovakian gas pipeline network, Slovakia will have access to the Świnoujście liquified natural gas (LNG) terminal, which will allow Bratislava a more intensive energy diversification.

Action of the V₄ during the migration crisis showed that the bloc can seriously influence policy development across the EU if it can uniformly act in enforcing its interests.

ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

Illegal immigration is considered to be one of the major security challenges for the European Union in the long term. In this regard, the V₄ have been strongly supporting border protection and local assistance in problematic areas, as opposed to admitting immigrants en masse. More than a few analysts expressed their opinion that the bloc's role has been valued in the EU mainly due to the migration crisis. The V₄ countries vehemently rejected the possible introduction of a migration quota, which has led Western European states to accuse these countries of lacking European solidarity. In contrast, the V₄ stance is that it is the sovereign right of each state to determine what solidarity means and to define the criteria for determining who is admitted to their territory. This is well reflected in the resolution of the Slovak political elite: they were willing to accommodate migrants and refugees, but only if the Slovak state can set the different criteria for judging their admission. The states of the bloc would rather support a more flexible solidarity, with a system less engraved than the migration quota, to help the EU countries suffering from massive influxes. On the whole, however, the action of the V₄ during the migration crisis showed that the bloc can seriously influence policy development across the EU if it can uniformly act in enforcing its interests.

For the Visegrad countries, rejecting the quota or admitting immigrants en masse is also due to their lack of experience in integrating different cultures, and over the centuries, multiculturalism has appeared in a negative rather than a positive light in the region.

Hence, the eyes of the EU have become steadily and gradually drawn paying attention to Africa. Especially in regard to illegal immigration. For similar reasons, following the events of 2015, the V4 countries pledged to cooperate closer to a modest degree on the continent's development policy. Several actors in the countries of the bloc have declared the need to bring aid in rather than admitting immigrants en masse. This, however, makes it essential to increase the capabilities which *really* enable them to operate in Africa effectively. There are also other signs that the Visegrad countries are serious about extending their influence in Africa. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary have increased the number of their delegations in sub-Saharan Africa from 2010 to the present, as well as increased the number of their soldiers and police from the countries of the bloc have recently served in missions in Mali and the Central African Republic.

THE WESTERN BALKANS

Providing political stability in the Balkans is crucial for the V4, as the bloc's states are almost immediately affected by any negative event. This finding was accentuated by the migration crisis. For the Visegrad countries, promoting the accession of the Western Balkans to the EU is a strategic objective. Several exchanges of experience, educational and cultural initiatives have been affirmed by the V4. The former mainly concerns how the countries of the Western Balkans are to prepare for joining the European Union and how they can further develop the operation of their democratic institutions. Additionally, the Visegrad countries built

a well-functioning regional cooperation after the regime change, which would be particularly useful to "export" to the Western Balkans, where tensions and distrust still dominate relations between the states. Benefits of the "model imitation" are shown, for example, by the setup of the West Balkan Fund (WBF) in 2015, which was modelled on the International Visegrad Fund. The idea itself also emerged from the V4 region: in 2010, the implementation of the WBF was raised by two NGOs, and then the idea was officially promoted by the Visegrad countries during the Czech Presidency of the V4. The states in the bloc voted in favour of a grant of EUR 80,000 to help the operation of the WBF. It should be noted that the Fund is currently struggling with underfunding. With the support of the Visegrad Development Fund, programs aimed at improving relations between local countries have also been affirmed. The project of the "*Western Balkans Expert Network*" can be considered a rather significant initiative, which provided further training for judicial staff in the Western Balkans in 2014.

During the migration crisis, the V4 actively assisted the Balkan states in strengthening their border protection, for example, by sending police officers there. However, this action undertaking has been mainly carried out through bilateral agreements, avoiding the formal organisational structure. One can observe analysts approaching the matter being divided, where considerable arguments do not see this as a disadvantage; some believe that it provides the bloc a high degree of flexibility. The argument follows up on this with that the international environment is ideal for the V4 to extend their influence in the region, since as a result of the events in recent years, Western Europe has lost some of its credibility and attractiveness. As a result of the increasingly intensive disputes and other circumstances within the EU, resistance to the expansion of the bloc remains strong. In these, it is



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PRESIDENTS, LEFT TO RIGHT: MILOŠ ZEMAN OF CZECH REPUBLIC, JANOS ADER OF HUNGARY, ANDRZEJ DUDA OF POLAND, ZUZANA CAPUTOVA OF SLOVAKIA, BORUT PAHOR OF SLOVENIA, AND ALEKSANDAR VUCIC OF SERBIA, JOIN HANDS AT A PHOTO SESSION PRIOR TO THE OPENING OF THE PLENARY SESSION OF VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES, LANY CHATEAU, CZECH REPUBLIC, OCTOBER 3, 2019

important to recognise that the V₄ cannot compete in the region with China namely, which has extraordinary financial means to gain influence.

Albeit considerable economic interests in the Western Balkans for the Visegrad countries are limited in scope for the time being, the importance of the region is steadily and surely increasing in this regard. Coordination of the development of the transport and energy infrastructure of the Western Balkan countries and the strengthening of local discourse on this topic were focused on during the Hungarian Presidency of the V₄. This remained a priority during the Slovak Presidency. By working in the region, the Visegrad countries demonstrate to Western Europe that even if they criticise several policies, they are committed to the EU. Through their support to the Western Balkans, the V₄ is also strengthening its position within the EU by proving that they are ready to use their own accession experience in order to prepare these countries. Finally, the influence of the V₄ in the region is being even further

The Visegrad countries demonstrate to Western Europe that even if they criticise several policies, they are committed to the EU.

raised by the invitation of Poland to the Berlin process. Poland's Presidency of the Berlin Process was culminated in the Western Balkans Summit was hosted in July in Poznan this year, making remarkable contributions as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was accompanied also by the Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Technology to underscore the integration facilitation across various levels and platforms, as was enabled by Poland's and the V₄ countries' experience.

Dániel Fónyi ■
September 2019

POLAND FIRST – POLAND’S PRESCRIPTION FOR HARD TIMES

WOJCIECH JAKÓBIK

Poland is continuously benefiting from the guarantee of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, renowned for assuring the help of allies in case of an attack on its territory. However, increasingly uncertain times seem impending, therein compelling Poland to reach for additional protective measures. Given Poland’s staunch support and avid role in NATO, such pursuits would be beyond military-orientated issues, mainly in the form of robust economic relations, notably, including in the energy sector. Operating within the EU but likewise also beyond it, furthering such endeavors would provide access to natural resources and technologies, and are likely to continue to draw the attention of the US, perhaps more than at any time in the history of the countries’ long-standing relations.



FLAGS OF POLAND AND NATO. WARSAW, MARCH 7, 2019

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NATO LIMITS

NATO reasonably interprets Russia's growing ambitions and actions, characteristic of violations of international law such as the illegal annexation of Crimea, as malicious intent. Hence, accompanying several other measures, the North Atlantic Alliance reinforces the Eastern Flank by deploying regularly rotating security forces near the borders of states neighboring Russia. The Eastern Flank is aware it should accelerate existing efforts, enable the rapid response times to plausible threats, namely such as incidents risking provocation in the Suwalki corridor. Strategists, analysts, commentators, and pundits alike of NATO member states also make no secret that, at the same time, new additional measures are necessary deterrents on this particular geopolitical chessboard.

At present, the strategic concept of NATO provides for analyses of energy security of its member states, recognizing it as an imperative factor in the calculus of their foreign and security policies. Supplies of natural resources via the Baltic Sea,

relevant namely to Poland and the Baltic states, and via the Arctic Sea, pertinent to Scandinavian states¹, appeared in the formal communication coming from the Warsaw NATO Summit in 2016. Generally speaking, it is natural that governments and other international organizations, specifically the EU (as noted by the author), which are better specialized economically are more active in, and take on greater degrees of responsibility in the area of energy security. Nonetheless, NATO is closely monitoring the influence of the situation in the energy sectors on security dynamics. NATO attaches great importance to supply diversification within the entire Euro-Atlantic region, more than is commonly appreciated. Therefore, we will be incessantly enhancing the strategic alertness in this matter, with aims such as exchanging intelligence and information, as well as further developing relations with international organizations, such as the International Energy Agency and the EU –

¹ <http://biznesalert.pl/bezpieczenstwo-energetyczne-komunikacie-ze-szczytu-nato-warszawie/>

In essence, better economic ties in Poland additionally stabilize mechanisms for US geostrategic interests where US foreign policies can fluctuate.

as NATO member states leaders elaborated in the communiqué mentioned above².

ANOTHER CARRIER OF THE USA

As it is difficult to find compelling arguments to encourage NATO to take care of the energy security of Poland, perhaps it would be more sensible to convince the main shareholder of the Alliance to play an increasingly larger role in it? That is what Poland has begun to do. Poles are planning to develop even closer relations with the US. Besides purchases of subsequent armament parts within the context of military cooperation, the energy industry may become a core of significantly enhanced economic cooperation with the Americans. As such, the US would be aptly incentivized to maintain or even further strategic contributions in Poland, regardless of their foreign policy shifts. In essence, better economic ties in Poland additionally stabilize mechanisms for US geostrategic interests where US foreign policies can fluctuate.

In this context, it is worth recalling that the economic program of the Presidents of the US, Donald Trump's administration called "*America First*" assumes that the export of natural resources and technology will be

the engine of economic development of the US, which shifted from the position of an importer to an exporter of hydrocarbon thanks to the Shale Revolution. Moreover, the idea of the international relations visible in the actions of American Congressmen contains a concept of a policy providing for bilateral aid for allies with the use of all possible tools, including technologies, natural resources, and raw materials. As a result, American foreign policy's "*carriers*" – Japan, South Korea, and Norway, appeared. Poland has already become a carrier to some extent and the development of cooperation in the energy industry may increase both its strategic weight and the strategic scope for Americans. There are at least three fields for cooperation in the regard mentioned above: gas, nuclear, and cyberspace.

GAS

Poland is increasing the purchases of liquefied natural gas, referred to as LNG, from the US. The volume of the US gas, deriving from numerous contracts with PGNiG, that will be at Poland's disposal, after 2022, will reach 9.45 billion cubic meters a year. This is almost the same amount as the maximal volume of purchases from Russia under the Yamal Contract (8-10.2 billion cubic meters a year), which expires in the second year of the following decade. This means that American natural gas entering the Polish market together with supplies from Norway through the Baltic Pipe will allow Poland to reduce or even abandon supplies from Russia. The remaining volume will re-enter the world markets, and PGNiG will benefit from the middle-man redistribution, standing shoulder to shoulder with other LNG trading giants, such as BP or Shell³.

It is worth stressing that the liberalization of the gas market conditions the development

² <http://biznesalert.pl/polska-walka-o-bezpieczenstwo-energetyczne-szczytu-nato/>

³ <http://biznesalert.pl/pgnig-jak-shell-lng-usa-udzialy-gazoport-zloze/>



FIRST LONG-TERM SHIPMENT OF US LNG AT THE LECH KACZYŃSKI LNG TERMINAL, ŚWINOUJŚCIE, JULY 26, 2019

of the gas hub in Poland. Infrastructure will allow increasing diversifying suppliers until 2022. Therefore, the liberalization of the market and admitting new players which could re-export gas imported to Poland through cross-border connections, e.g. to Lithuania or Slovakia ought to be the next step. The author maintains the argument that the development of the LNG trade by making more use of the PGNiG office in London should be considered as preparations for *softening* the Polish market after 2022. This company, without the burden of the Yamal Contract but with unique competences in the LNG trade, may then become less dependent on the development of the situation in the domestic gas market.

Whilst the price of LNG supplies from the USA to Poland is not precisely defined just yet, it is not a decisive factor whether gas should be imported or not. Attaining additional supplies via Świnoujście, as well as from the US, improves the negotiation position of Poland in talks with any supplier. Lithuania publicly announced in 2014 that as a result of adding such an alternative to the supply portfolio, it obtained a lowered price from Gazprom by 20%. Poland could achieve a similar favorable offer in 2022. One can try to estimate the price of LNG from the USA in

Attaining additional supplies via Świnoujście, as well as from the US, improves the negotiation position of Poland in talks with any supplier.

relation to the current market conditions but should also consider that most of the contracts will be realized after 2022, when these conditions may be different. The portfolio of the American contracts is as follows⁴:

In October, PGNiG signed two binding long-term contracts for LNG supply with Venture Global Calcasieu Pass and Venture Global Plaquemines LNG. Each contract provides for the purchase by PGNiG of about 1 million tons of LNG (which is about 1.35 billion cubic meters of re-gasified natural gas) every year for 20 years. Supplies will be realized in the free-on-board (FOB) formula, which means that PGNiG is responsible for the cargo from

⁴ <http://biznesalert.pl/pgnig-cheniere-umowa-lng-usa-fort-trump/>

Poland and the US have signed a memorandum of nuclear energy cooperation.

the moment of shipping. These supplies will enter the global market. It is not defined yet whether the PGNiG's strategy will include the purchase of a fleet of LNG tankers for international trade. Unofficially, it is rumored that such a possibility is taken into consideration.

In November, PGNiG signed a long-term contract for 24 years of US LNG supplies with the company Cheniere Energy. The contract involves supplies of 0.52 million tons of LNG (0.7 billion cubic meters after regasification) in the years 2019-2022 and about 29 million tons (about 39 billion cubic meters) in the years 2023-2042. The contract with Cheniere includes the Delivery ex Ship (DES) provision, which makes the American supplier responsible for the cargo delivery. This means that all possible market fluctuations will increase the cost born by the supplier and will not increase the price paid by the recipient, PGNiG. Supplies from Cheniere are dedicated to the Polish market. The first was delivered to Świnoujście on July 26, 2019, by the Oak Spirit LNG tanker. According to the declarations of the Polish authorities, the price of this contract can compete with the offers in the European market and is probably indexed to the levels of the Belgian TTF stock exchange. Furthermore, this would indicate that the price of supplies may be comparable to the offers at this level and compete with, for example, proposals of Gazprom in Western Europe.

Larger supply volumes, at a price competitive in relation to the Russian

offer, was enabled by the contract with Cheniere. Furthermore, the competitive price at these volumes is also enabled by the anticipated contract for Norwegian gas supplies through the Baltic Pipe, which may moreover give the Polish gas market a degree of price-setting abilities. In such an optimistic scenario, Poland would become a reference point for the pricings of gas contracts and be considered genuine competition for Germany, not mentioning the relatively expensive long-term agreements sorts of the Yamal contract⁵.

NUCLEAR

Although the conditions in the nuclear sector have hinted indications, it may be optimal also for Poland-US mutually beneficial energy cooperation, in what way remains to be determined. Americans could participate in the tender proceedings for the supply of technology. US enterprises could opt for a share in the construction of the Polish nuclear power plant, as Poland is planning to construct 6-9 GW plants⁶ by 2045.

Attesting to existing exploration, Poland and the US have signed a memorandum of nuclear energy cooperation, following up on a preceding document on energy industry cooperation⁷. The US nuclear umbrella based on the land-sea-air triad is linked to the civil nuclear energy sector. After their most intensive work period, military staff are guaranteed a soft landing onto leadership positions in civil solution-orientated companies. Companies in the civil sector, in turn, constitute a natural source of innovation for the military sector, and are the recipients of solutions given by this sector to the civilian one.

⁵ <http://biznesalert.pl/lng-usa-polska-pgnig-cheniere-centrica-cena/>

⁶ <http://biznesalert.pl/polska-atom-szesc-reaktorow-2040-piotr-naimski/>

⁷ <https://biznesalert.pl/atom-memorandum-energetyka-jadrowa-wspolpraca-polska-usa-energetyka/>

Therefore, the “*America First*” approach in this field will extend beyond only the promotion of US companies in tender proceedings due to economic prospects, it will be vital for security issues because of aforementioned factors, as well as namely for US foreign policy – the US will (and should) compete with the offers made mainly by China and Russia. This is particularly visible in Europe. New nuclear blocs in the Visegrad Group member states are becoming the object of rivalry between the mentioned powers and they are a chessboard of general economic competition in the region between them.

The Polish nuclear program may become an object of a similar scenario. Despite recurrent signals regarding the interest of Rosatom, Poland is currently negotiating with the US, South Korea and France. Washington does have an advantage here. The US government could provide financial support by using many means of foreign investments in countries crucial to the US foreign and security policy. Such initiatives are appearing in the US Senate. They could result in a long-lasting policy of creating the aforementioned “carriers” not only in developing countries but also in developed ones, such as Poland, and the nuclear sector would become an additional, new crucial element for US-Polish cooperation in foreign policy and security⁸.

If we are to be convinced by the declarations of the government, negotiations are ongoing on the involvement of the US or another foreign partner in covering about half of the cost. US companies and those related to the US, such as Bechtel or General Electric, could take responsibility for particular components of the project. It is worth stressing the significance of this sector for the national security of the US⁹.

⁸ <https://biznesalert.pl/polska-usa-wspolpraca-energetyka-jadrowa-bezpieczenstwo-nato-parasol-nuklearny-energetyka-gaz-atom/>

⁹ <http://biznesalert.pl/atom-usa-polska-ppej->

Poles were among the first in the world to participate in the GridEx exercise, ongoing since 2011. The GridEx 2019 edition was attended by 6500 people from 450 organizations.

It will turn out whether such a scenario is possible. Autumn is a time of decisions on this matter, as Poles are unable to wait much longer. The Polish Energy Policy until 2040 includes the construction of the first nuclear power plant in 2033. Therefore, considering the time of construction estimated at a decade, there is less and less time for a decision.

CYBERSPACE

The US has been supporting Poland in another dimension of the energy industry, namely by means of protection of its cyberspace through Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne (PSE). Poland – as one of few allies – was invited to participate in exercise during which it could improve its capabilities to react to hacking and cyber threats against the energy sector¹⁰.

Poles were among the first in the world to participate in the GridEx exercise, ongoing since 2011. The GridEx 2019 edition was attended by 6500 people from 450 organizations. Exercises will be taking place regularly every two years. One part of the exercise, entitled “CyberStrike,”

[energetyka-atom-memoirandum-wsparcie/](#)

¹⁰ <http://biznesalert.pl/naimski-wspolpraca-miedzynarodowa-to-klucz-do-skutecznej-cyberobrona-cc4es-energetyka/>

Long-lasting cooperation between Polish and American services in cybersecurity could develop into further cooperation within the SIGINT information intelligence fields, with the possibility to include Poland into the works of the Five Eyes alliance.

focuses on protection from threats specifically to the energy sector. During this exercise, attacks similar to the ones which paralyzed the industry and energy distribution systems in Ukraine in 2015 and 2016 are simulated. Poland will be organizing a similar exercise called PolEx every year¹¹. The inaugural exercise from November 2018 resulted in a series of recommendations of the US Department of Energy, Ministry of Energy of Poland, and the Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Technology (MPIiT) of Poland and the Government Plenipotentiary for Strategic Energy Infrastructure. Americans declared their readiness to support the organization of subsequent PolEx exercises prepared by Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne. The next edition¹² is scheduled for 2020.

The cooperation between Poland and the United States in cyberspace is vital,

especially in the face of growing tension in the relations with Iran and the long history of cyber-attacks on the US and its allies conducted by entities localized in China, Russia, North Korea and mentioned Iran. According to the author, long-lasting cooperation between Polish and American services in cybersecurity could develop into further cooperation within the SIGINT information intelligence fields, with the possibility to include Poland into the works of the Five Eyes alliance. This is an informal association of Anglo-Saxon services engaged in this matter.

POLAND FIRST?

Joint efforts of Poles in the security and energy sectors merits attracting further attention onto Poland from the US. The NATO alliance is the ultimate guarantee, but subsequent contracts and the enhancement of relations between companies are additional incentives for American efforts to assure security in our part of the world. If the analyses of a part of security specialists who predict an increasing return of isolationism to US foreign policy appear to be correct, these forms of enhanced relations will be especially crucial. This is already hinted in the “America First” approach, which subordinates US foreign policy to the interest of the domestic economic policy in a cruder manner. If energy cooperation with Poland supports the economic development of America, it will be even more determined to protect this allied state and steadfast friend on the international arena. It is, therefore, both possible and mutually beneficial that successful energy cooperation will encourage American strategists to create the “Poland First” approach in the future of US policy striving to simultaneously secure interests on both foreign and domestic fronts.

Wojciech Jakóbiak ■
September 2019

¹¹ <http://biznesalert.pl/polex-polska-i-usa-beda-regularnie-cwiczyz-obrone/>

¹² <http://biznesalert.pl/sordyl-polish-grid-exercise-to-nowa-jakosc-cyberbezpieczenstwa-w-energetyce/>

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p. 27

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p. 6

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p. 59

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p. 11

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p. 95

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p. 85

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