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Across many critical areas - from defense and diplomacy, to energy and economics - the alliance between the United States and Poland is reaching extraordinary new heights in 2019. Our longstanding partnership demonstrates the enormous possibilities for the world when two strong and independent nations unite in common purpose and in common cause - *Donald Trump, President of the United States of America*



Washington, June 13, 2019

”

There will be more American troops in Poland. This is going to be an enhanced cooperation. It's going to be an enduring presence, which hopefully will increase gradually in terms of the number of troops, but also in terms of infrastructure which is very important - *Andrzej Duda, President of the Republic of Poland*

Dear Readers,



The ninth issue of the quarterly opens with an article about the infrastructure project of strategic imperative for Poland – the construction of the Solidarity Transport Hub Central Airport. In the piece by the Secretary of State and Government Plenipotentiary for the Central Communication Port, Minister **Mikołaj Wild** maintains that the project is a development impulse for Poland and Central Eastern Europe. The author emphasizes the construction of the port would enable an increase in passenger and cargo potential and would situate Poland on the leading passenger and freight routes, which has considerable importance for economic development and security of the region.

In another part of the issue, the predicaments faced by the European Union are examined considering its internal challenges, such as a new composition of the European Parliament and European Commission, and external challenges – including the ongoing trade war between the United States and China. This prompts a broader analysis of the situation in the European Union and the external relations of the Community. **Jan Rokita** and **Prof. Mirosław Lenart** write about the situation in Italy and its foreign policy relations. In turn, **Prof. Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse** analyzes EU relations with world powers – namely the United States and the People's Republic of China. Furthermore, in the pages of the Visegrad reports, **Grzegorz Kuczyński** discusses the recent elections in Ukraine and their consequences for Europe and the region, while **Dr. Piotr Bajda** focuses on analyzing the foreign policy situations of Visegrad capitals.

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EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
IZABELA WOJTYCZKA
izabela.wojtyczka@warsawinstitute.review

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT
BERENIKA GRABOWSKA
berenika.grabowska@warsawinstitute.review

TRANSLATIONS
ALEKSANDRA TOMASZEWSKA
ALEXANDER WIELGOS

PROOFREADING
BARTŁOMIEJ BAGNIEWSKI
ŁUKASZ BIERNACKI

COVER AND LAYOUT
KATARZYNA DINWEBEL
JACEK KOTELA

DTP AND PRINTING
WWW.SINDRUK.PL

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PUBLISHER
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EDITOR@WARSAWINSTITUTE.REVIEW

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I would like to especially recommend the article by the leader of the American Polonia, **Daniel Pogorzelski**, who writes about Chicago, the “Polish” city in the United States. The author describes the city's history and Polish themes and symbols related to its development and culture. He points to numerous connections that link Poland and the United States through Chicago. Moreover, he underlines that it is the Polish symbols that give the city such a unique atmosphere, and Chicago itself is a city intertwined with the history of Poland and the United States.

I wish you all an enjoyable read,

IZABELA WOJTYCZKA
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
THE WARSAW INSTITUTE REVIEW

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
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SOLIDARITY TRANSPORT HUB. POLAND'S MUCH NEEDED AND ECONOMICALLY VIALE INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT

MIKOŁAJ WILD

Central Eastern Europe is a region that offers promise of tremendous growth in air traffic. Economic forecasts indicate a high profitability of a new airport to be located between Warsaw and Łódź. Thoughtfully governed states tend to invest into large scale airport infrastructure. It is high time for Poland to join their ranks.

Two parallel runways, each 4000 meters in length, will allow for serving 45 million passengers per year, with and two further runways to be constructed in later stages, along with taxiways, aprons, terminals: passengers, cargo, general aviation, and a railway station integrated with the passenger terminal. The initial concept of the Solidarity

Transport Hub Poland (STH), to be located 37 kilometers from Warsaw, will be presented to airline executives from all around the world in July this year.

One cannot design a well-thought-out airport without first consulting those who will be its primary users – the airlines. As such, the Airport Consultative Committee (ACC) has been established



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JASIONKA AIRPORT, APRIL 30, 2018. BOEING 787 DREAMLINER.

by the International Air Transport Association (IATA), in cooperation with STH. The consultative committee is composed of representatives of all the airlines that are currently operating out of Chopin Airport, as well as those airlines that are not currently associated with Chopin but are prospective stakeholders for Solidarity Transport Hub Poland. The goal of ACC is to develop and consult the concept behind STH in cooperation with the airlines, in order to better understand their needs, and if necessary, adjust the project to better cater to their expectations.

WHY IS SOLIDARITY AIRPORT NEEDED?

Before all else, rationale for the investment is based upon a real and actual market demand. Polish airports served more than 46 million passengers last year,

a 15% year to year increase, and a fivefold increase compared to fifteen years ago (8.8 million in 2004). Projected figures for 2019 indicate a further increase of over 10% as compared with 2018, which means that Polish airports will serve over 50 million people this year.

Polish airports served more than 46 million passengers last year, a 15% year to year increase, and a fivefold increase compared to fifteen years ago (8.8 million in 2004).



© GRZEGORZ MICHAŁOWSKI (PAP)

ŁÓDŹ, MARCH 23, 2019. MULTIMODAL BUILDING OF THE ŁÓDŹ FABRYCZNA RAILWAY STATION.

But there is more. In Poland the mobility coefficient (number of air travels per capita) is just above 1, while in Western European countries amounts to anywhere between 2 and 4. Therefore, there is a massive potential for improvement. Central and Eastern Europe experiences a consistent increase in air travel per capita – which is a product of continuous efforts aimed at closing the civilizational and economic gap resulting from the years of communism.

Moreover, Chopin Airport – the largest airport in Poland – with its 40% share of the total passenger traffic in Poland, is nearing its maximum capacity. The seasonal daily limit of operations has been reached already and carriers looking to expand are faced with severe limitations of airport slots available (landing and take-off permits). The unfortunate reality is that Chopin

airport has no space to expand further, which is due to both environmental and infrastructural constraints, related to continuous urban sprawl around the airport, and therefore noise reduction requirements, as well as roads traversing in direct vicinity of the airport, all of which preclude construction of additional runways.

Polish national carrier, LOT Polish Airlines, is also the main operator flying out of Chopin Airport with 70% of its flights arriving and departing from this largest Polish airport. The Polish carrier is also the largest airline in the CEE region. As of today, between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black seas, inhabited by a total of over 180 million people, there are no – other than Chopin Airport and LOT – airport-airline tandems ready to develop an airport hub. Importantly, LOT is the last airline based in former

communist states that has not gone bankrupt, has not been acquired by a third party – but instead is noting consistent growth, bringing in revenue streams to the national treasury.

Chopin Airport is recording consistent growth rates of well over 10% annually. According to Polityka Insight, even if all of the currently ongoing investments at the Chopin Airport were to be finalized, and Modlin and Radom airports enlarged, these three airports in Central Poland will reach their maximum capacity anytime between 2022 and 2025. Here, stakes are high; overcrowded Chopin airport and an inability to satisfy market demands could negatively affect Poland's prospect of economic growth.

4.3 billion people travelled on commercial airliners in 2018 globally. As per IATA, this number will increase to 4.6 billion passengers this year and double within the next 20 years, thus exceeding 8 billion. According to Eurocontrol forecasts, because of insufficient capacity of the currently existing airports as well as limited airspace in 2040 Europe's potential 160 million passengers will not be able to engage in air travel. Vice Chairman of IATA Rafael Schwartzman has stated that Europe needs new airport infrastructure, and Solidarity Transport Hub is one of the solutions to the problem.

HUB AIRPORT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY

Third, the airport component is bound to yield profit. Multiple examples point to cargo hubs being a major stimulus for the economy. Air transport, both passenger and cargo – is concentrated in large hubs, with cities and states hosting them benefiting greatly in economic, social and political terms. The relationship is fairly straight forward: connectivity is a key to commercial success; being located along

a frequently used trade route provides immeasurable benefits, which can be tapped into by a well-designed transport hub.

E&Y led MEO Principle Tests that have focused on the profitability of the airport component indicate that STH's return on investment is likely to exceed 10%. Furthermore, according to Baker McKenzie and Polityka Insight analysts, STH Poland could help garner an additional 4–7 GDP percentage points for the Polish economy. Experts claims, that by virtue of its geographic location, Poland could potentially absorb a significant percentage of air traffic between Europe, North America and Asia. In addition to that, the investment is likely to create additional 150 thousand new workplaces in and around STH and related industries.

According to the aforementioned report, aviation is one of the most productive sectors of the Polish economy. Eurostat data indicate, that there are over 1000 commercial entities currently involved in aviation market in Poland. Those companies employ a total of over 40.000 people; and taken together are responsible for creating a net value of over PLN 7.1 billion. In other words, a single employee contributes six times more to the economy as compared to the national average.

Good financial results of LOT, which as a national carrier has recorded from 2015 to 2018 a more than twofold increase of passengers (from 4 to 9 million), increased number of connections from 40 to 110 and doubled its revenue (from PLN 3 billion to PLN 6 billion), recording a significant profit. Without the new airport however, LOT will not be able to retain this dynamic.

According to Baker McKenzie, the stretch of land from Scandinavia, through

The railway junction in the Central Communication Port



RAILWAY LINES WHICH ARE TO BE:

— CONSTRUCTED BY THE CPK — MODERNISED AND CONSTRUCTED BY PKP PLK (POLISH STATE RAILWAYS)

1 NUMBER OF THE SPOKE

The map presents an overview of the railway junction in the Central Communication Port. It consists of ten railway "spokes" that will be located at an interchange hub in Baranów and Warsaw. The railway network will connect Polish cities (from 10 regions) with the airport in Baranów. Baranów is between Płock and Warsaw, not indicated on the map.

*Lesser Poland-Silesian Junction

The more affluent the societies of Central and Eastern Europe become, the more they will be willing to use airplanes as means of transportation.

Poland to Greece remains outside of "the sphere of influence" of any and all major European airlines. Currently, those companies consider the region to be a source of passengers that are transferred to Western European, Russian, Turkish, or Middle Eastern hub airports, and who then switch to long distance flights. Consequently, 90% of long-distance flights to and from CEE region occurs in hub airports far removed from the region, stripping Central and Eastern Europe from revenue streams.

Why a hub airport and a 'hub and spoke model'? The essence of a hub and spoke model is for a flagship airline to develop connections to as many destinations as possible from the airport that is simultaneously a base of operations for the airline. Looking at the connection network, flights converge on the central airport very much like wheel spokes are. By utilizing short and mid haul flights the carrier transfers passengers to the hub airport, from which the passengers can next conveniently transfer to either short, mid and long-haul flights (with the lattermost option taking place on wide body aircraft characterized by greater profit margins).

We know for a fact that passengers will be interested in flying to and out of Warsaw. Even today, half of LOT passengers use Chopin airport as a hub – in that they are flying neither to nor from Warsaw, but simply transfer there to another flight. Furthermore, the more affluent the societies of Central and Eastern Europe become, the more they will be willing to use airplanes as means of transportation. There is a scientifically proven correlation between an increase in GDP per capita and increase in air travel, which surely will translate to demand from passengers.

RAILWAY COMPONENT – AN INTEGRAL PART OF STH

Corresponding with airport development, railway infrastructure investments will too form a backbone of STH project. According to a government schedule and an agreement between STH and PKP PLK (Polish Railway Lines Authority), around 1.6 thousand kilometers of new railways will be built alongside the transport hub. Current plans assume that with completion of the so-called zero stage a 140 kilometer stretch of high-speed rail will be built, effectively creating a new HSR connection between Warsaw, STH

1.6 thousand kilometers of new railways will be built alongside the transport hub.

and **Łódź**. This new line will allow for a 15-minute Warsaw-STH transit time, and 25-minute STH-**Łódź** transit time. The railway component of Solidarity Transport Hub will assume a "spider's web" shape, with ten new lines radiating from STH. As a result, practically every major city in Poland will enjoy a direct connection to STH, with transit times of under 2.5 hours. In addition to that, regions bordering Czechia, Slovakia, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and Kaliningrad Oblast will too gain a convenient and fast access to STH.

Implementing the network-based railway system is an element of paramount importance for the overall success of the project. This is because at the present time, there are over 100 cities in Poland with a population of over 10.000 inhabitants, that do not have a direct access to the railway network. For comparison sake: there is one such city in Czechia, eight in Slovakia, six in Hungary, and five in Austria. Painful as it may be this sad state of affairs is a historical result of partitions of Poland, a fact that becomes abundantly clear is one looks at railway connection density in eastern Poland, and the fact that a number of cities are missing a direct rail connection with Warsaw. This is because under partitions some cities were located in different states, which did not have an incentive to increase connectivity with Warsaw and sought to develop railway connections to their own respective capitals.

Successful implementation of Solidarity Transport Hub Poland program will spur development and growth in Poland, as well as Central and Eastern Europe.

Planned investments in rail infrastructure will help Poland develop a more sustainable transport system. For years road transport has been prioritized in Poland. Unquestionably, the extend and pace of modernization of road networks is one of the staples of Poland's economic and social development. Regrettably, this progress is not matched by railway infrastructure. While there were over 4000 kilometers of new highways built since 1989, mere 50 kilometers of railway lines have been built in the same period. STH program presents an opportunity to make right on this failure, as the railway infrastructure investments partial to STH program will allow for more optimized usage of already existing infrastructure.

NOW OR NEVER

In conclusion, successful implementation of Solidarity Transport Hub Poland program will spur development and growth in Poland, as well as Central and Eastern Europe, exponentially increase passenger and cargo volumes, and place Poland firmly on major trade routes. I therefore urge all stakeholders not to consider STH through the prism of political rivalries and petty squabbles.

STH is a unique development opportunity for Poland, which once materialized will allow our country to leap forward in social, economic and sophistication terms.

As noted by PwC, projects that involve building or expanding airport infrastructure with a capacity exceeding 40 million passengers per annum are already underway in other European states, including Turkey, Russia and Germany. Construction of airports in Moscow and Istanbul goes hand in hand with a further expansion of their respective national airlines, that extensively utilize above mentioned hub airports to transfer passengers – a strategy that will likely be a success factor for STH. Solidarity Airport similarly to Moscow and Munich airports that are currently being expanded, will aim to satisfy the incessantly increasing demand for interchange traffic.

The decision to create a new hub airport in central Poland is long overdue. The idea was first conceived in the 70's, while scores of studies, analyses and reports that documented the need for such investment have been published since early 2000's, under auspices of different political parties. Today, Poland as an economic powerhouse of the Central and Eastern Europe has all the prerequisites needed to successfully develop a new transport hub, which is should be considered as must-have, bearing in mind that the entire region is in desperate need for additional airport capacity. By locating the new airport in a direct vicinity of two intersecting major international highways as well as train corridors and integrating the airport seamlessly with railway and road systems and further investments, such as Airport City, it is safe to say there has never been a better time and place to build STH.

Mikołaj Wild ■
June 2019

POLISH-ITALIAN RELATIONS: A CONSERVATIVE DREAM OF A “ROMAN FORM”

JAN ROKITA

For years, Italy has not been of much of importance to Polish politics. It was too far away and too far to the West – belonging to the powerful circle of Latin nations in Europe, and, above all, so far utterly uninterested in politics. What has united the two countries in recent years were two factors. First, the opposition of the Polish and Italian governing parties to the disproportionate influence of German political culture and economic thinking, both of which are now dominating the current practice of the European institutions in particular, and second, greater openness to influence, and consequently, to the interests of the EU's South.



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MATTEO SALVINI IN WARSAW AT A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF LAW AND JUSTICE PARTY JAROSŁAW KACZYŃSKI.

The visit of Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini to Poland in January 2019 to meet with Jarosław Kaczyński, President of Law and Justice (PiS) and the agreements between the Italian Five Stars Movement and the Polish Kukiz'15 party initiated at the same time raised the question of what Polish politics is looking for in Italy. Correspondingly, does the country stretching between the northern slopes of the Carpathians and the cold Baltic Sea find anything significant and permanent on the peninsula? (Or "*ch'Appennin parte e 'l mar circonda e l'Alpe*", as Petrark once put it "geopolitically" in his love sonnet¹).

Until now, Italy had practically not existed as an area of interest for Polish politics and Polish state leaders. Indeed, it had its moments, but rather out of courtesy and tradition. Polish politicians asked for meetings with their Italian counterparts usually when they came to church celebrations or had audiences with the Pope. In turn, in the political perspective of Rome, Poland, and the whole area between Germany and Russia, did appear sometimes, but rather as a source of political trouble. Why? Because

Warsaw would either demand imposing sanctions against the Kremlin together with Washington or support the EU budget restriction policy together with Berlin, both of which would directly affect the interests of the European South. Left-wing Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, in power in Italy until 2016, was still somewhat interested in "*Polish phobias*" in the context of the head of the European Council Donald Tusk. Renzi considered his point of view on the issue of the protection of the European Union borders to be an expression of "*disrespect for the Italian nation*", while his views on the war in Ukraine the result of "*Polish Russophobia*".² However, in fact, both in Rome and in Warsaw, until recently, it was recognized that there were no significant interests that could link both countries. Therefore, it is not surprising that intergovernmental Polish–Italian consultations at the level of prime ministers have been frozen almost spontaneously since 2013. To put it simply, there was nothing to consult. Luigi di Maio, who at the end of April once again flew to Warsaw, this time to a pre-election meeting of the Kukiz'15 party, has just announced that

¹ Sonnet 114 in fine

² *Rzeczpospolita*, May 22, 2014, Premier Renzi nie ma zaufania do Tuska ; „Il Giornale” October 16, 2015. Migranti, scontro Renzi-Tusk: „Da lui frasi non rispettose degli italiani”

these consultations are supposed to be resumed.

Admittedly, the idea of the superiority of political ties between North and South over those East and West, the latter of which dominate the real content of Polish politics on a daily basis, is still revived from time to time (probably even more than before). The European South appears in this idea as an almost rescuing alternative to the tiring entanglement in complicated and highly troublesome relations with Russia and Germany. One could even say that this idea is a result of the incomplete Polish consent to the *status quo*, which arose in the Central and Eastern European region after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Two elements of this *status quo* are, to some extent, uncomfortable for the Polish political self-awareness. The first of these is the peripheral economic status of the influential German economy, which admittedly gave not only Poland but all the countries of the Visegrad group, a strong impulse for economic growth and the second industrialization, so much desired after the collapse of communist industry in the 1990s. However, at the same time, it created (somewhat similar to Italy) a Polish complex of the perception of transforming the country into a manufactory of German industry³. The second element is the constant fear of political incalculability of Kremlin rulers followed by the awareness of the total dependence of one's own security on the – far from evident – readiness of NATO to fulfill their allied defense obligations, and, in fact, of the USA. In essence, the idea of building links with the Central South of Europe (especially with Hungary, Romania, and Croatia), both political and infrastructural, is sometimes treated as a way of at least balancing those real but

³ Cf. conclusions of the OSW report: “Nowa współzależność. Perspektywy rozwoju polsko-niemieckiej współpracy gospodarczej”, Warsaw 2019

Too far away and too far to the West, belonging to the powerful circle of Latin nations in Europe and, above all, utterly uninterested in politics.

troublesome dependencies, or even of strengthening the importance of Warsaw in relations with Berlin, Moscow, and Washington. After the 2015 elections won in Poland by Law and Justice, the idea took the political form of the so-called Three Seas Initiative (TSI).

However, Italy has so far remained on the margins of this kind of project: as aforementioned, too far away and too far to the West, belonging to the powerful circle of Latin nations in Europe and, above all, utterly uninterested in politics. This does not change the fact that recently, in the circles of Warsaw's conservative *intelligentsia*, the thesis on the so-called “Roman form” of Polish political identity has been vividly discussed, the defense of which would require a significant correction of the real policy pursued by the Polish state. A Warsaw-based professor Marek Cichocki became an intellectual voice for such ideas. In practice, this would mean putting a stop to the excessive influence of German political culture and German economic thinking which dominates, in particular, the current practice of the European institutions. It would also mean greater openness to influence, and consequently, also to the interests of the EU's South, including, in particular, those of Italy. “The story of Europe must start with Aeneas and not with Adenauer and Schuman, Rome

is more important than Brussels, and Poland's return to Europe after the communist era is a return to the sources, the warmth, and light that exist here in the South.⁴ It must be admitted that the ruling Law and Justice party treats such intellectual inspirations in a friendly way. Also, it is difficult not to recognize in them a particular affinity with the much more intense and longer lasting Italian debate on the harmfulness of the domination of "German values" in Europe.⁵

It was not until 2018 when the yellow-green coalition took power in Rome, that the matter was finally brought to the level of political realities – at least partially. Throughout Central and Eastern Europe Salvini was cheered on when, barely ten days after taking office, he started a battle to block Italian ports for black and Arab immigrants, the symbol of which was the case of the ship "Aquarius." Rome has unexpectedly acted as the main ally of the Visegrad countries in terms of their view on the role of the external Schengen border. Shortly after, in June 2018, an active but primarily exotic Polish-Italian alliance was formed at a meeting of the EU Council of Ministers of the Interior, the result of which was the overthrow of the so-called "Bulgarian project" of relocating immigrants within the EU. The idea was defended with determination but also with ineffectiveness by Berlin and Paris until the very end. The exotic nature of this alliance can be clearly seen from the fact that Rome vetoed the Bulgarian project on the grounds that it limited the forced relocation to extraordinary situations such as the crisis of 2015. Warsaw, at the same time, did so on the exact opposite grounds, because any forced relocation,

even in this relaxed version, was unacceptable to it. In Warsaw, firmly in conflict with the European Commission under the leadership of Mr. Juncker, the Italian categorical demand to limit the Commission's control functions in relation to the Member States of the European Union was also welcomed, although it is worth remembering that Italy and Poland want to 'stop' the Commission in entirely different matters. Rome has traditionally wanted the Commission to finally stop imposing budgetary rigor, while Poland is concerned with the intrusive interference of Brussels in the reform of the justice system. The tactical alliance of Polish and Italian interests was strengthened by the propaganda attacks of the media and European politicians on the yellow-green Italian coalition, which President Macron described as "*leprosy spreading even in countries where we thought it would be impossible*".⁶

The unprecedented cycle of conflicts between Rome and Paris, which broke the old rule of silencing all differences between the two countries in the name of the cultural solidarity of the Latin peoples, was exceptionally to the advantage of the Polish Government. It was because Macron, from the very first moment of its presidency, spared no public insults and threats to Poland, mainly because of the high competitiveness of Polish companies and Polish workers on the French market, irritating to the French people⁷. Just like in the case of criticism from the European Commission, the reasons for the state of relations between Warsaw and Rome, on the one hand, and Paris, on the other, were completely different. The Polish-Italian alliance, however, was formed according to the proven norm that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'. The rest has been

⁴ M. Cichocki, "Północ i Południe," Warsaw 2018, p. 85

⁵ Cf. "La Decima di Beethoven," l'editoriale del numero di "Limes" 12/2018: Essere Germania. Zarówno ten tekst, jak i materiały zawarte w tym numerze są dobrym rzutem oka na aktualny stan tej debaty we Włoszech.

⁶ *Il Giornale* June 21, 2018, Macron attacca ancora: "Populisti lebbra dell' Europa"

⁷ J. Rokita, "Nieprzyjazny Paryż", w *Sieci* nr 19/2017

done by the metapolitical ideas: Salvini, Kaczyński, and Orban are convinced that the EU can only be brought out of the current state of confusion if the European idea is reconciled again with the national identities revived today and if the so-called “European values” are no longer defined in a way confronting Christianity. The sudden intensity of Italian–Polish (as well as Italian–Hungarian) cross-party consultations, including these visits of Deputy Prime Ministers Salvini (to Law and Justice) and Di Maio (to Kukiz’15), was triggered by the European elections in May and the consequent need for political reorganization of the European Parliament in the summer of 2019. Both Italian deputy prime ministers and leaders of the government coalition have ambitions to exert more significant influence than before on the shape of EU decisions and need allies from large countries, such as Poland.


However, it was in this very aspect that geopolitics entered into Polish–Italian relations, causing considerable problems for the partners, the situation of which leads them to a tactical alliance. When united Italy, still at the end of the 19th century, abandoned its revolutionary and “Garibaldian” view of its role in Europe, it soon concluded that its interests were strongly correlated with the European influence of Russia. The unification of the country could have been made easier by the fact that after the defeat of the Crimean War the Romanovs took offense at the Habsburgs, so Italy had only one enemy left on the battlefield – Vienna, which was a much weaker enemy. The secret Italian–Russian system concluded in 1904 in Racconigi, directed against the interests of Austria and Turkey in the Balkans, remains a symbol of that “anti-ideological turn” of Italian politics, which from that moment, despite various historical adversities, continuously returned to the idea of including Russia in the mainstream of intra-European

politics. Italy was the first Western country to break the taboo by recognizing Soviet power in 1924, and during the Second World War it consistently showed that the war of their ally Hitler with Russia was by no means an “Italian war.” At the end of the war, Italian-loved communist leader Palmiro Togliatti led the famous “*Svolta di Salerno*,” introducing (not sovereignly, as some people say, but on Stalin’s orders⁸) a party of Soviet agents into the very center of power of one of the emerging Western alliance states. It was only the dramatic events of 1948 and the subsequent isolation of the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) that made Stalin–Togliatti’s plan merely impossible. However, as early as 1960, Christian Democrat president Giovanni Gronchi was again the first western head of state to come to Moscow to announce a return to the old idea of integrating Moscow into European politics and a list of new interests with Russia from companies such as Eni, Fiat, and Olivetti. Gronchi even ignored the condemnation of his line by the Holy See, which – in the famous sermon of Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani in Santa Maria Maggiore in Rome, will accuse him of betraying the memory of the Poles murdered in Katyn⁹. After the fall of the Soviets, Italy again became the initiator of Russia’s inclusion in the G7 group at the Naples summit in 1994, and stood on Moscow’s side during the war with Georgia in 2008, and against Poland, when it tried to locate an American “anti-missile shield” on its territory. Prime Minister Enrico Letta then flew to Sochi to open the West-boycotted Olympics there, almost precisely at the time when the Russian hybrid war against Ukraine began.

⁸ E. Aga-Rossi, V. Zaslavsky, “Togliatti e Stalin. Il PCI e la politica estera staliniana negli archivi di Mosca,” Roma 1997. The findings made by these authors based on the research of the Kremlin archives.

⁹ Alessandro Frigerio, “Il match Gronchi-Kruscev,” <http://win.storiain.net/arret/num160/artic1.asp>; accessed on May 1, 2019

Friends and Enemies of Russia in Europe



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This glance at the history of the united Italy's great dream about Russia allows us to understand that this is a dream that was passed on from generation to generation. Moreover, the attitude of the current yellow-green coalition, which evokes so much emotion in Poland, is neither historically new, nor unique, nor – most importantly – results from any ideological radicalism of the League or the Cinque Stelle Movement, but is simply a permanent legacy of Italian geopolitical thought

The liberal opposition in Poland is making a mental mistake, treating the Salvini

League – in particular – as a special case of support for Vladimir Putin's neo-imperialist whereabouts. A recent edition of the prestigious Italian geopolitical magazine "Limes" has revealed that Italy's civilizational mission is to "take advantage of the current situation to push Russia towards the West, freeing it from Chinese embrace"¹⁰. What is more, it also shows that it is Moscow that chooses Rome as its privileged partner, seeing that the West widely disregards its interests in Europe

¹⁰ P. Figuera, "L'Italia può e deve aiutare la Russia a rientrare in Europa," *Limes* 2/2019: Una Strategia per l'Italia, p. 91

and in the Mediterranean. The author of this geopolitical sketch and the book “*La Russia nel Mediterraneo*” published in 2016, Pietro Figuera from the *Istituto di Studi Politici S. Pio V* in Rome, emphasizes that although the “sovereign” group currently in power in Rome “*are tactical allies of the Kremlin, but it is, in fact, the result of a permanent attitude of the state, and not the line of some transitional government*”¹¹.

At the beginning of his cabinet, Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte tried to implement a project of in-depth cooperation with Moscow, hoping for the lifting of sanctions against Russia and on the Kremlin’s suggestion, blocking to build a trans-Adriatic TAP gas pipeline to bring gas from Azerbaijan to Europe. The mistake made by the leaders of the yellow-green coalition was a misunderstanding of America’s intentions. They believed that in this way, they would somehow inscribe Italy in Donald Trump’s new global strategy. Nothing could be further from the truth. Conte’s key visit to Washington in July 2018 was a real disaster. Trump “scolded” the Italian Prime Minister not only for the pro-Kremlin excesses, but also for signing a memorandum in Beijing on the construction of a 5G telecommunication system with the Chinese, and threatened Italy with US economic and financial retaliation¹². The effect of that visit turned out to be striking. Italy now loyally votes for sanctions against Moscow every six months, confirms the construction of TAP, buys 90 American F35 fighters, supports the American-inspired rebellion in Venezuela (although Deputy Prime Minister Di Maio is protesting here), and deliberately tries to bind itself deeper with the Visegrad countries, which in Rome are treated *en*

It also shows that it is Moscow that chooses Rome as its privileged partner, seeing that the West widely disregards its interests in Europe and in the Mediterranean.

bloc as the most faithful allies of the USA. As far as China is concerned, Conte broke the earlier memorandum. Importantly, Italy is doing all of this with the conviction that it should be doing the exact opposite.

Trump’s lesson permanently influences the geopolitical strategy of the yellow-green coalition. Italians understood that ‘contrary to all their hopes, the US approach to Russia has unfortunately not changed’ and that they are condemned to ‘follow the US superpower in their most fundamental choices’¹³. There is a fundamental difference in approach between Italy and Poland when it comes to the recognition of American leadership in the name of fundamental reasons for one’s security. In Poland, there is a fear that America may fail to fulfill its obligations in this area, hence the insistence on the increasingly strong presence of the US Army and American military installations on Polish territory. Italian politics, on the other hand, lives *sui generis* with a ‘complex,’ being convinced that Italy should, in essence, follow a completely different course, but cannot, because of its weakness – primarily financial – which makes it dependent on US-controlled international financial institutions. Even the Fitch ratings of February 2019,

¹¹ Ib, p. 99

¹² D. Fabri, “L’Italia per l’America ovvero per se,” *Limes* 2/2019, p. 42

¹³ Ib, pp. 43–45

Profound differences and collisions of Italian and Polish geopolitics are now visible.

which are relatively positive for Italy, are treated in Rome as proof of America's "satisfaction," which could change at any time. The current calculation of the Conte government is, therefore, moving in this direction in order to take advantage of the opportunities offered by current American policy. Italian analysts are mostly convinced that Trump's European goal is to counteract both Russian and German influence on the continent, in the name of the same principles that led Americans to intervene militarily in Europe in both World Wars.¹⁴ While in the case of Russia (and China) Rome is trying to demonstrate its subordination to Washington in actions (and not necessarily in words), in the case of Germany it may want to use the opportunity to confront Berlin, especially in the most critical field for Italy: eurozone reform, European co-responsibility for debts, and agreement on budget loosening. Italians are even counting on the fact that in the event of any EU's (i.e., indeed German) economic retaliation, they could count on compensation and rescue from America.¹⁵

Profound differences and collisions of Italian and Polish geopolitics are now visible. In Rome, Poland is treated as part of the core of the "European empire of the USA" and would like Washington to influence its younger ally so that it does not cling to the German financial strategy of disciplining the South of the EU. However, in Poland, under the rule

of the Law and Justice party, the reference to Germany is very ambivalent. The political rhetoric of the ruling party can be highly anti-German, both because of the unexpired trauma of the Nazi occupation and the strong syndrome of the "German manufactory". When it comes to the European integration, however, Warsaw and Berlin have been going hand in hand for years, especially when it comes to opposition to the building of diverse circles of integration and strict fiscal rules. The recent declarations of the Polish head of diplomacy do not leave Italy with much hope here: "*Do not subsidize those in need of reform.*"¹⁶ In the event of a sharp dispute with Berlin over the rules of the eurozone, which may arise in the event of a further economic downturn, Rome might not be able to count on Poland, nor on Central and Eastern Europe as a whole

because it may be on the side of Germany. In Warsaw, on the other hand, there remains an insurmountable distrust of the Italian view that the greater influence of Moscow on Europe is correlated with the growing importance of Italy and the possibility of being promoted to a higher level of sovereignty over America. Even if political pragmatism makes successive governments in Rome, regardless of their ideological orientation, follow Washington's directions in key world politics out of unwanted necessity. Both sides are unable to overcome their natural geopolitical limitations, i.e., radically different geography and completely different heritage of their state policy. Italia will not become part of an imaginary "Baltic-Adriatic corridor" and will remain on the margins of the slowly developing projects of the Three Seas Initiative

Furthermore, the dreams of the Polish *intelligentsia* of transforming the "Roman

¹⁴ "L'Europa tedesca, incubo americano", *Limes* (editorial) 5/2017: USA-Germania, duello per l'Europa

¹⁵ Fabri, pp. 39–40

¹⁶ *Rzeczpospolita* April 30 – May 1, 2019, „Jacek Czaputowicz: Razem z Niemcami w obronie jedności Europy.”

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form” into real political shapes will likely remain illusions. What *is* real, however, is the opposition of the parties in power today in Rome and Warsaw to the excessive claims of the European Commission and the vague common hopes of reconciling the European idea with the national idea and religion. For

the time of the ongoing ideological war in the European Union, it is quite a strong platform for cooperation, but it is not rooted in profound and permanent geopolitical interests.

Jan Rokita ■
June 2019


WHY IS IT WORTH- WHILE TO LOSE GOLDEN HORSE- SHOES IN ROME?

MIROSLAW LENART, PROFESSOR

This year we celebrate the 100th anniversary of the renewal of diplomatic relations between Poland and the Holy See, the establishment of which was possible after Poland had regained its independence in 1918. This anniversary is an excellent opportunity to reflect upon the role and importance of these relations, especially since religious issues remain a major topic of discussions – particularly in European countries. This debate consists of both identity issues traditionally associated with Christian roots, and the role of the institutions of the Catholic Church – which continues to have a significant influence in a secularized world confronted by Islamic believers.

Before we recall the historical facts referred to in the title to the old forms of diplomacy, we are going to present the underlying problems characterizing the Holy See and the Church in Poland today.

First, there comes the Vatican and the fact hardly ever mentioned by the media – the state is still the seat of two Popes. Benedict XVI did not cease his activity, which is closely followed by the people interested in the directions in which the Holy See is heading today. As for the evaluation of the



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VATICAN CITY, APRIL 19, 2019. POPE FRANCIS.

current activities of the Bishop of Rome, it is worth noting that the criticism of his lack of clarity in moral matters is growing. The doubts and discussions mentioned here extend to dogmatic issues, which lead to denouncements of the Pope, the undermining of his teachings, and even stir accusations of heresy. Ultimately, these assessments reveal his lack of understanding of Europe's predicaments, particularly when we bear in mind that he was formed and gained experience

in a different cultural context and on a different continent, where, for example, the conundrum of an Islamic onrush is practically non-existent.

As far as the Catholic Church in Poland is concerned, the most obvious thing is a lack of understanding of the threats posed by Catholic patriotism, which often takes the form of nationalism strengthened by religious values. The observation referring to the perception of the representative of

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Vatican diplomacy in Poland, from the beginning of the renewal of these relations, is still valid. It comes down to the fact that the Apostolic Nuncio seems to be treated as the representative of Poland in the Vatican and not as the Pope's envoy for the realization of the goals designated by the head of the Church. Ermenegildo Pellegrietti, the secretary of Achille Ratti, the first Nuncio after Poland had regained its independence, was the author of such an assessment.

As for Poland's diplomatic representatives in Rome, it may be noticed that they are unable to communicate the message concerning both the specificity of the Catholic Church in Poland in the historical context, as well as the Polish culture itself. The latter is difficult to speak about in a competent way without discussing the issues of religion. Most painful, however, seems to be the lack of control over the messages from Poland heard in the Vatican, which allows, for example, politicians at random to signal to the Pope the problems of the Polish Church, maneuvering the Pope into current political disputes. The facts provided

here are directly related to a complete misunderstanding of the new situation that arose in the Vatican after the death of John Paul II. The significant outflow of the Polish clergy from the Vatican to Poland has weakened the possibility of influencing the presentation of current problems relevant to the local Polish Church, and the explanation of the political context in which it has to operate. The limitation of this message concerns mainly ecclesiastical matters, but also refers to the political situation in Poland. The problem is that during the pontificate of John Paul II, no one needed to explain Polish matters in the Vatican, and after the death of the Polish Pope, no one realized that such a message is perhaps even more necessary than ever. However, while the church structures have their information channels, the Polish representation in the Vatican needed a complete reformulation of its activities, which unfortunately had not done. During the life of the Polish Pope, the representatives of diplomatic services accredited to the Vatican could practically concentrate on organizing further visits of representatives of the authorities to the bishop of Rome, which satisfied political, religious, and probably partly also patriotic aspirations of the visitors. It is regrettable to say that such a form of practising Vatican diplomacy seems to still be desirable, which is mainly due to a complete lack of understanding of the role of the Papacy and the potential of Rome itself in conducting effective diplomacy. For Poland, the aim of the latter is, among other things, to strengthen the positive image of Poland.

Mutual contacts resulting from the relations between the Holy See and Poland are currently burdened with inconveniences related to the lack of understanding of the role of the media and the possibility of subordinating the message to political goals. This is particularly evident in conforming to the



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WARSAW, JUNE 2, 1979. POPE JOHN PAUL II AND CARDINAL STEFAN WYSZYŃSKI AT VICTORY SQUARE (CURRENTLY PIŁSUDSKI SQUARE).

pressure exerted by representatives of the mass media in shaping general knowledge on the courses of action and the current standpoint. Moreover, there is a tendency to organize the past based on religious symbols and acts, which can especially be seen on the example of actions leading to beatification and canonization of successive popes of the twentieth century. The latter of the present-day tendencies mentioned here, which due to the canonization of John Paul II also concerns Poland, has its serious consequences. First of all, each Pope acts based on a political line of his choice, nature, and duration of which are linked to the dynamics of

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SWISS GUARDS STAND IN FRONT OF THE ST. PETER'S BASILICA AT THE END OF THE CHRISTMAS DAY MESSAGE BY POPE FRANCIS (NOT VISIBLE HERE), IN VATICAN CITY, ON CHRISTMAS DAY, DECEMBER 25, 2015.

© ALESSANDRO DI MEIO (PAP/EPA)

The more superficial and emotional the relationship between believers and religion is, the more effective the political attacks become.

historical change. Canonizing the Pope means canonizing not only a person but also perhaps it can be perceived as a kind of “canonizing” of a specific political line connected with his pontificate. Raised to the altars, the Pope becomes an easy target and at the same time an object of even more lively criticism, which in the past was already the case of Pius X, canonized before the Second Vatican Council. It is now evident that this fate also affects John Paul II. The Polish Pope, a specialist in moral theology, who has placed great

emphasis on such issues as the right to life of unborn children or marriage ethics, is being attacked not only for his views in this area, but above all for hiding cases of pedophilia among clergy, including Poles (for instance bishop Józef Wesołowski who died in 2015). Let us note that the calendar of political events almost always dictates the sequence of attacks, so it is not difficult to get the impression that the main objective of the attack is religion itself or, more specifically, the attachment to faith. The more superficial and emotional the relationship between believers and religion is, the more effective the political attacks become. On the one hand, they are a source of justification for moral conflicts arising in this context in humanity, and on the other, they reduce the reality of faith to the subject of political dispute, where it can be effectively ridiculed and discredited as any political idea.

The elimination of Christianity from social life seems to be for many left-wing parties' supporters not only a guarantee of the fall of the Church (which they loathe) as a structure not subject to full control

of the state. This will, in their opinion, make it possible to reach an agreement that transcends the religious divisions more and more apparent in Europe. The assumption of the “liberation” of man from the bonds of religion, which is, in their view, supposed to characterize modern man, would allow bringing closer the increasingly multinational and multiethnic community of people living in the Old Continent. Of course, abandonment of faith should also apply to adherents of other religions, including Islam, for example, but how this goal is to be achieved is not very clear.

One way of explaining this is to acknowledge that the creators of the future of Europe are people who continue to think in the languages traditionally used in Western Europe. Since thinking is carried out in language, the way of understanding the world in languages unknown to European ideologues is entirely alien. The target of the attack is, therefore, what is related to the Christian religion and what seems familiar and understandable. What is more, those who think in these languages have at their disposal a vast oeuvre of theologians and philosophers who, over the centuries, have conducted sophisticated deliberations on faith and religion-related topics – which have often resulted in the rejection of God. There will likely be little discussion of this type of consideration of Islam, not only because a possible attack on the foundations of the faith of its followers would meet with a strong reaction, but also because of a widespread superficial understanding of all that is at the heart of this religion.

A massive problem in the efforts to defend the faith and lead the faithful to salvation is the situation we are dealing with today in the Polish Church. Its leaders, bishops, have allowed for the position under which they have to act according to the dictatorship of the media. As a consequence, their role as

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spiritual guides is obliterated. This is partly a result of the delayed reaction to the line taken by Pope Francis about the cases of pedophilia in the Church. Furthermore, his teaching and activity, perceived with great mistrust by a part of the Episcopate, clearly overlapped with the conviction rooted in the Polish Church that it is Poland that knows better and reacts more appropriately to the problems faced by the Bishop of Rome. Pope John Paul II, a Polish Pope anticipated for a long time, is, in the conviction of many people, key evidence of this to the present day.

It should be noted that the attitude we are discussing here is mainly due to the

It is probable that the result was that in solving difficult problems connected with immoral behavior of representatives of the clergy, the Church applied the principle of sacrificing the suffering of victims for the greater good – protecting the faithful from moral corruption. It should be noted that in such an action one can see the awareness of shallow rooting of faith, which, by the way, will be possible to assess soon after the effects of the scandals shaking the Church in Poland.

specific experience of Christianity in this part of Europe. In Polish culture, the conviction of its leading role in defense of religious and pan-European values has become rooted, finally acquired in the seventeenth century based on aspirations to refer to the Republic of Poland as to a bulwark of Christendom – *Antemurale Christianitatis*. The attachment to the

idea of the militant Church has its effects in the way it acts, where the practices characteristic for the reaction on the battlefield are adapted to the action in the sphere of faith. It is probable that the result was that in solving difficult problems connected with immoral behavior of representatives of the clergy, the Church applied the principle of sacrificing the suffering of victims for the greater good – protecting the faithful from moral corruption. It should be noted that in such an action one can see the awareness of shallow rooting of faith, which, by the way, will be possible to assess soon after the effects of the scandals shaking the Church in Poland. However, we are not dealing here with a more in-depth analysis of this phenomenon but considering the consequences of this situation in relations between the Polish Church, the Polish state, and the Holy See.

Firstly, one should be aware that the slogan *Polonia Semper Fidelis* long ago ceased to have the meaning it indeed had characterized the vast majority of Poles during the partitions. Poland is becoming more and more of a problem for the Vatican – less exposed since the European Union itself is today not the object of particular interest of the Pope responsible for the Church all over the world. The role of Christian Poland as the savior of Europe certainly strengthens the idea of a local national church, but from the perspective of the Holy See, which began centralizing the Roman Curia with Pius X, it is not only incomprehensible but above all contradictory to this agenda. It seems that the Church in Poland must as soon as possible do its history and diplomacy homework and start its mission in accordance with the expectations coming from the heart of Christianity. The active participation of its structures in supporting the faithful will give better results in the pursuit of national unity than supporting patriotic or national

ideas. Ultimately, it will also help to spread Christian ideas and achieve the goals of both the Church community and those political forces recognizing the positive role of Christian faith, tradition, and roots in Europe.

In order to do that, it would be appropriate to treat the Vatican and Rome as places of effective diplomatic influence in terms of explaining the role of Poland in Europe. Making it a national perspective will always be burdened with the current political dispute and the conflicts that are constantly arising in relations between the Member States of the European Union – where there is a sharp financial and economic dispute. In this struggle, religion, values, and ideas are and will continue to play the role of the means to obtain immediate benefits in the form of power, influence, and money. Therefore, it is not Brussels, Berlin, Paris or Warsaw, but the Vatican and Rome that can invariably function as the center of the debate on the ideological future of Europe.

The weakening of the role of the Catholic Church, the spiritual and organizational center of which is now the Vatican, certainly reduced the once established conviction that it is Rome that is a place of special importance for diplomacy – and thus a specific promotion of the position and culture of nations belonging to the community referring in Europe to common roots. There are countless examples of this – ceremonial entrances, canonizations of national saints, showy funerals or other solemn ceremonies held in the Eternal City, which are known from the past. It is worth recalling at least one such event, which will link the deliberations conducted here with the title proposed at the beginning.

On November 27, 1633, a pageant of several thousand people, 300 of whom belonged to the retinue of Jerzy Ossoliński,

who came to Pope Urban VIII on behalf of the Polish King Władysław IV with an obedience message, drove to Rome through the gate of Porta del Popolo. This arrival is remembered not only with the exceptional splendor that the artist Stefano Della Bell captured in his etchings, but also the golden horseshoes with which the Polish diplomat's horse was shod before entering the eternal city. These temporarily fixed horseshoes were left on the pavement of Roman streets and for a long time remained a symbol of the power of the Polish state¹. The most important act, however, was the celebratory speech itself, given in Latin by the Polish Member of Parliament, which impressed the Pope and was immediately translated into French, Spanish, and German as a model for future orators facing the Bishop of Rome². It is hardly surprising then that Ossoliński's message is considered to be more than successful, and not only in the short-term promotion of the importance of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Apart from the ephemeral memory after the ceremonial entrance, the permanent trace of the presence of the Polish diplomat was a set of matters that were presented to the Pope in order to obtain his consent. Among them, it is worth noting that a separate breviary office (*Officium gratiarum actionis pro victoria ex Turcis obtenta anno 1621*) was established in connection with the victory of the Polish army over the Turkish army in the Battle of Khotyn in 1621³. In the history of the Church until that moment, only the victory of the combined Catholic forces in

¹ Arturo Cronia, *Festi polacchi in Italia*, in: *Relazioni tra Padova e la Polonia. Studi in onore dell' Università di Cracovia nel VI centenario della sua fondazione*, Padova 1964, p. 10 (Contributi alla Storia dell' Università di Padova, vol.1).

² Maria Barłowska, *Jerzy Ossoliński – orator polskiego baroku*, Katowice 2000.

³ Mirosław Lenart, *Miles pius et iustus. Żołnierz chrześcijański katolickiej wiary w kulturze i piśmiennictwie dawnej Rzeczypospolitej (XVI–XVIII w.)*, Warsaw 2009, pp. 179–185.



JUNE 13, 1999, WARSAW. POPE JOHN PAUL II CELEBRATED THE HOLY MASS AT PILSUDSKI SQUARE IN WARSAW.

© LESZEK WRÓBLEWSKI (PAP)

the naval battle of Lepanto deserved such a distinction. Celebrating the victories of the Polish army, included in the liturgical calendar, was an act that gave recognition to the event, comparable to today's appearance in the headlines of the most important newspapers in the world – and it should be added that this appearance would have to be repeated every year. The examples given here from the period of the power of the Republic of Poland show the value for Polish diplomacy of communicating with the world through Rome. It also shows that the center of Christianity was treated as a kind of “center of command” not only in spiritual but also in military matters. This was, of course, justified by the fact that the Papal States once took an active part in military missions. It should be remembered that

one such mission provoked an Italian Jesuit Antoni Possevino to write a book for the army, which was later used by Piotr Skarga to write a catechism for soldiers – *Żołnierskie nabożeństwo* “Soldier's Service” (first edition – Krakow 1606). This book accompanied Polish soldiers for over two centuries, and the texts of its prayers can also be found in contemporary prayer books prepared for the army⁴.

Even when the Papal States collapsed in 1870, the seat of the Bishop of Rome was a point of reference and a source of support for Poles. Testimony would be the national pilgrimages to Rome at the end of the 19th century, during which the desire to

⁴ Mirosław Lenart, *Podręcznik życia wojskowego i religijnego Piotra Skargi*, in: „Kto ojczyźnie swej służy sam sobie służy”. *Pamiętka obchodów czterechsetlecia śmierci Piotra Skargi*, ed. Mirosław Lenart, Opole 2014, pp. 45–56 (Opera Extraordinaria, 4).

regain freedom and connectivity were manifested, despite the divisions between the partitioning states. The Pope was also made a trustee of the independence issue and a kind of guarantor of historical truth. Meanwhile, it has not been forgotten that the Holy See constitutes an invariably important point of reference in the conduct of international politics. Therefore, the Vatican at the beginning of the last century was a place where an event that significantly influenced the fate of the Church in the world and Poland happened. On August 2, 1903, the Bishop of Krakow, Jan Maurycy Puzyna, issued the last veto on the conclave in the history of the Church, which blocked the assumption of the Holy See by Cardinal Mariano Rampolla del Tindaro. Eventually, two days later, Pius X became Pope, and on May 29, 1954, he was declared a saint of the Catholic Church. The blocking of Rampolla, who had excellent relations with Russian diplomacy, has supported the faithful of the Roman Catholic Church in the territory of the Russian partition – subjected to pressure from Orthodox Russia, which was reluctant to accept the faith that consolidated Poles within the framework of national, linguistic and cultural values⁵.

In this short study, we decided not to include the great importance for Polish-Vatican relations of the election as Pope of the first apostolic nuncio in Poland after Achilles Ratti's independence as Pope, a subject which is widely discussed in a bilingual volume recently published in the Vatican. Also, the figure of John Paul II would require a separate analysis⁶. In the

context of the deliberations conducted here, it seems that it is necessary to recall facts closer to us in time – on Friday, December 6, 2012, the day of the Epiphany, Pope Benedict XVI uttered significant words, which still seem to be valid today: “*la civiltà occidentale sembra avere smarrito l'orientamento, naviga a vista*” [it seems that the Western Civilization has lost its orientation and is now navigating using its eyesight]. In his speech, the Pope wished to stress that only the Church can see through the fog in which Europe is lost.

The observation of the Bishop of Rome seems to be accurate, but it is especially true of those countries which have been in contact with the problems of the conflict of cultures in the background, burdened with the experience of fighting, through other nations or only through the products of a given culture. Franco Cardini in the introduction to Daga Tessore⁷'s book *The Mystic of War (Mistica della guerra)* rightly pointed out that the radical rejection of violence as a means of conflict resolution after World War II, which was the result of the exceptionally traumatic experiences of the people involved in the conflict, had unpredictable consequences. It is about rejecting the idea of fighting deeply rooted in culture and which in Christianity is of great importance – in the context of the spiritual struggle. Looking at the history of the Polish nation and Polish culture, we realize that this assessment applies primarily to those countries and nations in which the fight was not so crucial in the process of preserving cultural and religious identity. If we look at the Balkan countries, it is hardly surprising that religious conflicts

⁵ See vol. edited by the author: *Genealogia dei desideri. Pio X nella memoria del popolo dell'Alta Slesia* a cura di Mirosław Lenart e Gianpaolo Romanato / ed. Mirosław Lenart, Gianpaolo Romanato, Libreria Editrice Vaticana: Città del Vaticano, 2015 (Pontificio Comitato di Scienze Storiche, 38; Atti e Documenti Opera straordinaria, 5).

⁶ *Nunzio in una terra di frontiera. Achille Ratti, poi Pio XI, in Polonia (1918–1921)* a cura di / ed.

Qurino Alessandro Bortolato, Mirosław Lenart, LEV: Città del Vaticano 2017 (Pontificio Comitato di Scienze Storiche – Atti e Documenti 47; Opera Extraordinaria 10).

⁷ Dag Tessore, *La mistica della guerra. Spiritualità delle armi nel Cristianesimo e nell'Islam*, prefazione di Franco Cardini, Roma: Fazi, 2003.

Countries such as Hungary or Romania are hesitant to migration because a notion from the collective cultural experience of these countries includes that Islam can only be stopped by force.

remain one of the most important elements of its regional policy – because of permanent conflict with the Ottoman Empire or its very existence within its borders. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that countries such as Hungary or Romania are hesitant to migration because a notion from the collective cultural experience of these countries includes that Islam can only be stopped by force. There is a reference here to religion, not to separate states, because the boundaries of division have been recognized in this way for centuries. The experience in question is not alien to Poland, which for centuries has been consolidating its image as a bulwark of Christianity. The problem is that while in the past, this attitude was supported by Rome, which seemed to be at the forefront of the crusade against the forces threatening Christian Europe, the situation has now changed completely.

The Vatican, whose strength lies in the constant reform of its structures and its adaptation to the changing world, which makes it the only institution with such a long, uninterrupted history, seems to have

adopted the concept of a Europe without borders. This idea is much easier to accept by the Church – it treats its structures only as organizational support of the political models of the states in which it operates. And although political changes sometimes lead to disputes over boundaries for dioceses, which also occurred after the territorial changes resulting from the last war, it is possible to find an agreement relatively quickly, because the primary goal is to provide spiritual care for the faithful. It turns out, however, that the nations defending their borders for centuries and, what is more, considering themselves to be a part of a fortified camp – such as Poland, which is close to the idea of a besieged fortress – find it difficult to understand that the solution to the problem lies in understanding their own limitations resulting from attitudes fixed in the cultural context of education, characteristic of a given country. The point is that in the past it was much easier, and probably still is, to fight a real enemy, and it is much more challenging to undertake a spiritual fight so close to the moral and spiritual path of development that Christianity proposes.

Finally, it is essential to once again pay attention to Jerzy Ossoliński's speech, mentioned in the introduction, which, although delivered in the 17th century, ends in a way that partly reflects the character of Polish religiousness and spirituality:

"[...] the first place belongs to Poland, which, just as it succumbs to its rulers, voluntarily submits to religion and holiness – not by violence and not forced. This Sarmatia, inaccessible to Roman weapons, succumbs today to the Roman faith. Once the hostess of so many superstitions, today it is the handmaid of the Only God; the most fervent guardian of freedom, never touched by oppression; today it yields to Roman bishops and the Holy See. Poland,

I say, which alone does not give birth to monsters in the world. No heresy, no separation from it has come out, and if there are some infected by the disease of neighboring nations, they are soon cut off from all the nobility by the strict laws of our punishment and the eternal infamy of their stigma. [...] passion in faith is inborn in the Polish nation; hence this respect for the bishops, who gave way to the first places in the Senate and to whom the most important matters of the Republic of Poland were devoted. I leave aside the religious edifices and decoration of their generosity, and I will keep silent that the earnest service is there and the whole world unanimously recognizes it. However, the greatness of the mind of this nation is seen, and from this very thing it is known that for so many centuries it has been against the wild and cruel Christian enemies, it does not yield to them. Ottoman crescents, which have endured so many powerful armies, so many defensive cities, so many inaccessible glens, so many clever rivers, so many Christian settlements, and destroyed so many of them, are being stopped by Poles. It is one Republic's merit that the Tatar acrimony that has not spilled all over Europe so far. Muscovites, who are Christians only by name, but their conduct and customs worse than of the rest of the barbarians – we have won them so many times, oppressed them and finally turned the most beautiful part of their countries into our province. It was all the greatest merit of the mind and the Roman virtue. We rewarded the ancient city with the sternness of our ancestors when we adopted its laws and customs. Here is the source of our freedom, justice, and law; here is the source of the examples of our valiant rule. Nothing caressed or effeminate in our customs and outfits. Children's youth do not spend their years at lutes and dances, but in the camp; the nobility is not ashamed of farming, they protect itself from the city's pleasures, which weaken the militant spirit. People of elevated hearts live in low

huts; they do not know fortified castles, drawbridges, because they feel safe with their fundamental laws and the innocence of life. [...] So raise, the Greatest Pope, Your right hand, with which you keep this world, moved by the storm, and the falling truth, for the happiness of our age. Strengthen the son of Your endeavor with a divine blessing. Other Christian lords will be awakened with this example, and, having abandoned the harmful fame of their envy, will turn their weapons to the place of the plunderer, for long crying out for vengeance.

Truly, my King, like now himself, subjects his kingdom and his weapon to Your Holiness and declares respect and fidelity to the Holy See. He promises, and he will always be ready to follow your guidance, to follow the Christian banners under your command – not only to march behind them but to overtake them⁸.”

And although the last words of Ossoliński's speech sound a bit disturbing, the discussion can be concluded with a question whether Poland can allow itself to be a country in which religious issues function on different levels of communication; to abandon Rome and the Vatican? This question will be justified by the history still present in the salons of the Vatican and referring to the visit of the Polish deputation in the '90s. John Paul II irritated a little by the acts of homage that he received, was said to address his compatriots from Poland: the Holy See expects from the representatives of diplomacy competence, not devotion.

Mirosław Lenart ■

June 2019

⁸ Teksty źródłowe do nauki historii w szkole średniej. Zeszyt 36 – Od rokoszu Zebrzydowskiego do wojen kozackich w świetle źródeł przedstawił dr Kazimierz Tyszkowski bibliotekarz Ossolineum we Lwowie, Cracow 1923, pp. 30–32.

THE EUROPEAN UNION IN RELATION TO WORLD POWERS

TOMASZ GRZEGORZ GROSSE, PROFESSOR

Rivalry of the US with Russia and China has induced a new course of change in the post-Cold War international order. Thus far, while Europe has participated in this rivalry to a limited extent, it has ambitions, however, to reassume a predominant role in the new, multipolar geopolitical order. Europe also intends to maintain the globalization of institutions of trade, ensuring a favorable exchange of trade and investment on the global scale.

INTRODUCTION

The subjects of the analysis are the relations of the European Union (EU) with three world powers: the US, Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Among them, the United States still carries the largest importance, albeit, its

geopolitical potential is systematically declining. Similarly, in the case of Russia – which in recent years has been trying to rebuild old influences and even expand them – has nonetheless categorically lost importance in comparison to the influence it commanded during the Cold War era.



BRUSSELS, BELGIUM, APRIL 11, 2019. EUROPEAN COMMISSION.

On the other hand, China is the power which is growing in both potential and geopolitical ambitions; increasingly dominating in relations with Russia, as well as rivalling with the US for primacy with increasing confidence.

The European Union is attempting to cooperate with all these powers, and yet at the same time, is also co-competing with an increasingly greater amplitude. This is a result of geopolitical changes which were induced by the crumbling of the Cold War

Germany and the entire EU entered a period of dynamic change within the international order with considerable aspirations of capitalizing upon this potential. Notwithstanding these developments, the chances of realizing European ambitions are decreasing further and further.

order. First, the collapse of the Eastern Bloc took place along with the distinct weakening of Moscow. Then, as it turned out, progressively larger problems have also affected the US. In this way, the domination of the two most important states after World War II appears to be in passing, especially relative to states which are gaining influence and importance. In the first instance this pertains to the PRC, which is aiming to assume a leadership role, taking it from Washington in a new, Sino-centric global order in an accelerating manner.

Besides China, another state which has clearly benefited from the aftermath of the Cold War is a unified Germany. Integration processes in Europe have, to this day, supported the potential and international role of this country. Nonetheless, the EU faces many challenges, and so far, Germany is not a regional hegemony. To lead the EU, it requires the support from other EU member states, namely France. Therefore, Germany and the entire EU entered a period

of dynamic change within the international order with considerable aspirations of capitalizing upon this potential. Notwithstanding these developments, the chances of realizing European ambitions are decreasing further and further.

Analyzing the issue of the EU's position in relation to world powers ought to be approached from an angle of the geo-economics concept. Most often, it is defined as the exploitation of economic instruments by states for strategic purposes, in both the economic sphere and in geopolitics¹. This is relevant to attaining asymmetrical advantages over rivals which would weaken them or make them dependent and at the same time surrender authority to the dominating power. In the case of the European Union, geo-economic efforts are undertaken foremost by select member states; in general, by the largest ones. At the level of the European Union, this type of activity is less visible, though representatives of EU institutions can also implement these activities, especially under the influence or pressure from national governments. In foreign policy, France and Germany have the largest influence on EU institutions; wherein although this had also included Great Britain earlier, from the moment the referendum concerning Brexit had occurred, the role of London has decidedly decreased in this field. As in the case of shaping EU policy towards external powers, the first tunes are played by Berlin and Paris. As such, the objective of this analysis is to attain an answer to the question on what the specifics of European geo-economics are. Until now, the EU approach has been dominated foremost by economic interests, and geopolitical matters have been rather secondary. It is for this reason the EU is often described as an economic power, yet a geopolitical dwarf. With regards to this aspect, do the economic aims still

¹ E.N. Luttwak, *From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce*, National Interest, 1990, 20 (summer), pp. 17-23.



BELGIUM, DECEMBER 11, 2017. FEDERICA MOGHERINI, THE EU HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY.

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dominate, or are they perhaps becoming gradually enhanced with geopolitics? Are the economic instruments, therefore, being utilized for the pursuit of geostrategic aims?

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Academics and researchers generally consider that at the beginning of the 21st century, the EU relations with the US has been weakening, both in the areas of economics and geopolitics². After the end of the Cold War, the role of NATO and the US in western Europe has undergone change. It has resulted from a diminished threat perception from the side of Russia, a perception that is especially true within France and Germany. On the same geopolitical basis, transatlantic cooperation has undergone erosion. Economic issues gained foreground importance for the mutual relationship, which are confirmed by earlier studies. For the EU institutions, the key matter in foreign policy is the promotion of European economic interests³.

² M. Riddervold, A. Newsome, *Transatlantic relations in Times of uncertainty: crises and EU-US relations*, Journal of European Integration, 2018, vol. 40, no. 5, pp. 505-521.

³ T.G. Grosse, *W poszukiwaniu geoekonomii*

That at the beginning of the 21st century, the EU relations with the US has been weakening, both in the areas of economics and geopolitics.

It results in a certain extent from the shaping of EU competences in this sphere. Foreign economic policy is a competency solely of the EU and it is overseen by the European Commission.

In turn, European foreign policy and security is conducted first and foremost in intergovernmental institutions, ergo by the EU member states. The role of the European Commission here is decidedly smaller compared to its role in economic policy; therefore, the Court of Justice of the EU is excluded from this field. Notwithstanding

w Europie, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Warsaw 2014.

the division of competences in EU foreign policy, it is the member states that take the fundamental strategic role in the spheres of economics and geopolitics. The focusing of the EU on economic interests results, therefore, not so much from granted competences as from, predominantly, the interests of its largest states.

Simultaneously, economic relations with Washington were characterized by a growing number of discrepancies. An example was the assertiveness of both sides during negotiations on the topic of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which was unable to have been negotiated in the period of the presidency of Barack Obama, and the discussions thereafter on this topic were suspended by Donald Trump⁴. These disputes concerned multiple economic sectors, commencing from the aviation industry; a several-year long legal dispute at the World Trade Organization (WTO) forum, imports of steel and automobiles into the US, blocking the imports of American food by the EU, decreasing the monopolistic position of American internet companies on the EU's internal market, as well as limiting armament imports from the US⁵. Discrepancies in economic interests underwent an escalation in recent years, especially during the Trump administration. For this reason, researchers tend to acknowledge that there is even a disintegration of mutual relations taking place⁶.

To a further extent, the worsening of these relations accordingly includes geopolitical issues. These were, from time to time, the function of economic

interests, as it had taken place in the example of the differing approach on the issue of Iran. For the largest EU states – signatories of the nuclear agreement with Tehran⁷ in 2015 – maintaining this agreement had an economic dimension, as many European firms participated in economic exchange with this country and dreaded the return of American sanctions. Accordingly, Germany, France and Great Britain established the company INSTEX, which was supposed to operate financial transactions with Iran, under the assumption it would allow European firms to avoid American sanctions. It turned out to be ineffective as the largest enterprises feared sanctions in the form of closing off access to the American market and to the financial sector of the said country. Faced with the decision between cooperation with the US or with Iran – they chose the larger partner. On the European side, it was an equally important factor of the geopolitical dispute surrounding Iran. It was associated with approaching the multipolar order, and simultaneously defending the multilateral agreement with Tehran with significant importance for the strategic situation in the Middle East.

Following the Cold War period, western Europe was counting on the possibility of overcoming Washington's dominance and establishing a more balanced multipolar order, based on multilateral agreements, based on international law and organizations. It is acknowledged that in such an environment the European regulatory and diplomatic strength would be celebrating triumphs. Therefore, the EU intended to build its geopolitical potential relying heavily on economic and negotiation potential and less on military strength. Scholars purport that the European aspiration for multipolarity is most often initiated and carried out by member states, occasionally without the participation of

⁴ M. Smith, *The EU, the US and the crisis of contemporary multilateralism*, Journal of European Integration, 2018, vol. 40, no. 5, pp. 539-553 [548].

⁵ M. Peel, A. Barker, *Europe must open military projects to foreign firms, says US envoy*, Financial Times, 11 March 2019, p. 2.

⁶ M. Smith, *The EU, the US and the crisis of contemporary multilateralism*, p. 539.

⁷ The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

EU institutions (as it was such in the case of the Normandy Format of 2014). This occurs relatively sporadically and is not really effective⁸.

European ambitions for multipolarity to a large extent were based on the international order, which was constructed in the aftermath of World War II and was ensured and guaranteed by the US. Meanwhile, one of the most important manifestations of the European approach to multipolarity was the emphasis on strategic autonomy in defense policy, which largely was regarded as being independence from US influences and strategies. As such, it is the most profound paradox of European ambition: on one hand, it aims to untangle itself from the influence of Washington in international politics; and on the other hand, the effectiveness of its realization is to a very large extent reinforced by the institutions of the American order, or dependent on political support in Washington.

Nonetheless, the accentuation of independence from the European side caused that the EU did not follow Washington in several of its geopolitical initiatives. A manifestation of this phenomenon was evidenced in the policy towards Iran, Russia and NATO (an example being the reluctance of France and Germany to expand the alliance to Georgia and Ukraine, to provide military support to Ukraine, and to increase US presence in Central Europe⁹), as well as the US dispute with China pertaining to the South China Sea¹⁰. In all cases, the largest member states also worried about the

Following the Cold War period, western Europe was counting on the possibility of overcoming Washington's dominance and establishing a more balanced multipolar order.

economic repercussions stemming from their support of US policy. In the situation of economic projects which were tied with the market for security – the largest EU states put economic benefits above geopolitical issues. An example is the construction of the northern gas pipeline¹¹ or receiving the Chinese G5 technology¹² despite opposition from Washington and doing so even under the threat of sanctions from the side of the US¹³.

Over time, since the end of the Cold War, Paris and Berlin – and, therefore, Brussels – with a decreasing extent were treating the US as a steadfast geopolitical ally, and increasingly frequently as an economic rival. The alliance with Washington has been not once perceived as a geopolitical encumbrance, potentially having adverse economic repercussions. Unsurprisingly,

⁸ M. Smith, *The EU, the US and the crisis of contemporary multilateralism*, p. 543.

⁹ M. Riddervold, G. Rosén, *Unified in response to rising powers? China, Russia and EU-US relations*, *Journal of European Integration*, 2018, vol. 40, no. 5, p. 560.

¹⁰ S. Biscop, *European Strategy in the 21st Century. New Future for Old Power*, Routledge, London – New York 2019, p. 40; M. Riddervold, G. Rosén, *Unified in response to rising powers?* p. 564.

¹¹ *Report: US moves ahead of Nord Stream 2 sanctions*, EUobserver, March 11, 2019, <https://euobserver.com/tickers/144372> [accessed on: 27.03.2019].

¹² *Germany's Huawei deal risks US intelligence sharing*, EUobserver, March 12, 2019, <https://euobserver.com/tickers/1443728> [accessed on: 27.03.2019].

¹³ Innym przypadkiem budzącym niepokój administracji amerykańskiej był udział niektórych państw UE, m.in. Włoch, w chińskiej inicjatywie nowego jedwabnego szlaku (ang. *Belt and Road Initiative*). Por. D. Ghiglione, D. Sevastopulo, *US rebuke sparks Rome split on Chinese investment overtures*, *Financial Times*, 7 March 2019, s. 1.



GERMAN CHANCELLOR ANGELA MERKEL; EUROPEAN UNION HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY FEDERICA MOGHERINI; AND FRENCH PRESIDENT EMMANUEL MACRON POSE FOR PHOTOGRAPHERS DURING THE ARRIVALS FOR A 'WESTERN BALKANS CONFERENCE' AT THE CHANCELLERY IN BERLIN, GERMANY, APRIL 29, 2019.

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therefore, the European dreams regarding the multipolar order was supported equally in Moscow as in Beijing¹⁴. Both capitals had their own geopolitical ambitions of rivalling Washington, and weakening transatlantic ties had essential importance to their aspirations, as it decreased the possibilities of US influence.

RUSSIA

According to researchers, after the end of the Cold War, Russia was not regarded in western Europe as a threat to security¹⁵. For example, after the war in South Ossetia in 2008, only the Baltic states and Poland increased their defense spending. In the remainder of the EU, defense spending underwent further reductions. Spending for this purpose increased again in Poland, Sweden and in the Baltic states after the aggression of Russia on eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2015,

but underwent reductions in Germany, among other EU countries¹⁶. Even under unprecedented pressure of the Trump administration on Berlin to increase spending for this purpose, it again took the decision to reduce it to 1.2 percent of GDP by 2022 (NATO expects spending to be 2% of GDP)¹⁷.

A certain change in the approach of the EU took place after the beginning of the conflict in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by Russia. France and Germany undertook negotiating with Russia in the form known as the Normandy Format, which was interestingly without the participation of EU representatives or other member states. As a result of the shooting of the passenger plane over Ukraine with a considerable group of European citizens on board, all member states (i.e. EU) put sanctions on Russia. The deciding factor

¹⁴ Ławrow: *Rosji zależy na silnej i niezależnej UE*, PAP, February 16, 2019, <https://www.pap.pl/swiat> [accessed on: 27.02.2019]; *Macron calls on China and EU to strengthen multilateralism*, Reuters, 26.03.2019, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-china-macron/> [accessed on: 27.03.2019].

¹⁵ S. Biscop, *European Strategy in the 21st Century*, p. 55.

¹⁶ Por. K. Schilde, *European Military Capabilities: Enablers and Constraints on EU Power?* Journal of Common Market Studies, 2017, vol. 55, no 1, pp. 45-46.

¹⁷ J. Gotkowska, *Budżet obronny Niemiec – słowa zamiast pieniędzy* [Germany's defence budget – more rhetoric than money], Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, Analizy, May 23, 2018.

for taking this step was not so much the pressure from the side of the media as was the pressure from the American administration¹⁸.

Despite that, Western Europe clearly concedes or acquiesces in disputes with Russia as evidenced by the projects aimed at normalizing relations with the eastern neighbor proposed by scholars and considered by political decision makers¹⁹. They encourage stabilizing geopolitical relations with Moscow even at the expense of an informal acceptance of Crimea's annexation and a commitment that Ukraine will never become a member of the EU or NATO.

Another factor is the traditional high support for the normalization of relations with Russia in select EU states, traditionally in France, Italy and Hungary. Eurosceptic movements cooperating with and in part financed by Russia additionally create political pressure for this type of change²⁰. Moreover, efforts for strategic autonomy with regards to the US in European defense policy leads to academic opinions of the necessity of normalizing geopolitical relations with Russia²¹.

In the foreseeable future, the EU alone and its armed strength are not able to replace NATO in the event of conflict with Russia. Therefore, decreasing the US presence in Europe must be preceded by the arrangement of geopolitical relations with the Kremlin, to a large extent on

¹⁸ M. Riddervold, G. Rosén, *Unified in response to rising powers?* p. 560.

¹⁹ S. Biscop, *European Strategy in the 21st Century*, p. 59.

²⁰ A. Polyakova, *Why Europe Is Right to Fear Putin's Useful Idiots*, Foreign Policy, February 23, 2016, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/23/why-europe-is-right-to-fear-putins-useful-idiots/> [accessed on: 27.03.2019].

²¹ J. Howorth, *Strategic autonomy and EU-NATO cooperation: threat or opportunity for transatlantic defence relations?* Journal of European Integration, 2018, vol. 40, no. 5, pp. 523-537.

Western Europe clearly concedes or acquiesces in disputes with Russia.

Russian conditions. In these changes, an improvement of mutual relations on the economic platform would be expected. A telling instance of such a policy was the construction of the northern gas pipeline "Nord Stream 2" at the same time when the EU was putting sanctions on Moscow²². A seemingly schizophrenic behavior, nevertheless, gave a clear signal to the Kremlin that sanctions are transitional, and economic cooperation is strategic in nature.

To summarize, Western Europe, and herein the EU institutions, in recent years, do not consider Russia to be a rival or a serious geopolitical threat; but rather a potential economic partner, and in the future, a likely political partner.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)

The PRC was for many years treated as an important economic partner, with whom cooperation brought benefits to the largest European exporters (mainly Germany). Therefore, European states favorably answered Chinese economic initiatives, even when it aroused the highest uneasiness from Washington. This was the case when the largest EU countries entered the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as "founding states." Nonetheless, towards the end of the second decade of the 21st century, the approach of the EU towards China began to undergo change. The European Commission described this state namely as an economic competitor and systematic rival, which promotes an alternative model for economic governance²³.

²² M. Riddervold, G. Rosén, *Unified in response to rising powers?* p. 561.

²³ *EU – China – A strategic outlook*, European Commission contribution to the European Council,

Berlin and Paris found themselves in the vanguard of the protectionist course towards Beijing. They sharpened oversight and supervision over Chinese investments in their countries, fearing largely the strategic technologies relevant to long-term competition of domestic economies²⁴.

Under the influence of both countries, the European Commission also undertook a more assertive stance. In 2019, it demanded from the PRC mutuality in economic relations, which includes the equal treatment of European investors on the Chinese market, receiving the same treatment as domestic enterprises. This concerns opening the market for investments from the EU, impeding practices of forcing the transfer of technology to local cooperating parties and subsidization of Chinese exporters by the state. The Commission predicted tighter control over Chinese investments on the EU's internal market as well as the closing off access to the European market for public orders from Chinese enterprises, to the similar extent that PRC will not contract tenders, on the basis of mutuality. The EU intends to change the WTO regulations to limit protectionism in the PRC. Although a few European states allowed the Chinese G5 technology on their markets, the Commission would like to, in the future, work out a common EU stance on this matter²⁵. Paris, Berlin and Brussels were also concerned with the infrastructure investments undertaken on the territory of the EU in context of the new Silk Road (The Belt and Road Initiative) which includes Greece, Portugal, Italy, Central European states and the Balkans²⁶.

European Commission, Brussels, March 12, 2019, p. 1.

²⁴ J. Hanke, J. Barigazzi, *EU accelerates moves to block China's market access*, Politico, March 19, 2019, <https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-accelerates-moves-to-block-chinas-market-access/> [accessed on: March 27, 2019].

²⁵ *EU – China – A strategic outlook*, European Commission contribution to the European Council.

²⁶ M. Peel, J. Brunsden, *Brussels warns Beijing on EU*

It appears that sharpening the course towards China resulted more from economic factors rather than geopolitical ones.

Scholars acknowledge that the largest states and the EU itself are passive towards the PRC on the geopolitical platform²⁷. The aforementioned subjects did not treat Beijing as a political rival or a threat for security. Simultaneously, the largest countries feared the economic repercussions if they supported the US in geopolitical disputes. This was occurring even when Beijing was not abiding by international law, which was otherwise very important in official EU rhetoric. It is pertinent to remember that China refused to respect the rulings of the Arbitration Tribunal from 2016, in the breaching the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea²⁸. The reaction of the EU regarding Beijing's stance was almost non-existent.

National governments geopolitically caved before China, attempting to leave sensitive matters for EU institutions (which include, for example, PRC's human rights record)²⁹. At the same time, when the European Commission was criticizing China's policy – which includes the growing investments in Italy and the Western Balkans³⁰ – the French government was signing economic contracts with Xi Jinping worth 40 bln Euros³¹.

investments, Financial Times, March 13, 2019, p. 2.

²⁷ J.E. Kirchner, T. Christiansen, H. Dorussen, *EU China Security Cooperation in Context* [in:] J.E. Kirchner, T. Christiansen, H. Dorussen (ed.), *Security Relations between China and the European Union: From Convergence to Cooperation?* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2016, pp. 1-18.

²⁸ M. Riddervold, G. Rosén, *Unified in response to rising powers?* p. 565-566.

²⁹ Por. A. Michalski, *Europeanization of National Foreign Policy: The Case of Denmark's and Sweden's Relations with China*, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2013, vol. 51, no. 5, p. 884-900.

³⁰ V. Hopkins, *Brussels hits at China's loan 'pressure' in bloc*, Financial Times, March 6, 2019, p. 2.

³¹ A. Rettman, *France takes Chinese billions despite*

The only exception to Europe's geopolitical passiveness towards the Middle Kingdom appears to be prompted by increasingly far-reaching Chinese investment and political penetration in Central Europe and in the Balkans. This concerned the largest EU states, namely Germany. The representatives of the European Commission had expressed their concerns with this expansion in the European "backyard". In the documentation prepared at the summit of the European Council, officials demanded larger unity of member states with regard to the "16 +1" format, respecting European norms and values in the Western Balkans. This was pointed at Beijing's ambitions of achieving technological supremacy in the armed forces by 2050, which would create major challenge for European security³².

Despite this, it ought to be acknowledged that European states and the EU itself deem China first and foremost to be an economic rival, and less so a geopolitical rival. Member states in this matter are deeply divided. Portugal, Greece, Hungary and increasingly Italy have become the defenders of Chinese interests in the EU. These are the states that are in dispute with Brussels or those most affected by the Eurozone crisis. In this way, European crises and political fractures in the EU are avidly exploited by Beijing to promote Chinese geo-economic interests.

CONCLUSION

In contemplating the EU approach to the largest great powers, one ought to pay attention to the policies of France and Germany, and periodically to that of other member states that influence

the stance of EU institutions and external EU policy. Until recently, the EU was mainly interested in the promotion and defense of European economic interests in international relations. In the geopolitical field, the concept of multipolarity as well as strategic autonomy (from the US) maintained fundamental importance. Occasionally, it was a narrative which enabled the development of economic interests, the legitimization of economic protectionism, or financing from EU funds development of European armaments. Scholars point to the limited scope of the European geopolitical strategy and the weakness of its implementation³³. Not uncommonly, economic interests were clear prioritized before the geopolitical interests. The fear of decision-makers was visible when it came to the endangerment of European business as a result of geopolitical actions. Even if the European entities (in this case, leading EU member states controlling EU policy) – had increasing geopolitical ambitions, they were intrinsically tied to their economic interests. It is possible to find only a few exceptions to this rule (for example, sanctions placed on Russia after the annexation of Crimea). European geo-economics has thus been concentrated on the economy, which means that instruments of foreign policy were used to support this aim, and from assumption, geopolitical matters should not collide with economic matters.

Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse ■

June 2019

EU concerns, EUobserver, March 26, 2019, <https://euobserver.com/foreign/144499> [accessed on: 27.03.2019].

³² *EU – China – A strategic outlook*, European Commission contribution to the European Council, pp. 2-4.

³³ M. Riddervold, G. Rosén, *Unified in response to rising powers?* p. 555; T.G. Grosse, *Systemowe uwarunkowania słabości polityki zagranicznej Unii Europejskiej*, *Studia Europejskie*, 2010, nr 1 (53), p. 33-66.

FRANCO-GERMAN STRATEGIC DISSONANCE

KRZYSZTOF RAK, PhD

From the outside, everything seems to be perfectly fine. Politicians hold solemn anniversary celebrations. On January 22, 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel ceremonially renewed their vows from the Elysée Treaty. However, even an inattentive observer of European politics knows that there is nothing left of the famous “motor of EU integration” and that the leaders of both countries are not even able to agree on the general principles of a common strategy.

GENERALITIES OF THE TREATY

The new treaty was supposed to symbolize a new beginning, sending a signal that Paris and Berlin are still capable of serving as European directorate. But upon taking a closer look at the provisions of the treaty, one could notice their conceptual emptiness. While the two parties to the agreement declared in the preamble that “*the time has come*

to take their bilateral relations to the next level,” no new ideas have been put forward since then in addition to what has already been repeated for years. What is typical for the treaty is its first article, under which “*the two countries shall deepen their cooperation on European policy. They shall promote an effective and strong common foreign and security policy and shall strengthen and deepen the Economic*



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GERMAN CHANCELLOR ANGELA MERKEL (R) AND FRENCH PRESIDENT EMMANUEL MACRON (L) SIGN A NEW FRANCO-GERMAN FRIENDSHIP TREATY IN AACHEN, GERMANY, JANUARY 22, 2019. PRESIDENT MACRON AND CHANCELLOR MERKEL SIGN A NEW FRIENDSHIP TREATY, INTENDED TO SUPPLEMENT THE 1963 ELYSEE TREATY, PLEDGING TO PROVIDE DEEPER ECONOMIC AND DEFENSE TIES AND COMMITMENT TO THE EU.

The systemic dysfunctionality of the eurozone, which resulted in dividing the EU into debt-ridden and non-developing countries in the south on one side, with France standing closer and closer to them, and into creditor countries in the north on the other.

and Monetary Union. They shall strive to complete the single market and work towards a competitive Union with a strong industrial base as a foundation for prosperity, promoting economic, fiscal and social convergence as well as sustainability in all its dimensions.”

Similar style and content are characteristic for most of the remaining 27 articles. More detailed information is contained in the chapter on security policy, with the two countries agreeing to strengthen Europe’s ability to act autonomously in the international arena. Also, the ‘Franco-German Defence and Security Council’ was established as a joint political body. However, what is most important in the document is what has not been included: a shared vision of the European Union, which could be an answer to its problems, among which are the eurozone crisis or migration issues. And this simply means that France and Germany have not reached agreement on a joint strategy for European policy.

MACRON’S STRUGGLE TO SURVIVE

Such an agreement is longed for by French President Emmanuel Macron who believes that any tilt in the current EU policy will help him to solve the problems confronted by his country. There is no doubt that his political future will much depend on whether he is capable of pushing through his European ideas because his earlier attempts to bring about economic and social reform ended in failure, as exemplified by yellow vest protests. This explains his consistency in calling on Germany to implement the said reforms as otherwise, he will be unable to put them in place. Macron’s general idea is to transfer more competencies to the supranational level, burdening the EU institutions with problems that national governments are unable to cope with. Macron would, in particular, seek to solve the problem of the systemic dysfunctionality of the eurozone, which resulted in dividing the EU into debt-ridden and non-developing countries in the south on one side, with France standing closer and closer to them, and into creditor countries in the north on the other with Germany as a leader, all of which do quite well economically. The crisis is manifested by the German trade surplus, triggered to a great extent by the European single currency. Following advice from economists who are not blinded by the dogmas of neoliberalism (e.g. Stiglitz), the French president would intend to prevent the split of the EU into creditors and debtors by creating a mechanism for massive financial transfers redistributed from rich countries (creditors) to the poor ones (debtors) while transforming the eurozone into a so-called transfer union. He therefore calls for establishing a common budget for the eurozone under the supervision of the EU Minister of Finance (lecture at the Sorbonne, September 2017).

Angela Merkel was more or less assertive in rejecting such proposals because she did not imagine that Germany would spend tens of billions of euros every year to subsidize the poor south. This prompted Macron to change his tactics. In his speeches, he no longer demands money from the richest but seeks to intensify EU cooperation, making it both centralized and bureaucratized by setting up new supranational institutions. In doing so, he probably assumes that deepened political and institutional cooperation will ultimately force Member States to increase their contribution to the EU budget. This approach found its reflection in an article published by President Macron at the beginning of March 2019 in major European newspapers, in which he called for a European Renaissance and blamed nationalists for all crises that plagued Europe. Incidentally, Macron's extremely ideological diagnosis seems absurd at first sight because these mythical nationalists should be in consequence found guilty of the decomposition of the eurozone and the migration crisis. The recipe for nationalists' plots is to "*build this renewal [of Europe] together around three ambitions: freedom, protection and progress,*" by creating a number of new European institutions, including European Agency for the Protection of Democracies, European Asylum Office, European Council for Internal Security, European Security Council, European Climate Bank, European Sanitary Inspection and European Innovation Council. It is noteworthy that most of these councils and offices already exist yet bear slightly different names than those proposed by Macron (for instance, in what way would a European Council for Internal Security be different from the already-existing Justice and Home Affairs Council?). Finally, the French leader suggested setting up a Conference for Europe in order to draft a new EU treaty.

One cannot help but get the impression that Macron's European policy comes down to a belief: more bureaucracy and ideology, and the problems will solve themselves.

GERMAN GAME OF WAIT AND SEE

Berlin would not at all have to respond to Paris' minor and uncontroversial proposals, at least when it comes to German interests. Also, it could try to keep it quiet, or at least declare its willingness to discuss the matter, in order to save face and dignity of the French President. But new CDU leader Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (referred to by her initials AKK) responded to Macron's call only a few days later in an article "Getting Europe right".

At first glance, it can be noticed that AKK made efforts to free the European discourse of ideology. Unlike Macron, she did not reprimand nationalists in an authoritative manner. Instead, she pointed to populists as opponents, although partially and indirectly admitting they are right and claiming that "*the forthcoming elections to the European Parliament cannot focus upon defending the imperfect status quo of today's EU against populist accusations.*" In the further part of her article, AKK rejected *expresses verbis* European centralism, European statism, the communitarization of debts, the Europeanisation of social systems, and the minimum wage, thus both openly and decisively questioning Macron's vision and leaving virtually no room for a future Franco-German compromise. Also, she dismissed amendments to the European Treaties, suggesting "pro-European elites" and not societies to stand behind them. What is more, AKK broke with the current position of the CDU, as the party sought to find a recipe for EU crises in subsequent attempts to deepen integration processes under the slogan of



GERMANY, FRANKFURT JULY 2, 2009. SYMBOL OF THE EURO CURRENCY BEFORE THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK.

“more Europe!” The vision laid out by the new CDU chief conveys tough realism that has long not resonated in German politics. It is worth recalling what AKK said in her most famous statement: *“There is no version of a European super state which can live up to the goal of a Europe made up of sovereign Member States, and able to take action. The work of the European institutions cannot claim any moral superiority over the collaborative*

effort of national governments. A new Europe cannot be founded without the nation states; they provide democratic legitimacy and identification. It is the Member States that formulate and bring together their own interests at the European level. This is what gives Europeans their international weight. Europe must focus on subsidiarity and the individual responsibility of the nation states, and at the same time be capable of

acting in the common interest. Our Europe should therefore stand on two equal pillars: the Intergovernmental method and the Community method. We should, simultaneously, also take long overdue decisions, and abolish anachronisms. The latter include the European Parliament's concentration on Brussels and the taxation of the income of EU officials."

Undoubtedly, European realism in AKK's views is a virtue, yet her article contains no proposal on how to tackle the eurozone crisis, referred to as the most critical European issue. And this is its fundamental weakness. Economists seem to agree that the eurozone will not become an optimal currency area in the near future. And if so, one of two possible solutions needs to be adopted in order to avoid a meltdown along with all its unpredictable consequences: create a transfer union, as it was laid out by Macron, or lead to a controlled decomposition of the eurozone, for instance by splitting it into two currency areas, with one bringing together wealthy creditors and another reserved for poor debtors. So, unlike Macron, AKK does not put forward any ideas on how to save Europe from an economic slump.

WHAT'S NEXT?

AKK's response to Macron's proposals, although relatively mild and diplomatic, leaves little doubt that France and Germany will shortly fail to reach a compromise regarding fundamental issues on Europe's fate.

This, in turn, is very bad news for Macron who fell into a political trap. He is today too weak to carry out a bold autonomous reform that would increase the competitiveness of the French economy while reducing the social costs of the French welfare state. French society does not want reforms and is ready to take quasi-revolutionary steps

against those politicians who would engage in difficult and painful changes. So, Macron has no other solution than to acknowledge the status quo, give up politics and focus on his own image, which is what he seems to do best. This is why he will probably not make any efforts to face up to the excessive power of Germany as the significant decades-long challenge for the European policy of France. It is recalled that European integration, followed by Elysée treaties, was meant to grant Paris control over the Bonn Republic as the latter was at the time becoming stronger and stronger. After de Gaulle's methods proved no longer effective in the 1970s, the French decided to balance German influence in Europe by giving the go-ahead for the United Kingdom's joining European Communities. In the 1990s, soon after the reunification of Germany, they replaced the Deutsche mark with the euro in a bid to diminish Germany's power. In doing so, Paris strove to solve the problem of Berlin's excessive superpower by adopting two methods: linking the two countries together with political and economic bonds or, although less often, by trying to create a proper balance of power in Europe. Once adopted nowadays, these methods prove no longer valid because France has established strong ties with its eastern partner while being unable to break free of its grip – so strong that France does not even make attempts to balance between European countries. And yet it could balance German influence by building strong ties with Washington – especially after Trump had abandoned the "leadership partnership" policy with Berlin – with the indebted countries in the southern part of the eurozone, becoming their natural leader in the fight against the German trade surplus, or at least revitalize the traditional alliance with Central European countries.

The biggest mine remaining under the EU is the single currency; the eurozone has never been and still is not an optimum currency area.

If this all seems so obvious, why does not the French leader introduce these solutions? It is noteworthy that one of Macron's predecessors, Nicolas Sarkozy, theoretically had such an option but failed to grasp an opportunity. This case indicates rather a systemic cause. France is making no bids to balance Germany's influence not because it has unreasonable and blind politicians but because it simply cannot do so. It fell victims of its own policy, binding Germany and France to that extent that the strength of these ties gave Berlin control over a weak France and not the other way around. Complicated plans often lead to counterproductive effects. And that is precisely what happened to the eurozone. When Mitterrand forced the introduction of the euro upon Kohl, he intended to limit the growing influence of the united Germany. In consequence, the German economy holds today a hegemonic position in Europe, as exemplified by its persistent trade surplus.

Hence it is hardly surprising that Germany's political elites strongly dismiss Paris's risky reform ideas. It is in their interest to maintain the status quo for as long as possible because they have comfortable conditions for governing the country and administer a balanced budget. From their perspective, any change will be a change for the worse. Once pursued in

this manner, Germany's policy will be backed by other creditor countries that benefit from the eurozone crisis. And paradoxically, maintaining the current status quo suits also the ruling elites of the debt-ridden countries in the south. Courageous and socially painful reforms will put an end to their power provided that the democratic rules of the game are observed.

Among those that reaped substantial benefits from the current eurozone meltdown are the new EU Member States that have not adopted the euro. The single currency certainly impedes to a great extent the development and prosperity of southern European countries. Incidentally, some economists claim that it slows down the pace of the economic growth of Germany and all countries referred to as creditors (Hans Werner Sinn). And this means that, thanks to the systemic euro crisis, countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic will more promptly reach the average limit of the EU GDP.

Almost everyone holds an interest in maintaining the status quo. This stems from an opportunistic approach of the European political class whose members may be deprived of their authority once changes take place. But this state of affairs will not last forever. The causes of the crises afflicting Europe have not yet been eliminated. The biggest mine remaining under the EU is the single currency; the eurozone has never been and still is not an optimum currency area. Accordingly, the business cycle will sooner or later lead to a Europe-wide meltdown, bringing about unpredictable consequences. But European politicians have broken thermometers and are now pretending that everything is fine.

Krzysztof Rak ■
May 2019

CHICAGO: AMERICA'S BRIDGE TO POLAND

DANIEL POGORZELSKI

On June 4th, 2014, President Barack Obama opened his speech in Warsaw commemorating the twenty-fifth Anniversary of Freedom Day by talking about the Polish spirit which pervades his adopted hometown of Chicago:

In Chicago, we think of ourselves as a little piece of Poland. In some neighborhoods, you only hear Polish. The faithful come together at churches like Saint Stanislaus Kostka. We have a parade for Polish Constitution Day. And every summer, we celebrate the Taste of Polonia, with our kielbasa and pierogies, and we're all a little bit Polish for that day. So being here with you, it feels like home.

Praise from politicians should be met with skepticism, particularly by those hailing from a place like Chicago where elected officials are well-known for their gift of gab. However, President Obama was not exaggerating about the

scope of Poles' imprint on the cultural landscape of Chicago. For those outside of the city, it can be difficult to ascertain how this longstanding presence of Poles in the metropolitan area has found its way into the most unexpected places.



CHICAGO, UNITED STATES MAY 19, 2018. PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND ANDRZEJ DUDA WITH HIS WIFE AGATA KORNHAUSER-DUDA DURING A MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POLISH COMMUNITY AT MILLENIUM PARK IN CHICAGO. THE POLISH PRESIDENTIAL COUPLE ENDS THEIR SEVERAL-DAY VISIT TO THE USA.

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POLES EVERYWHERE

Saint Sabina Roman Catholic Church is a sanctuary of Chicago's African-American Catholic Community. The parish is

What makes Chicago unique is the immense size of the Polish community at large, with an estimated nine hundred thousand inhabitants tracing their roots back to Poland.

located in Auburn-Gresham, a South Side neighborhood which is over ninety-five percent African-American. The pastor, Michael Pflieger, who served as the model for John Cusack's character in the Spike Lee film "Chiraq," campaigned for President Obama during his bid for the US Presidency in 2008. Yet even here in the cultural center of African-American Chicago, the visitor cannot miss the work of local artist Jerzy Kenar, a sculptor who works with wood. His career began with the creation of a wooden throne for Pope John Paul II's visit to Chicago in 1979. Mr. Kenar's work can be found all over the city, including prominent locations like the International Terminal at O'Hare Airport, and the city's flagship Harold Washington Library downtown. The artist's surname is recognizable to any Pole knowledgeable about their

homeland's art history. One of Poland's most prestigious art schools is located in Zakopane, the cultural capital of Poland's highlands, named after Jerzy's relative, Antoni Kenar. Other expatriates from the highlands have found a home eight miles west of Saint Sabina in the suburb of Summit. This is the seat of the Tatra Mountain Cultural Foundation, where Polish Highlanders have formed a community in the Chicago Southland.

Multiethnic fusions are typical of a cosmopolitan global city like Chicago, where diverse people live in close proximity to each other. What makes Chicago unique is the immense size of the Polish community at large, with an estimated nine hundred thousand inhabitants tracing their roots back to Poland. It's no surprise that Chicago's first Sister City was Warsaw. With the placement of "Polish Patches" scattered amongst a metropolitan area that spans three states, the Polish presence in this region has led to some fascinating cultural syntheses. Among these are murals depicting Frida Kahlo in Polish folk costume and designs which blend Polish and Latin American papercutting traditions, guava-flavored *paczki*, restaurants serving Polish-Korean cuisine, annual performances of Japanese Taiko drumming on the Polish Triangle, or an African-American woman who together with her Polish husband run one of Chicago's premiere Theater venues which doubles as a nexus for Polish cultural gatherings. These are just a handful of examples illustrating how Polish folkways and customs have woven themselves into the fabric of the city in intriguing ways.

THERE WERE POLES HERE BEFORE THERE WAS A CHICAGO

Prideful Poles wishing to highlight the community's long history in the city may joke that "there have been Poles here

before there was a Chicago," referring to the first Polish migrants who came to the settlement before its formal incorporation in 1837. From the very beginning, there was a contingent of Polish political refugees and activists who built their new lives in Chicago. Pushed out of Europe as a result of the November Uprising, one of the many failed bids for Polish independence during the partition era, two hundred thirty-four insurrectionists departed Trieste in November 1833, reaching New York City in early 1834. This group had hoped to settle together on a land grant in Northern Illinois, but the effort failed. Historian James Lodesky counts that at least thirty-five of these Polish insurrectionists made their way to Chicago before 1850. Some of these Polish pioneers would even vote in Chicago's first mayoral election in 1837.

A POLISH DOWNTOWN

Today, Poles and Polish-Americans are found all over the Chicago region. Historically, there were five concentrations of initial settlement for Poles migrating to the city in the 19th century. One of these areas is a neighborhood which came to be called "Chicago's Polish Downtown." This district would become in the words of Victoria Granacki the place where "nearly all Polish undertakings of any consequence in the U.S. during that time either started or were directed from this part of Chicago's near northwest side." John Joseph Parot in his book *Polish American Catholics in Chicago* writes eloquently about the Polish Downtown's transition from a rural outpost to the vibrant capital of Polish America:

Schermann's property and surrounding environment must have reminded him of many Polish farming communities. From the still undeveloped and sparsely settled prairie on the outskirts of ante-bellum Chicago, he could see nothing but grassland

stretching westward to the horizon. East of his land stood a thickly wooded area guarding both the both banks of the nearby North Branch of the Chicago River which swung noose like around Goose Island. The virgin land between Schermann's settlement and the river was populated at the time only by chickens and cattle belonging to neighboring farms; fifty years later this same land would support the highest population density in the city-more than 450 Polish immigrants on each acre of land, packed into tenement houses. But in the 1850s Schermann's rural outpost was a picture of serenity. His only outlet was Plank Road, a clumsily built highway actually constructed from wooden planks- a far cry from the bustling commercial thoroughfare later called Milwaukee Avenue along which Polish merchants in the 1920s built their own "Polish Downtown." Schermann's closest neighbors were other Polish settlers, perhaps landless tenant farmers, numbering approximately thirty families during the American Civil War.

All over the Midwest, Great Lakes, Mid Atlantic, as well as New England regions of the United States, one can find Polish enclaves referred to as "Poletown", "Little Warsaw", "Polish Village", or even "Ski Town." However, Chicago alone has a neighborhood designated as "Polish Downtown", a reflection of the prominence and prestige conferred upon this nook of Polish America. Centered on Polonia Triangle, a triangular park at the intersection of three major streets, the headquarters of nearly every significant Polish organization in the United States had their headquarters within a half-mile of the triangle. Nearly half of the population of Poles in Chicago lived in the vicinity Polish Downtown in 1890. Little wonder that historian Edward Kantowicz would write that "Polish Downtown was to Chicago Poles what the Lower East Side was to New York's Jews."

A CITY OF POLISH CATHEDRALS

One of the striking contributions of Poles and Polish-Americans to the built environment of the Chicago Metropolitan Area are the ornate churches that these immigrants constructed. The elegant spires, steeples, and domes built by Poles are prominent landmarks for drivers along the Kennedy Expressway. This interstate highway, running parallel to the Milwaukee Avenue corridor which historically anchored Northwest Chicago's Poles, is a great way to quickly survey some of the best examples of sacred architecture in the city.

Poles immigrating to Chicago were followers of several distinct religious traditions including Judaism, Lutheranism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and various other Protestant denominations. However, the vast majority were devout Roman Catholics. Their numbers, coupled with the clear nationalist leanings of the Resurrectionist religious order which founded many of the Polish parishes in the Archdiocese of Chicago, led to a wealth of religious structures which people admire to the present day. Over twenty churches in Chicago and its suburbs were constructed in a style popularly referred to as the "Polish Cathedral style," brought together not by the language of exterior architectural style, but by their largely consistent interior décor. Often built in an eclectic style, with elements of baroque and renaissance motifs predominating in a nod to the heyday of Polish grandeur during the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

As with other immigrant groups, religious communities were an anchor that helped people acclimate to their new surroundings and eventually assimilate. In the Catholic context, churches became centers of social integration and interaction with many of the other ethnic groups who called the city home.



CHICAGO, UNITED STATES, MAY 19, 2018. PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND ANDRZEJ DUDA, AND HIS WIFE, AGATA KORNHAUSER-DUDA, MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POLISH COMMUNITY.

© PHOTOSHOT (PAP)

At a time before the creation of the social safety net in the United States during the Great Depression in the 1930s, the Polish Roman Catholic parish network in Chicago created a unique system akin to Scandinavian socialism with a robust system of cradle to grave care for adherents. The first Catholic retirement home in Chicago was founded by Poles in 1894 and continues into the present day as St. Joseph's Village in Avondale, and the current Catholic health care system traces its origins in part to hospitals founded by Polish nuns.

A SAFE HAVEN AND A BASTION OF ACTIVISM

The role of Chicago as a haven for Polish people during their turbulent history contributed to the growth of the community over successive generations. Poles immigrated to Chicago after the January Uprising collapsed in 1864. The pediment of Saint John Cantius Roman Catholic Church and the logo of the Polish National Alliance both bear the coat of arms of these insurrectionists. Chicago's booming economy was a magnet and

pressure release for the people of the overpopulated and largely underdeveloped Polish lands in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After Hitler's invasion of Poland in 1939, some one hundred fifty thousand Poles would create a new life in Chicago over the next two decades. The home of Polish American Congress Founder Charles Rozmarek reputedly housed thousands of Poles over the span of nearly a half century. After the Soviets installed the Communist regime in the aftermath of World War II, dissidents and rebels opposing the government continued coming to Chicago. This wave would crest following the rise of the Solidarity movement and the subsequent declaration of martial law in the 1980s which brought large numbers of new Polish immigrants with them.

Parallel to this was Chicago's role as a hotbed for agitation during Poland's many fights for freedom. The city played an outsized role in Poland's successful bid for independence following the first World War, when a sizable number of Chicagoans joined a military force funded by pianist

The children of Polish immigrants in Chicago have risen to prominence on the municipal, state, national, and even international stage.

Ignace Paderewski which became the nucleus for the future Polish army that would later defend the nascent Polish state. There were five offices scattered across the city to draft soldiers into what came to be called the “Blue Army” led by General Haller. Nearly five hundred boys from the parish of St. Hyacinth alone fought during the first World War in support of the Polish cause.

During the Second World War, Polish organizations came together first for war relief and then subsequently formed the Polish American Congress. This organization would play a key role in the successful effort to topple the Communist government in Warsaw. It was this vitality that brought Pope John Paul II to visit Chicago in October of 1979, where he met with the local Polish community, thus keeping up the pressure in his confrontation with his native country’s undemocratic leadership.

THE POLISH TOUCH

The uniquely Polish aura in Chicago when compared with other American cities has lent itself to utilizing Polishness in literature, stage, film, and music as a way of highlighting the Chicagoness of a composition. Songs like *Casimir Pulaski Day* by Sufjan Stevens and *Pulaski at Night* by Andrew Bird are examples of this phenomenon. This trait is also visible in cinema, with actors playing Polish-

Americans on the screen in films such as *Call Northside 777*, *The Fugitive*, *The Breakup*, or the recently released *Widows*.

This dynamic also works the other way, where Polish-American characters have their ethnic background changed as the setting is moved away from Chicago. The film *Grease*, which was filmed in the Venice neighborhood of Los Angeles is an example. The original musical was based on the teenage recollections of the author who attended Taft High School on Chicago’s Northwest Side. The female lead character in the original was Polish-American Sandy Dumbrowski. This role was ethnically altered into the Australian Sandy Olsson when the piece was reworked for film, with the creative team evidently deciding that the Polish origin needed to be jettisoned in their retelling.

Chicago’s sizeable Polish community was also something that captured the imagination of street photographer Vivian Maier. Maier captured images of elderly people gathering at Polonia Triangle and immigrants congregating in Chicago’s Polish Village along Milwaukee Avenue. She even visited Polish film screenings in Avondale’s Milford Theater which was known by locals at that time as the “Cinema Polski.”

WHERE US LEADERS COME TO PRACTICE THEIR POLISH

The first movie palace in the city designed exclusively for sound cinema was purchased by Chicago’s Polish community in the 1970s. The exterior was modified to resemble the exterior of the Royal Castle in Warsaw, with the newly constructed spire visible from the Kennedy Expressway, serving as a symbol of pride to commuters traveling between Chicago’s city center and O’Hare airport. Christened as the Copernicus Foundation, the Polish cultural and civic center is home to Taste of Polonia, the largest ethnic celebration in

the City of Chicago with upwards of forty thousand attending during the four-day long festivities. Presidents George H.W. Bush and Barack Obama, Vice President Dick Cheney, Second Lady Tipper Gore, and Speaker Newt Gingrich have all visited the Copernicus Center during the festival to show their affection for the Polish community in the United States.

NATIVE SONS

The children of Polish immigrants in Chicago have risen to prominence on the municipal, state, national, and even international stage. Writers such as Stuart Dybek and John Guzlowski have captured the imagination of readers, channeling their singular experiences of growing up Polish-American in Chicago. Ray Manzarek helped propel the rock band The Doors to stardom as the artistic foil to the grit of the band's iconic frontman Jim Morrison. Photographer Victor Skrebneski, painter Ed Paschke, sculptor Stanislaw Szukalski all came into prominence as part of Chicago's art scene. Historian Dominic Pacyga has written several seminal books covering Chicago, lectured as a visiting scholar at Campion Hall in Oxford, and was a Fulbright Scholar at the prestigious Jagiellonian University.

The same exceptional trajectory was also true for the sons of Poland who entered politics. There was a time in the 1960s and '70s when nearly a quarter of the Chicago City Council was of Polish descent. The Illinois congressional delegation included names like Derwinski, Kluczynski, Pucinski, and Rostenkowski, a tradition continued by Congressman Dan Lipinski into the present day. Congressman Kluczynski is remembered with a forty-five-story skyscraper designed by Mies van der Rohe housing Federal government offices in downtown Chicago. Congressman Roman Pucinski was responsible for the Federal

mandate to install flight recorders on all commercial flights, as well as the US congressional investigation into the Katyn Forest Massacre. House Ways and Means Committee Chair Congressman Daniel Rostenkowski controlled the finances of the US House of Representatives, making him the second most powerful figure in Congress after the Speaker of the House during his tenure in the 1980s.

A DYNAMIC COMMUNITY

Statistics help to illustrate how active the Polish diaspora is with promulgating their native traditions. As of this writing, there are forty-seven Polish language Saturday schools teaching over fifteen hundred students. Two FM and three AM stations broadcast Polish language programming. There is Polvision TV. The Polish Scouting Organization Harcerstwo has around five hundred members imparting Polish cultural traditions to young Polish Americans. There are a plethora of Polish language publications, including daily, weekly, and monthly newspapers, in addition to a number of different magazines as well as a phone book advertising the many Polish businesses and services throughout the Chicago area.

JUST SCRATCHING THE SURFACE

The scope of this work and the medium of its delivery demands brevity for a topic that has been the subject of lengthy works on much narrower aspects of this subject. Numerous links that tie Poland to the United States all run through Chicago, which have lent the city an unmistakable streak of Polishness, are evident upon further reflection. It is my hope that this overview will spark the reader to investigate these topics for themselves in a place so intricately intertwined with the history of both Poland and the United States.

Daniel Pogorzelski ■
May 2019

A MIDDLE EASTERN WEB: ALLIES, ENEMIES, CONFLICTS

WITOLD REPETOWICZ

Processes taking place in the Middle East cannot be explained by drawing one line separating two hostile camps as it was in the case of the Cold War between the Free World headed by the US, and the USSR bloc. The political reality of the Middle East consists of many conflicts, and the interrelationships can best be demonstrated by drawing a spiderweb.

The fact that two countries share common interests and are considered to be allies does not exclude the connection of one of them with an enemy of the other (e.g., relations in the Russia-Iran-Israel triangle). It also happens that the official alliance can simply be a game of appearances, behind which there is hidden competition (e.g., relations between Russia and Iran), while the

façade of hostility, or lack of diplomatic relations, can mask an actual alliance (e.g., Saudi-Israeli relations).

THE HARM OF SIMPLIFICATIONS RELATED TO THE MIDDLE EAST

At present, the main regional state actors in the Middle East are Iran, Israel, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent, also the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Egypt, despite its military and



A YEMENI PRO-GOVERNMENT SOLDIER PATROLS AT A POSITION AS THE HOUTHI REBELS BEGIN A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL FROM TWO STRATEGIC PORTS IN THE WAR-TORN CITY OF AL-HODEIDAH, YEMEN, MAY 11, 2019.

© NAJEEB ALMAHBOOB (PAP/EPA)

demographic potential, plays a smaller role in these competitions, in part due to its structural problems and financial dependence on the richer countries of the region. Furthermore, the independent role of Jordan in the Middle East competition is considerably smaller, and the significance of this state rather stems from the fact that it remains the key and the most reliable ally of the United States and Great Britain in the region. Iraq, once one of the most powerful countries in the region, is slowly beginning to stand on its own feet, although internal problems still limit the possibility of outward use of its potential.

The external actors are primarily three large superpowers: the US, Russia, and China, with the latter being less visible

The external actors are primarily three large superpowers: the US, Russia, and China, with the latter being less visible than the first two.

than the first two. Regional rivalries, however, do not follow the pattern determined by the clash of global power interests, and some countries consider both Russia and the US as their allies (e.g., Saudi Arabia and Israel), and even both the US and Iran (e.g., Iraq). European countries, especially Great

None of these answers, however, explain all conflicts and problems, and the use of any simplifications does not make it easier, but rather makes it even more difficult to understand what is happening in the Middle East.

Britain and France, play a smaller but nonetheless important role, which a hundred years ago divided the Middle East into several spheres of influence. That picture, as far as state entities are concerned, is complemented by Germany, whose role is largely passive and is a derivative of German-Turkish ties. Non-state actors also play an important role, especially cross-border Islamic organizations such as the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, and the Muslim Brotherhood.

It is tempting to point out one key to the entire Middle Eastern conundrum of alliances, problems, and conflicts, bringing the whole puzzle into a simple answer for the question of “what is going on?” Such answers are given. Some point out that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is crucial; others bring everything to oil, and others to the religious war between Shias and Sunnis. None of these answers, however, explain all conflicts and problems, and the use of any simplifications does not make it easier, but rather makes it even more difficult to understand what is happening in the Middle East. An example may be the

deception of the conflict in Syria in the first years of its existence. It was then understood to have been brought about to fight for those who wanted the freedom of “moderate rebels” against a bad dictator. The fact that there is even another force, i.e., branches of Syrian Kurds, was usually neglected at least until the end of 2014, because of the notion that talking about them was an unnecessary complication of the image, and the cantons of Rojava created by them already in 2012 were an ephemera that would disappear quickly. However, it turned out completely different, and Rojava, or West Kurdistan, developed into the existing Autonomous Administration of North-Eastern Syria, covering all areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

In fact, to describe what is happening in the Middle East, we must distinguish several autonomous conflicts, i.e. the regional Saudi-Iranian rivalry and the Yemen war primarily within it, the Iran-Israel conflict, the war in Syria, the problem of Islamic State, Al Qaida and the Muslim Brotherhood, the isolation of Qatar, and the Kurdish and Palestinian problems. Geopolitical interests overlap, in particular, related to trade in energy raw materials, such as oil and gas, as well as religious and ideological conflicts (sometimes undervalued and sometimes overestimated). One cannot ignore the problem of democracy in the Middle East, although talking about it often provokes ridicule from people who are convinced that in this region one can only rule with a firm hand and that democracy is only the West’s excuse to intervene. Disregarding this problem in the name of *realpolitik*, however, leads to conclusions that fuel the Middle Eastern tragedy, failing to solve any problems, and often creating new ones permanently. On the other hand, democracy in the Middle East is often like a grenade that can easily explode in one’s hand.



SYRIAN KURDISH BOYS LOOK THROUGH A DESTROYED BUILDING IN KOBANÎ (ALSO CALLED AYN AL-ARAB), THE KURDISH REGION IN THE ALEPPO GOVERNORATE IN NORTHERN SYRIA, APRIL 26, 2019.

© AHMED MARDNLI (PAP/EPA)

Another problem is terrorism, and in particular, its understanding. After all, in 2001, after the attack on the WTC, President George Bush began intervention in the region under the slogan of the global war on terror. In the Middle East, however, the saying “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” works well, and is perfectly illustrated by the Israeli leaders (fighting Palestinian organizations like Hamas) and Turkey (leading a decades-long war with the Kurdish PKK) mutually labelling their opponents as criminal and their activity as genocides. Terrorism, however, is only a tool, not a spontaneous problem.

A SHADOW OF WAHHABISM OVER THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

The most important contention destabilizing the Middle East is currently the Saudi-Iranian regional competition, which is often reduced to the so-called

“*fitnah*,” or the sectarian war between Shias and Sunnis. However, albeit this is a far-reaching simplification, it is impossible to abstain from this aspect completely. Saudi Arabia is not only so much a Sunni state, as it was created on the Wahabi ideological foundation, and the problem of exporting this extremist ideology is crucial for understanding many problems not only in the Middle East but also around the world, including Europe. Wahhabism is inextricably linked to Saudi statehood from its beginnings in the middle of the 18th century. One of the Arab emirs, Muhammad ibn Saud, made a pact with radical Islamic reformer Muhammad ibn Wahab. Its effect was the creation of the first Saudi state, in which Wahhabism became the obligatory version of Islam. This ideology rejected the Muslim tradition and strives to restore the Islamic rule prevailing in the seventh century and



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IRANIAN PRESIDENT HASSAN ROUHANI, RUSSIAN PRESIDENT VLADIMIR PUTIN AND TURKISH PRESIDENT RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN SHAKE HANDS DURING THEIR MEETING IN THE BLACK SEA RESORT OF SOCHI, RUSSIA, FEBRUARY 14, 2019.

prohibiting everything contradictory to its restrictively understood monotheism. The consequence was that in this point of view it categorizes many Muslims, in particular, Shias, as apostates of ‘faith,’ and therefore ‘unfaithful,’ meriting the most severe punishments. The first Saudi state was thus not much different from the modern Islamic State, which sought to murder all Shias. In 1801, the Saudis burned one of the most sacred Shia places - the mausoleum of Imam Hussein in Iraqi Karbala, murdering almost all residents of the city. Thirteen years later, the Ottoman penal expedition captured the last ruler of the first Saudi state, who was beheaded in Istanbul.

During the First World War, the British made a pact with the descendant of Muhammad ibn Saud, Abdulaziz, so that in 1932 he reconstructed the Saudi state, in which Wahhabism was once again instated. Radical ideology was not very much in harmony with

the interests that the ruler of the new kingdom and his successors began to engage with the “infidel” West, which is why the Saudi rulers had to take care of their Wahabi followers. Hence, they established a Ministry of Islamic Affairs, which became a fiefdom of the family of ibn Wahhab. The Ministry, into which income largely flows from the sale of oil, undertook the export of Wahhabism, including to the western world. These were particularly intense during the reign of King Fahd (1982-2005), who allocated 75 billion dollars for the export of Wahhabism. The effect of this policy was violent radicalization in the Muslim world, which was indirectly paradoxically financed by the West. In this way, Al Qaeda was also established, which entered into conflict with the Saudi kingdom but maintained some contacts with the Ministry of Islamic Affairs. This was confirmed by the Congress’s report on the WTC attacks, which indicated that the perpetrators (almost all Saudi

citizens) received financial support from some of the high-ranking Saudi officials and members of the royal family. Of course, almost all of which were Saudis.

The Wahabis have never changed their attitude to the Shias, who make up at least 15% of the Saudi Arabian population and are persecuted in this country. A similar situation exists in the ruling Royal family of Bahrain, in which the Shias constitute the overwhelming majority of the population, but moreover this country had belonged to Iran in the past. When, in 2011, the so-called Arab Spring erupted, the Shia in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain also joined the protests. However, the protests were quickly and grimly suppressed, and in Bahrain, the Saudi army simply conducted military intervention, turning the country into a de facto protectorate. The Saudis also accused Iran of being behind the protests, and as a result of the antipathy towards Iran, the West turned a blind eye to the applied methods of dealing with the Shia. Meanwhile, Iran has indeed taken up the use of Shia communities in the Arabian Peninsula for the implementation of its great geopolitical project i.e., the Shia crescent.

SHIA CRESCENT

The notion of the Shia crescent is based on the assumption of a close alliance of Iran, dominated by Shias in Iraq, Syria ruled by Assad, dominated by the Shia Hezbollah of Lebanon, and controlled by the Shia-Yazidi Houthis in Yemen. In this way, Iran would gain land access to the Mediterranean and also control two key straits, i.e., Hormuz (exiting from the Persian Gulf) and Bab al-Mandab, which is the gate leading through the Red Sea to the Suez Canal. By marking a land route to the Lebanese port of Tripoli, Iran could intensify its trade with Europe. In particular, this would apply to oil and gas exports, not only from Iran but also

Saudi Arabia is the main partner of Russia in the OPEC + format and arrangements for global oil extraction in order to shape prices of this raw material.

from Iraq and Syria. This would affect the transit position of Turkey and would be an alternative to Russian supplies of these raw materials to Europe. This would be part of the new Chinese “silk road” project. Thus, it determines the naturalness of the Sino-Iranian and, to some extent, Euro-Iranian cooperation, as well as the unnatural character of the “alliance” in the Iran-Turkey-Russia triangle, which develops in the so-called ‘Astana format’.

The Iranian-Russian alliance is purely tactical because both countries have no common interests in the geopolitical dimension. In particular, this applies to Syria, where Russia is only seemingly on the same side as Iran. It is equally uninterested in building a land connection between Iran and Lebanon as Israel and Saudi Arabia, and therefore does not actively attempt to discourage Israel from raiding Iranian positions in Syria. Moreover, Russian-Israeli relations are intense, as are the Russian-Saudi relations. Saudi Arabia is the main partner of Russia in the OPEC + format and arrangements for global oil extraction in order to shape prices of this raw material. These relations likewise provoke Iran’s frustration. Also, it does not change the fact that Israel and Saudi Arabia are key US allies in the region. The

Already concurrently, the Sunni Arab states, except for Qatar, are trying to normalize their relations with Damascus, using, inter alia, the intermediation of Russia. Russia is also interested in this because it alone has no means to rebuild Syria and does not want to allow China to undertake such an opportunity, because it would be a dangerous competitor in this area.

increasingly strengthening relations of both these countries with Russia, which are also a derivative of the fears of an isolationist turn in US politics, awaken concern among Americans.

The project of the Shia crescent is not about the export of the Shia Islamic revolution. Such an idea existed after the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979, but currently, Iran's Shia support stems rather from the fact that they are their natural proxy in the ongoing surrogate confrontations with Saudi Arabia. Iran operates here in the Arab world while it is itself a non-Arab state. This card is being used in this conflict by Saudi Arabia, trying to break the key

link of the Shia crescent, i.e., weaken Iraqi-Iranian relations and strengthen Saudi-Iraqi relations by referring to the collective Arab identity. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also have an advantage over Iran when it comes to the ability to invest in Iraq, which after the war with the Islamic State, it needs very much. A similar pattern of action can also be applied in Syria as well.

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IRAQ AND YEMEN: SAUDI-IRANIAN RIVALRY

Iraqis are strongly divided in relation to Iran and Saudi Arabia. On the one hand, even many Shias do not accept Iran's disproportionate influence in Iraq. On the other hand, they remember that the Sunni Arab states, namely Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have contributed to destabilizing Iraq after 2003 in supporting the sectarian resentment of the Sunni minority towards the Shia majority, and that Iran helped Iraq to fight the Islamic State. Currently, Iran's main ally in Iraq is the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) created based on Shia militia, which is evolving towards a similar role in Iraq as the Revolutionary Guardian Corps (Pasdaran) in Iran. Iran has two priorities in Iraq: on the one hand, stabilization, whilst also preventing the over-strengthening of Iraq, because it could lead to the regional rivalry of the country with Iran; and in balancing on the other hand, the ensuring of the dominant role of Shias. Iran takes advantage of the fact that for Arab Shias in Iraq, the Arab identity is not very



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WARSAW, FEBRUARY 13, 2019. FAMILY PHOTO OF HEADS OF DELEGATIONS AT THE ROYAL CASTLE IN WARSAW. A MINISTERIAL MEETING IN WARSAW WAS ORGANIZED JOINTLY BY POLAND AND THE UNITED STATES ON PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

important. However, in being pragmatic, it also tries to find allies among Kurds and Iraqi Sunnis. Meanwhile, the policy of Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab states towards Iraq was based on three core characteristics: not allowing the prevalence of the Shia regime in Iraq, preventing the Iraqi regional potential from being restored, and disallowing the construction of a stable democracy in that country.

The emergence of a stable democracy in a strong, 40-million state, in addition to being dominated by Shias, would be a nightmare for Sunni monarchies because it would give a “fatal” example to the citizens of these countries. In 2016, notwithstanding, the Saudis changed their approach to Iraq, because they understood that their policy of distancing themselves from the authorities in Baghdad only strengthens the influence of Iran in Iraq.

Nevertheless, the actual main arena of Saudi-Iranian rivalry is currently in Yemen, where a war is fought between the Houthis, supported by Iran, and the legally-recognized government of Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, supported militarily by the Sunni coalition with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Yemen’s puzzle is additionally complicated by the activity of Al Qaeda and Islamic State in the south of this country as well as the active separatism of the south, which in the past was a separate state with the capital in Aden. A contributing cause of the Yemeni conflict was the swinging of the local Koranic schools, which has been ongoing since the 1980s, in part due to the layout of the long-time dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh, deposed in 2011, with Saudi Arabia. Zaidiyyah, although they are Shias but they belong to a different school than Iranian Twelvers, therefore for centuries they had little differences with

Much more complicated still is the civil war in Syria, where the interests of not only Iran and Saudi Arabia, but also Israel, Russia, the USA, Turkey, and Qatar are intersecting, and which also involves both the Kurdish and (indirectly) Palestinian problems.

Yemenite Sunnis, who follow the Shafi'i school of law that is considered moderate. The emergence of the Wahhabism imported from Saudi Arabia changed this situation and also led to the radicalization of the Zaidi community and increasing popularity of the system created in Iran among them. This was the genesis of the creation of the Houthi Movement, which at the end of 2014 took control of the capital of the country, Sana'a, the main port of al-Hudeida and the majority of the northern part of the country. Hadi managed to escape to Saudi Arabia, where he asked for military support, which led to the ongoing war.

WAR IN SYRIA AND THE KURDISH PROBLEM

Much more complicated still is the civil war in Syria, where the interests of not only Iran and Saudi Arabia, but also Israel, Russia, the USA, Turkey, and Qatar are intersecting, and which *also* involves

both the Kurdish and (indirectly) Palestinian problems. Now, after the near-complete suppression of the anti-Assad rebellion and the abolition of the Islamic State in its territorial dimension, the Syrian Autonomous Administration (NES), created in territories controlled by the US-supported and Kurdish dominated Syrian Democratic Forces is of key importance. The second key problem is also the occupation of northern Syria by Turkey. Both issues are interrelated because Turkish policy is determined by the anti-Kurdish phobia in this country. As a result, Turkey, being a member of NATO, runs a policy that is completely contrary to the interests of other Alliance countries. One of the manifestations of this paradox was Turkey's at the least friendly neutrality towards jihadists from Islamic State and Al Qaeda fighting Kurds in Syria. Turkey consistently interfered with the US in operations targeted at Islamic State, striking, again and again, at the key American land ally, i.e., the SDF. Such action was beneficial for Russia, for which either alternative – either weakening NATO's cohesion, or the US abandoning the Kurds (being their sole ally in Syria) – would be a win-win situation. Leaving the Kurds would have an additional positive effect for Russia because it would create a vacuum in northern Syria that only Iran or Russia could fill. Israel and Saudi Arabia would, of course, aim for it not to be Iran, which in turn would bind them more strongly with Russia. Such a scenario began to follow the US declaration regarding a withdrawal from Syria, but it was blocked (at least temporarily) after the announcement that partial US forces would be remaining in this region. Iran's determination to open the corridor connecting it with the Mediterranean also determines Israel's policy, which fears the use of such a connection to the logistical support of Israel's opponents, in particular Hezbollah, which in

combination with the Iranian nuclear program is now perceived by Israel as an existential threat.

The Kurdish problem is the subject of many misunderstandings. One of the frequent mistakes is not distinguishing between Syrian and Iraqi Kurds. Meanwhile, the relations between NES and the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq (KRG) are quite cold even though both of these entities are US allies. As far as KRG is concerned, this does not prevent them from maintaining close relations with Iran and let Rosneft to gain a key position on the Kurdish energy market. Another misunderstanding is the recognition as a real thesis put forward by Turkish propagation equating Kurdish troops in Syria with the PKK. An additional, fundamental mistake is the belief that the Kurds are fighting to create an independent state. Such a postulate was put forward only by the Kurdish Democratic Party (PDK) which dominated the Iraqi Kurdistan and referred only to the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, not to the entirety of Kurdistan. On the other hand, the Kurds in Syria have never advanced the postulates of secession, even while striving to federalize Syria or to grant autonomy to its north-eastern part.

TROUBLESOME US ALLIES

Closer cooperation between Turkey and Russia and its hostility towards SDF are not the only points where Turkish and American interests are contradictory. After 2011, Turkey proceeded with enthusiasm to join the support of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world. The supranational organization, with which the Justice and Development Party (AKP) ruling in Turkey since 2002 has connections to, on the wave of Arab Spring has taken power in countries like Tunisia and Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood, however, is designated as a

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terrorist organization by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and therefore the Saudis supported in July 2013 a coup in Egypt that led to the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood from power. Since then, the relations between Turkey on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and Egypt on the other are openly hostile. The Muslim Brotherhood has one more ally – Qatar, which caused the country's confrontation with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In July 2017, Saudi Arabia and UAE accused Qatar supporting terrorism and cooperating with Iran, made several demands, and then introduced the blockade of this country and threatening military intervention. The Qatari Emir was then protected by Turkey, which sent its troops to this country. Qatar maintains good relations with Iran, although at the same time it is perceived as the main sponsor of anti-Shia jihadists by allies of

The US would like to formalize cooperation between Sunni Arab states especially Saudi Arabia and UAE with Israel. This was the purpose of the Middle East conference held in Warsaw.

Iran in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, the largest US military base in the region also is situated in Qatar. Hence, the Saudi-Qatari dispute is another problem for US interests in the region. Moreover, the Turkish-Israeli contention should also be added to this. Relations between these two countries were excellent during the Cold War, though they began to deteriorate with the coming into power of Islamist Erdogan, and now they are already openly hostile. One of the reasons for this is Turkey's support for Palestinian Hamas.

The US would like to formalize cooperation between Sunni Arab states especially Saudi Arabia and UAE with Israel. This was the purpose of the Middle East conference held in Warsaw. The informal cooperation of these countries, despite not maintaining diplomatic relations, has been an open secret for quite a while. They are joined by a common enemy: Iran. However, the Palestinian problem is an obstacle to the formalization of this cooperation. It is not about the fact that Palestinians play an essential role in Saudi politics, but for fear of the reaction of Arab public opinion. In effect, the Palestinians themselves are treated entirely instrumentally by the Arab states of the region.

OLD AND NEW CHALLENGES

The future of mutual relations in the Middle East cauldron will also be marked by new challenges such as conflicts over water, demographic changes, as well as changes in the regional balance of power. The main determinants will be demographic potential, internal cohesion, military, and economic potential, including that of raw materials. Currently, according to the Global Fire Power rating, in the region, Turkey has the largest military potential (9th place), followed by Egypt (12th) and Iran (13th), with Iran only showing an upward trend. In further places, there are Israel (16), Saudi Arabia (26), and Iraq (47). In terms of demographic potential, the largest country is Egypt, followed by Turkey and Iran. Fourth place is Iraq, which, however, has a very high birth rate. On the other hand, the share of Sunni Arab states in the total population of the region is decreasing. Currently, the Sunni population of Arabian Peninsula countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain) is only 62 million inhabitants, for a total population of 440 million (including Egypt, Turkey, and Iran). According to forecasts, in 2050, the population of these countries will increase to only 84 million and will be comparable to the then population of Iraq (82 million), while the entire population of the region will increase to almost 720 million.

From Saudi Arabia's point of view, the greatest threat is paradoxically the collapse of the current regime in Iran, which the US aims for, seeing Saudi Arabia as an ally in this policy. Meanwhile, the rise of a democratic Iran would not only cause a domino effect in the region, but Iran as a US ally would be much more valuable than Saudi Arabia. Thus, it would be a nail to the coffin for the Saudi monarchy.

Witold Repetowicz ■
May 2019

TAIWAN – THE ONLY CHINESE DEMOCRACY

ROBERT RAJCZYK, PhD

The Republic of China, better known as Taiwan, maintains official diplomatic relations with only 17 countries in the world¹. Notwithstanding, it is an important player in the geopolitical conundrum of Southeast Asia and the global economy. At the same time, Formosa² is an example of a successful socio-political and economic transformation.

Certain notions and developments, critical to the regional and global geopolitical dynamics, are worth noticing and invite closer inspection. Inter alia, this includes that although Taiwan has the status of a non-recognized state, its currency – the new Taiwanese dollar is considered one of the

most stable in the world. Furthermore, whilst Taiwanese democracy is only 30 years old, it is an example of a successful transformation – from martial law to political pluralism. Next, due to foreign investments and public aid, Taiwan has transformed from an agricultural country into a global leader in the production of electronics and semiconductors.

¹ as of May 31, 2019

² Its previous name

The formal and legal status places Taiwan in a group of countries with disputed sovereignty, along with, inter alia, Kosovo, Western Sahara or Transnistria.

Taiwan became a subject of international interest in 1949. In that year, following the defeat in the civil war with Mao Zedong's communist rebellion forces, the government of the Republic of China was evacuated to the island, where some of the most valuable exhibits from the Palace Museum in Beijing were transported earlier. Only once has Taiwan appeared on the agenda of world powers. In 1943 at a conference in Cairo, Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt agreed to give up Formosa (the name given to the island by the Portuguese explorers in the early 16th century) to the Republic of China. Taiwan was a Japanese province in the years 1895-1945 under the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Although having incited social resistance, Japanese rule was associated with the development of transport infrastructure, modernization of agriculture and electrification, as well as the introduction of universal education.

On March 1, 1950, the Republic of China was formally re-established in Taiwan with Chiang Kai-Shek escaping from the continent. Taiwan was a member of the United Nations until 1971 and held the status of Permanent Member of the Security Council as one of the founders of the United Nations. The USSR and its allies meanwhile considered Chinese representation to be the Chinese People's Republic, which in fact controlled the

continental part of China, while Taiwan was only the island of the same name along with the surrounding islands. Formally, however, Chiang Kai-Shek exercised dictatorial rule under martial law³, and he regarded the Republic of China as the legitimate representation of all of China⁴. Meanwhile, as a result of the geopolitical rivalry of the world powers then, Taiwan ceased to be a member of the UN and all its agencies were replaced in lieu of the People's Republic of China⁵. Taiwan is, therefore, a special case as an example of the *withdrawal* of international recognition.

Renown expert on international public law, Lech Antonowicz, claims that the Republic of China is only the successor of the Chinese state, not its continuing international legal entity, because "*the identity and continuity of the constitutional law do not coincide with the identity and continuity of international law*"⁶.

³ Formally it came into force on May 20, 1948, pursuant to the Law on the Period of National Mobilization in order to suppress the Communist Rebellion. Martial law was abolished only in mid-July 1987 after 38 years of validity. At that time, only supplementary parliamentary elections were held, in which the mandates elected in the years 1948-1949 were mandated for life. Civil liberties were suspended, which meant that the Kuomintang (KMT) party enjoyed a de facto monopoly. There were two other parties still operating on the continent, but they were subsidized by KMT. Opposition activities were fought against, and the oppositionists most often accused of communism emigrated to the USA and Japan. The son of Chiang Kai-Shek, who in the years 1978-1988 held the office of President, laid down the end of the KMT dictatorship. He initiated democratic transformations in Taiwan, thanks to which political parties could be registered since 1989, and in 1991 general elections for the parliament were organized. Five years later, the first direct presidential election was held.

⁴ Based on the so-called the consensus of 1992, both Chinese states recognize the uniformity of Chinese territory while maintaining the right to its own interpretation.

⁵ Formally, the US broke off diplomatic relations with Taipei on January 1, 1979. Two months later, the Taiwan Relations Act came into force, which became the legal basis for mutual relations, regulating, among others, the issue of the sale of American military equipment and weapons.

⁶ L. Antonowicz: '*Status prawnomiedzynarodowy Republiki Chińskiej na Tajwanie*'. W: *Tajwan*



© PHOTO FROM THE AUTHOR'S PERSONAL COLLECTION

TAIWAN IS ONE OF THE MOST MODERN COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD.

In the light of international law, the Republic of China is thus an independent state, that is, it has only empiric statehood. The formal and legal status places Taiwan in a group of countries with disputed sovereignty, along with, inter alia, Kosovo, Western Sahara or Transnistria.

The political position of these entities' sanctions not only the degree of international recognition, but above all the economic potential and geographic location⁷. The first of these factors

w stosunkach międzynarodowych. Edit. E. Haliżak. Warsaw 1997, p. 38–42.

⁷ The Transnistrian Moldovan Republic is formally part of the Republic of Moldova and is not

generally determines the foreign policy of quasi-states. Taiwan again appears here as an exception due to the genesis of the uprising. It did not separate the borders of its territory from the home country, nor was it established as a result of the decision of an international organization. Unlike other unrecognized countries – for example, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic

internationally recognized nor is it a single subject (as a state) in international law, while for example the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic controlling about one third of the territory of Western Sahara as a member of the African Union enjoys the recognition of 51 countries, and Kosovo, on the other hand, is considered sovereign by about twice as many states.



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AWARENESS OF A SEPARATE TAIWANESE IDENTITY IS GROWING SYSTEMATICALLY.

or Transnistria – in the case of the Republic of China it is difficult to speak about the existence of a home state or a patron saint.

GEOPOLITICAL ISSUE

The geographical location of Taiwan as guard somehow to the most important waterway in the South- East Asia does make the island a strategic object. The control over Formosa means strategic dominance in this region of the world in which one of the world's major powers – China – plays the most important political and economic role. For this reason, but also because of the tradition of cooperation and the history of mutual relations, the US has on the basis of its relations with Formosa the possibility of exerting political influence on the People's Republic of China. American support for Taiwan prevents Beijing from reuniting the island with the matrix, which is the political and ambition-driven goal of the Chinese communists as another element in the recovery of territories lost to foreign powers in the nineteenth century during the Opium Wars. Regarding Taiwan, the idea of regaining power over the continent has evolved into the concept of

pragmatic independence, assuming the coexistence of two Chinese governments in recognizing each other as “political actors.” In Taiwan, the idea of exporting democracy to the continent has long since lost importance. The Chinese from the continent mostly appear as a society focused on the material dimension of their lives and improving its quality resulting from the incredible civilizational leap achieved on the continent through economic development.

Representatives of the local middle class, which formed as a result of economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping, are aware to whom they owe their material status. The potential for possible mass mutiny is also mitigated by the Confucian concept of respect and obedience to authority. In turn, manifestations of social dissatisfaction are catalyzed by controlled criticism, which is also a tool for achieving political goals (exchange of party elites⁸) and the Social Trust System,

⁸ An example of controlled criticism is the hit sensational series: Renmin de mingyi (translated into the name of the people), which was shown 7.5 billion times on one of the Chinese video platforms, and the production of this 52-part series was financially

the aim of which is to model an exemplary citizen through a system of point-based rewards, rewarding the fulfillment of civic obligations and the adaptation of the citizen to the desired social patterns. The Social Trust System is a Chinese response to the lack of social capital in the Middle Kingdom, but the goal of the program is not its social reconstruction, but rather social control. Democracy is, therefore, not a commodity of primary necessity for the Chinese who are increasingly living on a better standard of living than their ancestors. The Marxist idea of shaping consciousness has found its embodiment right now in the People's Republic of China, effectively displacing the Western model of democracy from social consciousness. This is the case, among others, in Hong Kong – the former British colony – where the pro-democracy social protests of residents, mindful of their freedoms and guarantees of democratic freedoms from the time of British supremacy, are suppressed by force.

DAVID VS. GOLIATH

The Taiwanese question finds a prominent place in Chinese politics. Since the communist rebellion of Mao Zedong, gaining control over Taiwan has become a matter of honor for the Chinese communists. They even added this to the preamble of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. After economic reforms of the People's Republic of China made an authentic “*big leap*” in economic and civilizational terms, the matter of superiority over Taiwan gained even more significance, especially after the experience of taking over the colonial powers of Hong Kong and

supported by the Supreme Public Prosecutor's Office People. The series deals with the struggle of law enforcement bodies in an authoritarian state with ubiquitous corruption. In turn, more on the subject of framing criticism in the press can be seen here: D. Young: *The Party Line. How the Media Dictates Public Opinion in Modern China*. Singapore 2013, p. 63–80.

The control over Formosa means strategic dominance in this region of the world in which one of the world's major powers – China – plays the most important political and economic role.

Macau. Chinese propaganda is intensively promoting the idea of “*one country, two systems*”, offering this systemic solution as an opportunity to reintegrate Formosa with the continent. For the Chinese communists, taking control of the island in addition to the prestige dimension – national pride from the recovery of all areas occupied by foreign powers as a result of the nineteenth century Opium Wars – is primarily of strategic importance. The solution of the Taiwanese problem in Beijing's mind would involve China's military and political domination in this part of the world, and for the US it would mean problems in the implementation of defense commitments towards Japanese and South Korean allies⁹.

Continental China believes that there is only “*one China*.” In this political

⁹ In the public discourse devoted to the issues of the Taiwanese Strait – the strategic waterway of south-east Asia – there is the concept of «Taiwan threat», which means the danger of drawing the US into war in that region of the world in the situation of China's military annexation of Taiwan, especially against the Chinese parliament in 2005, the so-called ‘anti-secession law’, which grants Beijing the right to armed intervention in the event of a formal announcement by the Republic of China of its sovereignty.



TAIWANESE ENJOY VERY MUCH USING CELL PHONES.

© PHOTO FROM THE AUTHOR'S PERSONAL COLLECTION

conception, Taiwan is considered a mutinous province. To convince the international community to do so, they use political and economic means. The first of these factors entails effective opposition to even symbolic manifestation of Taiwanese separateness on the international arena, contributing to the deepening of the isolation of the Republic of China, as well as economic factors¹⁰.

¹⁰ An example of such actions are the problems of the Republic of China related to the inability to participate in the annual meeting of the World Health Organization Assembly, in which the Republic of China participated as an observer until the takeover of power in Taiwan by the pro-independence Democratic Party of Progress. In turn, the Chinese promise of intense financial cooperation led El Salvador to break diplomatic relations with Taipei to establish them with Beijing. The Republic of China, outside the 17 countries of the world, including the Holy See, with the rest of the world maintains consular de jure relations through the network of Taipei Representative Offices acting as the de facto function of the Taiwanese embassies. Interestingly, the Taiwanese passport allows its owner to visa-free travel to twice more countries than the holder of the Chinese counterpart – [https://](https://www.passportindex.org/byRegion.php?country=tw)

Taiwan, however, resigning from using the attributes of its statehood¹¹, adopted a strategy for the authorization of so-called pragmatic diplomacy, which primarily intends to counteract the Chinese propaganda and political influence and thus gain an informational advantage on the international arena. It conveys effective implementation of own information agenda in the global media space. This demonstrates the high degree of communication effectiveness of the Taiwanese authorities. An example of such activities from the Taiwanese side is an information campaign supporting the implementation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals under the slogan: “*Taiwan Can Help*.” Limiting adverse climate change is one of such goals and although the Republic of China is not a member of the UN and was not officially invited to the December climate summit in Poland in 2018, it participated in events accompanying the debates, which was communicated intensively on the streets of Katowice, the capital of Upper Silesia¹².

ASIAN TIGER

The value of the Taiwanese national ‘brand’ is estimated at USD 675 billion in the world in 2018 and had increased by 8% relative to 2017¹³. The secret of Taiwanese economic success and the

www.passportindex.org/byRegion.php?country=tw (accessed: May 31, 2019)

¹¹ The Republic of China does not appear in international economic, political, cultural and sports relations as Taiwan or under the name of the state, and most often as Chinese Taipei with exceptions in the form of membership in the World Trade Organization (Separate Customs Zone of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu) and the Asian Bank Development (Taipei, China).

¹² World media were full of reports presenting a tram displaying the Taiwanese commitment to climate protection running along the UN climate conference.

¹³ *Nation Brands 2018. The annual report on the world's most valuable nation brands*; https://brandfinance.com/images/upload/brand_finance_nation_brands_reports_2018.pdf (accessed: May 31, 2019).

resulting international position of Taiwan lies in the transformation of the structure of the local economy. Until the middle of the 20th century, Formosa mostly exported agricultural produce mainly due to the agrarian reform carried out successfully in 1953.

However, the deepening economic crisis on the continent during the so-called ‘Great Leap’ and ‘Cultural Revolution’ became an inspiration for the Taiwanese authorities to portray the Republic of China as the Eldorado, which with its prosperity could tempt the compatriots on the other side of the Taiwan Strait to actively oppose the communists. The economic transformation was mainly supported by American financial assistance, which in the years 1950-1965 amounted to USD 1.5 billion. As a result, Taiwan started to invest in the light industry, which on the one hand was supposed to satisfy internal demand for consumer goods, and on the other hand, contribute to the island’s economic development through the inflow of foreign investors. Export has thus become the dominant feature of the Taiwanese economy. Visiting the Presidential Palace in Taipei - the former headquarters of the Japanese governors of the island - you can follow the history of the Taiwanese economy from rubber and plastic products, through bicycles to electronics and information technology products, which currently account for as much as half of exports¹⁴.

¹⁴ Taiwan’s economy was controlled by the KMT until the democratic transformation in terms of ownership. KMT is considered the richest political party in the world. The party’s assets are estimated at over USD 800 million. In July 2016, a law was passed that obliged political parties to return the assets and assets in which they attained possession of illegally, nationalizing the property of the Japanese invaders of the island in 1945, and investing in enterprises and foundations, monopolizing the ownership structure of Taiwan’s economy. Lawrence Chung writes more on this subject, see Lawrence Chung: Taiwan’s Kuomintang in crisis as ‘ill-gotten gains’ law threatens to reverse the party’s fortune. „South

Thanks to investments in the development of education and technological innovation, Taiwan has become a global leader in the production of semiconductors and integrated circuits, which merits it, along with Singapore, South Korea, and Hong Kong, a place in the group of so-called Asian tigers, the fastest-growing Asian countries until 1995. This position makes Taiwan a significant player not only in the global economy but also has its own political implications. Control over the island can mean control over technologies because production usually takes place on the other side of the Taiwan Strait.

Furthermore, the dreams of returning to the continent materialize in a slightly different form than Chiang Kai-Shek wanted. Albeit Taiwanese business is one of the largest investors in the People’s Republic of China, and even the Taiwanese districts are established in the province of Fujian with the main port of Xiamen. Thanks to the Chinese workforce, Taiwanese production of Foxconn giants and TSMC is competitive in the world¹⁵.

China Morning Post”, 18.09.2016; <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2020328/taiwans-kuomintang-crisis-ill-gotten-gains-law> [accessed: December 17, 2018].

¹⁵ Foxconn is the world’s largest producer of electronics and computer components for the needs of leading global brands. The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is the world’s largest independent manufacturer of integrated circuits and processors. Taiwan, as the location, has the largest share in the global semiconductor plate production market (about 21%) ahead of South Korea and Japan. Two-thirds of Taiwan’s revenues come from the sale of electronics. The high growth of the IT industry is primarily due to the employment of highly qualified engineering staff, which, using the experience resulting from the assembly of custom-made equipment, developed and implemented own structures for production. This was supported by substantial state aid, which involved granting subsidies for the development of the IT industry. At present, direct investments are preferred instead of subsidies, which will enable 30,000 start-ups to be created within a few years. Taiwan’s President Tsang Ing-wen wants the city of Taoyuan, where the international airport is located, to become the Taiwanese Silicon Valley. The launch of the Taiwanese “Silicon Valley” is one of the ideas for modernizing the



MAUSOLEUM OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK IN TAIPEI.

© PHOTO FROM THE AUTHOR'S PERSONAL COLLECTION

GLOCALISM OF TAIWAN

Japan, the United States, Germany, China, Hong Kong, South Korea and Singapore are the biggest trade partners of Taiwan, which as the 17th world economy is not limited only to signing free trade agreements, but is meticulously trying to diversify sales markets and the portfolio of its export products due to the fact that the Taiwanese industry is mainly focused on foreign trade. The promotional cooperation of government administration and the private sector in

economy of the Republic of China as part of the “5 + 2” industry innovation program. We are talking about seven investment projects related to the development of IT, biotechnology, aviation, robotics and defense, and renewable energy. The support for the Taiwanese “Silicon Valley” has already been declared by Google and Microsoft. The first of them launched the “Smart Taiwan” project, which aims to train at least 5,000 people in the field of artificial intelligence technology and over 50 thousand in the field of digital marketing. Microsoft, in turn, has opened a research centre in the field of artificial intelligence and employs 200 local specialists. The company also intends to develop 5G telecommunications technology in Taiwan mainly for the purposes of online streaming, smart cities, and intelligent applications.

the form of, inter alia, Taiwan Excellence project implemented by TAITRA, serves this purpose¹⁶.

An important element is also the correlation between the concept of foreign policy and the directions of economic cooperation. First and foremost, this is referring to the initiative of the New Policy Towards the South by President Tsai Ing-wen, whose aim is to intensify economic and political cooperation with 16 countries of South and Southeast Asia, as well as Australia and New Zealand¹⁷.

The activity of non-governmental organizations, supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, is an instrument to strengthen the

¹⁶ TAITRA – The Taiwan External Trade Development Agency as a non-governmental organization leads, among other things, a project for the promotion of Taiwanese exports – Taiwan Excellence and a network of trade offices around the world.

¹⁷ <https://nspp.mofa.gov.tw/nsppe/> (accessed: 31.05.2019).



© PHOTO FROM THE AUTHOR'S PERSONAL COLLECTION

THE FORMER MORTAL ENEMIES ADVERTISE TOGETHER ONE OF THE TAIWANESE BEER BRANDS.

Taiwanese presence on the international arena¹⁸. Taiwan runs humanitarian aid projects for regions and states affected by natural disasters, as well as development assistance, including not only countries that maintain full diplomatic relations with Taipei, but also developing countries – for example Bosnia and Herzegovina – and even those party to European Union¹⁹.

The Republic of China in Taiwan, despite its complicated history and special legal international position, unlike other countries with limited sovereignty, has become one of the important players on the international arena, effectively counteracting the Chinese political influence. However, Taiwan owes its success not only to US support but above all to the high level of

civil society development, which at the same time as an informational society is actively involved in building the international position of the Republic of China, constituting an important subject of public diplomacy activities. Public diplomacy, especially in its digital variety, shapes the international image of this state, also strengthened by reference to the Chinese cultural tradition. Culture, in contrast to the Taiwanese regional identity, becoming more and more popular in social research, does not pertain a carrier of political ideology and can become an element of Taiwanese competitive advantage over China. I argue it is more extraordinary that in Taiwan, original Chinese cultural traditions have been preserved in China, including also religious ones. Moreover, the renaissance of Buddhism on the continent is attributed to Chinese people from Taiwan and non-governmental NGOs.

Robert Rajczyk ■
May 2019

¹⁸ <https://www.taiwanngo.tw> (accessed: 31.05.2019).

¹⁹ In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, these are two projects in the field of green energy. In turn, projects implemented in Romania and Bulgaria included support for the financial development of the small enterprise sector, local energy efficiency project, as well as financing the green economy and the project of introducing electric buses in Sofia.

ARMENIA – PASHINYAN'S FIRST YEAR

MATEUSZ KUBIAK

One of the most critical turning points in modern Armenian history took place a year ago. In the spring, its citizens took to the streets in massive numbers and took power away from the Republican Party – a political vehicle which had stayed in power for two decades. The newly elected government's agenda is a combination of serious reforms with an alliance with Russia. This approach, however, results in mistrust on the part of Moscow. Armenia's authorities have also activated dialogue with Azerbaijan on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. This does not mean, however, that an agreement on this issue should be expected.

One year has passed since the mass protests that led to the resignation of Sergei Sargsyan, Prime Minister who has been ruling the country for a decade (2008–2018), and the seizure of power by the leader of street demonstrations, Nikol Pashinyan. As a direct consequence of these events, snap elections were called

and held on December 9, 2018, which finally completed the process of changing power and allowed the 20-year monopoly of the Republican Party of Armenia's (HHK) over the country to be broken up.

The new team led by Nikol Pashinyan proclaims the need for a thorough reform of the country, while also advocating a



ARMENIAN OPPOSITION LEADER AND NEWLY-ELECTED PRIME MINISTER NIKOL PASHINYAN (C) CELEBRATES WITH HIS SUPPORTERS IN THE REPUBLIC SQUARE IN YEREVAN, ARMENIA, MAY 8, 2018.

© HAYK BAGHDASARYAN (PAP/EPA)

Revolutionary moods have been growing in Armenia for a long time.

policy of continuity in the international arena. Although the government was favored with confidence (both in the country, winning a constitutional majority in elections, and abroad – Armenia was even recognized as the “country of the year” by the opinion-forming *The Economist*), it is already starting to be accountable for its actions. What has Pashinyan achieved so far, and what does he propose for relations with Russia and the still smoldering conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh?

THE CREEPING REVOLUTION

The direct cause of last year’s revolution was a kind of “constitutional maneuver” of Serzh Sargsyan – who was then about to end his second (and the last possible) presidential term. He was the first to

transfer powers of the Head of State to the Prime Minister. In April 2018 – contrary to previous announcements – he was nominated to the office of the Head of Government. This was the ultimate reason why crowds of people took to the streets of Yerevan and other cities. It should also be emphasized that revolutionary moods have been growing in Armenia for a long time.

In fact, Armenia has been in a permanent crisis throughout the entire period of its current statehood. The reasons for this situation are both the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh with Azerbaijan, as well as the extreme oligarchization of

Each year, more and more grassroots opposition actions were being organized in the country – first concerning local and then also national issues.

political and economic life and the resulting social stratification. Taking into account only on the last decade of the HHK government (or rather of the ‘Karabakh clan’ controlling the party), it can be pointed out that the percentage of people living below the poverty line remained at the level of 30–35%, while the official level of unemployment was within the range of 15–20%. A solution for the citizens has become economic emigration, which is now the case for one in three families. Armenia has been depopulating year by year, losing up to 2% of the population annually, and remaining dependent on money transfers from Russia (which, depending on the year, amounted even to several per cents of the country’s GDP).

The natural consequence of the difficult economic situation, corruption, and oligarchization of the country was social discontent. The latter even increased after the events of March 2008, when post-election protests were bloodily suppressed, and ten people died. In retrospect, these events can be seen as a turning point in the dynamic development of Armenia’s civil society. Each year, more and more grassroots opposition actions were being organized in the country – first concerning local and then also national issues. The

participants of these, often successful, protests were more and more convinced that civic activity makes sense, the proof of which became mass demonstrations against rising energy prices in 2015 (the so-called Electric Yerevan). It seems that it was this situation (together with the economic and political factors mentioned above) that resulted in the mass mobilization of society in the spring of 2018 and the removal of the HHK and the Karabakh clan from power.

As a result of last year’s protests, Nikol Pashinyan was appointed Prime Minister in May 2018. However, due to his poor representation in the National Assembly at that time, he was forced to act according to the votes of parties associated with the previous system (the main coalition member was, for example, the oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan). Although Pashinyan had, at that time, already made a full announcement of planned reforms, the actions taken in 2018 were somewhat temporary and focused primarily on the fight against the corruption and oligarchic arrangements of the previous system. It was clear that early elections were necessary for a thorough reform of the country, which would confirm the social mandate of the new government. Finally, they were held in December 2018, and as a result, the newly Pashinyan’s political vehicle – ‘My Step Alliance’ – obtained a constitutional majority.

DISTRUST OF MOSCOW

From the Western point of view, the fundamental question was whether and to what extent the change of power in Armenia would influence the shape of the foreign policy of the country and, above all, the nature of its cooperation with Russia. Today, from this year’s perspective, it can be seen that although there has not been a significant redefinition in the Armenian



ARMENIAN ARTILLERY POSITION OF THE SELF-DEFENSE ARMY OF NAGORNO-KARABAKH IN MARTAKERT, NAGORNO-KARABAKH REPUBLIC, 03 APRIL 2016.

international strategy, the authorities in Yerevan seem to be working towards a “soft emancipation” from Moscow’s domination. What is important, these efforts to reduce Russian influence are not so much the result of a different vision of relations in the region, but rather of an ambitious reform agenda in Armenia itself, reckoning with previous governments (linked to the Kremlin), and a desire to balance relations with the “Big Brother”.

A convenient example of the presented dependence is cooperation in the gas sector, where Gazprom Armenia, controlled by Russians, remains an exclusive monopolist for the transmission and distribution of the raw material (apart from Gazprom Armenia, only the state-owned combined heat and power plant in Yerevan has a license to import it). Already in mid-2018, the new Armenian authorities signaled to Russia the need to reduce the gas tariffs, which was then confirmed by a specially appointed commission, while at the same time the state authorities also launched a procedure for tax abuses in the monopoly company. As it seems, in

The actions taken in 2018 were somewhat temporary and focused primarily on the fight against the corruption and oligarchic arrangements of the previous system.

response to this there was a rumor in the media that the Russians were going to drastically (by as much as 1/3) raise the price of gas supplied from 2019 (by the end of 2018 it was 150 USD/thousand m³ “at the border”)¹. Finally, the terms and conditions of raw material deliveries were agreed at the end of December

¹ Although the price of Russian gas imported by Gazprom Armenia amounted to 150 USD/thousand m³, due to the already mentioned internal tariffs, the price for an average end-user in the country was almost twice as high (the exact tariff varies depending on the amount of gas consumed by a given consumer).



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YEREVAN, MAY 8, 2018. ARMENIAN PARLIAMENT MEMBERS DEBATE BEFORE THE VOTING OF THE NEW PRIME MINISTER IN YEREVAN, ARMENIA.

last year (i.e. when the existing contract expired) and despite Armenian efforts, they include a 10% increase to 165 USD/thousand m³. Although negotiations on this issue are still ongoing – Nikol Pashinyan declares that this increase in import prices will not affect end-users due to the reduction of Gazprom Armenia's tariffs – it is clear that this issue remains a problem in relations with Moscow. What is important, the Russians are suggesting that a possible reduction in Gazprom Armenia's profits will force a reduction in the country's investment agenda.

Naturally, the issue of gas prices remains only one of many examples of how the internal agenda of the new authorities affects relations with Moscow. Other factors are both the planned diversification in the energy sector (now also strongly dependent on Russian gas)², the fight against

informal monopolies and corruption (e.g. shakedowns in the offices of a railway carrier controlled by Russians) and, last but not least, reckoning with Armenia's previous authorities. In this context, reference should be made in particular to the proceedings against former President Robert Kocharyan and the former commander of the capital city's garrison, General Yuri Khachaturov, concerning their participation in the events of March 2008. The case is crucial to Armenian–Russian relations because Kocharyan is said to be closely connected (according to reports, even personally) with Vladimir Putin, and Khachaturov was the chairman of The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), from which he was dismissed at the request of the authorities in Yerevan. It seems that Moscow treated it as a blow to the prestige of the developed CSTO.

² At the same time, steps are also being taken to liberalize the electricity transmission market itself. After the outbreak of protests against rising energy prices in 2015, the Russian company INTER RAO sold its majority stake in the energy distribution

network to Moscow and the previous Armenian authorities, oligarch Samvel Karapetyan. Under the 2017 agreement with the Yerevan authorities, Karapetyan was also to manage the state energy transmission network (the highest voltage grid), but the Pashinyan government annulled the agreement in 2018.

As a result of all this, Armenian-Russian relations today seem to be characterized by a high degree of mistrust and a kind of a constant tug-of-war as to the extent of Kremlin’s influence over the changes in Armenia.

INTENSIFICATION OF TALKS ABOUT NAGORNO-KARABAKH

The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, which has a very real impact on the functioning of the Armenian state, remains a fundamental issue for any government, including the one of Nikol Pashinyan. The new authorities are also taking active steps in this area, but it seems that they do not have a real chance of translating it into any more comprehensive agreement with Azerbaijan.

On the one hand, there has been a significant intensification of talks between Yerevan and Baku. As of February, since the change of power in Armenia, four meetings of foreign ministers and three informal meetings of heads of state have been held. It is worth noting that the personal nature of Nikol Pashinyan’s talks with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev (“in the corridors” of international summits) does not mean in this case that these are only fleeting contacts. In January this year, during the Davos conference, the two politicians spoke to each other for about an hour and a half.

The fundamental postulate raised by Nikol Pashinyan is the need to include the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in the ongoing peace process. Pashinyan argues that as Prime Minister of Armenia, elected by the people of that country, he has no right to represent the Karabakh population. However, this issue seems to be, first and foremost, peripheral to the ongoing negotiations and, most importantly, actually unacceptable to the Azerbaijani side.

There has been a significant intensification of talks between Yerevan and Baku.

On the other hand, it is true that the change of power in Armenia did not have the right to influence the social mood in the country with regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In this context, it seems that the lack of readiness to make real concessions (in both countries) makes the current authorities in Yerevan very limited in their ability to reach a real compromise. It is noteworthy that as early as January this year, when Pashinyan’s alleged readiness to make concessions to Azerbaijan started to be speculated in public space, the Prime Minister publicly stressed that there was no question of adopting the principle of “territories for peace”, according to which Armenia would be the first to return part of the occupied land around Nagorno-Karabakh to the other side. He also reiterated this declaration in February this year, which was naturally viewed negatively by the Azerbaijani side.

In consequence, it can be asked whether, over the past year, apart from the declarations mentioned above and meetings, anything else has happened in the matter of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict? It seems that, above all, a noticeable calming of the situation on the so-called demarcation line has been observed – for example, not a single death in fighting on either side was reported in both December and January.

Lack of readiness to make real concessions (in both countries) makes the current authorities in Yerevan very limited in their ability to reach a real compromise.

What is also important is that following one of the meetings in 2018, a direct channel of communication between decision-makers in both countries has been re-established. In a similar spirit, the declaration of the parties to the conflict in January this year was created, in which Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed on 'the need to take concrete measures to prepare societies for peace.' This act is unprecedented and can be seen as a success in itself.

PROSPECTS FOR NIKOL PASHINYAN

The question is naturally also whether Nikol Pashinyan will remain in power and what difficulties and challenges he will have to face shortly. Of course, today, less than three months after the parliamentary elections that gave Pashinyan a constitutional majority, public confidence in the Prime Minister remains enormous, and this will probably not change much in the perspective of this year. Nevertheless, it seems that already now it is possible to diagnose factors that may become more and more of a problem for Nikol Pashinyan.

Firstly, Nikol Pashinyan's way of governing is increasingly being criticized: a number of commentators point to the Prime Minister's inability to cope with criticism from the media or the opposition, or to the questionable competences of some of his closest associates. It also seems that there is a lack of experience on the part of elected politicians from the new ruling camp, which in time may threaten unity within the ruling coalition. Furthermore, one can point to the issue of conflict of interest in the case of Pashinyan himself, whose wife decided not to resign from the post of Editor-in-Chief of the Haykakan Zhamanak newspaper (it was founded years ago by Nikol Pashinyan).

Secondly, it should be stressed that the situation of the current government is not simple. Although the country is experiencing economic growth, it is facing demographic collapse, significant social stratification, and decades of neglect and abuse in many segments of the state. However, it is worth emphasizing that, despite the huge support for the current authorities, selected social groups are already able to protest, as was the case, for example, with the increase in the taxation of Armenian gastronomic establishments. It even seems that street protests (including civil disobedience e.g. by blocking national roads) have become a relatively natural instrument of social participation in today's Armenia. As a result, if we add to this the potential ease of destabilization of the situation in Armenia (or in the region) by external actors (Azerbaijan, Russia), then it may turn out that in the next few years the government of Nikol Pashinyan may face significant difficulties.

Mateusz Kubiak ■
February 2019

THE KATYN MASSACRE – THE WAY TO THE TRUTH

JOANNA ŻELAZKO, PhD

‘The Katyn Massacre’ is a symbolic term. It refers to a series of mass murders of Poles imprisoned in special camps of Kozelsk, Starobilsk, and Ostashkov, and in prisons located in the so-called Western Ukraine and Western Belarus (Eastern Borderlands of the Second Polish Republic that were incorporated into the USSR after the Soviet invasion of Poland on September 17, 1939). This term has been widely adopted as the first place discovered regarding this tragic set of events was located in the Katyn Forest and, for a long time, it remained the only one that was known.

On August 23, 1939, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and the Foreign Minister of Nazi Germany Joachim von Ribbentrop signed a neutrality pact in Moscow. The secret part consisted of a protocol under which the Soviet Union invaded Poland on September 17, 1939 – only two weeks after Nazi

Germany had attacked its eastern neighbor. Approximately 250,000 Poles were taken prisoner on the Soviet-occupied territory. Among them included nearly 15,000 Polish officers, police and gendarmerie, prison guards and soldiers of the Border Protection Corps; all were placed in three special prison camps at Kozelsk, Starobilsk, and Ostashkov under the supervision



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KATYŃ, RUSSIA, APRIL 20, 2018. OPENING OF THE REBUILT MEMORIAL IN KATYŃ, INCLUDING A NEW MUSEUM CENTER, WHERE AN EXHIBITION ON RUSSIAN-POLISH RELATIONS CAN BE FOUND.

of the USSR NKVD Prisoners-of-War Administration.

Polish prisoners-of-war were interrogated by NKVD officers. The Soviets intended to find out about their political views, their potential will to collaborate with the authorities of the USSR as well as the possibility to use prisoners of war (POWs) for any propaganda activities. Meanwhile, as the chief of the NKVD Lavrentiy Beria considered most of the prisoners to be an “unpromising counterrevolutionary element” and “hardened, incorrigible enemies of the Soviet power,” he submitted a special request to the ACP (b) Politburo to shoot them without any trial. According to Beria’s demand, Polish civil detainees from prisons in Ukraine and Belarus would also be executed. The mass shooting would take place neither “without summoning arrested persons nor without presenting any charges or decisions to terminate the investigation and indictment.” The decision dated March 5, 1940, was accepted by the signatures

of Joseph Stalin, Kliment Voroshilov, Vyacheslav Molotov, and Anastasia Mikoyan. Besides, the document contained an annotation that the proposal had also been supported by Mikhail Kalinin and Lazar Kaganovich.

The transport of Poles from “special prison camps” (in the Soviet documentation, this was referred to as “camps unloading”) began on April 3, 1940, from Kozelsk, a day later from Ostashkov and on April 5 from Starobilsk. Mass executions were carried out by officers of the NKVD field units.

The prisoners from the Kozelsk camp were divided into groups of 100 to 300 and then taken by rail to the Gniezdowo station near Smolensk and from thereby prisoner transport vehicles to the forest near the village of Katyn. Some of them were killed in a villa in the forest; it was from there that the bodies were transported to the burial pits. Other victims were led one by one, with their hands tied, towards the end of the trench where they were shot dead. In

total, no less than 4,410 prisoners from the Kozelsk camp were executed while only 178 managed to survive.

Prisoners of war from the largest of the three camps in Ostashkov, reserved for officers of police and military gendarmerie, were transported to the internal prison of the NKVD headquarters in Kalinin (now Tver). They were murdered in this building, in a specially adapted prison cell. The bodies were then buried in the forest near the village of Mednoye. In total, 6,314 prisoners were killed while only 127 people survived.

The captives from Starobilsk were sent by rail to Kharkiv and placed in an internal NKVD prison where they were shot. Their corpses were then transported by trucks and buried in the forest area near the village of Pyatikhatka (today located within the boundaries of the city of Kharkiv). In total, 3739 prisoners from Starobilsk were killed, while only 90 survived.

The Soviet authorities sentenced to death approximately 3,000 Poles detained in prisons in Ukraine; meanwhile, 3000 were incarcerated in various penitentiaries in Belarus as well over 1,000 from the Bialystok region – a total of over 7,000 people. In the 1990s, mass graves were discovered in the villages of Bykovnia near Kyiv (Ukraine) and Kuropaty located in the vicinity of Minsk (Belarus).

Out of all the prisoners kept in the “special prison camps,” only 395 survived; they were taken to the Pavlishchev-Bor camp and then to Griazovets in Vologod oblast. The survivors thought that their colleagues were kept in similar camps in other locations. Nonetheless, after the deportation, the prisoners disappeared “without a trace” while their families, desperately seeking any information about their loved ones, were provided with false answers.

Finally, it became possible to search for “missing persons” thanks to a Polish-Soviet military agreement signed on August 14, 1941. On this basis, the Polish Army was formed in the USSR; it embraced Polish officers who were granted freedom under the decree on amnesty issued only two days earlier by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The Army, formed under the directions of General Wladyslaw Anders, consisted of Polish citizens who had been hitherto incarcerated in prisons, labor camps and places of exile on the territory on the USSR. On the order of General Anders, a special office of the Staff of the Polish Army was created to search for missing persons; also, the institution, governed by Captain Jozef Czapski, was charged with collecting any information about sought officers.

Representatives of the Polish authorities also attempted direct interventions in Moscow. The then Polish Ambassador to the USSR, Professor Stanislaw Kot, discussed the issue of the missing prisoners with Andrey Vyshinsky, a Soviet deputy commissar of foreign affairs. Moreover, a special note regarding the fate of the officers was sent to the Soviet authorities by the then Polish Prime Minister Wladyslaw Sikorski. However, it remained unanswered. In addition, Sikorski did not receive any information during his

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On April 13, 1943, the German authorities issued an official announcement via Berlin radio about the discovery of mass graves of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest.

conversation with Joseph Stalin that took place on December 3, 1941, in Moscow.

The possibilities of explaining the situation did not improve over time and were even hampered by the growing tension in Polish-Soviet relations. The latter was caused by factors such as the deteriorating living conditions of the Polish Army in the USSR and Stalin's pressure to send the Polish troops to the Eastern Front, which ultimately led to the evacuation of soldiers and their families to Iran in 1942.

On April 13, 1943, the German authorities issued an official announcement via Berlin radio about the discovery of mass graves of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest. Two days earlier, the Transocean Agency had informed about the uncovering of a mass grave "with the corpses of 3,000 Polish officers." It was only on April 15, 1943, that the Soviet newspaper *Pravda*, as well as Moscow radio, depicted their theory about the death of the Poles. The Soviet side declared that after Nazi Germany had invaded the USSR, the Germans executed prisoners of war who were located in camps near the city of Smolensk. Such statement began a half-century-long dispute over the presentation of the exact course of the crime, and indeed the guilty party thereof.

The Germans had been aware of the burial site of the executed Polish prisoners almost a year before it was announced to the general public. In the summer of 1942, a group of Polish workers from the German organization Todt, who were forced to build military facilities near Katyn, learned about the graves of Polish soldiers from the local population. Once the credibility of this information had been checked, they put two birch crosses where the site was indicated and informed their superiors; however, the German authorities were not interested in this at that time. It re-emerged only at the turn of January and February 1943 when the Germans ordered that part of the area be dug out and, as a result, the burial sites were discovered. The local population was then questioned, and the information provided was then passed to General Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Operations Staff of the Armed Forces High Command. However, it was only after one month that the Germans decided to open the graves, and they did so purely for pragmatic reasons. After the German defeat at Stalingrad, the state propagandists aimed to use the information about the crime committed by the Soviets on Polish officers to disrupt the Allies. As such, bringing about a possible dispute between the governments of Poland and the Soviet Union was seen as having the potential to cause a severe split within the entire coalition. Such a conflict may have resulted in decisions about certain activities to be carried out on the fronts, and thus, it might have improved Nazi chances in their fight against the anti-Hitler coalition forces.

A vital element of the propaganda campaign was the conviction of Poles, including those living in the German-occupied areas, and that it was the NKVD that had committed crimes in the Katyn Forest. For this reason, the Germans sent to Katyn delegations of Poles from occupied territories. Among them were doctors, representatives of the Polish Red



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MUSEUM OF THE 10TH PAVILION AT THE WARSAW CITADEL, APRIL 27, 2018, WARSAW. PHOTO PRESENTED DURING THE CEREMONY COMMEMORATING THE POLISH POWS OF THE SOVIET CAMPS IN KOZIELSK, OSTASHKOV, AND STAROBELSK ON THE 78TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE KATYŃ MASSACRE, TVER, AND KHARKOV.

Cross and the Caritas charity organization; the Germans aimed to show them the exhumation works carried out as well as to convince them about the authenticity of the graves. The German Commission worked under the supervision of Professor Colonel Gerhard Buhtz. Moreover, the Germans delegated to Katyn a group of Polish officers from the Oflag II-C Woldenburg as well as prisoners of war and journalists from other countries, including the United States.

At the end of April 1943, a group of experts in forensic medicine and criminology came to Katyn from 12 satellite countries or allied countries as well as those occupied by the Third Reich. For two days, their members carried out any necessary works in the forest near Smolensk. The scientists unanimously stated in the final protocol that the mass executions had taken place in 1940, during the period when the Smolensk region remained under Soviet rule.

The German press published frequent reports on the exhumation works: for instance, the number of victims was estimated at 10,000-12,000, even though not all graves could be discovered. Such estimates, however, allowed the remaining prisoners from special camps to be “found” to show the grander scale of murder committed. Blame for the

Katyn Massacre was put on the NKVD. At the beginning of June 1943, works in Katyn were interrupted. According to the Germans, such decision was made due to the approaching front; moreover, they had no intention to expose people conducting exhumation works that may potentially increase the risk of epidemics. Even if the arguments mentioned above were true, they served primarily as an excuse to put the undertaking to an end; at this stage of the exhumation, it was certain that the number of bodies buried in the Smolensk forest, which had been announced in all relevant statements, could not be confirmed. Thus, doubts could arise as to whether Germany had correctly blamed the Soviet Union for committing the mass genocide. Experts responsible for leading the works deliberately decided not to dig up the last grave; instead, they claimed that it contained the remains of other victims. Lists of names identified during the exhumation of the victims were printed in the Polish-language press in the occupied country. Prepared in a hurry and with little accuracy, they tended to contain names of people who had not died in Katyn; such mistakes additionally undermined the credibility of German sources.

Due to the fact that both the Germans and the Soviets accused each other of having committed the mass executions in

Until 1991 when it was found during renovation works.

Katyn, on April 17, 1943, the Polish government wrote an official request to the International Red Cross Committee to send to Katyn a special delegation whose representatives would be in charge of verifying the incoming information. Having discovered the intention of the Polish authorities, the Germans submitted their demand only two days later; thus, they managed to create the appearance of Polish-German cooperation on the issue of the Katyn Massacre. The International Red Cross was even ready to deploy a special commission to the crime scene, but such a decision had to be accepted by all parties concerned. The authorities of the USSR did not give their consent for fear of an impartial and unquestionable verdict. So, the Commission did not make it to the Katyn Forest. The Soviets took advantage of this situation to accuse the Poles of collaborating with Germany. In addition, they broke off diplomatic relations with the Polish government in London on the night of April 25-26, 1943. It was a convenient excuse for Stalin who was able to officially announce his support for Polish communists in the Soviet Union.

All materials collected during the German exhumation were then transported to Cracow where they were examined by a group of employees of the Institute of Forensic Medicine and Criminalistics under the supervision of Dr. Jan Robel (the documents collected are often referred to as the "Robel archive"). Original documents were taken by the Germans when they retreated in 1945. It is possible that the files burned during the bombing carried out by Allied Air Forces near the village Redebeul in the vicinity of Dresden.

However, the Poles managed to make illegal copies, thanks to which at least two sets could remain in occupied Poland. One of these copies was hidden in the headquarters of the Polish Red Cross in Warsaw. Unfortunately, it was destroyed in a fire when the Germans demolished the city after the fall of the Warsaw Uprising in the autumn of 1944. The second one was placed in the Department of Chemistry of the National Institute of Forensic Medicine and Criminalistics in Cracow and had not been discovered until 1991 when it was found during renovation works.

On September 25, 1943, the Soviet Army occupied Smolensk. Its next step was to establish a "Special Commission for Determining and Investigating the Circumstances of the Execution of Prisoners of War – Polish Officers – by Fascist Nazi Invaders in the Katyn Forest." As the name suggests, it had already recognized German guilt even before it proceeded to examine the evidence. The works led by Nikolai Burdenko were concluded with the publication of a report on January 24, 1944. In the document, Soviet experts in forensic medicine deduced based on examination of the exhumed corpses that the execution had taken place between September and December 1941, as evidenced by newspapers and letters found on the bodies. The number of victims was estimated at 11,000. Thanks to such a conclusion, it was possible to include the majority of missing prisoners as well as to close the issue of the need for any further exploration. According to the Commission, Polish prisoners were responsible for constructing roads in the Smolensk area; this is also where they fell into the hands of German officers and were then later shot by them. The Polish communists confirmed the Soviet version.

After the end of the Second World War, it may have been possible to identify the

perpetrators during the trial of the Nazi leaders at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. The indictment, brought by the Soviet prosecutor, contained among other things the allegation of committing mass executions of Polish officers in Katyn. In the period of July 1-3, 1946, the judges got acquainted with the evidence and questioned the witnesses. The only proof presented by the Soviet prosecutor's office was a report prepared by the Burdenko-led Commission. The Court agreed to hear three witnesses of each party, that is, the Germans and the Soviets; no Polish witnesses were included in this group. The Tribunal did not refer to material evidence possessed by the Polish diaspora, either.

Among the testimonies examined was that of Docent Marko A. Markov from Bulgaria, a member of the German Katyn Commission in 1943. After the end of the war, he was accused of cooperating with Germany by the Supreme Military Tribunal of Bulgaria. In addition, Markov, as a "foe of the people," spent several months in prison. Once he had regained his freedom, he suddenly changed all his declarations. During one of the Nuremberg trials, he stated that back in 1943, he had been forced to sign a German document and that the Germans could be blamed for the mass executions of Polish people. Such a change in attitude was probably the price for his freedom.

A completely different approach was adopted by Professor François Naville, an expert in forensic medicine at the University of Geneva and Professor Arno Saxén, a specialist in pathological anatomy at the University of Helsinki. Both scientists upheld their conviction about the guilt of the Soviets. German Colonel Friedrich Ahrens, who was accused by the Soviets of committing the Katyn slaughter along with the 537th Communication Regiment, volunteered to provide

testimony in Court. Nonetheless, it turned out that there had been no evidence to maintain such accusation.

Even if investigators discovered in trenches many shells from German-produced ammunition, the research on their markings (symbols) indicated that they had been produced in the interwar period; at that time, the USSR imported a lot of weapons and ammunition from Germany in the framework of military cooperation between both countries. Some of the murdered prisoners-of-war were additionally hit with bayonets. During the trial, information that their characteristic traces, which could have made it possible to indicate the guilty, was not used – the bayonets were quadrangular, like the ones used by the Soviets, and not flat like a knife, which describes the bayonets used by German soldiers.

In its judgment rendered on September 30 – October 1, 1946, the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg did not recognize the guilt of the Germans in the Katyn Massacre; the judges did not indicate any guilty entities, either. Instead, they decided not to mention the crime in the conclusion of the final opinion. Due to the political situation then, it was more convenient not to address the issue at all.

Poles living outside their motherland widely discussed the Katyn Massacre. The so-called *Katyn literature*, which concerned prisoners from all three special prison camps, embraced both memoirs of Władysław Anders, Józef Czapski, Stanisław Świaniewicz or Bronisław Młynarski, but also scientific monographs such as the one written by Janusz Zawodny. Thanks to them, it was possible to spread the truth about the slaughter around the world.

Due to some changes in the global political situation as well as increasing

tension between the Soviet Union and the United States, in 1949, the establishment of the American Commission for the Investigation of the Katyn Massacre headed by Arthur Bliss-Lane, a former US ambassador to Poland, was made possible. The Commission was primarily in charge of collecting German publications dating back from the Second World War; moreover, its members managed to obtain materials held by the Polish diaspora in London. However, it did not have the opportunity to examine any other documents.

In September 1950, a report written by Colonel John van Vliet who was taken by the Germans to Katyn along with a group of British and American prisoners of war was released and later published. In 1945, he wrote a report on Katyn confirming the version about Soviet guilt. Nonetheless, his files were later made secret. On September 1951, a group of US congressmen, impressed by the memo, created a special US congressional committee to investigate Katyn. A year later, the committee released a report prepared based on information gathered during the hearing as well as some other official documents. In its conclusion, American officials wrote as follows: “We unanimously agreed that there was no issue or reasonable doubt as to the fact that the NKVD of the Soviet Union had mass murdered Polish officers and members of the intelligentsia in the Katyn forest near Smolensk.” However, the committee’s final opinions did not align with Poland’s official standpoint in this respect. The country’s censorship body made its best efforts to present them as “imperialist lies.”

Many years later, on January 1, 1972, the British authorities decided to reveal reports written in 1940 by a British Ambassador to the Polish government-in-exile in London, Owen O’Malley, whose memos were initially addressed to the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden. He pointed to

Soviet guilt. In 1943, despite the lack of doubt in this matter, Eden regretted the fate of Polish officers: “but even if they were not alive”, he said, “no action from the Polish government could raise them from the dead while it may constitute a risk to British interests in the eyes of the Russians.” Due to political reasons, the truth about the guilty party remained top secret.

Poland, which was in the Soviet zone of influence, officially recognized German guilt in the Katyn Massacre. Nonetheless, despite communist propaganda, many people knew the truth about the slaughter and were prepared to be penalized for spreading the facts to the public. It seems that the first post-war decade was particularly repressive in this respect. Despite an inevitable “thaw” that took place after Stalin’s death and settlements caused by Nikita Khrushchev’s secret speech “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences” made to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Russia in 1956, the truth about Soviet guilt was however not disclosed. If such information had been unveiled, it would have been necessary to reveal any documentation regarding the crime, to identify all personal details of its perpetrators as well as to admit that Stalin had decided to murder prisoners of war (protected by international law). The 20th Congress took place only two days after the US Committee had announced that the Soviets were to blame for the Katyn Massacre. In this situation, especially in the period of the ongoing “Cold War,” such a step would provide enemies with additional arguments.

The Soviets aimed to distract attention away from the real crime scene; in order to do so, they attracted public attention to the village of Khatyn, located 250 kilometers east of Katyn, whose population was massacred by the Germans. In 1969, the slaughter was commemorated in a



KATYŃ, RUSSIA, APRIL 8, 2017. POLISH WAR CEMETERY IN THE FIELD OF THE STATE MEMORIAL COMPLEX "KATYŃ".

memorial that was later visited by US President Richard Nixon during his visit to the Soviet Union in May 1972. The names of Katyn and Khatyn, although phonetically similar for many foreigners, might have appeared credible for Soviet attempts at mystification.

The Katyn Massacre had not been discussed in Poland until the turn of the 1970s and 1980s when many Poles became interested in the tragic case. Of course, such interest was personal. However, some authors published books (most often unauthorized reprints of texts that had earlier appeared in the West as underground publications), including *Dzieje sprawy Katynia* [Katyn 1940] by Jerzy Łojek (under the pseudonym of Leopold Jerzewski) and *Dramat katyński* [The Katyn Drama] by Czesław Madajczyk. Many Poles sought to manifest their attitude towards the Katyn executions by lighting candles on their windowsills on April 13 and donating money for memorial plaques in churches. On July 31, 1981, thanks to the efforts of the Katyn Committee, a monument in honor of the victims was unveiled at the Powązki Cemetery in Warsaw.

Nonetheless, it was “robbed by unidentified persons” on the same night. However, the authorities of the Polish People’s Republic

could not accept such a blatant expression of opinion. On April 4, 1979, the Katyn Institute in Cracow started its operations, even despite possible repressions from the part of the country’s security services. Illegal at first, it only gathered a small group of people, to begin with.

Due to the dynamic political situation, the anti-government opposition in Poland, which was gaining more and more importance in the country, forced the authorities to make political concessions as well as to liberalize the living conditions of its citizens. As a result of perestroika, introduced in the Soviet Union on April 21, 1987, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev and First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party Wojciech Jaruzelski signed a declaration that gave birth to a committee of Polish and Soviet party historians. It was supposed to explain the problems of the shared history of both countries. Due to the immense public interest, priority was given to the Katyn Massacre. Nevertheless, the Soviet part of the Commission did not present any official information about the perpetrators; it falsely stated that there had been no sources to determine guilt. Polish investigators, based on their

materials, managed to develop reports on Soviet responsibility for the massacre as well as they could in specifying that the executions of Polish prisoners of war from Kozelsk, Starobilsk and Ostashkov had begun on April 4, 1940.

Moreover, as the Katyn slaughter was no longer a “public secret” and Poles could openly speak about the tragedy, the relatives of victims began to establish the so-called Katyn Families Association. The first was officially registered in May 1989. Since 1990, at the initiative of the Independent Historical Committee of the Katyn Massacre, it was possible to issue “Katyn Booklets” (*“Zeszyty Katynskie”*).

Besides, there was a group of Russian historians and journalists who intended to conduct a careful investigation as well as carrying out independent research for further documents. The breakthrough came in 1990, when they were allowed to query the files of the Special Archive and in the Central State Archives of the Supreme Archives Board at the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In mid-March 1990, the Soviet press published a statement on the findings contained in Soviet documents by Natalia S. Lebedeva; the reports seemed to confirm that the NKVD had to be blamed for the Katyn Massacre. At the same time, it was upheld that the reluctance of the Soviet authorities impeded their “findings.”

On April 13, 1990 – today celebrated as World’s Day of Remembrance for Victims of Katyn Massacre – the TASS news agency in Moscow issued an official statement. According to the communiqué, the NKVD was responsible for slaughtering Polish officers in the spring of 1940. All personal blame was put on Lavrentiy Beria and Vsevolod Merkulov, which was a breakthrough event because the USSR authorities pleaded guilty to the Katyn Massacre for the first time in 50

years. It was on the same day that Mikhail Gorbachev handed over the first part of the documents on Polish prisoners-of-war to General Wojciech Jaruzelski. The public widely discussed the fact of its disclosure. However, little media attention was paid when Polish Consul General to Kyiv, Ryszard Polkowski, received more folders contained with documents. Despite the secret place of storage, it was possible to determine that they had been kept in the Central Archives of the Soviet State Army. More materials were delivered to President Lech Walesa on October 14, 1992. These included essential investigative material to explain the crime, namely Package no. 1 that included Beria’s order to slaughter Polish POWs, internees, and prisoners. Moreover, the files contained the minutes from the Politburo meeting, which took place on March 5, 1940, during which the request had been accepted followed by its immediate implementation.

Since the 1990s, Polish publishers have printed numerous books and articles on the executions of Polish prisoners of war incarcerated in special camps at Kozelsk, Starobilsk, and Ostashkov. They consist of monographs as well as scientific and popular articles, biographical notes of the victims, as well as analyzes and reprints of previously unknown documents. Based on materials taken from the Soviet archives, they sought to broaden the knowledge about the situation in the camps and the details of the executions. Moreover, information on the Katyn Massacre can also now be found on various websites.

In the spring of 1990, due to the insistence of the Polish authorities, the prosecutor’s offices in Kharkiv (Ukraine) and Tver (Russia) launched investigations aiming to establish the perpetrators of the slaughter of prisoners-of-war from the special camps. Out of thousands of witnesses questioned, the most important facts were delivered by Mitrofan Syromatnikov and

Dmitry Tokarev. The former served as a senior caretaker of the internal block of the NKVD prison in the years 1939-1941 (his testimony concerned the execution of prisoners from the Starobielsk prison camp that took place in Kharkiv) while the latter was the head of the NKVD headquarters in Kalinin (now Tver). His statement referred to the prisoners based in the Ostashkov camp and contained the course of the crime as well as both organizational and technical details depicted with almost pedantic accuracy.

However, not all living witnesses were eager to testify in Court. Major Piotr Soprunenko, former NKVD director of POW affairs, claimed that he had heard about the Katyn Massacre on the occasion of the arrival of Polish President Wojciech Jaruzelski to Moscow in April 1990. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the investigation was continued by the Russian Prosecutor's Office. However, it decided to discontinue the proceedings on September 21, 2004. No one has ever been officially charged in Court because the Russian Federation does not recognize the Katyn Massacre as genocide; instead, they perceive it in terms of a crime whose prosecution has already expired. Thus, on November 30, 2004, the Katyn Committee notified the Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation of a crime committed by the NKVD. As a result, Poland's Institute of National Remembrance issued a decision to commence an investigation into the Katyn Massacre. The primary purpose of the proceedings was to determine the perpetrators of the crimes: those who issued orders as well as their direct executors.

Thus, since Russia did not recognize this crime as political murder, members of the Katyn Family filed a complaint with

the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. According to a judgment published on April 6, 2012, the Court ruled that the execution of Polish officers in Katyn could be perceived in terms of a war crime (which could not expire) while Russia humiliated the relatives of the killed by refusing to grant them the status of the victim. On the other hand, in the same ruling it was stated that the Court had no authority to assess the investigation from a formal point of view as it concerned events from 1940; at that time, the institution did not exist nor did the European Convention on Human Rights (it entered into force in 1953).

However, no judgment can change the view of ordinary residents of the Russian Federation. Moreover, even if the USSR admitted its guilt as well as despite archival documentation blaming the Soviets, some publications have recently attributed responsibility for the Katyn Massacre to the Germans as evidenced by the articles and books of Russian journalist Yuri Mukhin. At the same time, in Russia, there are currently many books and articles being published by such authors as Vladimir Abarinov, Andrey Guryanov, Natalia S. Lebedeva, Valentina Parsadanova and Oleg Zakirov who aim to present the truth about the Katyn Massacre.

Russian citizens, just like Germans after World War II had to confront the responsibility for the crimes committed by the Third Reich, will now have to accept that they are historical heirs of the "achievements" of Stalin's regime. Thus, they are facing a difficult task; they must work out a formula that would reconcile this fact with the lack of direct personal responsibility of modern Russians for these acts of atrocity.

Joanna Żelazko ■
July 2018

APPARENT REVOLUTION – PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN UKRAINE

GRZEGORZ KUCZYŃSKI

The results of the presidential elections in Ukraine are not so much a victory of Volodymyr Zelensky as much as the defeat of Petro Poroshenko. President Poroshenko was unable to make the election into a war plebiscite. Zelensky's narrative dominated; a referendum on Ukraine's leadership for the last five years. The defeat of Poroshenko signifies only shifts within the oligarchic system, instead of its defeat. The final balance of power will be known only after the parliamentary elections, which will also occur this year. The new presidency will not bring major changes in Ukrainian politics because of the inexperience and specificity of the back office of Zelensky, as well as the stronger position of the parliament. Therefore, one should not expect a radical improvement in the relations between Kyiv and Warsaw, and above all, with Budapest.



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UKRAINIAN SHOWMAN, COMEDIAN, AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE VOLODYMYR ZELENSKY REACTS AT HIS CAMPAIGN HEADQUARTERS FOLLOWING A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN KIEV, UKRAINE, ON APRIL 21, 2019.

In the second round of the presidential elections in Ukraine, on April 21, 2019, Volodymyr Zelensky attained 73.22 percent of votes. His rival, outgoing president Petro Poroshenko, received 24.45 percent of votes from participating voters¹. Zelensky was the winner in all regions of Ukraine except Lviv, where Poroshenko won. The departing president also won among Ukrainians living abroad, where he was supported by 54.7 percent of those voting; whereas the president-elect received 44.7 percent of the vote. Turnout in the second round of elections reached 61.37 percent – which represented over 18.4 million citizens. It is pertinent to consider that as a result of the Russian occupation of Crimea and part of Donbas, nearly 16 percent of Ukrainian voters were de facto deprived of the possibility of voting². The

impressive result of Zelensky is not so much his personal success as much as it is the defeat of his rival. Poroshenko had become the epitome of the “old” establishment in this showdown, and the vote on April 21st was a referendum in which the Ukrainians expressed distrust towards the current political class. In 2018, the level of distrust, frustration, doubt, and disappointment among Ukrainians reached the highest level since 1991. Zelensky’s victory is in effect an articulation against the betrayal of Euromaidan ideals by Poroshenko, who is a symbol of the old oligarchic system. The elections also compromised the Ukrainian intelligentsia and opinion-forming circles, the broadly recognized elite, the vast majority of whom supported Poroshenko as opposed to the “clown” Zelensky. According to polls, for 40 percent of voters, a vote for Zelensky was an expression of

¹ https://www.cvk.gov.ua/info/protokol_cvk_30042019.pdf

² <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/what-zelenskiy-s-victory-means-for-ukraine>



A GIANT SCREEN SHOWS THE COUNTRY'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS FINAL RESULTS DURING THE CENTRAL ELECTION COMMITTEE (CEC) SITTING IN KIEV, UKRAINE, APRIL 30, 2019.

© SERGEY DOLZHENKO (PAP/EPA)

protest against the current political class. Both supporters of more daring reforms, disappointed by the stagnation of the state modernization process, as well as the social and relatively pro-Russian electorate, had voted for him³.

Even before the first round of the election on March 31, 2019, many experts and publicists dismissed the polls indicating the sizeable advantage of Zelensky. Meanwhile, the result of the first contest put the actor in an exceedingly favorable situation and his rival in a very difficult one. It is worth considering that from the point of view of electoral arithmetic, three weeks between the first and second rounds of the elections should definitely be noted in favor of Zelensky. This is evidenced by the number of votes won by both candidates on March 31 and April 21: Zelensky obtaining 5.7 million and 13.5 million votes, respectively, and Poroshenko obtaining 3 million and 4.5 million votes, respectively.⁴

³ <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2019-04-21/wielki-eksperyment-zelenski-nowym-prezydentem-ukrainy>

⁴ https://www.cvk.gov.ua/info/protokol_cvk_31032019.pdf

Remarkably, the final result turned out to be substantially better for Zelensky than the survey forecasts. Ten days before the second round, a survey conducted by the sociological group Rating showed that as much as 51 percent of Ukrainians intend to support Zelensky. Poroshenko could count on only 21 percent. It is an overwhelming advantage, and yet other data from this study was even more pessimistic for the president. Within the group of voters who were sure that they would go to the polls, Zelensky's advantage was even greater, which showed him winning as much as 61–24. Zelensky lead in all age groups as well as in the south, east and the center of the country. Furthermore, as much as 61 percent of respondents thought that Zelensky would win, whereas only 17% believed in Poroshenko's potential success⁵. For almost two weeks after the first round, the president did not manage to change the course of events. Support for Zelensky increased clearly both as a consequence of him proving his capability to win the election, but also thanks to the

⁵ <https://warsawinstitute.org/pl/zelenski-zmierzapo-prezydenture/>

reallocation of votes given to most other candidates. Compared to the results from the first round, Poroshenko only slightly increased his electorate. Another negative for Poroshenko was that much as 83 percent of Ukrainians felt that the country needed shock and radical change. Zelensky's campaign and the slogan of choice between the past and the future better matched those expectations.

VOLODYMYR ZELENSKY. WHY DID HE WIN?

The broadcaster “1 + 1” television channel broadcasted Zelensky's speech about his intention to launch his campaign on December 31, 2018. However, the presidential campaign of Zelensky started much earlier, even prior to his name appearing in presidential election polls (autumn 2018). Operation “President Zelensky” actually started in 2015, when the TV series “Servant of the Nation” appeared on the television, where Zelensky plays the role of a school teacher who accidentally becomes president. Zelensky did not win the presidency in the weeks between the first and the second round. Nor did he even win it within those several weeks between the moment of his declaration of running and the moment of the final vote. Achieving the position of the head of state was possible thanks to the popularity gained over the last two decades in the role of not a politician, but an actor. Zelensky, the comedian, spoke more to the Ukrainians than the Poroshenko, the politician. Of course, it was possible to win thanks to the fact that Zelensky's campaign was conducted so as not to spoil the virtual image of the “servant of the nation.”⁶

Zelensky's campaign innovation was to concentrate – if discussing social media – on Telegram and Instagram. Until recently, Ukrainian politicians have been

present mainly on Facebook and Twitter. Investigative journalists from Bihus.info wrote that Zelensky's budget for online advertising reached \$300,000. It was particularly referring to the funding of bots on social media⁷. Mikhail Fedorov, head of Zelensky's digital campaign, denied that staff used bots and said that \$200,000 was spent on online advertising⁸. And that was before both rounds. As it turned out later, however, Zelensky's staff had created the so-called “*The Mobile Online Group*,” consisting of volunteers coordinating the “*feedback attacks*” of Zelensky's against his rivals. Interestingly, the only requirement to participate in the group was to have a Facebook account, which opened the door to foreigners, including Russians. Zelensky's campaign was almost one hundred percent virtual. No rallies and direct meetings with voters and instead participated in a television show featuring a performance by “Kvartal 95.” Zelensky avoided voters as much as he could. He did not talk to independent journalists. He appeared only on 1 + 1 television, where he recited prepared texts. Instead, his advisers spoke to the media on his behalf, assuring them that they expressed the position of Zelensky⁹.

The future winner presented his “team” only two days before the second round. Nevertheless, the staff very quickly admitted to cheap populism during the campaign – the key political adviser to the president-elect, Dmytro Razumkov, said that the president has no power to reduce bills for municipal charges or

⁷ http://texty.org.ua/pg/article/Oximets/read/93353/Jak_Zelenskij_reklamuvavsya_u_Fejsbuci_Zvernenna_do

⁸ <https://hromadske.ua/posts/za-takoyi-pidtrimki-nam-ne-potribni-buli-boti-kerivnik-didzhital-kampaniyi-zelenskogo?fbclid=IwAR1THE-XOZVZFqQZfPSkEjxupluOGCGvzt2uH6A65Iis2RLMnVG67XCXpQs>

⁹ <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/04/24/ukraine-president-virtual-campaign-226711>

⁶ <http://euromaidanpress.com/2019/04/23/why-zelensky-won-ukraine-presidential-elections/>

Zelensky's entire campaign consisted of unyielding criticism of Poroshenko's mistakes, mishaps, and omissions, using most obvious populist techniques.

imprison corrupt officials¹⁰. The notion that Zelensky's victory resulted from social media activity is a myth. He won thanks to television and private production, which was connected with Kolomoisky, a Ukrainian oligarch and his powerful connections, not by the hearts of young people through social media. In fact, on social media, the number of posts supporting Poroshenko and Zelensky were almost equal¹¹.

The success of Zelensky in the election was also possible due to the usage of populist slogans, which are much easier to put forward by the claimant than for the defending incumbent. Zelensky pointed to conflicting goals. He spoke about Ukraine's pursuit of NATO and the EU, but at the same time, he stipulated that this should be decided in a referendum. He spoke about reducing taxes for business, but at the same time advocated for increased social spending. He spoke about tightening economic cooperation with the EU (with Poland at the forefront), but at the same time called for closer relations with Russia,

because "her economy is important for Ukraine". He declared "not a step back" when discussing Donbas and Crimea, and at the same time he said that it makes no sense now to raise the affairs of Crimea, and the most important thing is to preserve the ceasefire and bring the soldiers home. During the campaign, it was possible to implement such a strategy – by almost entirely avoiding debates. Nevertheless, the time of making (or not making) decisions will come when Zelensky steps into power, which means that with every decision made by Zelensky, some groups of the voters will be dissatisfied and disappointed¹².

Zelensky used tactics that, renown Ukrainian writer, Oksana Zabuzhko called "draw your own candidate"¹³ Zelensky asked his followers to write the questions that he should ask Poroshenko, as well as write the main priorities for his program. From the beginning, he presented himself as a candidate of the people. "Everyone got colored pencils, like children in kindergarten. Draw your own president. And the whole kindergarten, inhabited by millions of people with different levels of education and social experience, this entire kindergarten was drawing..." Zabuzhko believes that in this way, this was a cynical exploitation of not only the people's trust but also their emotional capacities. It is easier to unite people, pointing to a common enemy than around a positive idea. Such a tactic was used by Zelensky. The enemy was Poroshenko, and the main slogans were "change" and "new faces." What change? What faces? Zelensky began to reveal this only at the end of the campaign. Besides, some of these new faces once belonged to the Party of Regions, the same party behind overthrown president Viktor Yanukovich.

¹⁰ <https://focus.ua/politics/427184-tarify-i-posadki-lyudej--ne-sfera-kompetencii-prezidenta--shtab-zelenskogo.html>

¹¹ <http://ukrcontent.com/reports/rosijskij-stil-propagandi-i-lideri-dumok-na-pensii-yak-zelenskij-i-poroshenko-voyuvai-i-vocmerezah.html>

¹² <http://euromaidanpress.com/2019/04/23/why-zelensky-won-ukraine-presidential-elections/>

¹³ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=brIULF7MSuI&feature=player_embedded&fbclid=IwAR1Fntd5702hUdhBxUkicdP67bHuAJ0zgGdsh1NraaC9TO4vKNPKdAuvC0

Zelensky's entire campaign consisted of unyielding criticism of Poroshenko's mistakes, mishaps, and omissions, using most obvious populist techniques¹⁴. It was all the easier because, as the survey conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Fund showed a week before the first round, voters have little knowledge about what the president is responsible for, as well as his competences and limitations. For example, 32 percent of respondents said that the president is responsible for taxes, salaries, and pensions. The voters' lack of awareness is also evidenced by another survey, conducted in April by the KMIS center, in which, as far as the question of what is expected of the president during his first 100 days of office, up to 39.1 percent of people answered 'the reduction of municipal charges'¹⁵. Poroshenko decided to engage in the campaign as a professional politician, statesman, and not a populist. He did not talk about gas prices or taxes because it is not the president's competence. He talked about what the president can actually address: homeland security, military affairs, foreign policy, and the decentralization and reformations of the judiciary. With his decision negative opinion among the electorate and general disappointment with the political elite, he was condemned to fail. It was Zelensky who spoke about most of the issues that people care about. When Ukrainians were asked about the three issues that they believe are the most important for Ukraine, they responded: military conflict in Donbas (41 percent); corruption in the state administration (40%); price increase (27%); municipal fees (25%); unemployment (23%); health care (20%); and the incompetence of the authorities (14%). Moreover, the Russian occupation of Crimea turned out to be one of the most important problems

for only 4 percent of respondents¹⁶. It was even more advantageous for Zelensky when the question concerned the most important issues for the respondent himself: price increase (42 percent); communal charges (38 percent); war in Donbas (25 percent); corruption (25 percent); health service (23 percent); and unemployment (21 percent)¹⁷.

One of the winning candidate's slogans was *"Zelensky unites the country."* Previous elections generally meant a choice between a pro-Western and pro-Russian candidate. The support map usually ran along the historical and linguistic lines of division in Ukraine. Zelensky is the second candidate in the history of modern Ukraine who can actually say that he unites the electorates of various parts of the country. He received the majority of votes in all regions except Lviv in the western part of Ukraine. Five years ago, Poroshenko did even better – he won in the first round in all circuits, which did not include the occupied regions of Crimea and one-third of Donbas¹⁸. By applying these new types of populist tricks and focusing on the national problems and expectations of the majority of citizens, Zelensky managed to overcome the traditional electoral division of Ukraine. Even in the west of the country, where Poroshenko had the most support, the incumbent president succeeded in defeating his rival only in the Lviv region. The best result was recorded by Zelensky in the south and east: in the Dnipropetrovsk district and in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, Odesa and Kharkiv regions. As he wrote in the financial commentary of The Financial Times, *"although [residents] of Crimea and Eastern regions are occupied by Russia, they could not take part [in the April election in Ukraine], Zelensky won in*

¹⁴ <http://euromaidanpress.com/2019/04/23/why-zelensky-won-ukraine-presidential-elections/>

¹⁵ <https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=851&page=1>

¹⁶ http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2018-5-21_ukraine_poll_presentation_0.pdf

¹⁷ http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2018-5-21_ukraine_poll_presentation_0.pdf

¹⁸ <http://euromaidanpress.com/2019/04/23/why-zelensky-won-ukraine-presidential-elections/>

every region except the westernmost Lviv, largely by eliminating the division into the east and west that characterized the previous post-Soviet elections.” The editors of the daily also emphasized that in Ukraine both the prime minister and the president would now be of Jewish origin, “...which makes Moscow’s claims that the country would become a neo-Nazi junta senseless.”¹⁹

PETRO POROSHENKO. WHY DID HE LOSE?

Poroshenko started in an impossible position to win. A few weeks before the first round of the election, he was listed as the least popular politicians (a recorded 47.7 percent)²⁰. Only 13.3 percent of the respondents said they would not vote for Zelensky under any circumstances. Another survey indicated that as much as 69 percent of respondents do not trust Poroshenko, and only 24 percent do trust him. In the case of Zelensky: 47 percent, and up to 43 percent, respectively²¹. Poroshenko was in a far worse situation from the beginning with a very large negative electorate and having the association of being a corrupt oligarchic establishment (while Zelensky’s connections with the oligarch Kolomoyskyi did not bother voters). The president’s staff also made several serious mistakes during the campaign. Firstly, for far too long, the main rival was seen as Tymoshenko and most of the efforts went to fight the former prime minister. Zelensky was not perceived as a serious competitor for a very long time because Poroshenko’s staff succumbed to the same illusion as most of the elites: that the Ukrainians were declaring willingness to vote for a comedian, but when election day comes, they will either not vote or vote for a “*serious candidate*.” Furthermore,

most of Zelensky’s supporters were young people who are not usually politically active. Their turnout in the first round of elections was not adjusted for in the opinion polls.

Low expectations of voters were poorly diagnosed. The campaign under the slogan “*Army, language, faith*” publicized those areas of politics in which the president could boast of some successes: strengthening the armed forces, supporting the Ukrainian language, Ukrainian-language music, and cinematography, obtaining autocephaly by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Poroshenko also turned his eye to nationalist circles, even allowing the glorification of UPA / OUN and Bandera (the activities of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance and Volodymyr Viatrovych). This, however, only mobilized Poroshenko’s hard electorate which was only enough to move him to the second round. However, nothing was done to fight for voters from southern or eastern Ukraine. Poroshenko de facto handed over those voters to Zelensky. Poroshenko divided the voters, even unintentionally, when he emphasized the role of the Ukrainian language, tradition and history, while Zelensky avoided categorical declarations in these areas and appealed to all Ukrainians, regardless of where they live, the language they use on a daily basis or their attitude to Russia and NATO, as well as what their views are on Bandera or Soviet tradition. Between the first and the second round, Poroshenko introduced himself as the only statesman who could face Putin, while Zelensky a novice who was not suited to lead the country during the war.

Five years of the presidency had politically exhausted Poroshenko. In May 2014, he won in the first round, and immediately after the election he had an approval of 55 percent. At the end of the term, it was only 9 percent. In October 2018 as much as 50.5

¹⁹ “FT”: wybór Zełenskiego dowodem na głęboką zmianę na Ukrainie, PAP, 25.04.2019.

²⁰ http://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_3ua_monitoring_ukraine_03209_press.pdf

²¹ http://ratinggroup.ua/files/ratinggroup/reg_files/rg_ua_032019_press.pdf



UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT AND PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE PETRO POROSHENKO (R) AND HIS WIFE MARYNA (L) REACT AT HIS CAMPAIGN HEADQUARTERS FOLLOWING A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN KIEV, UKRAINE, APRIL 21, 2019.

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percent of voters said they would never vote for Poroshenko and only 6.5 percent that would vote for him (KMIS survey, Razumkov Center, Rating Group). In April 2019, the negative electorate of Poroshenko increased to 58 percent – indicating that even his election campaign did not help. Zelensky was “*anti-Poroshenko*” for many voters²². One cannot forget about the Ukrainian political tradition: during over 27 years of independence, only one of the five presidents managed to gain re-election and Leonid Kuchma won the second round in 1999 only because he had communist Petro Symonenko competing against him. There is a lot of similarities

here to the elections in Russia in 1996 when many Russians begrudgingly voted for Boris Yeltsin who was an ailing drunk only because the alternative was Gennady Zyuganov, a communist.

After the second round of elections, in a closed meeting with the deputies of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, the president admitted that his failure was caused by communication problems and poor personal choices²³. It was only after the first round that Poroshenko began making personnel changes and removing officials being the most burdensome for him, including the Kherson-based perimeter

²² <http://euromaidanpress.com/2019/04/27/why-poroshenko-lost-to-zelensky-ukraine-elections/>

²³ <https://thebabel.com.ua/news/29264-poroshenko-proviv-zakritu-zustrich-zi-svoyeyu-frakciyeyu-proshcho-govorili>

The new president of Ukraine is not familiar with foreign policy, and among the official experts in his surroundings there were clearly no experienced people in the field of diplomacy or international relations.

administration, which is suspected of playing a key role in the murder of a civic activist Kateryna Handziuk. As the analyst Taras Berezowiec wrote about the president in 2016, *“instead of the professionalism of the candidate, personal trust is often the key factor influencing the nomination. If there is no trust, there is no nomination”*²⁴.

Another characteristic of the Poroshenko government, which ultimately influenced the course of the election, was the loss of a number of political allies. For example, the leading reformers in the government, Abromavicius and Danyluk, did not receive sufficient support from the president and left the ruling camp, to now be in Zelensky's camp. We cannot forget about the incident with Mikheil Saakashvili, whom Poroshenko appointed as governor of Odesa to carry out radical reforms, which served an example for the whole country. It soon turned out that in disputes with “old” politicians and officials reluctant to change, Poroshenko sided with them, not Saakashvili. As a result, he finally fell out

with the president and recently supported Zelensky, hoping to return after the change in the administration. The growing problems with reforms were not the only things that influenced the poor assessment of Poroshenko, who was supposed to embody the hopes of the crowds demonstrating at the Maidan in Kyiv in 2013 and 2014. His relations with some oligarchs and politicians from the Party of Regions camp were perceived as suspicious, including those with Rinat Akhmetov or Viktor Medvedchuk.

Despite the obvious mistakes and failures of Poroshenko, Ukraine has made progress through his rule. One cannot forget about the autocephaly for the Orthodox Church, the visa-free agreement with the EU, stabilization of the economy, international support in the war with Russia and increased US aid. Poroshenko is criticized for the slow pace of reforms. In turn, what succeeded was more often recognized as a change not due to the president, but despite him. This is not exactly a precise accusation. However, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc was constantly supporting important legislative changes in the parliament. Without the votes of the BPP and the coalition People's Front, no bill would be passed. Poroshenko is particularly strongly criticized for ineptitude or even reluctance to fight corruption. This was one of the key drivers of Zelensky's success. Meanwhile, hard data shows that it is not such an unambiguous picture. According to the Institute of Economic Research and Political Consulting, the steps taken in 2014-2018 to increase transparency and deregulation in Ukraine saved 6% of GDP annually, approximately 6 billion dollars²⁵.

Although corruption has declined, expectations were certainly higher. Poroshenko did not fulfil his promise to

²⁴ https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-38236744?fbclid=IwAR0wxHMFTilvhWs2NS5aCV0L6a6y9hkbPP1_oAkhk0eCx6ZFoDD8cN06e4

²⁵ <http://www.ier.com.ua/ua/publications/reports?pid=5993>

end the war in Donbass quickly – but here he cannot be blamed. The key to the end of the conflict lies in the Kremlin, not in the residence at Bankova Street in Kyiv. Assuredly, it was a success to strengthen the defense potential of Ukraine – at least it was possible to prevent further losses. The army had to be built from scratch – it should not be forgotten that in February 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, the Ukrainian armed forces were only capable of immediately sending a maximum of 5,000 soldiers to fight. The dynamics of the campaign between the first and the second round could probably only change in the event of a serious escalation of the conflict with Russia. All studies showed that the only area where Poroshenko is perceived better than Zelensky is defense, the army, and the conflict with Russia. However, such an escalation of the war did not occur. Other desperate actions of Poroshenko did not help; profound changes in his own team, a number of decisions showing that Poroshenko drew conclusions from the voice of the people – e.g., removing the most discredited officials and initiating radical legislative changes, especially those that show that the authorities do not control the fight against corruption²⁶.

PERSPECTIVE OF RELATIONS WITH HUNGARY AND POLAND

The new president of Ukraine is not familiar with foreign policy, and among the official experts in his surroundings there were clearly no experienced people in the field of diplomacy or international relations²⁷. Ukraine's biggest challenge in foreign and security policy will be Donbas. During the campaign, Zelensky gave various, sometimes even contradictory, signals on the subject. Russia will want to use the new president's lack of political

Difficult relations with Budapest are reflected in the cooperation between Ukraine and NATO.

experience and try to play on the fact that Zelensky assured his country that the priority for him is to end the bloodshed in the south-east of Ukraine. The Kremlin uses the classic carrot-and-stick method. On the one hand, it declares readiness to talk with Kyiv. On the other hand, it began to issue Russian passports to the inhabitants of the occupied part of Donbas *en masse* and stopped exports of oil and fuels to Ukraine. The actions of Zelensky in foreign policy will certainly be influenced by the expectations of his supporters. 37 percent of Zelensky's electorate supports Ukraine's membership in NATO, while 37 percent is for neutrality, and 8% is for close relations with Russia²⁸.

In this case, there is a clear geographical division: those who want to enter NATO come mainly from western Ukraine. Those who advocate for neutrality, come from the south-eastern part of the country²⁹. This means that Zelensky will not be as radically pro-Western as his predecessor. At the same time, one can expect a reversal of the deterioration of bilateral relations with western neighbors, which occurred under Poroshenko. This includes Poland and especially Hungary. By contrast, Ukraine shares decent relations with two other members of the Visegrad Group: Slovakia and the Czech Republic (despite the pro-

²⁶ <https://warsawinstitute.org/pl/wotum-nieufnosci-dla-ukrainskiej-klasy-politycznej/>

²⁷ <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2019-04-21/wielki-eksperyment-zelenski-nowym-prezydentem-ukrainy>

²⁸ https://censor.net.ua/resonance/3121989/37_vibortsv_zelenskogo_za_nato_stlki_j_za_neyitraltet_tomu_vn_unika_debatv_schob_ne_vdpala_chastina

²⁹ <http://euromaidanpress.com/2019/04/23/why-zelensky-won-ukraine-presidential-elections/>

Russian views of successive presidents here, now Miloš Zeman, previously Vaclav Klaus). In the case of Prague and Bratislava, there are no major potential conflict areas, which is not the case with Ukrainian-Polish relations (mainly historical issues) and Ukrainian-Hungarian relations (status of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia). Difficult relations with Budapest are reflected in the cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, because Hungary has been blocking high-level NATO-Ukraine meetings since autumn 2017 in connection with the adoption of a new educational law by the parliament in Kyiv. Budapest claims that it is violating the rights of the Hungarian minority in the Ukrainian Transcarpathia, as it restricts the right to teach in the native language. The crisis deepened after it was revealed that Hungary secretly issued Hungarian passports in Ukraine. In a recording made at the Hungarian consulate in the Transcarpathian town of Berehove, employees are instructed new passport holders to hide the fact that they obtained second citizenship from the Ukrainian authorities. Dual citizenship is not recognized in Ukraine and Kyiv expelled the Hungarian consul. In retaliation, Budapest sent home a Ukrainian consul. In February 2018, the office of the Transcarpathian Hungarian Cultural Association in Uzhgorod was attacked. The Hungarian authorities have repeatedly mentioned that they do not expect improvement in bilateral relations with the current government of Ukraine.

From the perspective of Budapest, this anti-Hungarian policy lasted almost until the end of Poroshenko's term of office. On April 25, the Ukrainian Supreme Council adopted a controversial law on the Ukrainian language. It provides for obligatory use of this language in state institutions, self-government bodies and other areas of public life (it does not apply to religious rites or language used in the

private sphere). The head of Hungarian diplomacy, Peter Szijjarto, said that the Act violates the rights of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. *"I believe that our Hungarian partners consciously chose a line of confrontation"* is how the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Pavlo Klimkin, reacted, at the same time admitting that the Ukrainian parliament should adopt a separate law on the languages of national minorities³⁰. Less than a month later, Klimkin resigned from his position, and Zelensky, stressing that Ukrainian is the only state language, announced that he is a supporter of the development of the Ukrainian language by encouraging its use, not by forcing it legal regulations. Therefore, after taking office, it will *"make a detailed analysis of this law to see whether it corresponds to the constitutional principles and the interests of all citizens of Ukraine"*³¹. Such a signal from Zelensky was well received in Hungary, although the declaration is still far away from the deed. However, Budapest and Hungarian organizations in Transcarpathia assume that it cannot get any worse than it was under Poroshenko. Considering Zelensky's background, his views and electorate, it does not seem that he would continue the nationalist viewpoint of his predecessor. In villages inhabited by Hungarians, 90% of the population voted for Zelensky. *"Let me congratulate you for this wonderful victory in the elections of the President of Ukraine,"* Prime Minister Viktor Orban wrote in a congratulatory telegram, stressing that the Hungarian government will continue to work for the development of Ukrainian-Hungarian relations. The Transcarpathian Hungarian Cultural Association in Uzhgorod welcomed Zelensky's victory, expressing the hope that Kyiv would now stop the

³⁰ Ukraina/ Szef MSZ: swoją reakcją na ustawę językową Węgry wybrały drogę konfrontacji, PAP, 26.04.2019

³¹ Ukraina/ Prezydent elekt zamierza przeanalizować ustawę o języku, PAP, 25.04.2019

“anti-Hungarian policy.” The association hopes that Kyiv will abandon the policy of deliberate assimilation of Hungarians and “in accordance with the constitution and international documents,” will ensure the Hungarian minority the full right to use the language in education from kindergarten to university. The association also expressed the hope that Zelensky will create the possibility for minorities, including Hungarians, to have representation in the parliament and among local authorities, and through bilateral talks will contribute to the transformation of Ukrainian-Hungarian relations and the legalization of the institution of dual citizenship³². However, it can already be assumed that Zelensky will not fulfil most of these demands for a simple reason: it was not a significant motive in the campaign and the president would not break with voters and politicians who were in favor of a decided policy on the Ukrainian language. It is also still unclear what will be the balance of power in the new parliament.

Nevertheless, for similar reasons, one should not expect a breakthrough in relations with Poland. At this stage, Kyiv should first make gestures and make specific decisions to restore confidence. Why? This was explained by Alona Hetmanczuk, the head of the Kyiv Centre of Analytics *Center Nowa Europa*, on his blog on the *Ukrainska Pravda* website. Firstly, the Ukrainian leadership does not treat Poland as a priority in the manner that Poland treats Ukraine. Secondly, “*there has been a certain reduction in the importance of Poland, which from a long-term advocate of Ukraine has become simply a country between Kyiv and Berlin*”. Furthermore, “*the Ukrainian political elite did not take the entry of the Law and Justice Party in Poland seriously*”, treating it as “*something temporary, which should simply be*

A serious factor, affecting not only relations with Poland, but also foreign issues in general, will be the real strength of the new president. There are many indications that he will be the weakest president since 1991.

waited out”³³. The office of Jan Piekla, the Ambassador of the Republic of Poland in Kyiv achieved little – the Ukrainian side de facto rejected Poland’s extended hand for such a long time that Warsaw’s stance towards Ukraine soured, evidenced by the presence of the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the swearing-in of Zelensky, instead of the President of Poland himself.

The question is, what can Zelensky do to improve relations with Poland? Certainly, an important gesture would be a visit to Warsaw as one of the first foreign trips of the new president. This could also be achieved through the weakening of nationalist tendencies in the policy of the Ukrainian state in both educational policy to historical interpretation. Bandera certainly does not belong to Zelensky’s ideals. However, the same question remains: what is profitable for the president and what can be applied without parliament? Subsequently, there is the issue of Zelensky’s struggle for

³² Stowarzyszenie Węgrów zakarpackich zadowolone z wygranej Zelenskigo, PAP, 23.04.2019

³³ Ukraina/ Ekspertka: Zelenski może poprawić relacje z Polską, PAP, 25.04.2019

Ukrainians gave the winner a free hand in the implementation of radical reforms and the purification of the state apparatus from the old elite.

supporting compatriots in the west of the country. He has the support from those in the central and southern regions, so he can make decisions (or not make decisions) to win over Ukrainians from Galicia. What is more, there are formal issues that matter. For example, the head of the Ukrainian IPN appoints and dismisses the government. Thus, the departure (if at all) of Volodymyr Viatrovich is not yet sealed. A serious factor, affecting not only relations with Poland, but also foreign issues in general, will be the real strength of the new president. There are many indications that he will be the weakest president since 1991. With the parliamentary-presidential system, Zelensky would have to have a very strong position in the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine's parliament. This remains a big question mark because even if his party, The Servant of the Nation, wins definitively, they will still need coalition partners. Furthermore, Vitaly Portnikov, Ukrainian commentator and chairman of the Ukrainian part of the Polish-Ukrainian Partnership Forum which is operating under the aegis of foreign ministers of two countries, also points out that most of the issues surrounding the Polish-Ukrainian historical dispute do not refer to the powers of state authorities, but authorities at regional and local level. *"It is obvious that the Ukrainian president does not affect the*

decisions of regional authorities, and what's more, they can become much more acute to show their independence and independence from Kyiv," stressed Portnikov³⁴.

What does Volodymyr Zelensky's crushing victory mean in practice? It can be said that the Ukrainians gave the winner a free hand in the implementation of radical reforms and the purification of the state apparatus from the old elite. The problem is that in the parliamentary-presidential republic this would only be possible with a majority in the Verkhovna Rada and with the government reflecting the composition of the president's alliance with the parliament. Currently, it is impossible, because the opponents of Zelensky dominate in the Verkhovna Rada. It is also not known how the balance of power will change after the election. Zelensky, therefore, promised things in the campaign that he might not be able to implement; however, this was already known. Just like focusing on issues which are not presidential competencies. Nonetheless, it did not make Ukrainians reluctant to vote for Zelensky – which was further evidence that it was more of a vote "against" rather than a vote "for". Without a strong representation in the parliament and participation in the ruling coalition, Zelensky's influence, as the head of state, on the political processes in the country will be small due to constitutional constraints. This means that the new president will try to run a non-controversial policy, and the possible conflict with the parliament will serve as an explanation for the lack of reforms³⁵, as well as the lack of improvement in relations with such neighbors as Poland and Hungary.

Grzegorz Kuczyński ■
May 19, 2019

³⁴ Ukraina/ Portnikow: Zelenski raczej nie usunie nieporozumień w relacjach z Polską, PAP, 22.04.2019

³⁵ <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2019-04-21/wielki-eksperyment-zelenski-nowym-prezydentem-ukrainy>

NEW CHALLENGES IN CENTRAL EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY

PIOTR BAJDA, PROFESSOR

The coming months will be a tough challenge in this dangerous time for Central European countries. Decisions taken by some capitals will define for many years the critical directions of development and the region's position in the international arena. As I write these words, Central European countries have concluded the elections to the European Parliament and the Three Seas Initiative summit but are still before the Berlin Process conference for the Western Balkans in Poznań. However, more importantly, the post-election European Union is soon to witness the process of electing new members of the European Commission. These decisions, along with the brand-new balance of power in the EU institutions, will determine

whether the Central European region maintains its peripheral position or attains that of a partner for Europe's largest countries while gaining the broader right to independently choosing its path of development.

It is clear that the EU's next multiannual budget will be much more modest than the current one, with the transfer of funds to less affluent regions being smaller due to the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union, or due to pressure exerted by the community's mighty members to allocate part of EU funds to programs they are committed to back, including those aimed at supporting refugees. Under these circumstances, there is a risk that the "cohesion policy friends club", as an informal group formed



BRUSSELS, BELGIUM, JANUARY 21, 2019. EUROPEAN COMMISSION VICE-PRESIDENT FOR ENERGY UNION MAROS SEFCOVIC.

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at the recent budget talks, which brings together net beneficiary states, will no longer demonstrate its solidarity whilst witnessing how the EU budget is divided. If the new European Commission pursues a policy comparable to what is taking place right now, one could expect that attempts will be made to break cooperation between Central European states by offering more favorable conditions to some countries. Moreover, public opinion has in recent years eyed the ability of the EU institutions and the mightiest countries to divide the European Union. Poland has, in particular, had to face an unpleasant experience after most of its smaller Central European peers backed the EU's posted workers directive.

Central European countries have not yet fully mastered how to employ European tools, from which they – as new EU member states – have failed to draw lessons. Older and more experienced EU members are perfectly aware of how to use the European institutions to bring in regulations and solutions to benefit from, even at the cost of limiting the free

competition of other European liberties. Fifteen years of EU membership have shown to Central European states that today's Berlin or Paris have a different understanding of freedom of movement for services, goods and persons while the strategy of threatening defiant countries with withdrawal from the Schengen Area has become increasingly frequent. The protectionism of the western states keeps restricting European freedoms or tends to over interpret provisions of the treaties, making other EU members believe that this is still the very same community Poland joined back in 2004.

Our first hazard is total anarchy in the Central European region, encompassing competition between all countries that try to win the favor of new EU authorities in Brussels and that of Europe's largest capitals. We can already observe the first symptoms speaking for such a scenario in the media. In the article "Europe from Left to Right" on the *Die Zeit* weekly's website, attention was drawn to the post-election map of Europe that classified Poland in the

group of far right-dominated countries, with Hungary, Austria, and Germany belonging to the conservative camp. In turn, Slovakia's English-language weekly was happy to report that the liberal and pro-European *Progresívne Slovensko* (Progressive Slovakia) party claimed victory in the European Parliament election, which was a success compared to other V4 countries


It seems, therefore, that Central European political parties that won the May vote belong to various political camps. This victory will prevent the region from agreeing to long-term deals, but alliances do not only have to rely upon ideological unity.

A hypothetical Central European coalition cannot be solely focused on party unity or a negative agenda aimed at blocking Brussels's most dangerous projects. To have an efficient impact, gain attention and become an attractive partner, countries of the region need to put forward constructive ideas and solutions. One of Central Europe's specialties might be to offer joint support for Europeanization processes in the Western Balkans.

To have an efficient impact, gain attention and become an attractive partner, countries of the region need to put forward constructive ideas and solutions.

Countries of the region should be the ones to defuse a growing powder keg in a bid to bring Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania closer to the European Union. Completing the process will put an end to the very last gray area east of the Iron Curtain, or an area that other countries, including Russia, China and Turkey, can use to achieve their goals and avoid major consequences.

It seems that the decision on integrating other Western Balkan countries is already



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BUCHAREST, ROMANIA, SEPTEMBER 18, 2018. PRIME MINISTER MATEUSZ MORAWIECKI (L) AND PRIME MINISTER OF ROMANIA VASILICA-VIORICA DANCIL (R) DURING A MEETING AS PART OF THE THREE SEAS' INITIATIVE SUMMIT IN BUCHAREST.

sealed since, due to the upcoming Brexit, not all of the UK's seats have yet been distributed to the remaining EU member states. The very declaration from the representatives for the European Union and the European Parliament leaves no doubt that the British seats in the European Parliament will be handed to MEPs from new EU member states in the future. Moreover, leaving vacant posts in the European Parliament for 2019–2024 may indicate that EU institutions are keen to open up an opportunity for the enlargement process to take place within the next five years. This is why it is all the more worthwhile to get involved while making Europeanization of the Western Balkans an element for building both a favorable scenario and agenda for Central Europe in a move to give an impulse to the entire European Union.

In the context of the above challenges, it would be a good idea for the leaders of the Visegrad Group to put forward a joint candidate for the head of the European Commission. At the time, support of Maroš Ševčovič was contemplated. Representative of a small Central European

nation, he rather characterizes a liberal-leftist environment than a conservative one. Nevertheless, at the end of May, the media was swamped with information that neither Hungarians nor Poles had any problems with supporting his candidacy. It is hence a let-down that at the last stage of the negotiations, after the meeting of Prime Ministers of the V4 on June 13, another message emerged that the partners did not agree on a common candidate. And if Ševčovič would have also received the votes of other countries in the region, he could become one of the more serious candidates. It is difficult to say whether the leaders of the Western European countries would be ready to give the steering wheel of the European Union into the hands of the Slovak. The problem with the acceptance of the candidacy of the incumbent Vice-President of the European Commission may be the fact that in the opinion of many politicians from Western countries, Central Europe is not sufficiently objective and ready to embrace the most important functions in the Community.

It seems today that attaining the region's subjectivity is a prerequisite for playing

an active role both in the international arena and in European relations, with the promotion of Central Europe as a term to define the region to symbolically mark its emancipation. Only what is named can fully enjoy its image power. Recognizing the region's right to independence, submit initiatives and promote its local candidates by western partners would corroborate the full integration of Central Europe while putting an end to the split into west and east.

The second requirement essential for viewing Central Europe as a more serious partner in the eyes of both Brussels and other influential European capitals provides for gaining greater multidimensional economic independence. All Central European countries see Germany as their largest economic partner whose macroeconomic indicators have for years determined to a greater or lesser extent the success of those regional economies that were undergoing transition. In many places today, the rapid economic growth of some Central European economies can, however, be only partially owed to their cooperation with Germany. Meanwhile, experts argue that Central Europe is not the only one to rely on Germany, but Berlin could not handle economically without the aid from its eastern partners¹. Notwithstanding that, the region's potential cannot be fully exploited due to a number of factors, including the lack of new and capable traffic routes running from north to south, restricted access to cheap energy resources and their low supply guarantee, as well as a modest share in implementing new technologies. The Three Seas Initiative and a list of 48 projects focusing on three fields – infrastructure, energy and digitalization – and drafted jointly at the Bucharest Summit in 2018 may emerge as an attempt to address these challenges.

This year's edition of the Three Seas Initiative forum in Slovenia served as an occasion to deliver a preliminary report on the state of implementation of individual undertakings². In addition to EU financing, the projects will be subsidized by a recently established The Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund, launched as a new capital instrument. This will enable the entire program to be set in motion more swiftly.

An additional condition is required to make Central Europe relatively independent. Each of its states needs effective leadership that is well aware of all challenges, with Poland, as the region's largest country, designated to tackle a particular task in this respect. Warsaw needs, therefore, to carry out exceptionally skillful foreign policy in order to connect and not to discourage, and to maneuver artfully between small Central European nations and their often-complicated histories. It seems crucial for Polish foreign policy to include the Central European doctrine, similar to the already well-established Eastern policy. Poland's Eastern policy has become a peculiar hallmark on the international arena, with the Eastern Partnership program at the forefront, even if it has not always proved effective. Nevertheless, Central European partners eyed it mainly in terms of an independent proposal alongside Berlin's *Ostpolitik* strategy. It is time to push forward a full-scale Central European policy alongside Germany's *Mitteuropa*. A condition for effective Polish policy in the region will be to show that we take our partners seriously. However, this effort will be profitable, because the empowerment of Central Europe will strengthen each of the countries in the region, but the greatest added value will be enjoyed by the mightiest.

Piotr Bajda ■
May 2019

¹ <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-report/2016-05-16/role-central-europe-german-economy-political-consequences>

² <https://three.si/progress-report>

VISEGRAD FOUR DEFENSE COOPERATION: YEARS OF MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

JURAJ KRUPA

Since the establishment of the Visegrad Four in the early 1990s, most of the leaders and experts expected that, due to similar situations in almost all areas of life in those countries, the cooperation of V4 countries would naturally flourish in all domains, including the areas of security and defense. Since all V4 countries have Warsaw pact armies' heritage and the same desire of Euro-Atlantic integration, their significant projects in the area of defense were expected to become successful. Although the idea of such a defense cooperation is supported by the authorities along with relatively high ambitions emphasized by many common declarations, the expectations and its potential have not been fulfilled. There were some partial successes, however, the existence of which leaves hope for tangible and more ambitious projects in the future.



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HUNGARIAN PRESIDENT JANOS ADER ADDRESSES A CEREMONY MARKING THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ACCESSION OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND THE REST OF THE VISEGRAD FOUR (V4) COUNTRIES INCLUDING HUNGARY, POLAND AND SLOVAKIA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO), IN PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC, MARCH 12.

Particular national interests and ongoing changes in the political process of Central European countries influence V4 defense cooperation. Certain countries in Central Europe seem to be fading away from democracy and liberalism for various reasons, which results in increased vulnerability for external influences and threats. This change in political discourse has an impact on their ability to share common values and principles and gives more ground to disintegration tendencies and particular ambitions. Geopolitical initiatives like the Three Seas Initiative might have a negative impact on security and stability in the region when used

as a foreign policy tool in disputes with other EU members. This is especially true in Central Europe, a region that has historically suffered greatly following changes in the balance of power or geopolitical games.

Pro-Americanism was the unquestioned foreign policy principle in Central Europe until 2014. This is not the case anymore. It is not that the region has become openly *anti-American* but rather its elites

and the public have lost interest in the United States, just as interest in Central and Eastern Europe has disappeared in Washington. This migration away from Central Europe is not new, however, and has been gradually ongoing as a result of growing American interests in Asia. Although this is not the case for Poland, it is already a fact for other Central European countries.

All V4 countries officially declare to be reliable allies with no alternative to NATO membership, but their attitudes towards NATO policies and fulfilling its goals are starting to differ. Hungary's perception of threat focuses on migration and this country keeps close relations with Russia. The political landscape in the Czech Republic and Slovakia are shaped by populism and they would like to play a role of a mediator between Russia and the West. Poland, on the other hand, sees Russia as the main threat.

Political differences, along with particular national interests, are seen in the V4 defense cooperation. This cooperation is formally presented as successful; however, no major project has so far been accomplished. Such projects as the EU BG V4 cooperation or JLSG would not be achieved without the European Union.

So far, the V4 defense cooperation has caused many disappointments and missed opportunities. To date, joint acquisition of systems that would be used by multiple V4 countries has not yet occurred. Many activities and projects, which have been started, have failed to fulfill expectations. Some were stopped while others are still running only on paper, without any tangible effects. The list of unfinished projects is long. Most of them were in the area of common acquisitions, modernization, and R&D. A CEPI policy paper lists a number of projects announced in public by political leaders

that did not get anywhere¹:

Mobile 3D radars is a project stemming from 2013, which had the aim to develop modern radars that would provide air protection and surveillance capability for V4 countries. A memorandum of understanding was signed in 2014 by defense industry companies interested in participating in the project. At the time, all V4 countries were planning to acquire new radars, and this project seemed to have not only political support but also common interest. After a promising start of negotiations, the project was stopped due to different national interests and timelines in acquiring new radars. The final result was that all countries were blaming each other for favoring national interests over the success of the project.

R&D and acquisition of Rosomak APCs started in 2015 with the support of both prime ministers of Poland and Slovakia. The APC is being produced under the license of a Finnish company Patria in Poland. The prototype has even been presented during the IDET Expo in the Czech Republic in 2015 under the brand Rosomak/Scipio. Due to budgetary issues of the Slovak Defense Ministry, the Slovak side offered to modernize self-propelled Howitzers Dana, Tanks, and Canons to the Polish armed forces. After months of complicated negotiations between both sides, the project has been dropped with both sides blaming each other for the lack of flexibility in finding a suitable compromise. The Slovak side, with its insufficient resources, was not able to provide enough financial coverage, while the Polish side was constantly coming up with new requirements (engines for MiG-29, etc.), which could not be fulfilled by Slovakia.

¹ DAV4 po piatich rokoch: úspech alebo nevyužitá príležitosť, 2015, Jaroslav Nad, Milan Šuplata, Marian Majer.

Modernization of helicopters has been identified as a need by all V4 countries already in the 1990s. Many new ideas and projects have been introduced since then – multinational aviation training center, for example – but without success. In the meantime, the countries launched their own programs for acquiring new helicopters. Each country decided to purchase different types of helicopters, which excluded future cooperation in this area. Such situations are symptomatic for many V4 modernization projects.

These examples show a problem in overcoming national interests in common acquisition projects that, if successful, would be favorable for all V4 members. Missed opportunities were not only in the area of modernization and acquisition projects but also in most other attempts in pursuing defense cooperation.

Even though there was progress made in improving common exercises, to date, no improvement in common education has been achieved. Taking into consideration that there is almost no language barrier between Slovakia and the Czech Republic and both countries used to have a unified education system, it is surprising that not a single project in this area has been finalized. Real cooperation between V4 military academies is non-existent despite the signed in 2013 V4 MILEP agreement. As the example of the Baltic countries shows, with political will, and a proper evaluation of the relevance of several education institutions, it is possible to improve education and eliminate duplications – which leads to the cost-saving on infrastructure and staff and bring closer officers from all V4 countries. However, the vision of a V4 academy is currently unreal².

The cyberinfrastructure of the V4 countries is closely interconnected, and its protection requires closer cooperation.

Despite the progress in **cyberdefense** capabilities and cooperation among Allies and within NATO itself, V4 has not been able to improve cooperation in this area. The cyberinfrastructure of the V4 countries is closely interconnected, and its protection requires closer cooperation. Cooperation in cyberdefense, which includes the exchange of industry information as well as common training and assistance, is absent. This should logically lead to at least some discussions on developing V4 cooperation.

Despite these missed opportunities and unsuccessful projects, substantial cooperation in defense area can be achieved. Some initiatives have been partially implemented and have the potential to contribute to improving defense cooperation in the long-term perspective.

One possible way to improve cooperation is to establish a V4 institutional framework that would also contribute to better branding and elevate the status of the region. With the establishment of the so-called Senior Body in 2014, the first precondition for such a framework has been established. Its objective is to coordinate various working groups, joint positions, and projects. This helped to better coordinate the positions of V4 countries within NATO and the EU.

² <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2012/joint-communicue-of-the-2012-Joint-Communiqué-of-the-Ministers-of-Defense-of-the-Visegrad-Group>

Despite its positive role, the Senior Body is largely considered to engage in duplicate work, competing with V4 political director meetings.

One of the biggest flagships of V4 cooperation is the establishment of V4 EU BG “Battlegroup” (operational in 2016). The V4 decided to keep the Battlegroup as a permanent unit after its operationalization as it was deemed to be mutually beneficial. The V4 also agreed to prepare this permanent operationalization in the second half of 2019. The V4 EU BG is one of the main drivers for improving interoperability and joint defense development of the four central European countries and is also highly valued by the EU and NATO. With the accession of Croatia to the second V4 EU BG in 2019 and its preparedness for potential participation of other allies and partner countries in the region, the V4 members already started discussions about the next operationalization of the Battlegroup expected in 2023³.

An important precondition for continuous cooperation is the establishment of V4 Joint Logistic Support Group Headquarters (JLSG HQ) that, in the context of lessons learned from the past, could be considered a milestone. The Memorandum of Understanding signed in Budapest in 2018, expects the group to achieve low operational readiness in 2020 and full operational readiness in 2023. If the JLSG HQ will be concluded as planned, it will provide important support to joint military exercises, logistics for the V4 Battlegroup and might also, in some cases, coordinate defense procurement⁴.

The development of common protection of the V4 airspace through Cross-Border operations could be another successful project as well. Negotiations have been taking place for years without any substantial progress among the V4 countries. Slovakia and the Czech Republic finalized a Cross-Border agreement in 2018 which could be used as a blueprint for further negotiations with other V4 countries. However, this project was undermined by Slovakia after the government released statements against air policing cooperating with the Czech Republic and Poland. Slovakia also made other arguments against the presence of NATO troops in Slovakia. On the other side, Poland and Hungary are also providing legal barriers that are unnecessarily prolonging the finalization of the agreement.

Major progress has been achieved in the area of joint V4 exercises that are also supported by NATO and the US through the European Deterrence Initiative and are conducted on qualitatively higher level thanks to the attitudes of all of the Armed Forces General Staffs. It adopted the decision to conduct one major exercise and some specialized annually. Regular participation of US troops and other allies are providing higher added value to the quality of the exercises⁵.

With the change in the security environment in and around Europe stemming from the assertive behavior and hybrid warfare by Russia, coupled with the issues of migration, terrorism and failed states, the V4 countries should put more effort towards closer

³ <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2014/budapest-declaration-of-2014>, Budapest Declaration of the Visegrad Group Heads of Government on the New Opening in V4 Defense Cooperation

⁴ <http://www.mocr.army.cz/informacni-servis/zpravodajstvi/seniorni-skupina-v4-jednala-v->

[budapesti-o-bezpecnostni-a-obranne-politice-eu-141535/](http://www.budapesti-o-bezpecnostni-a-obranne-politice-eu-141535/), 2018, Seniórní skupina V4 jednala v Budapešti o bezpečnostní a obranné politice EU

⁵ <https://www.vlada.gov.sk//martin-glvac-posilnujeme-regionálnu-obrannu-spolupracu-v4-cvici-spolocne/?pg=2>, 2016, Martin Glvác: Posilňujeme regionálnu obrannú spoluprácu: V4 cvičí spoločne.

cooperation in the area of security and defense. Unfortunately, the types of threats to each central European country are beginning to differ, what is also having an impact on specific projects that could help improve defense cooperation. Thanks to NATO and the EU, the V4 countries are participating in projects that are helping overcome these differences, but so far none of the V4 countries was able to put forward a project that would bring the V4 countries closer together in areas of interoperability, concrete defense planning and acquisitions. Therefore, more effort should be put forward in finding common ground towards addressing new threats jointly with our allies in NATO and the EU.

To be more successful in defense cooperation, some basic criteria must be met.

Similar political culture and goals: All V4 countries should try to make an attempt to undertake decisions that would confirm our allegiance to the values of NATO and the EU. This would again create common ground for real cooperation and projects based on fundamental criteria. This will also provide preconditions for the deployment of combined forces, pooling and sharing of resources while offering cost savings in the area of interconnected defense planning.

Trust and reliability: Partners should build trust to ensure projects will be completed and finalized in a timely manner so that the armed forces of a single partner will not be adversely affected by the withdrawal by the other partners⁶.

Interoperability: Despite having NATO membership for 20 years (15 years for Slovakia), most V4 countries failed to invest in expanding and modernizing their armed forces. The armed forces in each V4 country are in a different stage of modernization and use different equipment, making joint operations difficult.

Ability to coordinate defense policy and planning: All V4 countries are part of the NATO defense planning process, and three out of four also have NATO Force Integration Units in their countries. Despite meeting all preconditions for closer defense planning cooperation, no progress has been achieved so far and no signs of positive development can be seen on the horizon⁷.

Cooperation among V4 countries is of vital importance despite often different views on fundamental principles and national interests. The V4 group is geographically, politically and economically determined to cooperate, the fact of which is relevant for defense cooperation. The cooperation should focus more on practical projects, which do not necessarily have to be big. The aim should be to focus more on assistance, effective cooperation, and smaller projects with added value. Big projects could “sell the brand,” but smaller projects might be more beneficial, overall.

Juraj Krupa ■
May 2019

⁶ <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/156487/Towards%20a%20Deeper%20Visegrad%20Defense%20Partnership.pdf>, 2012, DAV4 Full report, Towards a deeper Visegrad defense partnership, Jozef Bátora, Gareth Chapell, Attila Demkó, Amb. István Gzarmati, Jan

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⁷ <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/about/cooperation/defence>, 2013, For a More Effective and Stronger Common Security and Defense Policy.

AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES

DANIEL POGORZELSKI

Daniel Pogorzelski is a writer and editor for the blog 'Forgotten Chicago' and Vice President of the Northwest Chicago Historical Society. As co-author of four history books from the Images of America series on the Chicago neighborhoods of Portage Park, Bridgeport, Logan Square as well as Avondale and Chicago's Polish Village. A native resident of Chicago's Northwest Side, Daniel has been civically involved in a number of community initiatives improving overlooked parts of Chicago, such as helping to organize and paint outdoor murals, serving on the Junior Board of the Polish American Association, as well as volunteering in the Polish Triangle Coalition.

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GRZEGORZ KUCZYŃSKI

Grzegorz Kuczyński is a graduate of history at the University of Białystok and the University of Warsaw, specializing in Eastern European Studies. Author of books 'How Do the Russians Murder' and 'Throne in Blood: Secrets of the Kremlin's Policy'. Journalist and expert specializing in the eastern area, Russia, and the former USSR.

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MIKOŁAJ WILD

Mikołaj Wild graduated from the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw; the School of German Law at the University of Warsaw and the School of American Law at the University of Warsaw and University of Florida. Between 2015 and 2017, he served as the Deputy Minister of the Treasury. From April 1, 2017 until May 8, 2017, as the Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister. Then, from May 9, 2017 to February 1, 2018, he served as the Secretary of State in the Chancellery of the Prime

Minister. Thereafter, also since May 9, 2017, Mikołaj Wild is serving as the Government Plenipotentiary for the Central Communication Port of the Republic of Poland.

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MIROŚLAW LENART

Mirosław Lenart is a director of the Interdepartmental Research Institute of History and Culture of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; the Head of the Old Epochs Literature Department at Opole University; Director of the State Archives in Opole; and Rettore of Accademia dei Rampanti in Padua, Italy. He is a graduate in Polish studies in Opole and theology at John Paul II Catholic University in Lublin (KUL). Prof. Mirosław Lenart has cooperated with numerous Italian universities since 2001. He taught history of Polish culture at Padua University during the years 2006–2010.

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ROBERT RAJCZYK

Robert Rajczyk, Ph.D. concentrates in his research on the political systems of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as propaganda and mass communication in the world.

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MATEUSZ KUBIAK

Mateusz Kubiak is a graduate of Eastern Studies and International Relations at the University of Warsaw. He works as an energy sector analyst in the consulting company Esperis. He runs a blog 'Kaukaz Kaukaz', dedicated to events from the region.

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JOANNA ŻELAZKO

Joanna Żelazko, PhD in Historical Sciences, employee of the Institute of National Remembrance Branch in Łódź. She specializes in the history of Poland in the years from 1945 to 1956, with particular

emphasis on the military judiciary, the activities of the independence conspiracy and the apparatus of repression in Łódź, as well as the subject of the deception and unraveling of the Katyń Massacre.

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KRZYSZTOF RAK

Krzysztof Rak is a historian of diplomacy and philosophy, translator, publicist, and expert in the field of international relations, and holds a Ph.D. in History (Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw). He currently works as a Managing Director of the Polish-German Cooperation Foundation. From the second half of the 1990s, he has undertaken journalistic activity, mainly in *Życie, Wprost, Rzeczpospolita* and *Nowa Konfederacja*. Moreover, he has also published, inter alia, in *Gazeta Wyborcza*, *Gazeta Polska*, *Nasz Dziennik*, *W sieci*, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Die Welt*, *Handelsblatt*, and *The Sarmatian Review*.

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TOMASZ GRZEGORZ GROSSE

Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse is a sociologist, political scientist, and historian. He is a professor at the University of Warsaw and Head of the Department of European Union Policies at the Institute of European Studies. He specializes in the analysis of economic policies in the EU and the member states, and is an expert in public management, geo-economics, Europeanisation, EU theoretical thoughts.

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WITOLD REPETOWICZ

Witold Repetowicz – a journalist, lawyer, analyst specializing in the Middle East. Author of two books: “My name is

Kurdistan” (2016) and “Allah Akbar, War and Peace in Iraq” (2019).

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JAN ROKITA

Jan Rokita is a lawyer, former Member of Parliament, Minister who moved away from politics, currently a publicist and lecturer.

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PIOTR BAJDA

Piotr Bajda holds a doctoral degree in Political Science. He is a lecturer at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Poland since 2007. He worked as a researcher at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences (2006–2013). Between 2000–2004, he was Deputy Director of the Polish Institute in Bratislava; from 2005 to 2009 he worked at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) and was a representative of the International Visegrad Fund (Trustee for Poland) between 2013–2016.

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JURAJ KRÚPA

Juraj Krúpa is Security and Defense program director at the Slovak Security Policy Institute. He worked at the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic where he gained experience with defense policy, crisis management as well as with bilateral and multilateral relations. In years 2013 to 2016, he worked at the Permanent Delegation of the Slovak Republic to NATO. He holds PhD in International Relations, which he obtained at Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica. He graduated in the Advanced Terrorism Studies program at George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen in Germany as well as in Program on Security at the Asian-Pacific at the PLA National Defense University in Beijing.

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The Warsaw Institute Review Sp. z o.o.
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
Contact to Event Coordinator:

Alexander Wielgos
Alexander.wielgos@warsawinstitute.review
Łukasz Biernacki
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Twenty-Fourth Floor Richmond

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