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WARSAW, POLAND, NOVEMBER 8, 2018. POLISH PRIME MINISTER MATEUSZ MORAWIECKI (R) AND US SECRETARY OF ENERGY RICK PERRY (L) DURING A MEETING IN WARSAW.

ON THE SAME DAY, A LONG-TERM CONTRACT FOR THE PURCHASE OF LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS (LNG) WAS SIGNED BETWEEN THE STATE-OWNED POLISH OIL AND GAS COMPANY (PGNIG SA) AND THE AMERICAN CHENIERE MARKETING INTERNATIONAL LLP. THIS CONTRACT SPANS A LENGTH OF 24 YEARS AND COVERS AROUND 40 BILLION CUBIC METERS OF GAS. THIS IS YET ANOTHER STEP FOR POLAND TO DIVERSIFY GAS SUPPLIES AND DEEPEN COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD OF ENERGY SECURITY.

Dear Readers,



The collapse of communism and the restoration of the states previously locked behind the Iron Curtain formed a new geopolitical constellation in Central Europe. One successful attempt to take advantage of the situation in the region was the launch of a new political initiative, which was expressed through an act of will to cooperate by the leaders of three countries: Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

In the framework of the Visegrad Group, these states, which are naturally related by a parallel historical background, cultural commonality, and geographic location, have further been consolidated by shared objectives for the future, the most noteworthy of which is the convergence of interests in foreign policy, and the emerging cooperation in terms of economy, transport, ecology, and science.

Although the most vital tasks, including the entry of the V4 countries into the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance, and then into the European Union, have been accomplished, effective teamwork has made it possible to inaugurate a sense of local community alongside each state's own coherent cultural and social identities. The past and future of this partnership are the topics raised in our Visegrad Report, in which you will find papers by the Head of Energy and State Treasury Commission of the Polish Parliament, **Maciej Małecki**, **Piotr Bajda**, **Joanna Antczak**, and **Aleksandra Romanowska**.

Another topic proposed to our readers is how Central European countries function in the European Union. In this regard, I especially recommend the article by our own Warsaw Institute

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expert, **Professor Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse**, in which he analyzes the functioning of EU institutions, and, more generally, European integration in aspects of integration “through law” and the problem of European constitutionalism (majority voting). As the author remarks, “these instruments are considered problematic in light of democratic standards”.

I also recommend two historical articles. The first is by **Karol Wolek**, entitled “The War after the War”, which describes the particular circumstances in which Poland found itself as a result of Soviet aggression, despite winning the war with Germany. Another subject described in this issue is the work of the outstanding Polish artist Józef Brandt presented by **Mariusz Klarecki** in his paper, which is illustrated with rich iconography.

I wish you all an enjoyable read,

ANNA KAROLINA PIEKARSKA
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V4: “IT’S GOOD TO BE AMONG FRIENDS”

MACIEJ MAŁECKI

The Visegrad Group is proof that it is possible to create friendly ties in international politics. These ties connect Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary – the Visegrád Four (V4). The strong relationships are built on newer and older common history, a shared geographical neighborhood, vivid contacts – both social and sometimes even familial, economic cooperation – but above all, an awareness of our common interests.

“Community in interests” does not mean that we are the same. Getting rid of differences is not what it is all about. The point is that the things in common between these countries with regional roots are more significant than

their disparities. It is distinguished by a far-reaching identity resulting from many aspects and confirmed again and again in the context of new challenges. This has been proven against the backdrop of (not necessarily) benevolent pressure of various international players.



CHAIRMAN OF THE PARLIAMENTARY
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TREASURY AND MEMBER OF THE POLISH
PARLIAMENT MACIEJ MAŁECKI.

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For Poland, the V4 is an invariably important framework for conducting regional policy and realizing the interests of the Central European region on the more general, global arena. The creation of the group and the development of cooperation within its framework is regarded in Poland as one of the greatest political successes after 1989, in addition to the accession to NATO and the EU. The fact that the group has maintained and intensified its cooperation by passing

The point is that the things in common between these countries with regional roots are more significant than their disparities.

The Visegrad cooperation is mainly focused on political aspects – based on the cooperation of state, government, and administrative authorities.

through different vicissitudes confirms that it also has significant political and practical value for Poland's partners. The current revitalization of this cooperation is particularly welcome.

The Visegrad cooperation is developed through several areas and formulas. The most visible results can be found in the V4 cooperation at the EU level. Common positions of the Visegrad countries on crucial elements of the EU political agenda – namely the future of the EU, the Multiannual Financial Framework, and the cohesion policy to the issue of artificial intelligence – are carefully noted, strengthen the position of V4 countries and facilitate the defense of common interests. Nonetheless, the countries in the Group still face various further challenges.

V4 should become a permanent, essential element of the European architecture and a cornerstone for the broader construction of a common representation of all interests of the Central European region as a result of its historical past, has generally been an object and not an actor in international politics.

The Visegrad cooperation is mainly focused on political aspects – based on the cooperation of state, government,

and administrative authorities. However, the group has weaker social, cultural and security dimensions, the construction of which is both a real challenge for V4 countries and simultaneously a pressing need.

The Visegrad Group should find common areas of cooperation primarily in the field of strategic security. The current geopolitical order is changing and the countries of the region, when grouped into one organization and speaking with one voice, would have a more significant influence on the international arena.

The migration crisis is one aspect of security that requires the close cooperation of V4 countries. The members of the group were able to build common ground to talk about it and dealing with it. The V4 countries should continuously demand the tightening of the EU's external borders and speak with one voice in the EU against the forced relocation and admission mechanism. However, they must consistently work together to raise awareness and talk openly about the general European opinion and the reasons thereof.

One aspect of security where they should cooperate more closely is in the sphere of energy security, which is crucial for all V4 countries.

Gaseous fuel is the most substantial imported energy raw material in Hungary, Slovakia and Poland. Each country has different energy consumption needs in the energy mix, but the problems they face are similar. Dependence on supplies from the east, the lack of an integrated energy market, infrastructural deficiencies between countries and, finally, the threat of an interruption in the supply of energy

resources have a negative impact on the security of the entire region.

This is the reason why energy policy cooperation and infrastructure development projects should be a priority for V4 countries and developed at a regional level. They should jointly respond to the initiative to build the Nord Stream II gas pipeline, which will not only affect the energy security of the countries of central and Eastern Europe, the budgets of individual states, by monopolizing and thus increasing gas prices in Europe.

The answer to this threat may be the promotion of such projects as gas interconnectors at the borders of Visegrad countries (e.g., the Poland-Czech Republic interconnector), the north-south corridor, i.e., the extensive development of LNG, or the Baltic Pipeline project. Diversification of raw material supplies can make a real contribution to enhancing the energy security of all the V4. However, the critical dimension of security here is to increase military capabilities and cooperation in the armed forces of all four Visegrad countries. They should discuss joint military exercises, support for combat capabilities and the exchange of defense experience.

It is also necessary to develop this arrangement for other countries, as in the case of the V4 political format, e.g., an extension of military exercises and technical cooperation to the Baltic States. Closer historical experience, a similar perception of threats and comparable operational requirements of the armed forces of the V4 countries provide a reasonable basis for cooperation on arms and possibly the joint purchases of equipment.

Poland encourages its V4 partners to take a closer look at the initiative of the Regional Security Assistance Programme

Recently, new dynamics have been observed in V4 cooperation.

(ReSAP 2022), which aims to promote the creation of technological sovereignty of the region through closer cooperation between defense industries.

The European Defence Fund (EDF) also opens up new opportunities for cooperation between defense industries in the V4 group. The countries of the Group should be ready to discuss joint V4 projects that could apply for EU funding. Recently, new dynamics have been observed in V4 cooperation. Visegrad countries have great potential for cooperation, which can have an impact on improving security in the region – and in the EU as a whole. Today it is evident that the V4 countries are in solidarity with each other in all domains. The main example of this is the common opposition to the construction of Nord Stream II, or the attempt to shape a single attitude towards the migration crisis. It is, therefore, necessary to overcome the obstacles together, open the door to closer cooperation and eliminate the risks associated with different perceptions of threats which constitute an impediment to real cooperation. The Visegrad Group can and should become an example of building good relations in international politics¹.

Maciej Małecki ■
September 10, 2018

¹ The text was written on the basis of the speech by Maciej Małecki, delivered on September 10, 2018 in Warsaw during the conference “The Visegrad Group Contribution to European Security – Common Challenges and Goals” organized by the Warsaw Institute.

THE VISEGRAD GROUP IN THE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPE


PIOTR BAJDA, PhD

While attempting to understand the role of the Visegrad Four (V4) in the security policy of Central Europe or, more broadly – the North Atlantic Treaty, it should not be forgotten that the Visegrad Group is strictly a political project, rather than a defensive project.

This was the case when the project originated, and this is how it is now. However, this does not mean that cooperation within the Visegrad format has no impact on the security policy in the region. In fact, it is quite the opposite: the Visegrad Group is a kind of political core of Central Europe, and the agenda of meetings in the framework of the annual V4 presidency of particular states has a visible impact on the discussions about the security policy

in Europe, though perhaps not in the hard, defensive dimension, but undoubtedly in what we call *soft power*.

This dimension of soft security was at the origin of the Visegrad Declaration signed in February 1991. Today it is hard to imagine Central Europe without the Visegrad Group, but this was not so when the process of political transformation began in our region. The main initiator and author of the project's founding documents was Václav Havel, the president



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of Czechoslovakia during that time, who – as befits an author of theatre plays – knew how to assign new political roles to particular states in the region. But his first concept, announced in Bratislava in April 1990 at a meeting with representatives of new Hungarian and Polish political elites, was the division of the region into the North and the South. According to Havel's concept, the real Central Europe was supposed to include the states of the Danube region, in the Adriatic Basin, and the task of Warsaw in this project was to organise an alliance around the Baltic Sea, together with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia who were at that time fighting for their independence¹. The scenario drawn

¹ President Havel wanted Czechoslovakia to be a kind of keystone between the two subregions – that is how he wanted to make Prague the indispensable element of cooperation for each of the two projects. Text of the speech: Projev prezidenta ČSFR Václava Havla na setkání představitelů Polska, Československa a Maďarska,

STRBSKE PLESO, SLOVAKIA, OCTOBER 11, 2018. POLISH PRESIDENT ANDRZEJ DUDA (L), HUNGARIAN PRESIDENT JÁNOS ÁDER (2L), SLOVAK PRESIDENT ANDREJ KISKA (2R), AND CZECH PRESIDENT MILOŠ ZEMAN (R) DURING THE OFFICIAL WELCOME CEREMONY IN FRONT OF GRAND HOTEL KEMPINSKI, WHERE A TWO-DAY SUMMIT OF V4 PRESIDENTS WAS HELD.

Dimension of soft security was at the origin of the Visegrad Declaration signed in February 1991.

up by the Czechoslovakian president was not a sign of dislike towards Poland; after all, Havel had plenty of friends there, which he mentioned in February 1990, during a speech in the Polish parliament – but rather a result of the assessment of the international situation. In the mid-

Bratislava 9 dubna 1990, http://vaclavhavel.cz/showtrans.php?cat=projevy&val=318_projevy.html&typ=HTML (accessed on: September 8, 2018).

The most significant result of the rising of the Visegrad Group, however, was the creation of an area of relative security and the setting up of a regional structure which was a credible partner for Western capitals.

1990s it was not certain how the process of dismantling the Eastern Bloc would go, what would be the result of the process of the reunification of Germany (including the issue regarding the country's exact boundaries), and whether the Red Army would peacefully leave East Germany and Poland. In this situation, it was safer for Havel to propose an alliance of small Central European states, leaning on Austria and based on the alliance with Italy. It was supposed to protect Prague from a geopolitical storm. The president of Czechoslovakia was therefore concerned about the security of his own state when he was presenting his ideas in Bratislava.

A year later, at a meeting in the Castle of Visegrad, things were no different. Havel was aware of the progressing decomposition of the USRR, growing ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia, and, what is more – of the lack of interest of Vienna to play a more significant role in stabilizing the area of the old Habsburg monarchy. In this situation Poland, which had just signed a border treaty with Germany, became a more attractive partner. Otherwise the only alliance left for Prague would be Hungary, dreaming about building autonomy for Hungarians living

in neighbouring countries, including those in south Slovakia. This is why in the following stage Havel proposed the cooperation of three Central European states, which resulted in signing the Visegrad Declaration in February 1991. The above-mentioned document should be closely examined because of two reasons. Firstly, due to the title, which emphasizes the goal of this initiative: a common goal towards achieving European integration². The second significant detail was a specific character of the new structure of this form of regional cooperation. From the very beginning, Havel assumed it would not be a new international organization of any kind, but rather a loose form of political cooperation between the three states. This is how he wanted to avoid the danger of the new structure being dominated by the biggest state, Poland, and of Warsaw forcing its agenda on it. The rule of consensus that was accepted resulted in smaller countries feeling safe and equal.

The most significant result of the rising of the Visegrad Group, however, was the creation of an area of relative security and the establishment of a regional structure which was a credible partner for Western capitals. Rather than follow the Yugoslavian scenario of ethnic conflicts and generate further tensions, the three Central European states declared their intention to cooperate. Looking at historical animosities, one may have been surprised by this. Common experiences and a unity of principal objectives, emphasized during the Visegrad summit, were a smart use of a communication code which was clear to Western politicians. This is how the Visegrad Group filled the

² Exact title: Declaration on Cooperation between the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Hungary in Striving for European Integration, <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/visegrad-declarations/visegrad-declaration-110412> (accessed on: September 8, 2018).

geopolitical void after the fall of the Berlin Wall, proving to European institutions and the most powerful European capitals that there is a regional political center behind the eastern border of Germany which is ready to accept the Western model of action. Therefore, the motto of returning to Europe was not included in the title of the Visegrad Declaration on purpose. And as for the European institutions and western capitals, the establishment of V4 was a relief; instead of a new problem there was a chance for dialogue between partners and stabilization in a strategic region.

There was another unexpected result from establishing the Visegrad Group in 1991. Thanks to the initiative of Havel, the term “Central Europe” made its way back into the political science vernacular. A new, local and original initiative was placed on the old Cold War division between the East and the West. The creation of an independent political center was another result of the formation of the V4. This was rightly predicted by Karl Schlögel, professor at the Viadrina European University who noted that Germany will be “ousted” from Central Europe and that decisions will be taken independently in Warsaw, Prague or Budapest. The day before the V4 entered the EU he wrote: “Central Europe is not a utopia, not an idea or fiction, but a fact which can be discovered by any interested person – it is a historical and very cohesive land”³. I dare say that the Visegrad Group strongly contributed to this statement and to a certain political independence of Central Europe.

This sense of independence of the V4 had to be dealt with during quite turbulent times. Apart from the final act of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in Belarus (December 1991), Czechoslovakia was also

In 1998 The Visegrad Group turned out to be an exceptionally useful and effective tool.

divided (January 1993). For many Western observers, who looked up to Havel, this came as a big surprise. Only few had actually taken into consideration Slovak aspirations and fears, which were best illustrated by Ján Čarnogurský – former dissident and prime minister of the Slovak republican government at that time – in an interview for PAP (Polish Press Agency) in 1991 about the Slovak people’s desires to have their own star on the European flag⁴. Nevertheless, it was not the dissolution of Czechoslovakia which represented the most important test in the early years of the V4. A more severe crisis happened between 1993 and 1998, when the leaders of the newly created independent Slovakia and Czech Republic, in order to emphasize their underlying differences, rejected the Central European identity they had previously declared. Vaclav Klaus, the prime minister of the Czech Republic, declared that the Czech people are a bastion of Western civilization in the Central European desert⁵, while one of the closest advisers of Vladimír Mečiar, the head of the Slovak government, declared that the Slovak people are the only bridge between the East and the West⁶.

However, already in 1998 The Visegrad Group turned out to be an exceptionally

⁴ Czechoslovakia: interview with the PM of Slovakia, „Przegląd Międzynarodowy – Dodatek Tygodniowy PAP” [International Review – PAP Weekly Supplement] No. 1189, from July 13, 1991.

⁵ After: B. Doležal, *Niebezpieczne zaszłości* [Dangerous animosities], „Gazeta Wyborcza”, July 27, 2000, p. 12.

⁶ R. Chmel, *Poslední rusofili střední Evropy*, „OS – Občianska spoločnosť”, No. 2/2007, p. 22.

³ K. Schlögel, *Środek leży na wschodzie. Europa w studium przejściowym* [The centre is in the East. Europe in a temporary stadium]. Warsaw 2005, p. 73.



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HUNGARY, VISEGRAD, FEBRUARY 15, 1991. A SUMMIT IN VISEGRAD, TRILATERAL TALKS: CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S DELEGATION (L), POLAND'S DELEGATION (C), HUNGARY'S DELEGATION (R).

useful and effective tool. As a result of Slovakia becoming internationally isolated during the rule of Mečiar, Bratislava was rejected from the group of the first candidates invited to join the European Union and NATO. There was, therefore, a threat that a black hole would appear in Central Europe – a state which would be a grey area of security, and, in addition, separating Hungary, about to join the North Atlantic Treaty, from other members. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that the cabinet of Mečiar was given a particularly warm welcome in Moscow, where ideas of some politicians from the government coalition that Bratislava should declare neutrality were much anticipated⁷. There is no space for a more profound analysis on this particular matter, but it is clear that for the Russians, Slovakia was the last chance

to halt the process of NATO enlargement or to marginalize the Central European coalition – the Visegrad Group.

However, the V4 turned out to be an instrument worth maintaining, a form of cooperation which had the power of mobilization in breakthrough situations. The first depiction of this phenomenon was perhaps the diplomatic support given to Slovakia on the international scene. When the government of Mačiar was ousted from power, it was under the aegis of the Visegrad Group that Bratislava was given the perspective of membership negotiations with the EU and NATO. Thanks to the diplomatic support of the Central European states and to the resumption of the Visegrad cooperation, Slovakia, until recently an isolated state, entered the European Union together with other Visegrad states, as well as NATO – with a slight delay, in the second wave of enlargement in 2004.

This lesson of Visegrad solidarity in the face of Slovakia's struggles, as well as the adopted mechanisms of institutionalization of the Visegrad

⁷ More about the Russian support for the Mečiar government in: P. Bajda, *Elity polityczne na Słowacji*. [Political elites in Slovakia] *Kręta droga do nowoczesnego państwa* [Winding road to a modern state], Warsaw 2010, pp. 108–115.

cooperation (annually rotating presidency, creating the V4+ format and establishing the International Visegrad Fund⁸) raised the overall level of attractiveness of the Visegrad Group. Therefore, it should not have come as a surprise when new candidates started applying for V4 membership. This was the moment when the Visegrad states' leaders took a decision which may have been difficult to understand at first. The goal of each organization is to strengthen its position, and its attractiveness is defined by the number of applicants for membership. However, with Lithuania, Slovenia and Romania applying for membership, the Visegrad Group decided not to expand and proposed the V4+ format to all of the parties interested in cooperation. There were two principal reasons for this decision. First and foremost, this self-limitation was due to security reasons. The V4 feared that accepting new members could create an impression that the intention of Warsaw or Prague is to build an alternative political centre or an alternative defensive alliance, which could be used by others. The ultimate aim of the V4 states was always to be stronger within the European Union and NATO, and not outside these structures. The second reason for the decision was tactical; it was in the best interests of the small Visegrad states to maintain the exclusive status of being a founding member. In other words, if the V4 accepted Romania or Lithuania, the presence of the founding members

With Lithuania, Slovenia and Romania applying for membership, the Visegrad Group decided not to expand and proposed the V4+ format to all of the parties interested in cooperation.

would become blurred, and their position – weakened. Among the V4 states, Slovakia – the smallest state – cared most about this exclusive membership status. This was largely due to the benefits this provided to the country's image and the opportunity for it to represent the Visegrad Group in the European Monetary Union, as it was the only V4 state to have adopted the euro when it did in 2009⁹.

The contemporary role of the V4 in the security architecture of Europe can still be discussed, as the Visegrad Group was not dissolved the moment the Central European states entered the European Union. In theory, the task of the V4 included in the Visegrad Declaration was in greater cooperation towards European integration. This aim was accomplished in 2004. There could be no objections when the leaders of the Visegrad states announced the success of the project on May 1, 2004. Nevertheless, a couple of days after the greatest enlargement

⁸ In 2000, the V4 defined the mechanism of presidency from July to June of the following year, in the following order: Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic. Also, the V4+ format gives a lot of freedom to invite third states to meetings in the Visegrad format; there are annual V4+Western Balkans meetings, and V4+Japan, V4+Germany and France summits were also organized in this format. The International Visegrad Fund is the only institution which joins all the four states under a formal agreement, in the framework of which a sort of foundation was established, to sponsor projects allowing for connecting and cooperation in various areas and formulas (NGOs, local government, schools and universities).

⁹ More about the V4 role in the strategy of Bratislava in: P. Bajda, *Małe państwo europejskie na arenie międzynarodowej. Polityka zagraniczna Republiki Słowackiej w latach 1993–2016* [Small European country on the international scene. Foreign policy of the Slovak Republic in 1993–2016], Cracow-Warsaw 2018, pp. 251–260.

The Kroměříž Declaration includes a statement that the unique experience of the V4 should be used to continue the process of EU enlargement with other Eastern and Southern European states.

of the EU, the leaders of the V4 met in the lovely Czech town of Kroměříž and decided to continue regional cooperation in the Visegrad format. In the announcement published after the meeting, they emphasized their satisfaction with achieving the main aim, but that they had also decided that the Visegrad cooperation ought to be continued for the sake of strengthening Central European identity. The Kroměříž Declaration includes a statement that the unique experience of the V4 should be used to continue the process of EU enlargement with other Eastern and Southern European states¹⁰. It was the eastern and the southern neighbourhood that made up one of the principal areas in which the V4 states wanted to work and contribute their added value to the entire European community. And indeed, from that moment on, meetings of the leaders of the V4 states with the leaders

of the Western Balkans or the Eastern Partnership became almost obligatory in the program of each Visegrad presidency. For a long time before it became popular in Brussels, the idea of a Western Balkan EU enlargement was largely promoted by the Visegrad politicians. It should, however, be emphasized that this engagement for the stabilization and Europeanization of the Western Balkans was often met with the approval of EU or Western states leaders. It relieved them from actually taking care of this subject, which for many capitals was not a priority. As a result, many Czech and Slovak diplomats were given community tasks in this region. For instance, the current Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajčák who, on behalf of the EU, was responsible for organizing an independence referendum in Montenegro (2006) and served as the EU High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina between 2007 and 2009.

The Visegrad cooperation can also be perceived as the inspiration of a new regional project – Three Seas Initiative. The frequently used V4+ format contributed to meetings of representatives of Northern and Southern Europe, at various levels and under the Visegrad aegis.

And yet, despite so many initiatives stabilizing the immediate surroundings of the European Union, the Visegrad Group was recently perceived by many as the main obstacle for the new migration policy. The objection of the V4 states to accept migrants on a mass scale became almost a trademark which strongly polarized EU members. Over time, the policy of Visegrad states to seal the external borders of the community and to preserve the attainment of the Schengen zone was in the most part considered the right approach. However, the fact that the ‘European outskirts’ broke ranks with the most powerful capitals and disagreed with their decision was almost regarded by Brussels to be a rebellion,

¹⁰ Declaration of Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic on cooperation of the Visegrad Group countries after their accession to the EU, <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2004/declaration-of-prime> (accessed on: September 10, 2018).

prompting them to threaten withdrawing European funds or imposing financial penalties for not accepting refugees.

For the new and small members of the European community, the Visegrad Group offers a change to express fears regarding policies in the protection of a recognizable regional structure. However, because the actions of the Visegrad Group often irritate Brussels and leaders in powerful western capitals, the potential of the format of this cooperation is not fully used. Nevertheless, the V4 has naturally become the region's main political center; if not governing, then certainly organizing the outskirts of the European Union, which stabilizes the European neighborhood and advocates for the soft Europeanization of these states (the Western Balkans, the Eastern Partnership).

From the perspective of Warsaw, the Visegrad Group is one of the most important instruments in Polish foreign policy making in two ways. The principal dimension concerns European politics. The V4 considerably strengthens the position of particular Central European states in key areas. It is mostly thanks to efficient Visegrad cooperation that the club "Friends of Cohesion" was established during negotiations regarding the last multi-annual EU budget. The second aspect relates to regional dimension of Polish foreign policy. The occasion when the opinion of Budapest, Prague or Bratislava on a given issue varies from that of Warsaw is not unprecedented. Probably the most visible difference is the policy towards the Russian Federation. Moscow has succeeded in building strong and influential pro-Russian communities in smaller Visegrad states. The framework of this article does not allow for a more profound analysis of the roots of these pro-Russian attitudes, which vary greatly among the states. In the Czech Republic or in Slovakia they are deeply rooted in history and are built on the idea of Pan-

Slavism, while in Hungary it is a decision of the political leaders, who perceive a close relationship with Russia mostly as a chance to carry out lucrative business projects and who do not consider Russian policy as a threat to international order. There is an analogical difference of opinion between Warsaw and other Visegrad capitals when it comes to relations with Ukraine. For Slovakia, it is mostly a partner in the transit of Russian energy fuels; for Budapest – a state discriminating against the Hungarian minority living in Zakarpattia, and for Prague – a secondary partner. Despite different opinions on such sensitive issues, it is most often thanks to Polish initiatives that Ukrainian leaders are invited to Visegrad meetings, while the International Visegrad Fund has a program of support for the Eastern Partnership states. It is hard to specify to what extent coexistence within the V4 contributed to the fact that our partners did not strongly object to the program of the pronounced presence of NATO troops on the Eastern flank or declaring that they were not interested in hosting alliance troops on their territory was their only response.

The Visegrad Group is therefore not a perfect structure of regional cooperation, but it is a proven instrument, so there is no urge to replace it with something else. For all four capitals it constitutes an important tool in their respective national foreign policies. The V4 – despite being mostly a strictly political project – contributes importantly to building regional and European security. In addition, it creates an environment in which the partners trust each other, which positively influences relations with direct neighbours of the EU in the Western Balkans or with the states participating in the Eastern Partnership.

Piotr Bajda ■
September 24, 2018

EXPENDITURE ON CYBERSECURITY OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES

JOANNA ANTCHAK, PhD

Nowadays, cyber threats have become increasingly strategic in nature, covering all activities of the state, including its security and defense system.

Cybercrime is causing greater losses to national economies, businesses as well as private individuals than ever before, with cyber methods now being used to influence democratic elections in individual countries. On the one hand, armed forces are there to protect citizens from such attacks, while on the other hand, the very same forces develop their proper offensive capabilities. Therefore, cyber methods are seen as an effective deterrent when making political or military decisions; also, they can be used as a means of a retaliation or response to political or military actions of other countries (such as the recent changes made by the US President Donald Trump, that give even more freedom when it comes to offensive actions).

Cybersecurity is a matter which cannot be considered in isolation. In order to ensure the digital security within

a given state, as well as the digital security of its institutions and citizens, a number of entities have to engage in dialogue and partnership. First of all, a common strategy should be developed in cooperation between representatives of the administration responsible for action plans and entrepreneurs experienced in eliminating online threats. Second, it concerns operational activities undertaken by network administrators of public administration offices and their counterparts in private companies. However, this must not be simply superficial dialogue. The EU and its member states need to devise a coherent system of protection, based on standards applicable to entities affected by cybersecurity (*de facto*, each and every one of us). Protection in cyberspace cannot be provided in isolation from the outside world¹.

¹ *Cyberbezpieczeństwo – problem nas wszystkich? Strategie państw UE wobec wyzwań związanych z dostępem do danych w sieci*, „Europejskie Forum

**CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES**

The Visegrad Group (V4) is an association of four Central European countries. The original reason for its establishment was to provide a platform on which to cooperate regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Central and Eastern Europe. Subsequently, the V4 played an important role in the coordination of efforts to join NATO and the EU. Today, the group's objective is to further develop a partnership between

these countries and to coordinate their positions on major international issues, including those within the EU. The group was set up on February 15, 1991 by three countries: Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, creating the so-called Visegrad Triangle. Following the split of Czechoslovakia into two countries on January 1, 1993, the Czech Republic and Slovakia became members of the Group. The International Visegrad Fund is an institution established to finance joint projects.



Nowych Idei” [Cyber security – a problem affecting us all? Strategies undertaken by the EU Member States with regard to challenges posed by accessing online data, from: European Forum for New Ideas], Sopot, October 1, 2015, p. 1.

All four countries joined the European Union on May 1, 2014 and have belonged to the Schengen zone since December 21,

2007. Slovakia adopted the euro on January 1, 2009, while the others chose to keep their national currencies.

a system of interconnected facilities, including construction facilities, equipment, installations, and services

Characteristics of the analyzed countries

COUNTRY	CAPITAL CITY	CURRENCY	AREA (THOUSAND KM ²)	POPULATION	GDP PER CAPITA IN PPS*
CZECH REPUBLIC	PRAGUE	CZECH KORUNA (CZK)	78,9	10 538 275	85
HUNGARY	BUDAPEST	FORINT (HUF)	93	9 855 571	68
POLAND	WARSAW	POLISH ZLOTY (PLN)	312,7	38 005 614	68
SLOVAKIA	BRATISLAVA	EURO	49	5 421 349	77

* Price measurements for goods and services in relation to average income, with the use of the purchasing power standards, understood in terms of a common currency

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Source: private materials based on data from: https://europa.eu/european-union/index_pl (accessed on: July 19, 2018).

Taking into account the living standards in the analyzed countries, defined as GDP per capita expressed in PPS, the Czech Republic (85) and Slovakia (77) perform best, while Poland and Hungary are at the same level (68). In terms of area, Poland is the largest country while Slovakia is the smallest. This is also true as of population size. All of the countries are parliamentary republics.

CYBERSECURITY SYSTEM OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES

In Poland, the issues of its cybersecurity system have been addressed in the following documents:

- Act of April 26, 2007 on crisis management (the Official Journal of Laws of 2007 No. 89 item 590, as amended), in which Article 3 item 2 defines critical infrastructure to be
- Act of August 5, 2010 on the protection of classified information (the Official Journal of Laws 2010, No. 182, item 1228, as amended) and Act of July 18, 2002 on the provision of electronic

essential to the safety of the state and its citizens and ensuring efficient functioning of public administration bodies, as well as institutions and businesses. Critical infrastructure includes the following systems: energy supply, energy and fuel raw materials, communications, ICT networks, financial, food supply, water supply, health protection, transport, and rescue, all of which ensure the continuity of public administration, production, storage, and the use of chemical and radioactive substances, including pipelines of hazardous substances.


services (the Official Journal of Laws 2002, No. 144, item 1204, as amended), in which an ICT system was defined, which should be understood as a set of interconnected IT devices and software that ensures the processing and storage, and the sending and receiving of data via telecommunications networks with a terminal device appropriate for a given type of telecommunications network, as defined in the Act of July 16, 2004.

- Telecommunications Law (Journal of Laws of 2016, item 1489, as amended).
- National Framework for the Cyber Security Policy of the Republic of Poland for the years 2017–2022 (Resolution No. 52/2017 of the Council of Ministers of 27 April 2017) and the Cyber Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland for the years 2017–2022, in accordance with the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (EU) on measures for a common level of high security

of networks and information systems within the territory of the Union (EU OJ 2016 L194), which remain closely related. These were developed by a group consisting of representatives of the following ministries: digitization, national defense, internal affairs and administration, as well as representatives of the Internal Security Agency, the Government Centre for Security and the National Security Bureau. In accordance with the vision contained in point 4, in 2022, Poland will be a country more resilient to cyber-attacks and threats. Thanks to the synergy of internal and international activities, the cyberspace of the Republic of Poland will constitute a safe environment enabling the implementation of all state functions and allowing for the full exploitation of the potential of the digital economy, while respecting the rights and freedoms of citizens.

The main as well as specific objectives of the Strategy are presented in Figure 2.

Main goals and specific objectives of cybersecurity of the Republic of Poland for 2017–2022



Source: private materials (based on: Cybersecurity strategy for the Republic of Poland for the years 2017–2022, p. 8).

On April 26, 2018, the Council of Ministers adopted a draft act on the national cybersecurity system which aims to implement the NIS directive effective as of May 25, 2018. The Act provides for, *inter alia*:

- the creation of three CSIRTs²: Gov³, MON⁴ and NASK⁵;
- rules for identifying the operators of key services and their obligations,
- implementation of a safety management system and conducting audits),
- rules regarding public entities (these will be obliged to handle incidents),
- requirements for digital service providers (online trading platforms, cloud computing services and search engines),
- a description of the incident response system and the involvement of all stakeholders, as well as the categories of incidents.

In March 2018, the Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Cyber Security⁶ was established. Pursuant to § 2 of the Regulation, the plenipotentiary is the Secretary of State or the Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of National Defense. The tasks of the Plenipotentiary include ensuring the coordination of activities and implementation of the government's policy in the area of ensuring cybersecurity, and in particular:

1. Analysis and assessment of the state of cybersecurity on the basis of aggregated data and indicators developed with the participation of government administration bodies and teams responding to computer security incidents operating in the Ministry of National Defense, the Internal Security Agency and the Scientific and Academic Computer Network – National Research Institute;
2. Developing new solutions and initiating activities in the field of cybersecurity at the national level;
3. Issuing opinions on drafts of legal acts and other government documents affecting the implementation of tasks in the field of cybersecurity;
4. Conducting and coordinating activities conducted by government administration bodies aimed at raising public awareness of the threats of cybersecurity and safe use of the Internet;
5. Initiating national cybersecurity exercises; and
6. Cooperating with other countries, organizations and international institutions on cybersecurity issues;
7. Undertaking activities aimed at supporting scientific research and the development of technologies in the field of cybersecurity; – in consultation with relevant ministers.

On February 16, 2015, the Government of the Czech Republic approved the new National Cybernetic Security Strategy for the years 2015–2020, which is a comprehensive set of measures aimed at achieving the highest possible level of cybersecurity in the Czech Republic.

The main objectives to be achieved in five years are a key part of the strategy. They are divided into the following priority areas:

² CSIRT – Computer Security Incident Response Team operating at the national level.

³ CSIRT GOV – Computer Security Incident Response Team led by the Head of the Internal Security Agency.

⁴ CSIRT MON – Computer Security Incidents Response Team led by the Minister of National Defence.

⁵ CSIRT NASK – Computer Security Incident Response Team run by the Scientific and Academic Computer Network – National Research Institute.

⁶ Resolution of the Council of Ministers of March 16, 2018 on the appointment of the Government Plenipotentiary for Cyber Security, Journal of Laws of March 20, 2018. Item 587.

1. Ensuring efficiency and strengthening of all structures, processes and cooperation in the field of cybersecurity.
2. Active international cooperation.
3. Protection of the national Critical Information Infrastructure and Important Information Systems.
4. Cooperation with the private sector.
5. R&D/Consumers' trust.
6. Support to the education, awareness and development of the information society
7. Support of the development of the police's capabilities to investigate and prosecute information crime.
8. Cybersecurity legislation (development of legislative framework). Participation in the creation and implementation of European and international regulations⁷.
1. Citizens' awareness.
2. Critical Information Infrastructure Protection.
3. Engage in international cooperation.
4. Establish a public-private partnership.
5. Establish an incident response capability.
6. Establish an institutionalized form of cooperation between public agencies.
7. Establish baseline security requirements.
8. Establish incident reporting mechanisms
9. Foster R&D.
10. Organize cybersecurity exercises.
11. Strengthen training and educational programs⁹.

The National Agency for Cyber Security and Information has been operating since August 2017. The concept of cybersecurity of the Slovak Republic for the years 2015–2020 was implemented on June 1, 2015.

The concept is based on a statement and a description of the basic terms and principles, characteristics of the current situation of the strategic, legal and institutional frameworks in the area of cybersecurity in the Slovak Republic and on a strategic and methodological framework formed by NATO and European Union documents; subsequently, the concept formulates principles, goals and proposed solutions⁸.

They are divided into the following objectives:

In June 2015, the government set up a National Security Office for cybersecurity. The National Agency for Electronic Networks and Systems is also in place.

On March 21, 2013, the Hungarian government decided on a national cybersecurity strategy (No. 1139/2013).

The purpose of the strategy is to determine national objectives and strategic directions, tasks and comprehensive government tools which will enable Hungary to enforce its national interests in the Hungarian cyberspace, within the context of the global cyberspace¹⁰.

They are divided into the following objectives:

1. Critical Information Infrastructure Protection.
2. Develop national cyber contingency plans.
3. Engage in international cooperation.
4. Establish an incident response capability.

⁷ Vide: <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/about-enisa/structure-organization/national-liaison-office/news-from-the-member-states/czech-republic-national-cyber-security-strategy-2015-2020> (accessed on: August 19, 2018 r.).

⁸ *Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic for 2015–2020*, p. 6.

⁹ Vide: <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-security-strategies/ccss-map/strategies/cyber-security-concept-of-the-slovak-republic> (accessed on: August 19, 2018).

¹⁰ *National Cyber Security Strategy of Hungary*, p. 2.

5. Establish an institutionalized form of cooperation between public agencies.
6. Establish baseline security requirements.
7. Establish incident reporting mechanisms.
8. Organize cybersecurity exercises.
9. Strengthen training and educational programs¹¹.

It is worth noting that in 2018 two legal acts entered into force in all countries belonging to the European Union:

- On 10 May – Directive 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 on measures for a high common level of network and information system security within the Union, which requires member states to develop national strategies for network and information system security or to set up appropriate monitoring and risk response units.
- On 25 May – Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR). The regulation covers all entities, both public and private, that process personal data and, at the same time, most of the data processing operations.

EXPENDITURE ON CYBERSECURITY OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP COUNTRIES

A state's expenditure on cybersecurity is difficult to estimate. Costs calculated at the state level are scattered across different areas such as digital technologies, digitization, development, economy,

science, security and defense, thus making it difficult to determine exact values. There are no comprehensive statistics that cover cybersecurity expenditure at different levels.

The analysis of expenditures on cybersecurity of the Visegrad countries was made on the basis of selected indicators:

- defense spending;
- defense spending as % of GDP;
- R&D expenditure as % of defense expenditure;
- ICT sector as % of GDP;
- employment in the ICT sector;
- employment in fields related to science and technology;
- number of ISO/IEC 27001 certificates issued;
- ICT Development Index (ITU);
- IMD World Digital Competitiveness (WDC);
- National Cyber Security Index (NCI);
- the difference shows the relationship between the NCSI score and DDL.

Selected indicators indirectly demonstrate a state's preparedness to finance cybersecurity.

Table 2 presents defense spending. Table 3 shows the level of defense spending as a percentage of GDP in 2010–2017.

An analysis of the data presented in the table shows that in 2017, defense spending in each country increased compared to 2016. The highest increase was recorded by the Czech Republic (14%) and the lowest by Poland (9%) (Note that absolute numbers should be taken into account – and here, it is Poland that takes the lead in this type of expenditure).

Only Poland allocates at least 2% of its GDP to this purpose, in accordance with NATO guidelines. In other countries, the level of defense spending is approximately 1%.

¹¹ *Vide:* <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/national-cyber-security-strategies/ncss-map/strategies/national-cyber-security-strategy> (accessed on: August 19, 2018).

Military expenditure by country, in millions of US\$ at current prices and exchange rates, 2010–2017

COUNTRY	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
CZECH REPUBLIC	2497,9	2474,3	2220,6	2148,8	2022,9	1779,9	1954,9	2232,5
HUNGARY	1350,8	1472,1	1322,3	1280,1	1209,8	1132,5	1288,7	1414,7
POLAND *	8790,2	9455,4	8986,8	9275,7	10345,2	10212,8	9164,2	10009,7
SLOVAKIA **	1137,7	1064,8	1020,2	967,9	997,7	985,9	1003,0	1126,5

* The figures for Poland exclude some defence spending in other ministries, and additional domestic defence spending such as the Armed Forces Modernization Fund (AFMF) and some additional Defence R&D. Between 2004 and 2016 these additional sums varied between about 240 million and 640 million Zlotys. No AFMF for 2017.

** Figures for these countries do not include military pensions.

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Source: SIPRI NATO milex data 1949–2017.xlsx; <http://www.sipri.org/> (accessed on: August 10, 2018).

Military expenditure by country as percentage of gross domestic product, 2010–2017

COUNTRY	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
CZECH REPUBLIC	1,2%	1,1%	1,1%	1,0%	1,0%	1,0%	1,0%	1,1%
HUNGARY	1,0%	1,1%	1,0%	1,0%	0,9%	0,9%	1,0%	1,1%
POLAND *	1,8%	1,8%	1,8%	1,8%	1,9%	2,1%	2,0%	2,0%
SLOVAKIA **	1,3%	1,1%	1,1%	1,0%	1,0%	1,1%	1,1%	1,2%

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Source: SIPRI NATO milex data 1949–2017.xlsx; <http://www.sipri.org/> (accessed on: August 10, 2018).

Research and Development Spending in Military Expenditures (in millions of euro and as % of GDP)

COUNTRY	2010		2011		2012		2013		2014	
	AMOUNT	%	AMOUNT	%	AMOUNT	%	AMOUNT	%	AMOUNT	%
CZECH REPUBLIC	20,2	1,0	16,3	0,9	16,2	1,0	15,4	1,0	16,4	1,1
HUNGARY	0,2	0,02	0,4	0,04	0,5	0,05	0,1	0,01	0,02	0,002
POLAND	121,2	1,9	167,6	2,6	143,6	2,1	94,3	1,4	217,2	2,9
SLOVAKIA	0,1	0,0	0,6	0,1	5,1	0,6	3,4	0,5	2,1	0,3

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Source: private materials based on www.eda.europa.eu (accessed on: 10 July 2018).

Analyzing overall defense spending in 2014, the Czech Republic (6,5%) recorded a decrease compared to the previous year, while the other countries recorded an increase (the largest made by Poland – 12,6%).

Poland allocates a significant part of its defense budget on research and development. Table 5 presents the share of the ICT sector in GDP in selected countries for the years 2009–2015.

ICT sector as percentage of country's GDP, 2010–2015

COUNTRY	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
CZECH REPUBLIC	4,43	4,38	4,38	4,4	4,31	4,27
HUNGARY	5,68	5,96	5,79	5,84	5,65	5,87
POLAND	3,19	3,27	3,12	3,01	3,05	3,14
SLOVAKIA	4,67	4,48	4,73	bd	4,17	4,39

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Source: private materials based on Eurostat.

Analyzing the data in Table 5, it can be observed that Hungary recorded a high share of ICT above 5% between 2010 and 2015. The share of the ICT sector in the GDP of the Czech Republic and Slovakia is above 4%. The share of the ICT sector in Poland’s GDP is still relatively low,

which may indicate a high potential for development. In Poland, this sector translated into 3.14% of GDP in 2015, while in countries such as Malta, Great Britain, Hungary, Bulgaria, Estonia the level is at 7.26%, 5.9%, 5.87%, 5.08%, and 4.81%, respectively.

Table 6 illustrates employment in the ICT sector in 2010–2015 and Figure 1 shows employment in science and technology related areas in 2016 (as a % of the active population aged 25–64).


Employment in ICT sector, 2010–2015 (in %)

COUNTRY	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
CZECH REPUBLIC	2,7	2,79	2,79	2,76	2,81	2,84
HUNGARY	3,63	3,69	3,65	3,54	3,41	3,42
POLAND	1,71	1,76	1,84	1,91	2	2,14
SLOVAKIA	2,32	2,34	2,41	2,52	2,52	2,61

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Source: private materials based on Eurostat <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/digital-economy-and-society/data/database> (accessed on: July 10, 2018).

Employment in science and technology sectors



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Source: private materials based on Eurostat.

The analysis of Table 6 shows that Hungary has the highest level of employment in the ICT sector, exceeding 3%; whereas for Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic this accounts for less than 3%.

Analysis of Figure 1 shows that the highest level of employment in science and technology (42,8%) was recorded by Poland and the lowest by Slovakia (34,2%).

On January 10, 2018, the standard PN-EN ISO/IEC 27001:2017-06 “Information security management systems. Requirements” was issued. This standard does not introduce new requirements for PN-ISO/IEC 27001:2014-12, and this update results from the introduction of previously issued corrections to ISO/IEC 27001:2013: Cor 1:2014 to Annex A Clause 8.1.1 and Cor 2:2015 to Clause 6.1.3.

ISO/ IEC 27001 (PN-ISO/ IEC 27001) “Information Security Management Systems. Requirements” is the basis

for the certification of the information security management system.

The ISO/IEC 27001 standard has international scope, and defines the requirements and principles of initiating, implementing, maintaining and improving information security management in an organization. It also includes best practices for the application of security objectives in the areas of information security management. In 2016, the ISO 27001 certification market grew globally by 25% y/y. According to Przemysław Szczurek, Product Manager for Information Security TUV NORD Polska, the main reasons encouraging a certification of information security management system are as follows:

- improving the security of our own information, as well as information entrusted to us by our business partners,
- increasing a company’s value,
- establishing a competitive advantage¹².

Number of ISO/IEC 27001 certificates issued in the years 2010–2016

COUNTRY	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
CZECH REPUBLIC	529	301	264	399	276	381	507
HUNGARY	151	178	199	280	295	323	421
POLAND	229	233	279	307	310	448	657
SLOVAKIA	70	111	127	159	162	232	212

Source: private materials based on: <https://www.iso.org> (accessed on: July 10, 2018).

¹² Market Analysis Report_ISO_27001.pdf, p. 3.

By analyzing the data covering a period of seven years, it can be seen that the largest number of certificates has been issued in Poland: in 2016 alone, as many as 657 certificates were issued in Poland. Compared to 2015, this represents an increase of 47%. Globally, Poland ranks 11th. The largest number of certificates are issued in Japan, where in 2016 the number of certificates issued was 8,945, followed by the United Kingdom with 3367. Within the Visegrad countries, Poland takes the lead. In the Czech Republic, the highest number of certificates were issued in 2010 (529), in Slovakia in 2015 (232, a drop of 9% y/y in 2016), and in Hungary in 2016 (421, a 33% y/y increase). In terms of industry, information technologies take first place, with the number of certificates in 2016 amounting to 6,578 (the public administration sector ranks 7th, with 235 certificates issued). The ICT Development Index of the International Telecommunication Union is one of the most trusted indicators in

countries, which in turn translates into the level of awareness of threats in the cyber field, i.e. the readiness to bear the costs of strengthening cybersecurity. In 2017, the ITU issued a second edition of the index (the first one was published in 2014). The indices in both reports are based on the same pillars:

- 1. Legal basis – with an emphasis on forensic science and the fight against cybercrime;
- 2. Operational capacities – comparable to the EU index;
- 3. Organizational measures – so-called *road maps*, policies, procedures, evaluation systems;
- 4. Reinforcement of the capacity of the state – standardization of development, development of professional staff, certification;
- 5. Cooperation between countries, agencies, sectors and within the framework of interstate organizations.

ITU ICT Development Index 2017

COUNTRY	IDI		RANK	
	2016	2017	2016	2017
CZECH REPUBLIC	7,06	7.16	39	43
HUNGARY	6,74	6.93	49	48
POLAND	6,73	6.89	50	49
SLOVAKIA	6,84	7.06	46	47

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Source: private materials based on: www.itu.int (May 2, 2017).

the world reflecting a given society's and economy's reliance on ICT technologies. Indirectly, it also indicates the technological advancement of individual

Analyzing the data shown in Table 8, in 2017, the index (+7) was reached by the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and (-7) by Hungary and Poland.

In 2018, a separate report assessing the “digital” competitiveness of countries was published by the International Institute for the Development of Lausanne Management (IMD World Competitiveness Center) for the second time.

The IMD World Digital Competitiveness (WDC) ranking analyzes and ranks countries’ abilities to adopt and explore digital technologies leading to transformation in government practices, business models and society in general. Based on research, the methodology of the WDC ranking defines digital competitiveness into three main factors: knowledge, technology, future readiness¹³. Out of the 63 countries surveyed, the Czech Republic ranked 33rd with 71,488 points (out of 100,000 possible achieved by the United States, which was ranked first). The rest of the Visegrad Group was ranked as follows:

- Poland ranked 36th (in 2017: 37th) scoring 68,557;
- Hungary ranked 46th (in 2017: 44th) scoring 57,099;
- Slovakia ranked 50th (in 2017: 43rd) scoring 56,536.

The National Cyber Security Index (NCSI) is a global index, which measures the preparedness of countries to prevent cyber threats and manage cyber incidents. The NCSI is also a database with publicly available evidence materials and a tool for national cybersecurity capacity building. The indicators of the NCSI have been developed according to the national cybersecurity framework. The NCSI Score shows the percentage the country received from the maximum value of the indicators. The maximum NCSI Score is always 100 (100%) regardless of whether indicators are added or removed¹⁴.

IMD World Digital Competitiveness Ranking

COUNTRY	OVERALL		KNOWLEDGE			TECHNOLOGY		POTENTIAL	
	2018		2017		2018		2018		2018
	RANK	POINTS	RANK	RANK	POINTS	RANK	POINTS	RANK	POINTS
CZECH REPUBLIC	33	71 488	32	38	60 959	31	73 064	34	64 864
HUNGARY	46	57 099	44	48	53 292	40	60 146	58	42 284
POLAND	36	68 557	37	33	65 629	37	63 838	37	60 627
SLOVAKIA	50	56 536	43	49	52 301	47	54 340	53	47 393

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Source: private materials based on: IMD World Digital Competitiveness Ranking 2018.

¹³ IMD World Digital Competitiveness Ranking 2018, p. 28.

¹⁴ Vide: <https://ncsi.ega.ee/methodology/> (accessed on: August 17, 2018).

In addition to the NCSI Score, the index table also shows the Digital Development Level (DDL). The DDL is calculated according to the ICT Development Index (IDI) and Networked Readiness Index (NRI). The DDL is the average percentage the country received from the maximum value of both indexes. The difference shows the relationship between the NCSI score and the DDL. A positive result shows that the country's cybersecurity development is in accordance with, or ahead of, its digital development. A negative result shows that the country's digital society is more advanced than the national cybersecurity area¹⁵.

Chart 2 illustrates the current NCI Index, and Table 10 the difference between NCSI and DDL results.


Slovakia is ranked 4th in the NCSI, which measures a state's preparedness to prevent cyber threats and to manage cyber incidents, with a relatively high score of 80,52% (France is ranked first, with 83,12%). The other Visegrad Group countries were in the top 20 places:

- Czech Republic ranked 9th, scoring 74.03%;
- Poland ranked 13th, scoring 70.13%;
- Hungary ranked 16th, scoring 66.23%.

The Visegrad countries have exhibited positive results, which means that the development of cybersecurity is in line with the digital development in each country.

To recapitulate the results of the comparison of indicators for selected countries, the following conclusions can be drawn:

National Cyber Security Index



www.warsawinstitute.org



Source: private materials based on: <https://ncsi.ega.ee/ncsi-index/>, (accessed on: August 10, 2018).

¹⁵ Vide: <https://ncsi.ega.ee/methodology/> (accessed on: August 10, 2018).

The Difference shows the relationship between the NCSI score and DDL

COUNTRY	NCSI	DDL	DIFFERENCE
CZECH REPUBLIC	74,03	69,37	4,66
HUNGARY	66,23	66,08	0,15
POLAND	70,13	66,59	3,54
SLOVAKIA	80,52	66,73	13,79

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Source: private materials based on: <https://ncsi.ega.ee/ncsi-index/>, (accessed on: August 10, 2018).

- There is a continuous need for an ongoing analysis of expenditure versus costs/threats on a national scale (public and private sector, support for science, for ICT security and for the development of the society/digital economy);
- A cost/threat analysis should be linked to a single cybersecurity think-tank that would coordinate actions (and hence expenditure) across the country;
- The Visegrad Group countries have evinced relatively good cybersecurity potential.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The above analysis has proved that the identification of cybersecurity spending ceilings is not a simple operation. It appears that governments, public institutions and private entities all lack an appropriate tool, which would help to assess risks and threats (in the short-, medium- and long-term perspective), develop strategies and programs to counter these risks and, in so doing, allocate appropriate resources.

There is a need for a systemic coordination on a national scale in order to effectively analyze the need for expenditures and to minimize costs on a national scale. It is necessary for authorities to be informed of the costs incurred by the private sector. Conclusions from this analysis should influence an efficient building of our own national potential at the scientific, technical and industrial level in order to ensure overall cybersecurity.

A well-designed decision-making structure is key to a rational and more effective government policy of expenditure on cybersecurity, both at the national and private levels. At the national level, it is necessary to specify competencies in three areas: detecting, protecting and responding to threats at all levels of government, simultaneously initiating and coordinating actions at all levels.

In 2012, the Kosciuszko Institute published *V4 Cooperation in Ensuring Cyber Security*

– *Analysis and Recommendations*, in which the following recommendations were put forward, which are still valid:

- Common understanding of the fundamental cybersecurity framework needs to be ensured. The process includes, among others, consideration of key players, definition of basic notions and fundamental security goals as well as limitations which need to be respected (e.g. privacy preservation).
- There is a strong need for public-private cooperation within each of the V4 countries as well as on the level of cross-national sectoral working groups. Additionally, private entities should be strongly involved in the process of cyber space protection.
- The V4 countries should support the involvement of the private sector in Cyber Europe exercises and exercises organized by NATO.
- The V4 countries should jointly explore the utility for the benefits of regional cooperation on cybersecurity, the mechanism offered by European treaties such as permanent structured cooperation, and the EU's provision to a task undertaken by several Member States.
- The V4 countries should support the inclusion of the provisions related to cyber threats in the new edition of the European Security Strategy.
- There is a need for establishing a new comprehensive EU cybersecurity strategy that would encompass all the dimensions of the EU's action in this field.
- The V4 Group should support establishing a body (e.g. EU Cyber Security Coordinator) for the purposes of coordinating various aspects of the EU's cybersecurity policy. Alternatively, the responsibilities of the above-mentioned entity can be attributed to an already existing structure.

- Developing a CSDP doctrine on cyberwar that would encompass the issue of information operations and would be compatible to relevant NATO procedures is recommended.
- The V4 Group should postulate the inclusion of funding tasks related to cybersecurity into various EU's funding mechanisms (e.g. cohesion policy)¹⁶.

In conclusion, it may be stated that in terms of both tangible expenditure on research, as well as in the organization and effectiveness of the cybersecurity system, the Visegrad Group countries are more or less in the vicinity of the EU average. A successful coordination both within and among the V4 countries may lead to the development of a specialization of these countries in the field of cybersecurity (although competition is high – from large countries such as Germany, France or the Netherlands, to smaller but advanced countries in this field such as Estonia or Lithuania). This can promote good use of the International Visegrad Fund programs and the Group's efforts to create even broader cooperation forums – such as the Three Seas Initiative¹⁷. All of the above activities are related to a readiness to incur expenditures on building efficient structures, both in respective countries and internationally, increasing expenditure in the field of ICT and on R&D (and its implementation), as well as on initiating international programs under V4, the Three Seas Initiative, the EU or NATO.

Joanna Antczak ■
September 1, 2018

¹⁶ T. Rezek, T. Szatkowski, J. Świątkowska, J. Vyskoč, M. Ziarek, *V4 Cooperation in Ensuring Cyber Security – Analysis and Recommendations*, The Kosciuszko Institute, Cracow 2012, s. 83–87.

¹⁷ More on this topic in: BRIEF OF THE PROGRAMME OF THE KOSCIUSZKO INSTITUTE, The Digital 3 Seas Initiative – The Digital Tri-City Initiative is a step into the future of the region, June 2018.

V4 COUNTRIES TOWARDS RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE

ALEKSANDRA ROMANOWSKA

The establishment of the Visegrad Group was a response to the new challenges that Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary faced after another European spring of nations.

In their founding declaration of February 15, 1991 (the Soviet Union dissolved on December 26th of the same year), the V4 “founding fathers” pointed to “the full restoration of the independence of states, democracy, and freedom” and “commitment to the creation of a European political and economic system”. They drafted their program when Soviet troops were stationed in the territories aspiring for independence.

The economies of the V4 countries depended on the Kremlin for raw materials and their economies were associated with the collapsing economy of the Soviet Union.

For the first time since the Yalta Conference, this new situation required the V4 countries’ leaders, elected in democratic elections, a permanent redefinition of relations with the Soviet Union, and then with Russia, its legal



HUNGARY, BUDAPEST, MARCH 2, 2018. THE CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF PARLIAMENTS OF THE V4 COUNTRIES.

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successor. The Soviet, and then the Russian factor, were present in the politics of V4 countries.

Today, European historians remind us that their first common political and military success was moving the Soviet army units away to the Soviet Union. It was a very important moment in this history. However, the Soviet Union (and subsequently Russia) have remained a permanent reference point for many policies of the V4.

Russia has not intended to give up its political and economic influence in Central Europe and in the so-called post-Soviet area. From the perspective of 27 years (from the dissolution of the Soviet Union to the present day), we can form a hypothesis regarding the political

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conflict between the V4 countries and the Soviet Union (and its successor, Russia).

Russia's policy towards Prague, Warsaw, Budapest and later towards Bratislava, was first focused on having economic, political and on establishing secret service base in the former satellite countries, as illustrated by some links to Russia's policies towards the new states taking advantage of the historical occurrences and susceptibility as well as pro-Soviet leanings of certain circles. Both the new V4 authorities and the general public rejected these policies.

Another contentious point between Russia and V4 countries was a strategic issue of key importance to security and the future: the accession of Central and Eastern European countries to NATO and to the EU. This was and remains a fundamental dispute concerning the nature and meaning of politics, the understanding of European values and, in particular, the analysis of the message of Europe's tragic history in the 20th century. Russia was and remains opposed to this choice.

Russia considered the NATO enlargement a historical mistake; a decision directed against their interests. They also negatively assessed the European political and economic model. Russians subordinated their revisionist policy towards Europe and the North Atlantic Community to this very thesis. One of the strategic aims of Russia is to stop the evolution of NATO and to weaken the European Union.

Russia is permanently seeking to revise the constructive order in Europe after the victory of Solidarity, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Velvet Revolution. The authorities are trying to believe they can turn back time and find alliances.

V4 COUNTRIES AGAINST THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA AND RUSSIAN AGGRESSION

The annexation of the Crimea and the organization of a separatist rebellion in eastern Ukraine is another example of the continuation of Russia's revisionist policy. This sequence of events should also include the history of the conflict over Transnistria and the war with Georgia in 2008. In this context, we can see a combination of two strategic lines of Russian policy: maintaining control (political, military, and economic) of the post-Soviet area as well as attempting to block European Union and NATO expansion in this region. Sociologically, these conflicts are also one of the sequences of the disintegration of the Soviet empire: not only is this historical process still ongoing, but also without a foreseeable resolution in the near future. It is the background, or more precisely, the counterpoint and inspiration for the Kremlin's revisionist policy.

V4 countries rarely adopted a common position on Russian policy, especially in crisis situations. The divisions within the group became obvious during the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, when the presidents of Slovakia and the Czech Republic, Ivan Gašparovič and Václav Klaus, and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico accused Georgia of being responsible for the armed conflict. Poland, however, supported Georgia. Polish President Lech Kaczyński organized a pro-Georgian alliance with the participation of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine. He did not get the support of the President of Hungary for his initiative, though.

V4 COUNTRIES TOWARDS RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE



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BUDAPEST, HUNGARY, JUNE 26, 2018. PARTICIPANTS ATTEND THE INTERIOR MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE VISEGRAD GROUP (V4) COUNTRIES AND AUSTRIA IN VARKERT BAZAAR.

László Sólyom, the Hungarian president during this time, remained neutral towards the Russian-Georgian conflict.

In the Georgian capital, President Kaczyński took part in a rally and delivered a sharp, anti-Russian speech: “We are here to take up the fight. For the first time in years, our eastern neighbors show the true face we have known for hundreds of years. They think other nations should be subordinated to them. We say no! That country is Russia”, Kaczyński said. The Visegrad Group countries did not support the Polish President. His initiative was also criticized by the “old Europe”.

The German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* recalled that France, having held the EU presidency at the time, considered the five leaders’ trip to Tbilisi to be “an unhelpful expression of bias”. The newspaper claimed the expedition was arranged so quickly that there was no time to fully agree on common positions, and that Lech Kaczyński took little effort to agree on a trip with the EU, whose then-president, French President Nicolas Sarkozy, was at the same time mediating in Moscow.

When Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine in 2009, the Slovak Prime Minister accused Ukraine of being responsible for disrupting gas supplies to the Slovak Republic, whereas Poland condemned Russia for using “gas weapons” against Ukraine. The different positions of the Czech Republic and Hungary on the 2009 gas crisis, which were described as “pragmatic” by their governments, did not hinder the start of cooperation on European integration of gas markets and its diversification.

In the political discourse within the Visegrad Group (V4) some argue repeatedly that the different nature of perception of security threats and national interests, including fundamental differences in the assessment of Russian politics, may undermine trust between V4 countries and consequently weaken their cooperation.

UKRAINIAN CRISIS

When Euromaidan in Kiev was radically exacerbated, V4 ministers convened on January 29, 2014, to advocate a peaceful solution to the Ukrainian crisis. They also expressed disappointment over Ukraine’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union. In this phase

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of the crisis, the ministers supported the activities of the European Union mission in Kiev with the participation of Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski.

After the annexation of Crimea, V4 called on Russia to respect the Budapest Memorandum guaranteeing Ukraine's territorial integrity and reached a consensus on the reverse flow of gas to Ukraine, the direct supply of which was blocked by Russia. Ukraine received gas through Slovak, Polish and Hungarian gas pipelines. The Visegrad countries also shared the responsibilities related to economic and humanitarian aid for Ukraine.

In December 2014, all V4 countries supported the Polish suggestion to establish the second V4 EU Battlegroup in 2019. However, they were not that unanimous supporting another proposition—regarding the increase in military spending to 2% of GDP. Czechs, Hungarians, and Slovaks believed this was a premature and unrealistic postulate.

The attitude of V4 partners to the Ukrainian crisis has gradually evolved. At the EU level, V4 countries supported the sanctions imposed on Russia linked with the annexation of Crimea and the separatist rebellion in eastern Ukraine and supported internal reforms in Ukraine in various ways. In national political discourses, new trends have emerged, revealing fundamental differences in the assessment of the situation and proposed solutions. The dividing lines are formed on the assessment of Russia's threat, the effectiveness of sanctions and their further application, and ways of pursuing national economic interests, especially in energy.

In 2018, Hungary continues to advocate for the lifting of economic and political sanctions against Russia and implemented major energy projects with Ukraine. The Hungarian government believes that sanctions have been, and still are, costly for the Hungarian economy and it will be difficult to rebuild the trade balance with Russia even after lifting them. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is blocking Ukraine's dialogue with NATO, demanding Kiev provides for greater freedom for the Hungarian ethnic minority in Zakarpattia. Ukraine perceives Orbán's policy as another threat to its territorial integrity.

Today, the Czech Republic and Slovakia believe that there is no longer a direct security threat caused by Russia and are also considering the advisability

KIEV, UKRAINE, JANUARY 29, 2014.
PROTESTERS GATHER
IN INDEPENDENCE SQUARE DURING
THE CONTINUING PROTEST.



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of maintaining sanctions against this country. Governments in Prague and Bratislava distance themselves from American decisions to rearm and strengthen the Ukrainian army, describing their attitude to the conflict as pragmatic, related to implementing economic interests of their countries and voters. President Milos Zeman, the most prominent representative of this pro-Russian political trend, proposed in his election campaign that Russia should pay Ukraine for Crimea.

Poland seems to be the most consistent in implementing the assumptions and objectives of its policy towards Russia adopted four years ago – after Russia's annexation of Crimea and the aggression in eastern Ukraine. The Polish government is strongly in favor of extending the time and its anti-Russian sanctions and expresses its solidarity with the policy of the United States supporting Ukraine also in the military sphere. An important element of this policy is Warsaw's opposition to the construction of the second line of the Northern Gas Pipeline (Nord Stream 2) and the creation of alternative gas supply networks to Central and Eastern Europe.

CONCLUSIONS

The Visegrad Group has reached no consensus on shaping a common policy towards Russia in one of the most complicated conflicts after the collapse of the Soviet empire. The initial agreement reached at the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis at the turn of 2013–2014 and immediately after the annexation of Crimea turned out to be very fragile. Some countries had their own separate economic policies with Russia. This confirmed that V4 could not aspire to take part in a geopolitical game: as one of its critics said, it “stood outside European politics”. Strategic objectives, such as diversification of energy transport routes, security, environmental and climate cooperation, and the delivery of transformation help to Ukraine, remained common priorities for the V4 countries. However, divergences regarding Russia, which is questioning the foundations of the European order and striving for their radical revision, may damage trust among the V4 countries, causing political erosion of the Visegrad Group.

Aleksandra Romanowska ■
September 24, 2018

ON DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE

TOMASZ GRZEGORZ GROSSE, PhD

Democracy constitutes the core of Europe's political culture¹. At the same time, it is endangered by the ongoing processes of European integration. As for the European Union, it has no proper legitimacy while such phenomenon is referred to as a democratic deficit².

EU institutions are increasingly restricting democratic practices in its member states. This is due to two main reasons: first, the EU aims to improve the efficiency of the management of public policies, and second, it seeks to develop the

so-called integration as well as through the observation of the rule of law principle. The goal of the following article is to analyze certain European problems with democracy using the example of two basic mechanisms of European integration: the first

¹ Comp. Grosse T.G., *Changes in Western democracy: a systemic crisis, or a chance to overcome it?* Politeja, No. (3) 21, 2012, pp. 133–154.

² Follesdal A., Hix S., *Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik*, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2006, Vol. 44, pp. 533–562; Hix S., *What's Wrong with*

the European Union and How to Fix It, Polity, London 2008; Habermas J., *The Crisis of the European Union*, Polity, London 2012; Habermas J., *Democracy in Europe: Why the Development of the EU into a Transnational Democracy Is Necessary and How It Is Possible*, *European Law Journal*, 2015, Vol. 21, pp. 546–557.

mechanism concerns the ingratiation “through law” while the second concerns European constitutionalism. Here, I will focus in particular on the example of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) as well as its policy of extending the scope of EU law, seeking to enhance the competences of EU supranational institutions and the protection of the rule of law principle within the community. The second mechanism is related to the majority voting procedure in the EU, which appears to be more and more frequently used within its structures. Both instruments are considered problematic under the light of democratic standards. According to some scholars, such mechanisms³ may therefore result in the rebellion of member states along with their societies against EU institutions and thus might deepen further disintegration processes in Europe.

DEMOCRACY STILL IMPORTANT FOR VOTERS

Modern Europe’s problems with democracy seem to be a major challenge for future integration processes. Some research has referred to the “democratic deficit” in the EU or insufficient political legitimacy for the European project⁴. The most well-known typology specifies two types of legitimacy: the first is the so-called “input legitimacy”, which is typically based on a mandate granted via general scrutiny⁵. According to the aforementioned research, such legitimacy appears to be weak in the European context⁶. The second type of legitimacy,

hereby referred to as “output legitimacy”, regards essentially the direct results of all policy-making processes. That is why it is justly specified as “utilitarian legitimacy”. In times of economic prosperity, when the European Union was not tormented by any serious crises, the issue of insufficient “input legitimacy” was usually downplayed; instead, the community was rather praised for its usefulness in relation to the member states, being alleged to provide better solutions to social and political problems. Therefore, utilitarian legitimacy was expected to constitute the very core of both the EU’s political authorization and its subsequent progress. Yet this sometimes occurred at the expense of reducing the influence of electoral *politicization* while progress in integration acted to the detriment of “input legitimacy” of the political process. Nonetheless, electoral mechanisms constitute the very core of democracy while utilitarian legitimacy has only a complementary character.

During subsequent crises it turned out that all claims concerning the EU’s higher utility had been severely dented whereas utilitarian legitimacy ceased to justify the EU’s power over European societies. According to polls conducted by Eurobarometer, such was the feeling of at least a large part of EU citizens⁷. Therefore, it can be assumed that the EU’s structure is properly legitimated during “good times”, but not during periods of trouble. Before such problematic situations started to emerge, progress in integration processes enjoyed some social consent, even though the project did not fully meet

³ Scharpf F.W., *De-constitutionalisation and majority rule: A democratic Vision for Europe*, European Law Journal, 2017, No. 23, pp. 315–334.

⁴ Comp: Grosse T.G., *Kryzys demokracji w Europie* [Crisis of Democracy in Europe], Przegląd Europejski, No. 3/2014, pp. 24–52.

⁵ Scharpf F.W., *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999.

⁶ Schmidt V.A., *The European Union: Democratic Legitimacy in a Regional State?*, “Journal of Common Market Studies”, 2004, Vol. 42, No. 5, pp. 975–997,

V.A. Schmidt, *Democracy in Europe. The EU and National Politics*, Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press 2006; Risse T., Kleine M., *Assessing the Legitimacy of the EU’s Treaty Revision Methods*, “Journal of Common Market Studies”, 2007, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 69–80.

⁷ *Eurobarometer Survey 89.2 of the European Parliament. A Public Opinion Monitoring Study*, European Parliament, June 2018, pp. 51–52.

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all democratic criteria. In the literature on this subject matter, such phenomenon is generally referred to as the period of "permissive consensus"⁸. Citizens allowed political elites to make decisions on the EU's essential affairs as long as there were no major problems; it was only later that they began to monitor the issue of integration – either by criticising it or questioning its further development. Such was the manifestation of electoral politics, which had until recently been either dormant or simply ignored by the elites during some integration processes. This new political period has been referred to as "constraining dissensus", which was equivalent to reducing integration processes by dissatisfied Europeans. Interestingly, some scholars have been wondering why certain societies eventually decided to accept integration processes, bearing in mind that they kept evolving without any proper democratic mandates for quite a long time⁹. Additionally, experts

claim that the growing importance of electoral politics in the EU, and thus the ever-increasing role of voters in political processes at the European level, may exacerbate hitherto crises and prevent integration from fully developing¹⁰. Moreover, the European Union lacks the adequate democratic legitimacy to conduct such radical reforms that would make it possible to deal with the aforementioned impasses as well as to ensure more effective governance, understood in terms of greater utilitarianism of the European project.

INTEGRATION MECHANISMS: NOT REALLY DEMOCRATIC

It is vital to indicate two basic integration mechanisms. The first is referred to as integration "through law" or "European constitutionalism". This consists of granting European law supremacy over national law, as well as envisaging the systematic strengthening of the competences of the European Commission (EC) and the Court of Justice of the European Union in ensuring proper implementation of EU law in all member states. In light of the discussed concept, European treaties aspire to become EU constitutional law whereas the CJEU is eager to be perceived as the constitutional court for the entire community. Under the notion of integration "through law", as mentioned above, both treaties and European law tend to encompass more and more public affairs. In addition, these two institutions actively seek to extend their current scope of competences as well the impact of EU law, even beyond the literal understanding of treaty provisions, which in fact influences some spheres controlled exclusively by the member states¹¹.

⁸ Hooghe L., Marks G., *A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus*, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 39 (2009), pp. 1–23.

⁹ Scharpf F.W., *De-constitutionalisation and majority rule: op.cit.*, p. 319.

¹⁰ Hutter S., Grande E., Kresi H. (eds), *Politicising Europe: Integration and Mass Politics*, Cambridge University Press 2016.

¹¹ Read more: Cappelletti M., Secombe M., Weiler J.H.H. (eds), *Integration through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experiment*, De Gruyter, 1985.

As for the second mechanism responsible for deepening integration, this concerns the ever-growing number of cases submitted to intergovernmental institutions (mainly in the EU Council) that are subsequently handled through the majority voting procedure. This institution plays a leading role in legislative procedure (“community method”), even despite the fact that it is the European Commission that has a near monopoly on legislative initiatives while the European Parliament is also involved in the legislative procedure. In addition to improving governance, majority voting speeds up the law-giving process as well as facilitating the adoption of more effective solutions and not only those solutions that could satisfy all interested parties. Nonetheless, such procedure shifts power in the EU to the community’s largest states, which only intensifies during times of crises, and what I personally refer to as the systemic tendency towards the “asymmetric confederation”¹².

Therefore, scholars claim that these two main integration development mechanisms should not be perceived as purely democratic tools. According to Fritz W. Scharpf, integration “through law”, along with expanding the competences of both the EC and the CJEU, seem highly problematic from the perspective of democratic principles¹³. The former lacks appropriate electoral input legitimacy while the latter does not have at its disposal adequate political supervision from the elected “majoritarian” institutions. Being part of the *trias politica* model, the judicial system shall indeed enjoy some autonomy; nonetheless, it cannot be completely free of influence exerted by the electoral politics in any of the

world’s democratic countries. Such claim may be evidenced by the fact that in many democratic systems voters, parliaments or representatives of the executive branch have the right to appoint judges, or to influence the choice of the state’s highest judicial bodies, with particular regard to members of constitutional courts. Moreover, the EC tends to extend the scope of impact exerted by European law also on the domains being within exclusive competences of member states and those that have been nominally excluded from the jurisdiction of the CJEU. The Commission interferes in these areas on the pretext of protecting liberties on the common market as well as taking advantage of referring member states to the CJEU. Such was the case of the limited use of military offsets by EU countries, even regardless of the fact that both security and defence matters were excluded from the rules related to the common market (pursuant to Article 346 of the TFEU)¹⁴. As for the Court, it tends to agree with the Commission in such cases¹⁵. Needless to say that, under the CJEU rulings, also in some matters in which the European Union has no competencies, member states shall exercise their respective powers in accordance with European law¹⁶. Such attitude violates the democratic principle, according to which only sovereign political communities, backed by their democratically-elected representatives, are entitled to pass competences to international institutions.

In addition, more and more cases of majority voting have emerged,

¹⁴ Comp. Weiss M., Blauburger M., *Judicial Law-Making and Opportunistic Enforcement: Explaining the EU’s Challenge of National Defence Offsets*, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2016, Vol. 54, No. 2, p. 451.

¹⁵ Malecki M., *Do ECJ judges all speak with the same voice? Evidence of divergent preferences from the judgments of chambers*, Journal of European Public Policy, 2012, Vol. 19, No. 1, p. 59–75.

¹⁶ Case C-341/05 Laval, No. 87. See also: Weiss M., Blauburger M., *Judicial Law-Making and Opportunistic Enforcement*, op.cit., p. 448.

¹² Grosse T.G., *Introduction*, [in:] Grosse T.G. (ed.), *European Union Policies at a Time of Crisis*, Scholar Publishing House, Warsaw 2017, pp. 9–32.

¹³ Scharpf, F.W., *De-constitutionalisation and majority rule*: op.cit., p. 319.

Essential problem of the EU results basically from the choice between the greater effectiveness of its governance and fidelity to the aforementioned democratic principles.

the procedure of which raises some concern about its compliance with democratic principles. The EU is closer to a confederal rather than federal solution, thus constituting first and foremost a union of equal states while its democratic mandate derives primarily from scrutiny carried out in subsequent member states. Many scholars urge that the EU should be referred to as a “demoi-cracy”, and not as a “democracy”; it forms a union of democratic national communities (*demoi*) that has failed to develop into a uniform European community (*demos*). So, voting processes in such systems shall be primarily based on consensus, understood in terms of unanimous decisions made by their members. Therefore, it is not democratic to let one national community – or a group of them – to outvote any other ones. Under EU principles, all democratic communities shall be equal with no apparent dominant structure¹⁷. Therefore, providing only one

of them with a greater number of votes and – more importantly – outvoting some other communities in the Council of the European Union – does not comply with democratic legitimacy. If the European Union had the intention to apply majority voting in its institutions, such occurrences would have to take place only in cases where a losing minority could be entitled to take advantage of the opt-out right, which would allow them to exclude themselves from a given regulation without a need to implement it on their territory¹⁸. For instance, such was the case of the Central European countries that voted against legislation on the compulsory relocation of asylum seekers in the EU in 2015 when having been outvoted by other member states, they refused to enter the directive into force in their respective national systems. Although such behaviour constituted an example of violating EU law as well as the principles of “European constitutionalism”, they acted according to democratic rules.

This brings me to the main conclusion of this part of the paper. The essential problem of the EU results basically from the choice between the greater effectiveness of its governance and fidelity to the aforementioned democratic principles. Nonetheless, today’s political reality makes it impossible to meet both of these criteria while any undertakings aiming to enhance action effectiveness are immediately associated with disregarding democratic legitimacy. Obeying such strict democratic norms translates usually into a detention in action efficiency as well as difficulties occurring at the decision-making level in the EU institutions. This is dramatic for the European project, constituting

¹⁷ Cheneval F., Lavenex S., Schimmelfennig F., *Democracy in the European Union: principles, institutions, policies*, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2015, Vol. 22, No.1, pp.1–18; Habermas J., *Citizen and State Equality in a Supranational Political Community: Degressive Proportionality and the Pouvoir Constituant Mixte*, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 2017 Vol. 55. No. 2, pp. 171–182; Nicolaïdis K., *European Democracy*

and Its Crisis, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2013, Vol. 51, No. 2, pp. 351–369, Scharpf, F.W., *De-constitutionalisation and majority rule*, pp. 326–327.

¹⁸ Scharpf, F.W., *De-constitutionalisation and majority rule*, *op.cit.*, p. 331.

a situation with no simple solution, which has additionally worsened during subsequent crises.

RULE OF LAW AS A MECHANISM FOR THE INTEGRATION PROGRESS

One of the most important instruments of the integration “through law” is the practical implementation of the rule of law principle. Its main task is to defend the authority of European law and its supremacy over national law. In addition, it constitutes a source of power for the EU institutions, with particular regard to the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union, as both of them account for the interpretation of rule of law and its observance in EU member states. Therefore, such principles mainly seek to promote

a specific vision of integration, based on the expansion of European law as well as the competences of the EU institutions. Therefore, the above-mentioned rules reconcile the supranational interests of both the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union. However, in Europe, the rule of law tends to be exercised in a rather flexible, discretionary and often arbitrary manner. Such approach gives the impression that some national interests, especially those of the largest and most influential member states, are far more privileged than those of others, as evidenced by the expansion of the existing Nord Stream pipeline; the undertaking of which actually breaches EU law – or at least is far from the rule of law principle¹⁹.

¹⁹ Comp.: Riley A., *Nord Stream 2: A Legal and Policy Analysis*, CEPS Special Report, No. 151, November 2016, <https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/SR151AR%20Nordstream2.pdf> (accessed on: June 29, 2018); Fischer S., *Nord Stream 2: Trust in Europe*, Policy Perspectives, Vol. 4, No. 4, March 2016, Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, <http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/PP4-4.pdf> (accessed on: June 29, 2018).

Europe’s rule of law is safeguarded by the CJEU, referred to as the most independent judicial institution in the world²⁰. Nonetheless, possessing independence does not translate directing into having an apolitical nature. According to scholars, the court does not operate in a political vacuum, being in fact a political actor²¹, involved in implementing a particular vision of a progress in integration²². Moreover, it fosters the expansion of both European law as well as the power of the community’s institutions while its judges seem to closely follow public debate; they “read morning papers”, with special regard to Western European titles, according to some experts²³. Some examples emerged of judicial decisions aimed at establishing long-term public support both for the union as well as the work of the court. Such type of policy, which is currently being created by the members of the CJEU, has been even described in the subject-matter literature as so-called “diffuse legitimacy”²⁴. The aforementioned strategy consists of defending rights of EU citizens, ranging from consumer protection to some regulations regarding mobility and employment in the internal market²⁵.

²⁰ Kelemen R.D., *The political foundations of judicial independence in the European Union*, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2012, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 43–58.

²¹ O’Brien C.R., *The ECJ sacrifices EU citizenship in vain: Commission v. United Kingdom*, *Common Market Law Review*, 2017, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 209–244.

²² Scharpf F.W., *Perpetual momentum: directed and unconstrained?*, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2012, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 127–139.

²³ Blauburger M., Heindlmaier A., Kramer D., Martinsen D.S., Sampson Thierry J., Schenk A., Werner B., *ECJ Judges read the morning papers. Explaining the turnaround of European citizenship jurisprudence*, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2018, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2018.1488880.

²⁴ Clark T.S., *The separation of powers, court curbing, and judicial legitimacy*, *American Journal of Political Science*, 2009, Vol. 53, No. 4: 971–989; Larsson O., Naurin D., *Judicial independence and political uncertainty: how to take risks of override affects*, *International Organization*, 2016, Vol. 70, No. 1, pp. 377–408.

²⁵ Read more: Kelemen R.D., *Eurolegalism. The*

In the 1990s, the court safeguarded the right to move freely within the territory of the EU, while another incentive was open access to the welfare systems of the most affluent European countries. The same applied to the possibility to work in the internal market; freedom of movement of employees was widely encouraged, mostly by eliminating barriers imposed by countries that could offer higher wages but which were also characterised by more extensive regulations and a strong level of unionisation. So, in both cases, namely access to social welfare and freedom of employment in the common market, the court's judicial decisions backed liberal solutions that were beneficial to the inhabitants of less affluent Central European states, not to mention greater financial solidarity granted by the countries of Western and Southern Europe.

Nonetheless, at the time of the global financial crisis, such case law was subject to gradual changes. The court ceased to invoke the rights of EU citizens to free movement, all to work – no longer perceived in terms of superior values – simultaneously stipulating that job opportunities offered by other EU member states, or the possibility to profit from their social security systems, shall have a solely conditional character. The judicial institution referred to the need to protect public finances of the EU's most affluent countries as well as to reduce the free flow of workers on EU territory, a solution that could have been implemented through the necessity to comply with protective regulations on local markets²⁶.

Transformation of Law and Regulation in the European Union, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2011.

²⁶ Comp. Blauberger M., et. al. *ECJ Judges read the morning papers*, op.cit.; Grosse T.G., *The prospect of euro egoism*, op.cit. *European Union on the way towards protectionism*, Jagiellonian Club, 2017, Report for the Center for the Analysis <http://cakj.pl/2017/09/21/the-prospect-of-euro-egoism->

While observing such changes within the jurisprudence of the court, numerous pundits question the actual reason for such state of affairs. According to some opinions²⁷, the court essentially took into account the change in attitude of voters in western and southern countries who, facing the global economic recession became much more critical of both liberal principles in the internal markets as well as of the ongoing globalisation processes. Yet other experts claim²⁸ that the court bore in mind the fact that the EU's most influential member states, including France, Germany and Italy, opposed such liberal rules. In light of both interpretations, it is recognized that political factors have altered the jurisprudence of the court while its protectionist interpretations of EU law seemed beneficial for the societies of the so-called "old Europe", at the expense of the newly-admitted member states of the European community.

The issue of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in the context of the Eurozone crisis, especially in terms of some unconventional interventions of the European Central Bank (ECB), has come under scrutiny in relevant literature. Interestingly, some scholars perceived such interventions as evidence of breaching or bypassing EU law²⁹.

european-union-on-the-way-towards-protectionism/ (accessed on: December 27, 2017).

²⁷ Blauberger M., et. al. *ECJ Judges read the morning papers*, op.cit.; Grosse T.G., *The prospect of euro egoism*, op.cit.

²⁸ Carrubba C.J., Gabel M.J., *International Courts and the Performance of International Agreements. A General Theory with Evidence from the European Union*, New York: Cambridge University Press 2015; Larsson O., Naurin D., *Judicial independence and political uncertainty*, op.cit.

²⁹ Kreuder-Sonnen Ch., *An authoritarian turn in Europe and European Studies?* *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2018, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 452–464; Joerges C., *Three transformations of Europe and the search for a way out of its crisis*, [in:] Joerges C. and Glinski C. (eds), *The European Crisis and the Transformation of Transnational Governance*.

For example, the ECB broke the principle of independence of the national fiscal policy and the sole responsibility of the member states for their own debt (pursuant to Article 125.1 of the TFEU). The institution is also believed to have violated both the ban on the mutualization of debt as well as that on making the ECB the lender of last resort (under Article 123.1 of the TFEU). In many cases, the ECB has ceased to be a politically-independent institution, which can be observed in situations where it forced borrowing states to accept all conditions imposed by the creditor states. Both the ECB and the EC disrespected the treaty rule related to some public policies, which should be left to the exclusive competence of the member states (pursuant to Article 5 of the TEU). This was a consequence of imposing fiscal austerity on some member states that affected these public policies.

As for the court, it authorized the activities carried out by both the EC and the ECB that were referred to by many lawyers as disregarding Europe's constitutional law, including treaties³⁰. Similarly, the judicial institution limited the citizens' abilities to assert their basic rights if they were disregarded by international assistance programs³¹. Therefore, it altered its previous policy of "diffuse legitimacy" that opted for safeguarding the rights of EU citizens while such a step has been

taken in the name of a higher historical necessity. There is little doubt that the court acted accordingly with European integration, preventing the EU's monetary union from undertaking any dissolution processes. Nevertheless, many lawyers refer to these actions as arbitrary and as characterized by their loose approach towards the treaties in force; some of whom resorted even to accusing the EU institutions of changing hitherto constitutional order³². Of course, it is considered by some that the Court had sought to authorize such unconventional policy conducted by the ECB, though it was deprived of its legitimacy based on the rule of law observance³³. During the recession, integration "through law" was used to centralize power at the European level, which appeared particularly visible in the case of technocratic institutions, including the EC, the ECB as well as the CJEU. They all became subject to the politicization, i.e. they served the interests of the EU's wealthiest states that granted assistance loans to some members of the monetary union. In such a way, formally independent institutions became a tool for the most influential and well-off European countries, thus sanctioning the hierarchy of power in the EU (and more specifically – the monetary union) between creditor countries and debtor countries³⁴. In addition all actions performed by the CJEU, including the rather arbitrary implementation of the principle of the rule of law, have been completely subordinated to such hierarchy, which I have previously defined as asymmetrical power relations between stronger and weaker member states³⁵.

Authoritarian Managerialism versus Democratic Governance, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014, pp. 25–46; White J., *Emergency Europe*, Political Studies, 2015, Vol. 63, No. 2, pp. 300–318.

³⁰ Menéndez A.J., *The Crisis of Law and the European Crises: From the Social and Democratic Rechtsstaat to the Consolidating State of (Pseudo-)technocratic Governance*, Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 44, No. 1, March 2017, pp. 56–78; Scicluna N., *Integration through the disintegration of law? The ECB and EU constitutionalism in the crisis*, Journal of European Public Policy, 2017, DOI:10.1080/13501763.2017.1362026.

³¹ Comp. Costamagna F., *The Court of Justice and the Demise of the Rule of Law In the EU Economic Governance: The Case of Social Rights*, Carlo Alberto Notebooks, 2016, No. 487, pp. 1–29.

³² Menéndez A.J., *The Crisis of Law and the European Crises*, op.cit.

³³ Scicluna N., *Integration through the disintegration of law?*, op.cit, p. 10.

³⁴ Menéndez A.J., *The Crisis of Law and the European Crises*, op.cit.

³⁵ Comp. Grosse T.G., *Introduction*, op.cit.

GROWING REBELLION OF NATIONAL COMMUNITIES

Such steps as promoting the principle of the rule of law within the EU structures, escalating the power of both the EC and the CJEU in relation to subsequent countries, as well as outvoting all countries representing interests other than those of the EU's largest member states, may eventually lead to some instances, in which the EU's political order could be openly questioned. This might be executed on the basis of, or even to defend, democratic principles³⁶. Individual national communities or their governments may challenge the authority of the Commission as well as the judgments of the CJEU, or even fail to implement any regulations that have been adopted contrary to their positions. Scharpf urges that undermining the EU's legal order may concern the rejection of liberal principles applied in the internal market by voters being increasingly critical of liberalization and globalization processes³⁷. The same may also apply to liberal values being questioned in other domains. Such a trend seems more and more visible in the case of migration policy, as evidenced by the example of tensions amid the alleged violation of the rule of law principle by both Poland and Hungary, within the framework of which the right of the European institutions to interfere in states' internal reforms has been reportedly undermined in both countries. Nonetheless, the European legal system was perhaps most seriously questioned during the United Kingdom's European Union membership referendum in 2016, as a result of which the country voted to leave the community. Most Britons sought to regain their sovereignty in enacting law giving processes, among other reasons, and thus,

also to become independent of the judicial decisions issued by the CJEU.

It is worth noting that all tendencies mentioned above, which ultimately lead to the rejection of two basic integration instruments, stem directly from the increase in electoral politics within member states, thus undermining liberal norms and defending democracy. Therefore, they result from the deficit of "input" democratic legitimacy of Europe's political processes, and are fuelled by some instances of European inconsistency or even hypocrisy within the scope of the rule of law.

CONCLUSION

Recent crises have seemingly woken up the EU's dormant election politics. Voters have decided to defend their own national democracy against the authoritarian and liberal tendencies that accompanied the progress of European integration. The literature refers to such direction of integration development as "authoritarian liberalism"³⁸, which is being increasingly contested by some societies. We cannot be sure whether such sentiment(s) will continue to grow or how they might possibly influence further processes of European integration. Nonetheless, everything seems to indicate that the European Union should alter its hitherto approach and adapt to the principles of democratic legitimacy, which could be achieved even at the price of less operational efficiency and weaker decision-making processes. Undertaking all steps aiming to improve the management, yet at the expense of democratic standards, constitutes a shortcut that seems profitable for integration processes only in a short-time perspective.

Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse ■
September 1, 2018

³⁶ Grosse T.G., *A Potential for Revolution in Europe?* [in:] Góralczyk B.J. (ed.): *European Union on The Global Scene: United or Irrelevant?* Center for Europe, University of Warsaw, Warsaw 2015, pp. 203–223.

³⁷ Scharpf F.W., *De-constitutionalisation and majority rule*, p. 321.

³⁸ Read more on the concept of authoritarian liberalism in the EU: Somek A., *Delegation and Authority: Authoritarian Liberalism Today*, European Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. May 3, 2015, pp. 340–360.

IS IRAQ SET TO BECOME THE FUTURE REGIONAL SUPERPOWER?

WITOLD REPETOWICZ

Today, many regard Iraq to be a failed state. Therefore, this title would seem to be absolutely absurd.

The future of Iraq depends heavily on two major factors. On the one hand, its strategic geography, vast natural resources and demography seem to argue future dominance in the region. Yet, on the other hand, the same factors fuel third countries' concerns over Iraq's growing stability, making them counteract the state's efforts to strengthen its position. This is particularly true of Iraq's neighboring countries.

A country's power is subject to change. Under unfavorable economic or military circumstances, a superpower may quickly sink into decline. Potential, though, is not lost so easily. History offers innumerable examples of this. Over the course of the

20th century, Germany lost its power twice only to rebuild itself each time owing to its potential. Similarly, Russia or the USSR collapsed spectacularly in the early 1990s. While it may be argued that

Under unfavorable economic or military circumstances, a superpower may quickly sink into decline. Potential, though, is not lost so easily.



BAGHDAD, IRAQ, SEPTEMBER 3, 2018. IRAQI LAWMAKERS ATTEND THE FIRST SESSION OF THE PARLIAMENT AFTER ELECTIONS.

Russia's comeback as a superpower has not been achieved yet (with many factors that could potentially stall or even reverse its progress); a comeback, nonetheless, is achievable due to the country's considerable potential.

The Middle East is no different. Iran rose to prominence after it briefly lost its position, following Iraq's 1982 counter-offensive in the Iran-Iraq War. The 1979 Revolution brought disarray in the Iranian military, thus depriving the country of its military power and

This can only be achieved through bolstering a sense of national identity among different ethnic and religious groups.

encouraging its regional rival, Iraq, to invade. Additionally, the particular demography of Iran, that is, its ethnic and religious diversity further contributed to its weakening position. To a varying degree, the population of Iraq is also marked by a similar particularity. Such diversity weakens the country's unity and facilitates debilitating or even disintegrating activities (such as separatism) on the part of rival countries. Therefore, instead of struggling for power with rival countries, what is needed is investment to protect and deepen the country's unity. Such diversity, however, may prove to be a great asset and even a mighty weapon if used skillfully. This can only be achieved through bolstering a sense of national identity among different ethnic and religious groups. Such groups can consequently exert influence over their counterparts in third countries, thus extending their country's spheres of influence rather than contributing to the continuous disintegration of their own state.

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In the Middle East, the influence of ethnic and religious diversity on a country's significance and power is of fundamental importance. If one was to oversimplify, it can be said that this is attributable to the fact that every country in the region, except for Iran, was largely constructed after World War I, mostly due to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. While Iran's case is different, for various historical reasons, it also boasts a very ethnically diverse society (and to a lesser extent, religiously diverse as well). This plays a role in the state's spheres of influence/continuous disintegration dynamic, which is particularly visible in Iran-Iraq relations. Both regional powers then tried to exploit that diversity during their eight-year-long conflict. For a number of reasons, the success of that strategy was equally limited on both sides. Saddam Hussein tried to unite the Iraqis by playing out the Arabic identity vs. Persian identity card all the while making efforts to appeal to the Arabic minority inhabiting the Khuzestan Province in Iran. This strategy proved to have little to no success as the Khuzestani (2% of Iran's population) are predominantly Shia. Until 2003, Shia Muslims were a marginalized group in Iraq even though they are a majority in the country. Moreover, under Hussein's regime they were persecuted. Iran tried to capitalize on this fact, perhaps with greater success. This, however, did not lead to mass desertion within the Iraqi army as it had been intended. It shall be underscored that Iraqi Shia were the majority among the army's privates, thus being a pillar of Iraq's military force. The strategy proved unsuccessful largely due to the underlying conflict between the Shia and Arabic identity. Within 30 years following the Iran-Iraq War, both countries have been subject to profound changes. For instance, in Iraq after 2003, the Shia majority took power, which translated into radical change in Iraq's relations with Iran. Notwithstanding

the aforementioned demographic phenomena, it is still present and vital to the potential of both Iraq and Iran. What does, however, change with time is the country's ability to capitalize on it as well as the need to do so.

A country's potential relies on three major elements – its economy, demographics and territory.

Undoubtedly, monitoring GDP rates is a classical qualitative index of a country's performance. Another indicator is the country's quantity of natural resources. Since the majority of Middle Eastern economies are rather poorly diversified, natural resources play a key role in establishing a country's potential.

According to the 2017 World Bank GDP Index, the GDP of Iraq is ranked 52nd, and behind four countries of the region: Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (as well as Israel, which shall be excluded here, given its particularity). Out of the four, three share a border with Iraq, and all, except for Turkey, base their economy on oil and gas exports (although the UAE is perhaps less dependent on such exports). While the GDP of Saudi Arabia practically stalled between 1980 and 2000, the country later benefited greatly from Iran's isolation as well as Iraq's precipitous slide into chaos. It must be noted, however, that in 1980 the GDP of Saudi Arabia was 8.5 times higher than that of Iraq. Meanwhile, by 2016, it was barely 3.2 times higher.

Undoubtedly, Turkey is the region's richest economy with its total GDP being 4.3 times higher than that of Iraq. The country is faced with serious problems, though, in addition to being strongly dependent on the imports of natural energy resources, and on its convenient transit position, to which an alternative may soon be provided. Interestingly, comparison between the Turkish and Iraqi economies

has been surprisingly stable for the last 38 years despite the numerous problems that Iraq has dealt with: a costly war against Iran, imposed sanctions, turmoil following the ousting of Saddam Hussein, and the war it waged against ISIS. Meanwhile, the gap between the GDP of the UAE and that of Iraq shrunk only a little – from the GDP of the Emirates being 2.2 times higher to 1.9 now. Although Iran boasted a GDP five times the size of Iraq's GDP in 1980, today this number falls to just 2.2 times higher. It must not be forgotten that Iran is faced with economic sanctions, which heavily influences its yearly performance. The analyzed data clearly demonstrate that Iraq's economic potential has grown in the last few decades, despite the country's troubled times.

Iraq is currently the world's third largest petroleum exporting country with 3.8 million barrels sold daily. And that is excluding the fields of Kirkuk and those of Kurdistan. Exclusion of oil sales from these regions stems from a conflict between the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and federal authorities. According to Iraqi oil minister, Jabbar al-Luaibi, if oil exports from Kirkuk are resumed, the sales would shortly reach 1 million barrels a day. Kurdistan Region currently sells around 600,000 barrels a day. Interestingly enough, prior to the sanctions imposed on Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait in the mid-1990s, the country produced nearly 2.9 million barrels a day. By 1991, this number plummeted to a humble 300,000 barrels a day. Meanwhile, Saudi output rose from round 5 million barrels in 1989 to 8.3 million within a period of three years. It was not before 2012 that Iraq managed to reach its pre-1991 production levels. Neither the war waged against ISIS nor the current conflicts with Kirkut and Kurdistan regions had an effect on Iraq's oil output.

In 1990, Iranian oil output was comparable to the Iraqi oil output.

It wasn't until shortly before 2012 that both countries produced a near equal amount of oil again. Currently, Iranian exports are significantly less than that of Iraq.

This is due to both the imposed sanctions and domestic consumption. In 2011, even the UAE's output was higher than that of Iraq. Saudi Arabia's sales figures currently stand at 7.2 million barrels daily, which is double Iraq's current output. During his recent visit to Warsaw, Mr. al-Luaibi announced that Iraq was going to increase its daily output from 5 million barrels today to 7 million by 2022, thus becoming the second largest exporting country in the region, already ahead of Russia and getting closer to the world's leader, Saudi Arabia.

Additionally, Iraq holds considerable reserves of natural gas, although its extraction output is currently minimal, smaller even than Poland's extraction quantities, which ranks 65th largest in the world. Iraq ranks in 11th place on the list of countries by natural gas proven reserves. According to al-Luaibi, however, new extraction works will mean the country moving into 4th place by 2022. Furthermore, Iraq is set to build a new LNG terminal in the city of Basra.

Territorially speaking, Iraq has something to offer as well, having two major trade routes crossing: one running north and south while the other one running east to west. Presently, the former route is used more frequently. It runs from the Persian Gulf, through Baghdad, Kirkuk, Erbil and Mosul up to the border with Turkey and further into Europe. Its significance, however, depends heavily on Iran's geopolitical position because Iran can offer alternative routes to the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea area, China, the Persian Gulf, and through Turkey's Anatolia to Europe, all of which bypass Iraq. Therefore, Iraq's position as the second-best choice to Iran's trade routes



BASRA, IRAQ, SEPTEMBER 8, 2018. IRAQI SHIITE GUNMEN STAND GUARD OUTSIDE THE OFFICE OF SHIITE POPULAR MOBILIZATION FORCES.

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connecting the Gulf to Turkey. Europe is also dependent on Iran's continued conflict with Turkey and Europe and the country's resultant isolation. Quite ironically, this is favorable to Iraq's east-west route, which results from the fact that this is how Iraq provides an alternative to Iran's trans-Anatolian route. The said alternative connects Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and the Mediterranean Sea, and is referred to as the Shia Crescent. Some see it as a part of China's larger project: the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as the One Belt One Road (OBOR), which has triggered strong opposition, most notably from Israel, the US, Saudi Arabia and Russia. The reasons behind this vary but include the military threat stemming from Iran gaining ground in the regional struggle for dominance and trading losses linked with routes and supply diversification. The Shia Crescent is intrinsically linked with Iran's domination in the Middle East, much to the detriment of Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Globally, it weakens the position of the US and Russia, while favoring China. Iraq's moves, even though they eventually benefit other actors on the whole, influence the region's balance of power. This alone gives proof of the country's potential. Iraq can capitalize on such decisions to increase its

The Shia Crescent is intrinsically linked with Iran's domination in the Middle East, much to the detriment of Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

own significance in the region providing that it has the ability to make decisions that are advantageous to its own interests. That is why neighboring countries make efforts to prevent it from happening. So far Iraq's ability to self-govern in this respect is limited, especially when it comes to benefiting from benefiting from the rivalry between Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. This, however, may change.

Iraq's total area is significantly smaller when compared to the area of Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey, three of its six neighboring countries. Much of its Western provinces, bordering Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria, are deserts, which could be used as strategic depth



BASRA, IRAQ, 7 SEPTEMBER 2018. IRAQI PROTESTERS CHANT ANTI-IRAN SLOGANS AFTER BURNING THE IRANIAN CONSULATE IN BASRA CITY.

© HAIDER AL-ASSADEE (PAP/EPA)

in the event of war. In a sense, they have already been used in this fashion after 2003, except it was solely for the use of partisan warfare targeted at the newly-elected government. Furthermore, they are tribal lands that transborder Sunni tribal federations, which span territories in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. While the mountainous borders with Turkey and Iran may appear to be different at first glance, they are similar because they are inhabited by Kurds, which means that the natural borders (mountains and deserts) are indeed not borders at all. Therefore, the defensive tactics pertaining to these lands focuses not on natural obstacles but rather on winning the loyalty of both the Kurds and the Sunni tribal federations. If Iraq's demographic diversity has so far weakened the country's position, it may soon become one of Iraq's main assets. The situation of the Kurds is of fundamental importance in Iraq's relations with Iran, Turkey and to some extent Syria as they inhabit all four countries. For decades on end, they were instrumentally used in proxy wars between authoritarian if not totalitarian regimes. Syria, for instance, backs the PKK in Turkey while

Iran supported the Peshmerga against Iraq. In 2005, after ousting Saddam Hussein and adopting a new constitution the situation changed dramatically. Iraq was to become an Arabic-Kurdish state, at least in theory, with both ethnic groups enjoying equal rights, despite a major disproportion in terms of population size considering the fact that the Kurds only make up 20% of Iraq's population. Neither the Iraqis nor the Kurds have found a way to benefit from the situation. Only strong cooperation between both groups would translate into a strong situation for the Kurds within a strong Iraq. The result would strengthen Iraq's position in the region while allowing Kurds to wield influence over the Kurdish diaspora in other countries (or take disintegrating action there). Presently, the situation appears to be different. Turkey and Iran (Syria has deprived itself of such possibility) capitalize on Kurdish inner rivalries as well as on conflicts between Baghdad and Erbil. The vast majority of Iraqi Kurds do not want a stronger Iraq as they feel Kurdish rather than Iraqi, and gravitate toward independence. This, however, would weaken the position of the

Kurds rather than strengthen it. A small, strong state of a few million inhabitants, surrounded by enemies, geopolitically would be a weak move. Any index, whether it is GDP, resources, population, or territory, indicates its poor potential and power. This cannot be said of the notion of Great Kurdistan, but its potential existence is merely abstract at the moment.

The alternative would be to have real influence over regional policies of a superpower that in a few years can yield its full demographic potential. The Iraqis should feel compelled to convince the Kurds that Iraq is their home, too, and that they are advancing the Kurdish agenda more effectively when part of a strong country. Without them, Iraq simply cannot be seen as a strong and stable state. This is perfectly understood by Iraq's neighbors (including Iran, despite the two parties officially having good relations, based on a shared 'Shia identity'), concerned with stoking the Kurdish-Iraqi conflict without taking things as far as allowing for Kurdish independence.

The Kurdish question aside, Iraq's unity and identity are stronger than they might seem. Already in 2014, Iraq was heralded as a failed state. What was to follow was its allegedly inevitable fragmentation into three substates: Kurdish, Shia and Sunni. The idea of 'Sunniland' remained a distant myth, popularized only among Western theoreticians, but very far from local reality. Admittedly, a number of Iraqi Sunnis did initially back ISIS, but this was a far different proposal than traditionally understood. A more common demand among the Iraqi Sunnis (which make up 20% of the country's population) was a return to the status quo from before 2003, as opposed to further division of the country into three parts, each of which even weaker than Kurdistan. The four-year-long experience of war changed much as well. The lands of a future

Iraq's unity and identity are stronger than they might seem.

Sunniland happened to be among the most affected by the war, thus needing considerable financial support. Furthermore, Arabic Sunni countries benefiting from fueling Sunni-Shia animosity would regard such a purely Sunni state as cumbersome, since it would eliminate the possibility of steering Baghdad.

One should bear in mind that the concept of Iraq as a nation was artificially created 100 years ago as was the case with Turkey. The latter consolidated over the experiences of a war of independence, which the Turks had fought led by Atatürk until 1923, when a peace treaty was signed in Lausanne. It seems that Iraq followed in its neighbor's footsteps with its own war waged against ISIS, which has only recently finished. Little is certain, as Iraq's neighboring countries are fully aware of the damage Iraq could bring to the current balance of power, if consolidated. This seems all the more threatening to today's regional leaders – especially those of Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia – given Iraq's astounding demographic growth. With 39 million inhabitants, Iraq has the 35th largest population in the world, which is twice as small as that of Turkey and Iran but slightly larger than that of Saudi Arabia and significantly larger compared to other countries in the region.

Yet Iraq's growth in this sense has been far greater in the last few decades compared to the growth exhibited by other countries in the region. Demographic forecasts leave no doubt that Iraq is quickly bridging the gap between both Iran and Turkey. Before

It may come as a surprise, but this may be further facilitated by Iraq's democracy, as one of the strongest in the region (while still being very weak), which is also regarded as a threat.

2060, Iraq is expected to be the world's 20th largest country by population, having twice as many people as Saudi Arabia, some pundits say. Such fast population growth may be conducive to internal tensions, but it undoubtedly increases the possibility of wielding influence over other countries, especially if Iraq manages to consolidate itself as a nation. It may come as a surprise, but this may be further facilitated by Iraq's democracy, as one of the strongest in the region (while still being very weak), which is also regarded as a threat. Moreover, the RNI for Turkish Kurds is higher than for the Turks themselves, which means that Turkey must preoccupy itself with settling the Kurdish question. Otherwise, it may be subject to growing influence from Iraq, if Kurds happen to identify with Iraq more strongly. On the other hand, the growing number of atheists among Iranians will shift the Shia-Sunni dynamics both in Iraq and Iran. The center of the Shia world will move from Qom in Iran to Najaf, thus changing the geopolitical deal.

Unquestionably, Iraq's neighboring countries are well aware of these threats, which they will not leave unanswered. Iraq is by no means on the losing end here, as its opponents' interests are often contradictory

and self-defeating. This is especially true of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Already in 2017, the Saudis revisited their foreign policy as they understood that the further weakening of Iraq actually favors Iran, since it makes Iraq more and more dependent on its mighty neighbor. But one of Iraq's major geopolitical weaknesses, access to water, is often overlooked. This is yet another Iraqi paradox, given the fact that the world's oldest civilization flourished there precisely thanks to the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. In the 21st century, though, Iraq, as a downstream country, is subject to 'water theft' by Turkey, and Iran (to a lesser extent), which occurs as a result of dam construction. Interestingly enough, in this regard, Iraq's interests are identical to Kurdish ones. Moreover, both rivers flow from Turkish Kurdistan in the direction of Iraq. This makes it all the more possible to incite possible military conflict over water between Turkey and Iraq that would be set against a Kurdish background. Admittedly, the Iraqi military force was laughable in 2014 but much has already changed since then and it should not be forgotten that the Islamic Republic of Iran needed only three years following its creation to fully restore its military power.

The list of internal obstacles that Iraq has to overcome is far from being exhausted here. Problems like rampant corruption or its feudal approach to holding offices stand in the way of rebuilding its position in the region. After the war, the Sunni provinces need more than \$80 billion to cover the damages sustained. And the southern provinces are in dire need of desalination installations. Such expenditure makes it more difficult, if not impossible, to harness economic potential to becoming an economic and military superpower. Therefore, the way Iraq is going to be governed in the following years is crucial.

Witold Repetowicz ■
September 1, 2018

THE BALKAN MELTING POT

ROBERT RAJCZYK, PhD

Talk about the current border between the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Kosovo risk escalating the simmering ethnic conflict between the two. Following its unilateral declaration of independence 10 years ago, Kosovo has been indefatigable in its effort to become a full-fledged member of the international community.

While the Poles have their Jasna Góra Monastery and Gniezno, the Serbs and the Albanians

revere the Kosovo field. It is a mythical cradle of the Serbian state. Except for the fact that it is located within the territory of the Republic of Kosovo. In mid-June 1389, it became the theater of battle between the Ottoman Empire and the Serbs, supported by their Slavic allies. According to some historical sources, Polish knights might have even joined the Serbs. That would then

be the first of many confrontations between the Poles and the Turks. While the battle decimated both armies and claimed the lives of both rulers, it was won by the Turks. Nonetheless, some accounts claim that it has never been settled. What is certain, however, is that the battle is important for this Serbian national myth. Prince Lazar (Serbian

It is a mythical cradle of the Serbian state.



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IN MITROVICA, THE CULT OF THE LEADER OF SERB CHETNIKS LIVES ON.

for Lazarus), who commanded the Serbian army, is worshipped as a martyr and the knight Miloš Obilić holds the status of a national hero. While there are no historical accounts confirming his existence, legend has it that, when in battle, he pretended to be a converted Muslim. He was then led before Sultan Murad I to perform the traditional ritual of kissing his feet. He stabbed the Sultan with a tainted dagger, thus assassinating him, and was killed afterwards. His legend turned into a cult reaching as far as Greek Mount Athos, which enjoys autonomy within Greece and is an important center of the Orthodox Church.

The legend of Miloš Obilić lived on thanks to two men: a Montenegrin ruler who established the highest military decoration named after him and a local bishop who extolled the courageous knight in his sermons. Interestingly, there is an Albanian version of that

legend according to which Miloš Obilić was indeed an Albanian. The lost battle established permanent dominance of the Ottomans over the region for the next 500 years. This important moment in Serbian history is commemorated by a memorial in the shape of a medieval tower known as Gazimestan, which was erected in the 1950s. A nearby mausoleum is said to accommodate the remains of Sultan Murad I, who perished in the battle. In 1987, Slobodan Milošević, so far only locally known as the leader of Serbian communists, gave a speech that came to be one of the most important speeches of his career. He appeared as a defender of the Serbs, who complained about the discrimination they experienced from Albanians. As hundreds were trying to get through to hear the speech, they were attacked by the police. Milošević was quick to comment on the situation: *Niko ne sme da vas bije* (roughly translating into: 'no one will beat you again'). Quite symbolically, Milošević arrived in a

helicopter, which was supposed to parallel the myth of Prince Lazar's assumption. Gazimestan and the Kosovo field in general is what brings the Serbs and the Albanians together all the while bitterly dividing them.

ALBANIANS OR KOSOVARS?

The Kosovars much like the Albanians derive their roots from the Dardani, an ancient Illyrian tribe. This hypothesis, as well as the resultant linguistic community, is the very foundation of Albanian identity. It is worth mentioning that modern Kosovar identity is built upon recent political events. From calls for granting Kosovo equal republican status within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to demanding its actual independence. One of the mightiest *mythmoteurs* of Kosovo was the armed struggle for independence as performed by the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK) and its resultant ethos. Part of this myth is holding fallen soldiers of the UÇK in reverence, which translates into much attention and care for military cemeteries. Numerous public facilities are named after Adem Jeshari, one of the commanders of the UÇK. The list includes a sports stadium in Mitrovica (or Kosovska Mitrovica for the Serbs) and the main airport in Pristina, the country's capital.

The Serbs are the largest minority of the Republic of Kosovo. They are Orthodox and inhabit several enclaves (communes located in the northern part of Kosovo – author's note). Other ethnic minorities include the Bosniaks, the Turks, the Ashkali (Albanized Romani), the Balkan Egyptians (of Romani descent and deriving their origin from ancient Egyptians) and the Romani.

Kosovo is marked by significant religious and ethnic diversity. 92% of its inhabitants identify themselves as ethnic Albanians (Kosovars – author's note). Islam is the

One must bear in mind that Kosovo is of particular importance to the Serbs also for religious reasons. Three historic monasteries are located in Peć, Prizren and Gračanica, all within the territory of Kosovo.

dominant religion. While they share an ethnicity, the Albanians from Kosovo differ from the Albanians of Albania. This is especially true in the case of religion. The Kosovars are Sunni while the Albanians are Bektashi, with a considerable number of atheists as well.

TOGETHER AND APART

The history of Kosovo has been influenced by the Serbian-Albanian conflict ever since the Albanian mass migration began in the 15th century and continued for over 200 years. It is connected with the Serbian Great Migration Period, as it is called. As of 1690, 200,000 people emigrated. As the Orthodox Serbs fled Turkish expansion, they were replaced by Albanians who were converting to Islam. This gave them a better social and economic standing (mostly thanks to tax exemptions). Kosovo, except for Metohija, became part of the Kingdom of Serbia as late as 1912, when the First Balkan War came to a halt. One must bear in mind that Kosovo is of particular importance to the Serbs also for religious reasons. Three historic monasteries are located in Peć, Prizren

In 1989, the autonomy of Kosovo was significantly limited only to be abolished one year later, after a new Serbian constitution was adopted.

and Gračanica, all within the territory of Kosovo. The latter is a great Balkan phenomenon as both Muslim Romani and Orthodox Serbs make pilgrimages there. Moreover, one of Islam's denominations, Bektashi Order, recognizes several Catholic celebrations and the cult of saints, which are popular mostly in Albania and Turkey.

The dominance of Serbian landowners was greatly felt under the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS) created on December 1, 1918 and as of 1929 under the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In 1943, shortly after the Italian occupation, Kosovo and Metohija came under German rule. That period was marked by ever stronger Albanian extermination of Romani and Jews as well as the banishing of Serbs from their homes. The League of Prizren was founded at the time whose political agenda included the notion of the Great Albania, the creation of which would result from joining all Albanian lands.

CONFLICTED FOREVER?

Historically, the Serbian-Albanian conflict in Kosovo is divided into three stages. The first stage, occurring in the years 1944–1945, is connected with the policies imposed first by the Italian and then the German occupier. The second

stage was marked by the events of 1968, when Kosovo-based Albanians pushed for recognizing Kosovo as an equal constituent of the Republic.

Politically controlled by the socialist state and dominated by the Serbs both culturally and economically, in 1968 the Albanians started voicing their dissatisfaction ever louder. Josip Broz Tito, the leader during that time, conceded under pressure and granted the Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija more freedoms. The name Metohija was dropped as many Albanians opposed it due to the name sounding very controversial (Metohija in Greek means as much as monastic estates). Albanian national symbols were allowed in public. The year 1969 saw the foundation of the University of Pristina, which turned out to be key in strengthening the position of the Albanian language and culture. One of the direct consequences of its existence was the push for equalizing Kosovo's status with Yugoslavia's constituent republics. Such call had existed ever since the end of WWII, which marked the incorporation of Kosovo into the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Yet it was only in 1974 that the newly adopted constitution established local government and parliament for Kosovo. In reality, it meant as much as reporting to Serb authorities.

The third stage of the Albanian rebellion began in 1981. Further disintegration of Yugoslavia had encouraged the Serbs to strive for political dominance aimed at keeping the country's federal character. In 1989, the autonomy of Kosovo was significantly limited only to be abolished one year later, after a new Serbian constitution was adopted.

INDEPENDENT KOSOVO

In the historical process of Kosovo's struggle for independence, the late 1980s are of paramount importance. The



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THE CULT SURROUNDING UÇK IS PART AND PARCEL OF THE KOSOVAR NATIONAL MYTH.

beginning of Yugoslavia's final decline incited a wave of nationalism, which was successfully suppressed until this point by the personal authority of Marshal Tito who passed away in early May of 1980, among other things. Seven years later Serbia saw the onset of nationalistic rhetoric while Slobodan Milošević, president of the League of Communists of Serbia, rose to political leadership, even though he did not hold the office of the Republic's president.

In September 1990, in Kaçanik, members of the Kosovar parliament adopted a new constitution of Kosovo. A year later, a referendum was held between 26th and 30th September. As a result, 87% of voters said yes to independence. The plebiscite was boycotted by local Serbs and Montenegrins while Belgrade declared it as illegal. By virtue of the referendum's result the parliament of Kosovo declared independence from Yugoslavia. In the elections held on May 24, 1992, Kosovo's Democratic League came first, with

its leader Ibrahim Rugova appointed president. From then on, a period of double-government ensued. Next to the official Serbian government bodies, there existed an underground government of independent Kosovo. This was due to the fact that the Republic of Serbia did not recognize the results of the elections as valid. President Rugova's policy of non-aggression with regard to the political and ethnic conflict was rather fruitless. In 1994, in wake of growing disenchantment with his policies, the Kosovo Liberation Army was created, which pledged an armed battle for independence.

Two years later, in response to Serbian repression and persecution from the police, the Kosovo Liberation Army undertook partisan activity. Following the conclusion of the Dayton Accords in 1995, support for Rugova's non-violent policy had plummeted. The Dayton Accords put an end to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the Dayton

In the Dayton Accords, the international community ruled the problem of Kosovo to be an internal affair of Serbia.

Accords, the international community ruled the problem of Kosovo to be an internal affair of Serbia. In 1997, Serbia offered Kosovo limited autonomy. While the proposal was backed by Rugova, the Kosovo Liberation army refused to accept it.

As the international community engaged in the resolution of the Serbian-Kosovar conflict, the UN adopted Security Council Resolution 1244 in 1999. Consequently, Kosovo's unofficial government bodies were forced to comply with the UN's mission in Kosovo (UNMIK – United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo) which took over the country. It took control of the legislative, judiciary and executive. This double-government situation (UNMIK on the one side and the underground Kosovar authorities on the other) led to the establishment of the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS). The Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) comprised four administrative bodies: Special Representative of the Secretary-General who exercised general supervision, Interim Administrative Council composed of four UNMIK officials and four representatives of the Kosovars, a 36-member Kosovo Transnational Council representing Kosovo's ethnic structure as well as administrative departments of *de facto* ministries.

In 2001, a constitutional framework was promulgated thus laying the groundwork for the establishment of state institutions known as the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG). It divided competencies between UNMIK and PISG. It also established a 'self-governing geopolitical entity under temporary international control'. To guarantee their participation, the minorities were granted 20 parliamentary seats as well as three ministries. The PISG enjoyed a three-year mandate. This included the Assembly of Kosovo, which was a parliamentary body. Its legislative acts, however, had to be approved by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo. The Assembly actively participated in the procedure of government election through a vote of confidence. Meanwhile, the president held representative functions only.

Due to a lack of progress in Serbian-Kosovar talks on the status of the province, the Kosovars unilaterally commenced the execution of constitutional solutions as formulated by the UN Special Envoy for the Kosovo Status Process. According to Martti Ahtisaari's plan, UNMIK was to cease its activity and gradually pass on its competencies to Kosovo's administrative bodies under the supervision of the International Civil Representative, who also held the function of EU Special Envoy.

On April 8, 2008, Kosovo's new constitution was carried by acclamation. It entered into force on June 15 and comprised 142 articles. One of its key features is its republican nature. When it comes to the organization of power, the constitution established a parliamentary system of government with a rather strong position of prime minister, who is independent in his personal decisions regarding the cabinet without having to ask for presidential consent.

The government is appointed by the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo. The cabinet members take an oath of office before the Assembly and are politically responsible before the Assembly. The president holds representative functions and is elected indirectly by the Assembly. The judiciary is executed by common courts while the execution of the constitution is supervised by the Constitutional Court. The constitution's elementary provisions include state secularism, equality before the law (including gender equality and positive discrimination of national minorities), and sovereignty (the people as sovereign, without reference to a given national community, but to a multiethnic society). The constitution rules out the possibility of accession to another state or any border changes without the consent of the Serbian community.

QUESTIONED SOVEREIGNTY

In its advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice in The Hague did not question the legitimacy of Kosovo's

On April 8, 2008, Kosovo's new constitution was carried by acclamation. It entered into force on June 15 and comprised 142 articles.

unilateral declaration of independence, which means that Kosovo's parliament validly proclaimed the declaration of independence. What remains questioned is the independence itself. Kosovo based its independence on the principle of the self-determination of nations as mentioned in international law. It refers, however, to postcolonial regions rather than secession through violation of territorial integrity. Undoubtedly, the active engagement on



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SERBIAN NATIONAL SYMBOLS DOMINATE THE DIVIDED TOWN OF MITROVICA.



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A FEW YEARS BACK, THE IBAR RIVER BRIDGE WAS BLOCKED AND THUS A SYMBOL OF THE TOWN'S DIVISION.

the part of international organizations in the process of Kosovo's creation may prove to be a significant obstacle in Kosovo's struggle for international recognition under international law. For what happened was that a state, that is, a primary legal entity, was created by an international organization, a secondary legal entity.

Kosovo is recognized as an integral part of the Republic of Serbia. It is included in the Republic's administrative division comprising five regions and the Autonomous Region of Kosovo and Metohija. It is further divided into five districts: Kosovo, Peć, Prizren, Kosovska Mitrovica and Kosovo-Pomoravlje.

Under the agreement between Serbia and Kosovo on the regulation of government and on the normalization of their relations, concluded on April 19, 2013, the Community of Serb Municipalities was established. In these municipalities, along local Kosovar authorities, consisting of all Kosovo's 34 municipalities, there exist parallel local government authorities, which have competence over local budget, health care, education, and landscape planning. Under the agreement, parallel structures exist in the police force. It is organized in accordance with the ethnic structure of

four majority Serb municipalities, including local chief officers. Regarding the judiciary, the Appeal Court in Pristina is to include a special chamber dedicated to the cases concerning Serb enclaves and ruled by Serbian judges. Given Serbia's efforts to join the community of the European Union, the agreement on mutual relations was concluded under the auspices of the EU. This general agreement was complimented in 2015 by five additional agreements, which laid out the cooperation provisions in further details. They concerned such topics as the functioning of the Community of Serb Municipalities, energy provisions, car circulation on the Ibar River Bridge as well as Kosovo's own telephone prefix.

TOWARD THE FUTURE

Following Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence, it has since been mainly preoccupied with its recognition by the international community. So far, Kosovo has been recognized by over 100 states all over the world, which comprises over a half of all UN members. Kosovo's potential UN membership seems to belong to the distant future, as it will surely meet strong opposition on the part of two permanent members of the UN's Security Council, namely the Russian Federation and the People's Republic

of China, which openly question the country's sovereignty. The Republic of Kosovo is neither a member of the Council of Europe, nor of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). It does, however, feature among the members of the IMF and the World Bank. In December 2015, the Republic of Kosovo officially joined the International Olympic Committee, which means that its national team can now compete in the Olympic Games.

When it comes to the economy, the Kosovars need to tackle numerous challenges: dramatic economic situations, unfavorable economic structures, a high unemployment rate, as well as significant dependency on foreign aid. Furthermore, the country deals with rampant corruption and organized crime. With a total area of 11,000 square meters, it is one of the poorest regions in Europe. Its population is estimated at 1.8 million, one third of whom lives below the poverty threshold while over 30% of the active population is unemployed. Among those aged 15–24 years, as many as two-thirds are deprived of stable employment. Kosovo's GDP per capita stands at \$3,500 USD. The economy is dominated by mining, agriculture, forestry and cattle husbandry. The main natural resources are brown coal, zinc, lead, and nickel.

In politics, one of the challenges Kosovo's current leaders face is that of their pasts, especially those in the ranks of the Kosovo Liberation Army. This has generated much controversy as the army has been accused of organized crime, drug and arms dealing, as well as selling transplant organs in the years 1998–2000.

Reconciliation and laying a foundation for a common state call for reliable investigations and due justice for the crimes committed on both sides. Obtaining such consensus will likely pave the way for

Following Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence, it has since been mainly preoccupied with its recognition by the international community.

Kosovo's international recognition. Until June 2018, the most serious criminal cases were handled by EULEX, the EU's police mission, co-responsible for the security and protection of the northern borders in cooperation with Serbian border guards.

The ongoing border talks between presidents Aleksandar Vučić (Serbia) and Hashim Thaçi (Kosovo) were the subject of heated debates among members of the international community with such well-known figures like Federica Mogherini taking a stance. Trading northern parts of Kosovo with its center in Kosovska Mitrovica for the now Serbian Preševo Valley is hoped to remedy current border tensions. Interestingly, the proposal seems to have caused more controversy among the third parties than the two countries involved. At present, Mitrovica, or Kosovska Mitrovica for the Serbs, is a symbol of a divided country. This half-Kosovar and half-Serbian town is the centerpiece of this long-lasting conflict, which was touchingly epitomized by the case of the Ibar River Bridge, until-recently blocked, thus dividing not only two river banks, but also ethnic communities.

Robert Rajczyk ■
September 24, 2018

HOSTILE PROPAGANDA: HOW IT AFFECTS LITHUANIAN SOCIETY

LAURYNAS KASČIŪNAS, ALBERT KOMAR

State-sponsored propaganda, which in recent years has become a more visible phenomenon, is never spread just for its own reasons.

It is either part of a broader foreign policy toolbox or part of the new hybrid warfare, thus pursuing deeper goals.

American scholars Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell defined propaganda as a “deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.”

Propaganda is not a spontaneous activity, but rather a well-thought-out and planned strategy, thus its definition only contains those propaganda activities that can

be classified as “deliberate”. Moreover, propaganda is an attempt to create a certain state for a specific audience towards which the propagandist has clear pre-set aims. Succeeding in this attempt is the goal of propaganda. Specifically, propaganda can be dedicated to forming an understanding or perspective (by using and manipulating speech, slogans and symbols), manipulating awareness (by forming cognitive skills useful for the propagandist) or impacting behaviour (by focusing not only on forming a specific mode of thinking and habits, but

also on the capacity to “activate” the target group and exploit its actions).

Propaganda can be compared to radiation. Propaganda, just as radiation, can slowly affect society, which, for a long time, does not even recognise that it is being affected. Therefore, the state only turns to its defence system the moment it becomes visible and when perhaps damage has already been inflicted. For example, for more than 20 years, the narrative that Crimea belongs to Russia was pursued by means of soft power. Therefore, when the “little green men” showed up, society in the peninsula did not resist the brutal violations of the most basic international norms in the 21st century.

According to Vytautas Kersanskas, an expert on hybrid threats, propaganda as a phenomenon encompasses a wide variety of manipulation techniques such as overemphasising the facts and making them “breaking news” when they are not, presenting one-sided information, disinformation, etc. All these techniques, including in particular the increased use of fake news, basically serve one goal, i.e. they make people lose hope in the possibility of fully understanding everything and finding out the real truth about the political developments taking place both domestically and internationally. This correlates with the growing distrust in the media and the belief that everyone lies. It is no coincidence that *Russia Today* (RT), the main globally oriented propaganda channel of the Kremlin, uses a “Question more” slogan, by which they mean to infer that “yes, maybe we are lying, but everyone – including your own government, your own media – lies”. People get confused and become dull and apolitical, because they are no longer aware of which side to choose. For propagandists, the expansion of this grey zone that exists in-between the supporters and the adversaries is useful. Firstly, it is much easier to make indifferent and confused people supportive

Propaganda is not a spontaneous activity, but rather a well-thought-out and planned strategy, thus its definition only contains those propaganda activities that can be classified as “deliberate”.

of propaganda in the long term. Secondly, an apathetic and apolitical society is perfect for employing other hybrid means to influence the development of the country.

Kersanskas notes that although the last couple of years were marked by an increased level of state-sponsored propaganda, it is still not popular to talk about the manipulation of information as an act of war or part of warfare. A peace-time mentality is still leading the narrative; therefore states are quite reluctant to act against this threat. This is also visible in Western democracies where state-sponsored propaganda manages to manipulate the core element of liberal democracy, i.e. the right to personal views and the possibility to express them freely. Therefore, propaganda news outlets become an “alternative opinion” in a pluralist society. However, they are strongly coordinated at the political level of the state, which supports them, or they might even be state-owned news networks, as in the case of *Russia Today*. Any attempt to control, limit or ban the spread of propaganda becomes an opportunity to talk about an undemocratic and illiberal act against the freedom of the media, which is why many governments are still afraid to take such action.

Russia has implemented the most integrated system of state-sponsored propaganda in the world. The exact understanding of the Kremlin as to what the media is and what journalists are for has been well represented by Sergei Shoigu, Russia's Minister of Defence, who said the following: "The day has come when we all have to admit that a word, a camera, a photo, the Internet, and information in general have become a yet another type of weapon, yet another component of the armed forces.

This weapon can be used both in a good and in a bad way. This is a weapon that was involved in various events in our country in different years, both in our defeats and in our victories."

Russia has already developed a unique approach to international politics, which can be regarded as "Russian" geopolitical discipline, marked by a certain perception of the world and Russia's place in it. Russian propaganda inevitably relates to the desire to export this perception to foreign countries, incorporating the Russian worldview into the consciousness of the largest audience of foreign citizens possible, legitimising this perception globally, and facilitating the realisation of Russia's foreign policy objectives. After all, a state's influence increases when it becomes the centre of power that formulates concepts and proposes a wording that others adopt or adapt to. Hence, the worldview of that country becomes a socially constructed truth¹. The power centre, which is able to impose its definition of reality, also imposes the political rules of the game.

The goal of the Kremlin's propaganda is to create an image of the Baltic States as "temporary" and "derivative" structures. The constant sticking of such labels as "fake West" and "false Europe" is related to Russia's geopolitical interest in creating

a so-called neutral space between Europe and Russia and maintaining the status of a so-called buffer zone comprising the Baltic States, despite their membership in Euro-Atlantic organizations. There are also attempts to exploit Lithuania's socio-economic disadvantages by strengthening the cultural divide within the country as well as in Lithuania's relations with Europe and emphasising the problems of the country's policy on historical memory.

The propaganda image of Lithuania is created by:

- a) Emphasising and hyperbolising the problems of social exclusion and emigration in Lithuania, thus forming an image of a "failed state";
- b) Contrasting historical narratives (especially with regard to the assessment of the consequences of World War II), thereby creating a myth of Lithuania as a neo-fascist state;
- c) Highlighting the myth of alleged distrust in Western allies and the importance of the so-called consensus with Russia;
- d) Supporting the tendencies of closure of national communities, thus encouraging cultural and political fragmentation of Lithuanian society.

MYTH OF LITHUANIA AS A FAILED STATE

In an interview with a US television channel in September 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that "only 1.5 million people currently live in Lithuania". The Russian leader wanted to make the suggestion that Lithuania is a failed state, which, in just over two decades of independence, has lost more than half of its population². Yes, the emigration

¹ Polegkyi, O., Changes in Russia foreign policy discourse and concept of "Russian World", PECOB's Papers Series, Wrocław University, 2011, p. 10.

² BNS, „V. Putinas interviu JAV žiniasklaidai dukart sumažino Lietuvos gyventojų skaičių“, September 29, 2015, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/lithuania/v->

problem is real in Lithuania and, compared to 1990, there are about 900,000 less people living in Lithuania today. However, the manipulation of data forms a negative image of the country both in the eyes of the US, a strategic partner of Lithuania, and in certain segments of Lithuanian society. In addition, according to the Russian state news agency *Interfax*, Putin invites Lithuanians to immigrate to the Kaliningrad Region³. It should be noted that the alleged narrative of only 1.5 million people living in Lithuania has been repeated several times by Putin in various media outlets.

Russian propaganda also focuses on social problems. Moreover, the vulnerability of post-Soviet states also increases due to the phenomenon of Soviet nostalgia among the population. This is particularly manipulated by Russian propagandists, who maintain that the life in Russia today could be associated with the life that existed in the Soviet Union (hence, for example, the narrative “life was better when we lived together with Russians”). In the Baltic States, the aim is to set people against each other and divide the public by consistently repeating the message that the development of the country has been disturbed, that it is unable to overcome the problems faced by the most vulnerable social groups, and that injustice is thriving. The magnitude of actual problems is stressed by emphasising negative tendencies, which creates a negative atmosphere, undermines confidence in the authorities of the country, and diminishes a sense of pride in the state and its history. In such a medium, society becomes vulnerable⁴.

putinas-interviu-jav-ziniasklaidai-dukart-sumazino-lietuvos-gyventoju-skaiciu.d?id=69130444.

³ 15min.lt, „Vladimiras Putinas lietuvius kviečia emigruoti į Rusiją“, July 26, 2015, <http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/aktualu/pasaulis/vladimiras-putinas-lietuvius-kviecia-emigruoti-i-rusija-57-518010>.

⁴ Martišius, M., „Komunikacinės progresijos konstravimas informaciniame kare“, *Žurnalistikos*

Today the Lithuanian view of history of World War II recounts the role of the Soviets as being equal to that of the Nazis.

LITHUANIA AS A NEO-FASCIST STATE

After the restoration of Lithuania's independence, there was no space in the narrative of Lithuanian history for the cult of the heroic Red Army and its “glorious” victory in the so-called Great Patriotic War⁵. Today the Lithuanian view of history of World War II recounts the role of the Soviets as being equal to that of the Nazis. In other words, the USSR is perceived as an aggressor which illegally occupied Lithuania, while the people who opposed the Soviet occupation and were participants of the anti-Soviet resistance or underground non-violent resistance (dissident movement) are treated as the new heroes of Lithuania. This narrative of Lithuanian history contradicts the cult of the so-called Russian heroic victory in World War II.

It is precisely for this reason that the Kremlin's historical policy towards Lithuania has relied heavily on the attempt to persuade that the Soviet occupation was a voluntary step made by the Lithuanian government and its people. There is also widespread questioning of the memory of the restoration of independence and other important dates of the Lithuanian state. Various media outlets are employed

tyrimai, 2012, nr. 5, p. 183–205, <http://www.zurnalai.vu.lt/zurnalistikos-tyrimai/article/view/1800/1071>.

⁵ Oficiali dabartinės Rusijos (kaip ir SSRS) istoriografija nuo Antrojo pasaulinio karo, pradėto SSRS ir Vokietijos sutartu Europos padalijimu, atskiria Vokietijos ir SSRS karo veiksmus, pradėtus 1941-06-22, neprisiimant atsakomybės už Lenkijos padalijimą, Žiemos karą, Baltijos valstybių okupaciją.

When Lithuania joined the European Union and NATO, Russian propaganda started creating an image that Lithuania was not an independent state and did not carry out sovereign policies.

to downplay partisan activities, promote nostalgia for the Soviet past, criticize the aspirations to investigate Soviet crimes, and improve the image of those who worked in the Soviet structures and those responsible for mass deportations.

One of the most frequently attacked episodes of Lithuanian history is the tragedy of January 13, 1991 caused by the bloody attack of the Soviet Army against the peaceful people of Lithuania, who defended the recently restored independence of the country. Even in 2007, the Russian broadcaster *First Baltic Channel* showed a TV program telling a distorted story of the events of January 13. After repeated reports of such slandering information in 2013, when the commemoration of a freedom fighter of Lithuania was defamed, the channel was banned.

This decision was taken after the TV program *The Man and the Law* (Rus. Человек и закон) aired on the *First Baltic Channel* in October 2013⁶. The program suggested that on January 13, 1991 not a single man was killed by Soviet soldiers

and that there were allegedly evidence that the killing was planned in advance by the Lithuanian leadership. In particular, the program tried to emphasise that all currently accused persons are Russians only, thereby demonstrating the allegedly existent tension between Lithuanians and Russians. The program tried to make an impression that the circumstances of the events of January 13, 1991 and the ongoing pre-trial investigation were motivated by national hatred. As in the case of assessing the history of World War II, Russia accused Lithuania of radical nationalism. The aim was to delegitimize the Lithuanian government with the introduction of a conspiracy theory, maintaining that it was the Lithuanian government that was responsible for the victims whose deaths were supposed to incite hatred for the then legitimate Soviet government.

Similarly, other historical topics are also manipulated. For example, there is particular emphasis on the history of the Vilnius Region to create confrontation between Lithuania and Poland. In this case, the merits of the Soviet Union in “returning” the Vilnius Region to Lithuania are emphasised⁷.

INCREASING THE DISTRUST IN WESTERN SECURITY GUARANTEES

When Lithuania joined the European Union and NATO, Russian propaganda started creating an image that Lithuania was not an independent state and did not carry out sovereign policies. According to propagandists, even before Lithuania's accession to the EU and NATO, the country went through a Brussels-Washington controlled path of policy making. This narrative is reinforced by depicting Lithuania as a pseudo-member of the European Union and NATO in order to convey the impression that other members of the organizations

⁶ „Человек и закон“, Youtube, October 4, 2013, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Pb6bwNNODM>.

⁷ Regnum, «Красная армия и Армия Крайова: Как 71 год назад освобождали Вильнюс», July 15, 2015, <https://regnum.ru/news/polit/1942284.html>.

would turn their backs on the Baltic States in the event of an emergency⁸.

Lithuania is portrayed as an instigator of tension in the region which artificially increases the threat posed by Russia. The outrage stemming from Russian propaganda that emphasised social problems was caused, in particular, by a statement made by the President of Lithuania maintaining that Russia is a terrorist state and that the Baltic States are, therefore, asking for permanent deployment of NATO forces. There were widespread Russian disinformation campaigns reacting to other events. For example, the establishment of a joint Lithuanian, Polish, and Ukrainian brigade was interpreted by the Russian media as a means of sending conscripts of the Lithuanian Army to fight in Ukraine.

Russian propaganda related to the activities of the Baltic States in NATO has become especially active. In July 2016, after the NATO Summit in Warsaw took a decision to deploy an international battalion in each of the Baltic States, Russian authorities reacted immediately and stated that the act was considered to be NATO's way of further expanding its borders towards Russia. It was announced that Russia, in response to such actions, would increase its forces along the borders with the Baltic States and in the Kaliningrad Region. Although official statements by the Kremlin, as always, are distinguished by laconic rhetoric, the Russian state media outlined the NATO Summit in Warsaw more visually. In one of the most popular Russian news program *Vesti* (Rus. Вести, which is also broadcast in Lithuania), Dmitry Kiselyov said that NATO's approach to its relations with Russia has changed substantially after the Warsaw Summit. He maintained that "Russia was no longer a partner, but rather a target",

and plans to create new bases, headquarters and airports, which were discussed at the summit, and "left no doubt that NATO was preparing for a war". The Russian message was very clear, i.e. NATO's deterrence measures were causing tension in the region, promoting a so-called arms race and reducing the security of Lithuania and other Baltic States. In this context, however, it is concealed that the arms race in the region had already begun starting from the very moment Russia turned Kaliningrad into its military forefront in the space of just a few years, thus threatening to separate the Baltic States from the Alliance's defence system.

On the one hand, such statements are aimed to support the hostility of Russian society towards the West. On the other, they seek to provoke anxiety and fear in Russia's neighbours and NATO member countries, including the people of Lithuania, thus forcing them to feel that they are in danger of war which they do not want at all. Propagandists are deceiving the people of Lithuania and trying to portray, in particular, the US as a state merely interested in maintaining its global hegemony. Under the circumstances of such rhetoric, some political movements are now claiming that Lithuania has once again been "occupied" by alien military forces.

Russian media also attempts to portray the contradiction that arises between the political elite of Lithuania with regards to NATO and its relations with Russia. A lot of attention was paid to the statements made by Commissioner Vytenis Andriukaitis highlighting that there should be more negotiations with Russia. In June 2016, Andriukaitis criticised Linas Linkevičius, Lithuania's Minister of Foreign Affairs, for his "unfriendly" rhetoric concerning Russia⁹. The news agency *Baltnews.ru* stated

⁸ Воробьев, В., «Пентагон: НАТО не в состоянии защитить Прибалтику», June 22, 2016, <https://rg.ru/2016/06/22/pentagon-natone-v-sostoianii-zashchitit-pribaltiku.html>.

⁹ Baltnews.lt, «Еврокомиссар ответил главе МИД Литвы: с Россией нужно вести переговоры», June 16, 2016, http://baltnews.lt/vilnius_news/20160616/1015694844.html.

that Andriukaitis's moderate position in relation to Russia did not coincide with the strict official position of Vilnius. It was also mentioned that Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, was criticised by Linkevičius when the latter expressed his concern for the lack of Europe's efforts to renew and improve relations with Russia at an economic forum in Saint Petersburg. The purpose of highlighting such disagreements in the Russian media is to convey the impression that the EU is fragmented and that the central EU government would be willing to negotiate if it were not for certain states, such as Lithuania, who have an interest in increasing the military contingent of NATO in their territories in order to deter Russia. The Russian media portray Lithuania as an allegedly uncompromising state which is unwilling to sit at the negotiating table and is actively increasing its military potential at the same time.

PROMOTION OF EXCLUSION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES FROM LITHUANIAN SOCIETY

Unlike in Latvia or Estonia, all inhabitants in Lithuania were immediately granted Lithuanian citizenship after the restoration of the country's independence. Therefore, for a long time Russia had no reason to speak about discrimination against local Russians in Lithuania. In Estonia and (in particular) in Latvia, the problem of non-citizens (stateless persons) is still widely publicised by Russian propaganda. The Baltic States in the Russian press are constantly portrayed as countries where the rights of Russian-speaking people are violated and their interests ignored. An example of such a narrative is the report of Russian media sources on the alleged Russian language ban in Latvia¹⁰.

¹⁰ Delfi, „Rusijos žiniasklaida dėl Latvijos sukėle istorijos Banga“, January 19, 2015, <http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/world/rusijos-ziniasklaida-del-latvijos-sukele-isterijos-banga.d?id=66942210>.

The Russian community in Lithuania is comparatively small and cannot be mobilised to cause cultural and political fragmentation in Lithuania. That is why the Kremlin's goal is to unite, both politically and culturally, the Russian and Polish communities based on the worldview of the so-called Russian World and by promoting the Soviet nostalgia still felt by those communities¹¹. The results of a sociological survey titled *Who is guilty for the conflict in Ukraine*, conducted by the BNS in 2014, show that Russian propaganda messages about the events in Ukraine resonate in the national communities of Lithuania. Apparently, the share of Poles and Russians who believed that either Ukraine itself or the West were to be blamed for the conflict in Ukraine was significantly larger than that of Lithuanians¹².

In Lithuania, the creation of a civic platform favourable to the Kremlin is also aimed at uniting national minorities by putting emphasis on domestic policy issues. One way to achieve this is by highlighting the importance of education of national minorities. Russian mass information sources maintain that the two national minorities of Lithuania have been merging for years now and that, since the Soviet times, not only Russians, but also many Poles have acquired education in Russian language¹³. The problem is quantitatively raised by placing the Polish and Russian minorities into a historically and politically common national group, which allegedly suffers from a national government, so that the issue of the Lithuanian Poles can

¹¹ Ramonaitė, A., Maliukevičius, N., Degutis, M., Tarp Rytų ir Vakarų: Lietuvos visuomenės geokultūrinės nuostatos (Studija), Vilnius, Versus Aureus, 2007, p. 3, http://www.civitas.lt/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/geokulturines_nuostatos_isplestine_santrauka.pdf.

¹² BNS, „Apklausa: Lietuvos tautinės mažumos apie įvykius Ukrainoje sužino iš Rusijos.“, January 7, 2015, <http://www.lrt.lt/naujienos/lietuvoje/2/88819>.

¹³ RuBaltic.ru, «Нацменьшинства в Литве — заложники геополитики», December 17, 2015, <http://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/171215-natsmeshinstva-litva/>.

thus become a matter to be addressed by not only Lithuania and Poland but also by Russia. For the Russian-speaking Lithuanian Poles, who feel nostalgic for the Soviet past but do not know much about Poland, Russia claims to be their shelter abroad with its concept of the so-called Russian World.

It should be noted that pro-Kremlin Russian online press (for example, *Rubalt.ru*) emphasises that the national minorities in Lithuania are allegedly hostages of geopolitics and that the multi-polar international system should be more favourable to the situation of such minorities. In this context, Russia's support for the narratives of a neo-fascist Lithuanian state and depiction of both NATO and the US as aggressive policy makers serve as a means of deepening the divide between the national communities living in Lithuania and the Lithuanian state and weakening the integration of Lithuanian society.

HOW TO DEAL WITH PROPAGANDA?

In seeking a recipe that would limit the impact of propaganda, it is, first and foremost, important to answer the question of whether we can equate the impact of propaganda with the spread of Russian media or Russian cultural production in Lithuania. According to sociologist Ainė Ramonaitė, seeing propaganda messages does not necessarily mean an acceptance of or reliance on them. Well-thought-out propaganda tries to exploit the prevailing attitudes of society, reinforcing them or linking them with other propaganda messages. This means that the prevalence of every Russian-friendly message cannot be regarded as a consequence of Russian propaganda¹⁴.

¹⁴ Ainė Ramonaitė, „(Ne)atsparumas Rusijos propagandai: priežastys ir padariniai“ iš A. Ramonaitė et al „Kas eitų ginti Lietuvos?“, Vilnius, 2018, p. 139.

This brings us to another question concerning practical policy: how much do the measures proposed in Lithuania, such as the ban on Russian TV channels or the restriction of Russian production on Lithuanian television channels, make sense? The answer to this question depends on the theory we choose to apply. In this case, two different theories compete with each other, i.e. the theory about the effect of communication and the theory about the model of resonance.

The theory about the effects of communication says that the repeated hearing of a certain message affects the recipient. For example, a 2007 investigation of the impact of the FOX news channel on US voters revealed that watching the channel convinced from 3% up to 28% of non-Republican supporters to vote for the Republican Party. In this case, it was concluded that even if a person rationally perceives the channel they are watching as biased, hearing a certain message repeatedly still affects that person.

The theory about the resonance model claims otherwise, i.e. the effect of a message depends on its compatibility with the person's beliefs. If the message corresponds to the person's beliefs, the message is accepted and reinforces the opinion that already exists, and if not, the message is rejected as biased, unreliable, etc. In other words, propaganda is effective when it is based on existing beliefs. The image of the world created by the Kremlin seems persuasive when it fits and “resonates” with the person's internal attitudes, familiar symbols, and usual cultural and social norms. Therefore, the most important task in the fight against hostile propaganda is to find a way to change that framework which employs all interpretations of empirical (real or false) facts, familiar symbols, and normal cultural and social norms.

A poll conducted in Lithuania asked the people surveyed who was to be blamed for the military conflict in eastern Ukraine. Of non-Russian channel viewers, 67% blamed Russia for the war in eastern Ukraine. Of those who sometimes watch Russian channels, 60% indicated Russia as the main culprit behind the war in eastern Ukraine. And 46% of viewers who watch Russian channels every day mentioned Russia as the main reason for the war in Ukraine. There is a difference found between the groups of television viewers, but it is not as significant as one could expect if the theory of communication effects was absolutely correct¹⁵.

According to Ramonaitė, an assessment of the Soviet era helps to explain the resistance to propaganda much better than an analysis of the effect of watching Russian TV channels. In other words, the essential difference lies in whether or not a person values the life in the Soviet Union (be it a better or a worse one) more than the life in a free and independent Lithuania. The Soviet-era assessment involves a change in the standard of living by taking into account the person's status in the Soviet era and how their social status changed after the restoration of independence. The more one appreciates the Soviet era, the more often one watches Russian TV and not the reverse. Sociological surveys show that during the 2012 economic crisis, 42% of Lithuanians said the Soviet past was better than the present reality. Now the figure stands at around 25 %. This shows that the reduction of social exclusion, strengthening of the middle class, and creation of a welfare state are essential policies to strengthening the public's resilience to propaganda.

On the other hand, there is no need to reject the arguments of the theory of the effects of communication in that the repeated hearing

of a certain message may have a certain impact. Lithuania has made some policy decisions that take into account these arguments. For example, the ban of two Russian TV channels resulted in the viewing duration of Russian TV by one third in the space of just a few years¹⁶.

However, the limitation of Russian TV program brought another problem, the spread of Russian production on Lithuanian TV channels. In the period of one week in January 2007, Lithuanian channels had broadcast 79 hours of Russian production, while the figure soared to 151 hours in 2016 and 198 hours in 2017. Most of this production consisted of Russian TV shows and movies. On some Lithuanian TV channels, almost half of the production was made in Russia. Taking into account the fact that almost all Russian productions are broadcast with Lithuanian subtitles, it was expedient to change the existing legal regulation and establish that television program broadcast in non-EU languages are to be translated into the Lithuanian language with either Lithuanian voice-over or dubbing. Currently, broadcasters can choose between a translation and a display with Lithuanian subtitles. Given that translation is expensive, subtitling is usually chosen as the cheaper option. In the absence of such choice, the cost of broadcasting Russian production would increase and also the emotional connection with this production will decrease. It is, therefore, believed that some broadcasters could reduce the expenses of such production by instead offering more European products to their television viewers.

Laurynas Kasčiūnas, Albert Komar ■

October 15, 2018

¹⁵ Ainė Ramonaitė, „(Ne)atsparumas Rusijos propagandai: priežastys ir padariniai“ iš A. Ramonaitė et al „Kas eitų ginti Lietuvos?“, Vilnius, 2018, p. 153.

¹⁶ Verslo žinios, Apklausą rodo rusiškų televizijų populiarumo mažėjimą Lietuvoje, February 1, 2017, <https://www.vz.lt/verslo-aplinka/2017/02/01/apklausa-rodo-rusisku-televiziju-populiarumo-mazejima-lietuvoje>.

WARSAW-VILNIUS RELATIONS AS A COMMON MATTER: THE POLISH ETHNIC MINORITY IN LITHUANIA

PAWEŁ OZDOBA

“Lithuania, my country!” – these words were written by Adam Mickiewicz, a Polish poet and independence activist, in the first half of the 19th century to refer to his homeland. While today, despite much political turmoil and after many years, similar exclamations can still be heard from the 200,000 or so Poles living in Lithuania.

Unfortunately, members of the Polish minority in Lithuania often face procedural difficulties and discrimination on the part when dealing with local authorities, which have been noticed in Warsaw. Meanwhile, few are aware that outside Poland's current borders there are still some cities inhabited by Poles who constitute 60–70% of their population.

For instance, such phenomenon can be observed in Lithuania, in particular in the Vilnius Region. As confirmed by official statistics, the Polish community in Lithuania is perceived as an inseparable element of the country's demography. It is estimated that one quarter of the inhabitants of the Vilnius Region claim to be of Polish nationality while the vast majority of them consider themselves



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RASOS CEMETERY, VILNIUS, LITHUANIA, FEBRUARY 17, 2018. PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND ANDRZEJ DUDA AND HIS WIFE AGATA KORŃHAUSER DUDA DURING A WREATH-LAYING CEREMONY AT THE MAUSOLEUM OF THE MOTHER AND THE SON'S HEART, WHERE THE HEART OF MARSHAL JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI'S IS ENSHRINED.

to be patriots who express a vivid interest in Poland's current situation and engage in both social and cultural activities aiming to maintain national traditions.

As a result of some political decisions made right after the Second World War, Poland was deprived of the Vilnius Region. Even several years later, this issue keeps inflaming the hearts of many Poles. The region's charm, traditions and history have been repeatedly immortalized both in Polish literature as well as in film. Poland's relations with the Vilnius Region are evidenced by such symbols as the Gate of Dawn – along with the icon of Our Lady – that constantly attract many Poles living in various parts of the world and numerous groups of Polish pilgrims. In addition, both countries seem united by the fate of many distinguished Poles who considered Lithuania to be their home. This includes Marshal Józef Piłsudski, who played a key role in regaining Poland's independence, Jesuit Andrzej Bobola, declared Saint of the Catholic Church, as well as poets Czesław Miłosz – awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature – and Adam Mickiewicz who is regarded as one of Poland's most talented poets.

However, such rich and beautiful past traditions or common interests could be translated into equal rights for the Polish minority in Lithuania. And despite the fact that Lithuania signed the Treaty of Friendly and Neighbourly Cooperation with Poland in 1994, as well as both countries belonging to the EU, Poles living in the Vilnius Region often report abusive practices and unequal treatment by the Lithuanian authorities.

FEELING AT HOME: 700 YEARS OF POLISH PRESENCE IN LITHUANIA

First, it should be noted that Lithuania is home to many Poles. These people are neither immigrants nor displaced people as many of them have been living in the Vilnius Region for several generations. Moreover, the first migrations of Poles to the territory of today's Lithuania took place as far back as 700 years ago with some important political declarations dating back to 1385; their subsequent decisions resulted in the creation of a common state organism. Under the Act of Kreva, the Grand Duke of Lithuania Jogaila (later Władysław II Jagiełło) committed himself to marry the Queen of Poland Jadwiga and to convert to

Roman Catholicism. In addition, Jagiełło was obliged to attach both Lithuanian and Ruthenian lands to the Crown of Poland. While the Lithuanian sovereigns were preparing themselves to adopt the Roman Catholic religion in 1387, an increased number of Poles migrated to Lithuania. At that time, not only did Polish priests and monks come to the lands northeast of the then-Polish Kingdom; the territories also became the destination for numerous townspeople, officials and soldiers.

The agreement concluded in Kreva fell shortly after the death of Queen Jadwiga; nonetheless, close relations between the two countries were constantly maintained and refreshed by subsequent acts such as the Pact of Vilnius and Radom, the Pact of Horodło, and the Union of Grodno (1432); the latter of which specifically aimed to rebuild good relations between the two countries.

ONE STATE – TWO NATIONS

Nevertheless, the glory times of both Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland were yet to come. On July 1, 1569, the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland and the Great Duchy of Lithuania reached an agreement in the city of Lublin, also referred to as the Union of Lublin. Under the treaty, a powerful state – the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – could be formed and united with a common ruler, coat of arms and currency. In addition, both countries shaped their foreign and military policy with the aim of protecting their common interests. The decisions made by the rulers of both countries exerted a very large impact on the ever-increasing number of Poles in Lithuania. At that time, both peoples could be connected by common interests and the state, whose development became a priority for Poles and Lithuanians.

It is noteworthy that national awareness in the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland kept developing in the mid-16th century;

Lithuania's capital became one of the most important cultural centres of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the country's fifth largest city.

meanwhile, the magnates and Lithuanian nobility were undergoing gradual polonization. Thanks to the increasing popularity of the Polish language, it was possible to conduct cultural integration within the structures of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In addition, the development of the common state fostered further migration processes. The disintegration of this powerful state organism did not occur until the Third Partition of Poland in 1795; yet, in spite of this Polishness in Lithuania still managed to survive until modern times.

Following Poland's return to the map of Europe, the state authorities made some political decision related to the creation of Central Lithuania, which eventually incorporated the Vilnius Region into Poland's territory. At the time, the Vilnius Voivodship consisted of about 1.3 million inhabitants; 60% of whom were Poles, while Lithuania's capital became one of the most important cultural centres of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the country's fifth largest city. Poland lost the Vilnius Region again as a result of political changes that occurred after World War II. However, despite several dramatic events as well as some difficulties in integrating these areas within the USSR, the Polish community, whose representatives largely remained in their homeland, kept expressing a strong sense of national consciousness.

In the remaining parts of this article, there is no more room to further discuss the history and development of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; nonetheless, such a brief historical outline may help readers to understand – at least to some extent – the reasons behind the Polish presence in Lithuania’s present territory.

THE RUSSIAN INVADER TO REINFORCE ANTI-POLISH SENTIMENTS

The problems of the Polish community in Lithuania did not emerge overnight. The fall of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the end of the 18th century opened the way for growing anti-Polish sentiments in Lithuania. The situation got more complicated in the second half of the 19th century after the failure of the January Uprising; at that time, it was forbidden to use the Polish language on the territory of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania while Poles were treated with hostility. The conflict between Poles and Lithuanians was additionally exacerbated by the Russian invader. A similar state of affairs was maintained even after Poland regained its independence; even if a large part of the Vilnius Region could be then found within the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Poles living on the Soviet-controlled territories encountered much more serious obstacles. In addition, the interwar period was marked by an ever-increasing level of de-Polonization, which eventually resulted in closing Polish schools and cultural institutions. To make matters worse, Poles could no longer use their surnames, and were obliged to use Lithuanian versions. Under Lithuania’s citizenship law, members of the Polish minority were deprived of many rights and could not practice in many professional fields including medicine and law. Some of the above-mentioned problems are faced by Poles even today.

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST POLES IN LITHUANIA

Today, despite their common history, Poles in Lithuania often stress that they feel discriminated against. Although the Lithuanian authorities keep insisting on the importance of the Polish minority in some official statements, many Polish nationals are constantly facing various difficulties, as evidenced by some issues related to language and terminology. For instance, Lithuania’s State Language Act of 1995 provides that all inscriptions in the Republic of Lithuania shall be conducted in the national language. As a consequence, it is not possible to have Polish names of cities and towns – even for those inhabited mostly by representatives of the Polish minority – on road signs. In addition, under present law, it is prohibited to use Polish spelling in the names of Polish schools, as evidenced by the 2008 case where in the Lithuanian town of Lavaryshki, located in the Vilnius Region, the Polish community intended to name Emilia Plater – a participant of the November Uprising – the patron of the school. However, local authorities decided that this would be possible only if the school’s name was written in the Lithuanian version “Emilija Plateryte”. The Polish community living in the Vilnius district referred the case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which was eventually dismissed due to procedural errors.

POLES FORCED TO USE LITHUANIAN NAMES AND SURNAMES

Under present law, Poles living in Lithuania cannot use the Polish versions of their first and last names. Instead, they are forced to use the Lithuanian versions of their names, which usually consists of adding the masculine suffixes “us” or “ius” and feminine endings “aitė” or “ienie” to all Polish surnames. In 2009, the Constitutional Court examined an application of Lithuania’s Seimas (the legislative branch of government) concerning the possibility of writing both the name and surname



ANTAKALNIS CEMETERY, VILNIUS, LITHUANIA, MARCH 9, 2018. POLAND'S PRIME MINISTER MATEUSZ MORAWIECKI DURING A WREATH-LAYING CEREMONY AT THE MONUMENT COMMEMORATING POLISH SOLDIERS WHO DIED IN THE POLISH-BOLSHEVIK WAR.

in the national language; regardless, the final ruling did not turn out satisfactory for the Polish minority. According to the court, the Polish form might be included in official documents, such as in passports, but it could be treated only in terms of its auxiliary role whereas the Lithuanian version would still be recognized as the only official form. Members of the Polish minority claim that the difficulties in using their own first and last names constitute a deliberate act on part of the Lithuanian authorities.

NOT ALL POLES ARE ABLE TO RESTITUTE THEIR PROPERTY

Poles living in Lithuania point out that the local authorities do not fulfil the basic provisions of the Treaty of Friendly and Neighbourly Cooperation. Another example of gross negligence, aiming to discriminate against the Polish minority, is the lack of solutions to some matters regarding the restitution of property lost by Poles as a result of Soviet decisions. The inhabitants of the Vilnius Region argue that a very large number of applications for the return of nationalized property are still to be considered. Moreover, representatives of the Polish minority have noticed a trend, according to which Lithuanian citizens are provided with preferential treatment as their applications are examined much more quickly.

COMMUNITY THREATENED WITH ONGOING RUSSIFICATION

Poles in the Vilnius Region appear afraid not only of being discriminated against by the Lithuanian authorities but also of the ongoing process of Russification, understood in terms of imposing Russian culture onto the public. According to the Lithuanian census of 2011, the Polish minority numbered slightly over 200,000 while the second largest community, the Russian minority, is estimated at 177,000. In addition, Moscow, which seeks to pursue a “divide and rule” strategy, is oftentimes responsible for the worsening relations between Poles and Lithuanians. After all, weakening both Poland and Lithuania appears beneficial to Russia. A similar policy has already been implemented over many years, both after the Second World War and in the early 1990s when the countries of the region were regaining their independence. It is noteworthy that Polish residents speak overtly about the omnipresent “Russian propaganda” being offered to the Lithuanians via easily accessible Russian media, which seem so popular and numerous that people in Lithuania increasingly tend to prefer them while abandoning Lithuanian-speaking TV stations and newspapers. Unfortunately, it is difficult to counterbalance the

Moreover, members of the Polish minority complain about the difficulties in accessing Polish classical literature, and new editions of contemporary novels in Polish.

strength of the Russian media. Apart from having small budgets, Polish media are often underinvested and fought off by their competitors. Such was the case of the Polish-language daily *Kurier Wileński* (Vilnian Courier); the newspaper, which has been printed in Lithuania since 1990, has recently required subsidies by the Lithuanian state budget. With no support being granted, the only Polish newspaper published in Lithuania struggles and finds it difficult to compete with powerful competition.

NUMBER OF POLISH SCHOOLS IS LIMITED DESPITE THEIR SUCCESSES

Poles living in the Republic of Lithuania also face problems in the domain of education. It is certain that the country has numerous Polish primary and junior high schools but in most cases, they are not subsidized to a satisfactory level. Moreover, Lithuania's government keeps deliberating about the closing of Polish educational institutions. According to the Ministry of Education, there are too few students in Polish schools so their further financing does not appear profitable for the state budget. It needs to be mentioned that these institutions are sometimes financed by the Polish government as well as the Senate of the Republic of Poland. Even if the funds make it possible to purchase the necessary equipment perform minor repairs, the schools remain rather underinvested. The Polish inhabitants in the Vilnius Region

claim that the liquidation of Polish schools is essentially aimed at weakening the Polish minority.

In 2017, five Polish junior high schools ("gymnasiums") were listed among Lithuania's top schools, according to the *Reitingai* magazine. The top positions were occupied by John Paul II Gymnasium in Vilnius, ranked 21st, and Adam Mickiewicz Gymnasium, ranked 42nd.

POLISH SCHOOLS FORCED TO CONDUCT CLASSES IN LITHUANIAN LANGUAGE

There are other difficulties related to education as well. According to information that appeared in July of this year, Lithuanian politicians are seeking to reduce the importance of the Polish language in Polish educational institutions. The bill provides that as much as 60% of such classes would be conducted in the Lithuanian language. If these proposals come into force, they will constitute yet another blow to the Polish education system in Lithuania. In 2011, the authorities introduced similar regulations that obligated Polish schools to run part of their classes in Lithuanian language. This new development may be perceived in terms of another step aimed at undermining the importance of Polish education. In addition, since 2000, Polish students in Lithuania are no longer required to pass Polish language in their secondary school final examinations.

Moreover, members of the Polish minority complain about the difficulties in accessing Polish classical literature, and new editions of contemporary novels in Polish. This problem often occurs in smaller towns, where libraries are full of books only in Lithuanian and Russian. As for Polish editions, they are usually old and worn-out, which discourages young readers. However, thanks to the efforts of non-governmental organizations, some institutions have

managed to provide libraries with new copies in Polish, which translates into an increased readership, according to local residents.

COMMON INTERESTS AS A HOPE FOR BETTER RELATIONS

Despite the fact that Poland and Lithuania have been united by long-lasting traditions and a common history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, their current relations appear extremely complex. Both countries are neighbours and common members of international institutions, including the European Union and NATO. They are also united by shared economic interests as well as some other issues related to both energy and military security. However, relations between Warsaw and Vilnius have somehow cooled over the last few years; this did not change despite the close friendship between the then-Presidents of Poland and Lithuania: Lech Kaczyński and Valdas Adamkus, respectively. Unfortunately, the governments of both countries have not managed to work out any common strategy regarding the Polish minority in Lithuania. Following many years of neglect as well as some external interference in the relations between the two countries, the Polish-Lithuanian alliance has so far failed to bring about satisfactory results. Therefore, the position of Poles living in Lithuania has gradually weakened while their potential is no longer capitalised upon.

POLISH NATIONAL MINORITY TO BRING BOTH COUNTRIES TOGETHER

Many argue that the period of coolness in Polish-Lithuanian relations is slowly fading away, which may ultimately translate into a stronger partnership on many levels. Friendship between the two countries could be additionally tightened by the patriotic and extremely active Polish community in Lithuania whose members have repeatedly signalled their willingness to participate in any possible talks. In addition, some

representatives of the Polish minority living in the Vilnius Region have noticed an improvement in the relations between Warsaw and Vilnius. The same can be said about the increased level of trust between the two partners. Thanks to a mutual understanding and fight for common interests, both countries can be economically stronger and more secure. The first serious cues about the potential will to strengthen mutual cooperation appeared at the turn of 2017 and 2018, which were accompanied by a debate on the implementation of the Three Seas Initiative policy inaugurated by Poland's President Andrzej Duda. Moreover, the Lithuanian army participated in the celebrations of the National Day of Remembrance of the Cursed Soldiers. This was the second time that the Lithuanian army participated in Wolf's Trail Run, which was met by great enthusiasm by Lithuania's Polish community.

A BETTER FUTURE IS POSSIBLE TOGETHER

A possible thaw in Polish-Lithuanian relations – as well as a will to undertake some multidimensional cooperation – raises hope for building a new and better future. However, it is necessary to take decisive steps that will seek to strengthen the role of the Polish minority in Lithuania and its empowerment. The Polish authorities in Warsaw cannot take such decisions unilaterally. It is also vital to engage the Lithuanian government to further cooperate. The final outcome will appear beneficial not only for Poland and Lithuanian but also for the Polish community whose links to the Vilnius Region as well as their attitude can be described by the lyrics of the song by Polish-Lithuanian politician and musicologist Gabriel Jan Mincewicz: *Vilnius, my beloved land! I will not exchange anything for you, let me live with you and let me die!*

Paweł Ozdoba ■
September 1, 2018

WHY DESTROY THE NATION STATE?

KRZYSZTOF RAK

Neoliberals, who seem fully committed to fighting against any manifestations of nationalism, do not know what they are doing. Their victory would be considered tantamount to destroying all foundations of our social life. Deprived of a nation state organism, Western societies are destined to plunge into unimaginable chaos.

AD HITLERUM

An enlightened neoliberal establishment, until recently predominant in the West, eventually put nationalism forward as the main enemy of the system, which is why it aimed to fight against its two most important creations: the nation and the nation state. However, its arguments do not seem particularly sophisticated and take the form of syllogisms, whose construction appears to be very simple, as they tend to associate nationalist attitudes with anti-Semitic behaviours.

This assessment is no exaggeration. For example, to find out more one should read the interview with the famous Polish intellectual and journalist, Adam Michnik, in the German weekly *Der Spiegel* in 2013, where he boasted about his acuity. “Back in 1990, I wrote that nationalism is the last stage of communism: a system of thought that gives simple but wrong answers to complex questions. Nationalism is practically the natural ideology of authoritarian regimes”, he claimed.

And while the German journalist suggested that anti-Semitism tended to run concurrently with nationalism, Michnik did not deny this, while making a small exception for the Poles, noting that “Poland is the only country in Eastern Europe that was able to control itself in this respect”. The Polish intellectual added that “anti-Semitism is no longer socially or politically acceptable in Poland”. Therefore, as evidenced above, the most important phenomenon shaping the socio-political life of the West for the last two centuries has been reduced by neoliberal intellectuals to an extremely simple formula: nationalism is bad as it often consists of showing hatred towards Jews, which ultimately led to the Holocaust. Such an understanding of nationalism is not only an expression of the intellectual immaturity of many members of the western elite; it also constitutes a form of “false awareness” of the European establishment whose representatives are afraid of losing the dominant position they managed to assume after the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, it has little in common with the hitherto achievements of modern social sciences. It is, therefore, first worth starting with current knowledge about nationalism as well as its functions.

FRUITS OF NATIONALISM

Nationalist ideology was founded at the beginning of the 19th century. It developed the concepts of a “nation” as well as a “nation state”, both constituting institutions that keep determining our social existence in a decisive way. Leaving aside all considerations about their historical origin, it can be concluded that they have managed to reach their present mature form as a result of mutual and continuous interactions. Therefore, it is clear that the nation has created the modern state while the state has come up with the idea of the modern nation. Both state nation and nation state incorporate

It developed the concepts of a “nation” as well as of a “nation state”, both constituting institutions that keep determining our social existence in a decisive way.

the same social being – just as two sides of the same coin.

Awareness of such a quasi-tautological relationship between these two notions emerged some time ago as their early traces can be found in the philosophical works of Georg Hegel. This seemed natural for legal positivists living in the second half of the 19th century who had come up with the idea of the current state and law doctrine. Needless to say it was integrated into the classical definition of the state formulated by the Austrian law professor Georg Jellinek. According to this tradition, the nation is referred to as a national state (*staatsvolk*), mainly due to the fact that the state itself is expected to form any nation-creating bonds. The nature of this relationship is best understood by the phenomenon of citizenship. Generally speaking, there are two types of relations: vertical – between the state (state authority) and individual – defined by the recognition of mutual rights and obligations as well as horizontal ones that ultimately create social ties, making each society much more than just a mere collection of individuals. Any national bond is thus assumed in terms of its civic – and political – affiliations, which seems to explain why a state nation may be identified with a

political nation. Naturally, back in the 1930s, the German state imposed a racist interpretation of national ties on their citizens, hence associating nationalism with anti-Semitic attitudes. Interestingly enough, the phenomenon of anti-Semitism is considerably older than nationalism.

INDUSTRIAL HOMOGENIZATION

The core of any relationship between nation and state can be understood thanks to industrialization processes. The concept had previously attracted the attention of Karl Marx who was able to distinguish a factor that would first foster the development of the nation state but also able to destroy it. Nonetheless, Marx's historiosophical predictions did not come true since the working class did not manage to annihilate the existing order based on national institutions. It was not until the 20th century that nationalism emerged victorious from its historical clash with internationalism while the reasons for this unprecedented triumph were convincingly explained in the early 1980s by the philosopher Ernest Gellner in his time-honoured book *Nations and Nationalism*.

Gellner argued that the nation state was necessary to make any industrial society exist as it "lives from constant, uninterrupted development and from continuous improvement". As a result, man became *homo oeconomicus* whose aim is to work more and more efficiently in order to improve both the quality and quantity of production. Such progress can be understood as a continuous change in production methods. It is possible to attain such ideal situations provided that a new type of society is created while its members need to be characterized by a high level of mobility and flexibility so as to meet various challenges resulting from work organization and constantly changing technology. Such shifts occur

mostly due to the existence of a state educational system, which creates a homogeneous national culture that eventually leads to the unification of society members. As its tools, the state uses a monopolistic educational and information policy, which leads to the emergence of a nation whose victorious expansion aims to eliminate all regional differences by means of a gradual, yet inexorable process. The nation disposes of a unified conceptual apparatus, which allows its members to perceive the world in the same way, thus bringing about a national intersubjectivity that eventually stems from such unification.

Cultural homogenization disposes of an overwhelming force, which seems particularly visible even in today's times, thus aspiring to abolish all biological differences between men and women. The traditional division of a man who maintains a family, and a woman who raises children at home, constitutes a huge waste from the point of view of modern industrialisation processes. Accompanied by such a rigid distinction of social roles, any work that generates profit – and therefore also progress – can only be carried out by half of the population. Such is the reason behind the revolutionary transformation of traditional types of family that has taken place over the last two centuries and whose main outcome was providing women with an equal position on the labour market. This was not the last stage, though. According to industrial logic, the family is not the only institution perceived as irrational; basically any social bond appears to be dysfunctional as it binds people together, thus limiting their mobility and posing a threat to homogeneity. Not incidentally, the current stage of industrialisation strongly endorses the "ideal", in its opinion, institution of the so-called 'single'. Such an individual is genderless; not being

related to other society members in any significant way; he or she does not get involved in any deep social relations. Such a person constitutes an incarnation of an alienated human whose emergence had already been anticipated by 19th century philosophers. Apart from having some personal obligations, a single person has no commitments to anyone, which makes him or her a perfect candidate on the labour market. With no bonding commitments, including even biological ones, such a person can fully devoted himself or herself to work much more instead of being distracted by ever-going consumption. Omnipresent in the neoliberal media, singlism constitutes one of the greatest victories of culture over nature, understood as biological processes. It reflects the possibility to take advantage of culture to overcome the biological division of both sexes, as evidenced by gender ideology.

As for Gellner, he believed that unification, which shall be perceived as a prerequisite for further industrialisation processes, could only take place under the conditions of a nation state. Therefore, he was convinced that this institution would be able to fulfil its functions for a long time.

UNIVERSALIST UTOPIA

Gellner's diagnosis dates back to the early 1980s. Less than a decade later, global sociology was dominated by a contradictory view that managed to flourish as a result of the popularity of neoliberalism after the end of the Cold War. Some Western elites believed that the fall of communism was possible due to the triumph of such neoliberal ideology. Yet all simple explanations are characterized by their great persuasive power. As for representatives of neoliberalism, they were convinced that they could solve all social problems provided that free market mechanisms

Some Western elites believed that the fall of communism was possible due to the triumph of such neoliberal ideology.

were allowed to run undisturbed. Their task will be to ensure constant economic progress, making humanity wealthier over time. Individuals will be busy consuming their ever-increasing income; focused solely on fulfilling their own needs, before eventually plunging into the universe of heavenly happiness. In this new brave world, there will no longer be war or social conflicts. It is expected that the history of mankind will reach its end in this respect. Such view was expressed by the philosopher Francis Fukuyama in his book *The End of History*, published in 1992, which dominates the thinking of neoliberal elites to this day.

According to the researcher, nationalism constitutes a relic of history; a phenomenon that needs to be eliminated since it does not allow for the further development of economic forces. As a result, a new society will emerge while its perfect homogeneity will be based on universal principle rather than on a national one. This "new brave world" will be shaped by a new social formation – a homogeneous universal state that will replace the unified nation state. According to Fukuyama, "it must be universal, that is, grant recognition to all citizens because they are human beings, and not because they are members of some particular national, ethnic, or racial group. And it must be homogeneous insofar as it creates a classless society based

Eliminating the dialectic of a slave and a master would be the same as ousting both power and violence from our social life. And such a society would comprehend absolute equality as it would be deprived of any hierarchy.

on the abolition of the distinction between masters and slaves”.

However, such neoliberal Arcadia constitutes a classic example of utopia since it is impossible to build a community based on the idea of humanity. No culture – at least not one that would be able to homogenize – could be created in that respect. Such thesis seems clear provided that we understand that there is neither language that would constitute one common culture of the aforementioned humanity nor would it be elaborated upon in any imaginable future. If Fukuyama’s predictions were to be taken seriously, such a universal state would have to encompass the entire territory of our globe while humanity would become one monoculture. The fact of eliminating the dialectic of a slave and a master would be the same as ousting both power and violence from our social life. And such a society would comprehend absolute equality as it would be deprived of any hierarchy.

Interestingly, as evidenced by the example of Fukuyama, Western utopians have been pursuing the same goal now for many centuries. One may notice that neoliberal thought is tightly connected with Marxist philosophy. The German sociologist also believed that mankind was only a step away from a society where all differences between particular members would be abolished due to an internationalist culture taking control over the world. Such a society would provide individualists with freedom resulting from the lack of social hierarchy.

FALSE AWARENESS

Neoliberals are not aware that the fight against nationalism – which currently takes the form of a clash with nation states – keeps destroying the foundations of Western societies. The liquidation of nation state institutions is not equivalent to the destruction of the present welfare state. Implementing the desired universal homogenous society would result in its members no longer being bound to having to maintain any social ties. In particular, this would result in annihilating any instances of generational solidarity. Working generations would have absolutely no intention to pay for pensioners’ social services. But can anyone imagine our lives without universal health care, a social insurance system or pensions? Today, Europe’s nation state is bound to provide its citizens with social security. Without such institutions, we are all doomed to chaos and unimaginable social catastrophe.

Events of recent years seem to corroborate the validity of Gellner’s reflections – we will still have to wait for a new type of social organization that could replace the homogeneous nation state. This is best evidenced by the failure of a homogenous European state, which is how Gellner would probably describe all instances

of power centralisation and federalization of the European Union, which failed after having been confronted with reality – there is no homogenous culture that connects all those who inhabit the territories between the Atlantic Coast and the Bug River.

What are neoliberals fighting for today? First and foremost, they seek to keep all hitherto influences while their clichés of freedom and equality are only empty ideological slogans used in their constant struggle for political survival. In the course of the last generation, representatives of neoliberalism have become an oligarchy capable of governing Western societies. Neoliberals have focused on implementing the idea of freedom, understood by them as a lack of restrictions. Rather, this was more about lifting limitations of all kinds; not only economic, but also those imposed by family, the state and culture (nation). Therefore, most neoliberals consider the nation state as their main opponent; an institution that shapes any social existence, and by also introducing some restrictions. Such an approach is fiercely combatted by all those who oppose any utopian attitudes. In order to defend all their possessions, they do not hesitate to attack the democratic decisions of societies that seek to deprive the neoliberal oligarchs of their influence. And if democracy manages to overcome oligarchy in one of the states, such a situation is immediately referred to as “the triumph of populism”.

Since the time of Plato, we have been aware that all absolutization of freedom in social life ultimately leads to the oligarchization of democracy and the emergence of social inequalities. Today's Western societies have a strong sense of the ever-growing wealth gap that exists as well as the power of the few privileged individuals over the rest. Interestingly enough, today's

oligarchy consists of the same people that had called for a new society to be created some 30 years ago. Yet Adam Michnik, the aforementioned intellectual, passes for an emblematic figure of the Western European oligarchy as he seeks to defend its *status quo* at all costs.

Nonetheless, any action triggers an appropriate reaction. The neoliberal absolutization of freedom gave the birth to political movements whose aim was to fight for greater social equality. Democracy can only work effectively if both its basic principles of freedom and equality are mutually exclusive while equality may only be implemented in the nation state. Neoliberals oppose this concept while their opponents – hereinafter referred to as neostatists – appear attracted by such idea.

Who will come in first in this political clash? As evidenced by Donald Trump's triumph in the U.S. presidential election, it seems that the neostatists are most likely to win with a pyrrhic victory. Western society is currently tormented by a problem of childlessness caused mainly by the long-term impact that industrial homogenization keeps exerting on families. A woman, whose position on the labour market corresponds to the role of a man, is now less likely to give birth to children than in previous times. Such a demographic catastrophe refers to the situation in which the labour force will be no longer able to provide financial support to pensioners. And this will bring about disturbances to Western Europe's prosperous society, leading to the collapse of nation state institutions. The socio-economic system, based on continuous progress and increasing prosperity, will eventually cease to exist. Thus, it is very likely that industrialization will eventually devour its own child – a nation state.

Krzysztof Rak ■
September 24, 2018

KEY INSTRUMENTS FOR FINANCING INNOVATIONS IN POLAND AS PART OF THE “ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE” POLICY

ADAM STOLARZ

Over many centuries¹, both innovations and inventions have constituted an inherent part of the human creative process. Since the beginning of the 20th century, they have become an essential carrier of economic value, almost as important as traditional resources, such as land, labour and capital, all of them having been mentioned in Adam Smith’s classical economics theory.

¹ Vide: cf. http://www.mariangorynia.pl/prasa/ekonomista/Ekonomista_2013_nr_4.pdf (accessed on: July 30, 2018).



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CRACOW, JUNE 14, 2018. DEPUTY HEAD OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, IZABELA ŻMUDKA (C), PRESIDENT OF THE MANAGEMENT BOARD OF POCZTA POLSKA SA, PRZEMYSŁAW SYPNIEWSKI (L), AND MEMBER OF THE PP SA MANAGEMENT BOARD PAWEŁ SKOWORKO (R) SIGN A LETTER OF INTENT ON COOPERATION BETWEEN NCBR AND POCZTA POLSKA FOR DEVELOPING ELECTROMOBILITY IN POLAND WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE IMPACT '18 CONGRESS IN CRACOW.

Innovation economics focus mostly on such concepts as knowledge, innovation, technology, and entrepreneurship. These factors have stimulated values responsible for the successful growth of many of the world's countries while boosting innovations² constitutes one of the core determinants of a state's prosperous development policy, which basically consists of the following components:

- purchasing innovative products, both by the state and by its subordinate entities, financing their further development or applying new solutions in public sector companies;
- research grants and scholarships, providing support for scientific

societies, subsidizing conferences, financing research and development studies;

- backing business environment institutions, including clusters, incubators, and technology parks;
- initiating research consortia and science parks;
- adapting a higher education system by promoting all research domains being of particular importance to the state's main industries;
- stimulating cooperation between public research institutions and companies;
- supporting technical and business consulting for technology companies;
- disseminating the results of R&D works and information on innovative solutions via mass media and publicly accessible databases.

² Knosala R., (ed.), *Inżynieria produkcji. Kompendium wiedzy [Production engineering. Knowledge compendium]* PWE 2017, p. 324.

INNOVATION POLICY IN POLAND

At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published guidelines concerning innovative activity, which currently constitutes an internationally-accepted methodological standard. These assumptions have also been included in the OSLO MANUAL, a publication containing both definitions and methodological recommendations concerning the following issues:

- expenditure on innovative activity and the types thereof,
- effects of innovation and ways of measuring their impact,
- sources of information for innovation ideas,
- objectives of innovative activity,
- obstacles that hinder or prevent innovation.

The percentage of entities that implement process or product innovations is commonly used when assessing the level of modernization in enterprises. According to Eurostat data in 2006–2008, Poland dropped in out one of the bottom positions among other European Union countries. Germany was ranked 1st while Lithuania was placed as the last country on the³ list. In Europe, the innovation potential of economies is traditionally measured by the Summary Innovation Index (SII), which is published within the framework of the Innovation Union Scoreboard. The total index is calculated as the weighted arithmetic mean of 29 partial indicators for EU countries, Turkey, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, USA, and Japan. The single indicator consists of several partial ones that cover both innovation expenditures as well as results obtained in this respect. This index assumes a value from 0 to 1,

due to the following correlation: a country's level of innovation will be higher provided that its value is closer to 1. According to the Innovation Union Scoreboard 2015 report⁴, Poland, which has achieved a synthetic innovation rate of 0.313, could be ranked among countries with moderate innovativeness, referred to as moderate innovators, being at the same time ahead of Romania (0.204), Bulgaria (0.229), Latvia (0.272) and Lithuania (0.283).

Still, Poland has managed to remain in the group of moderate innovators, taking fifth to last place, while the leading position was maintained by Sweden. The list of Europe's fastest-growing innovators includes such countries as Malta, Latvia, Bulgaria, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Poland. Globally speaking, EU results still seem to give way to the achievements of the United States, Japan and South Korea. The total innovation indicator for Poland amounts to 56.4% of the average indicator for EU countries; such state of affairs has allowed the state to maintain its position among other moderate innovators. Total indicators for EU countries in 2006–2014 confirm a clear upward trend while Poland underlined its quite stable position with a slight increasing tendency.

Unfortunately, according to the European Innovation Scoreboard 2017 report⁵, Poland was ranked 25th out of 28 EU member states, followed only by Croatia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Even this decline did not prevent the country from being part of the group of so-called moderate innovators. According to data from the Global Innovation Index 2017 ranking⁶ (GII 2017), which analyzes 127 world economies, Poland was ranked 38th;

⁴ Vide: cf. <https://badania.parp.gov.pl/polska-w-innovation-union-scoreboard-2015> (accessed on: July 30, 2018).

⁵ Vide: cf.: https://www.rvo.nl/sites/default/files/2017/06/European_Innovation_Scoreboard_2017.pdf (accessed: July 30, 2018).

⁶ Vide: cf.: <https://www.kpk.gov.pl/?p=37250> (accessed on: July 30, 2018).

³ Janowska A.A., Malik R., Wosiek R., Domańska A., *Innowacyjność i konkurencyjność międzynarodowa [Innovation and international competitiveness]*, SGH 2017, p. 58.

simultaneously, it was a global leader in terms of growth in dynamics of R&D expenditures by enterprises in 2008–2015, which resulted in an overall increase of 212 %. As for growth in the state's domestic spending, Poland was put in third position, behind Slovakia and China (with an increase of 107%). Moreover, the report states that during the economic recession in 2008–2009, both research and development expenditures seemed to vary significantly in individual countries. For example, China, India, Mexico, Russia, and Poland did not reduce their spending during the crisis; interestingly, they even intensified it once the recession was over. A similar tendency could be observed in enterprises' R&D expenditures; during the recession, there was a decrease in both domestic and business spending on R&D. Nonetheless, systematic growth was noted compared to the situation before the crisis. According to the authors of the report, such was the case of the economies that traditionally spend much of their funds on research and development, including the United States, Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands as well Chile and Slovakia.

In both rankings, Poland stayed ahead of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, and Slovakia while Croatia and Romania are ranked even lower. In addition, Poland does not submit many international patent applications that can indicate the efficiency of using funds allocated for innovation. Fortunately, Poland is perceived as one of world's leaders in terms of growth dynamics, which looks favourably on the country's future prospects. Nonetheless, the state authorities should make their best efforts to ensure that all of the above-mentioned will be used genuinely to support the idea of setting up the innovative economy, the effective spending on which is one of the pillars of the country's Responsible Development Strategy. Thanks to the wide scope of the activities planned, as well

Since the beginning of 2016, the concept of economic patriotism has become the core exponent of Poland's economic policy, defined by Professor Eryk Łon as the concern for the common good and the further development of the property of Polish citizens and a systematic increase in their incomes.

as special emphasis on the venture capital formula – which seeks to use public funds and resources – it is possible to take advantage of foreign capital as a significant shareholder of the emerging funds.

RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

Since the beginning of 2016, the concept of economic patriotism has become the core exponent of Poland's economic policy, defined by Professor Eryk Łon as the concern for the common good⁷ and the further development of the property of Polish citizens and a systematic increase in their incomes. Such steps

⁷ Łon E., *Patriotyzm gospodarczy [Economic patriotism]*, Zysk i S-ka 2018, p. 127.

can be implemented by the Responsible Development Strategy (RDS), also referred to as the “Morawiecki Plan”; this roadmap for Poland’s development was set up in 2016 under the leadership of Deputy Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, who served as Minister of Economic Development and Chairman of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers in the Cabinet of Beata Szydło. The draft was adopted by the Council of Ministers on February 16, 2016 whereas

the final version of the RDS was approved only a year later with main tasks that were written out up to 2020 (with prospects until 2030)⁸.

The RDS aims to boost Poland’s own potential for responsible development of the country and to improve the quality of life of its inhabitants. All corrective measures shall focus on three specific objectives as well as being based on the⁹ following pillars:

Five traps for Poland’s economic development



MIDDLE INCOME TRAP

(half of Poland’s working population earn less than PLN 2,500 net while their salaries are third times lower compared to those in highly developed countries)



LACK OF BALANCE TRAP

(the majority of Poland’s domestic capital is transferred abroad)



AVERAGE PRODUCT TRAP

(poor innovation, no global brands)



DEMOGRAPHIC TRAP

(low birth rate, increase in the number of people at the post-working age)



TRAP OF WEAK INSTITUTIONS

(low tax collection, no coordination of activities of the public administration)

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⁸ Council of Minister Resolution of 14 February 2017 on adopting the Strategy for Responsible Development by the year 2020 (with the prospects to 2030) (“Polish Monitor” 2017, Item p. 260).

⁹ *Vide*: <http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WMP20170000260/O/M20170260.pdf> (accessed on: July 30, 2018).

Specific Objective (1) – Sustainable economic growth based on knowledge, information and organizational excellence

- 1. Reindustrialization processes**
carried out on the basis of Polish resources and aiming to strengthen the foundations of the Polish economy. Industry constitutes the very core of all commercial spending in research and development, and for companies belonging to the tertiary sector.
- 2. The development of innovative companies**, understood mostly in terms of boosting the level of products' technological advancement, stimulating new organizational and technological solutions on the basis of enterprises' own resources as well as promoting pro-innovation attitudes thanks to the optimal use of human capital.
- 3. Small and medium-sized enterprises**
– increasing Polish companies' potential in order to make them more competitive, due to all actions performed in their legal environment as well as implemented innovations, creating new jobs and facilitating greater access to financing instruments for enterprise development.
- 4. Capital for development** translates into mobilizing financial resources, including these of the private sector, which should eventually result in higher levels of investment. In order to strengthen Polish companies, it is vital to expand the financial instruments offered by state development institutions. Moreover, it is desirable to boost the efficiency of using public funds, with particular regard to European subventions as well as capital gathered by the Polish diaspora. Capital for development may also provide favourable conditions for establishing a

savings culture in Poland, mainly due to the fact that the level of domestic savings largely determines investment possibilities of the state economy.

- 5. Foreign expansion** of Polish companies encompasses the efficiency of employed capital, both thanks to economies of scale as well as due to their stronger presence in already existing markets and entering emerging and fast-growing ones of Asia and Africa. Such a step will help to reduce the current account deficit in the country's overall balance of payments. Apart from exports – with special regard to high-tech goods – foreign expansion should primarily consist of direct investments of Polish enterprises.

Specific Objective (2) – Socially-sensitive and geographically-balanced development

- 1. Geographically-balanced development**
is defined as an evolution of all territories by reinforcing their endogenous potential, boosting development factors, as well as removing all existing barriers. In addition, such advancement processes shall encompass regions that are currently struggling with restructuring and adaptation challenges (including Silesia and the macroregion of Eastern Poland), rural areas (along with their local urban centres), and medium-sized cities being gradually deprived of their essential economic functions.
- 2. Social cohesion** needs to become a determinant of the economy's dynamic progress, therefore such development shall be first and foremost conducive to social inclusion, which will subsequently translate into an economy characterised by a high level of quality employment and entrepreneurship.

Corrective measures (according to the Action Plan for Responsible Development of Poland)



REINDUSTRIALIZATION

(state partnership for the strategic branches of Poland's economy, clusters and industrial valleys, seeking attractive foreign investments)



DEVELOPMENT OF INNOVATIVE COMPANIES

(establishing new „Business Constitution”, reviewing Poland's research institutions, „Start in Poland” program, creating friendly legal environment for entrepreneurs)



CAPITAL FOR DEVELOPMENT

(mostly by growing savings, acquiring European funds, Polish Development Fund, funds from Juncker's plan, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank as well as from Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank)



FOREIGN EXPANSION

(setting up Export Support Division at the Polish Development Fund, reviewing Poland's business diplomacy, building a strong Polish brand)



SOCIAL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

(effective regional policy, pact for rural areas, promoting educational programs)

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On the one hand, such attitude may mean the need to adapt the economy to current demographic trends, in particular by ensuring the availability of services provided in response to these challenges while, on the other, it may necessitate further development to be supported as well as appropriate use of the potential offered by particular social strata on the labour market.

Specific Objective (3) – Effective state and institutions for growth and social and economic inclusion

1. **Law in the service of citizens and state economy** is essentially understood in terms of improving the quality of law,

mostly by reducing regulatory burdens in order to provide more favourable conditions for carrying out business activities in Poland as well as satisfying the basic needs of particular groups of citizens. Therefore, any changes in this respect shall be primarily marked by such factors as deregulation, improvement of the legal system – including a stable and predictable legal environment as well as rationalised legislative processes, understood in terms of partnerships between the main institutional, corporate and social entities.

2. **Pro-development institutions and strategic expansion management**

are equivalent to the functioning of institutions that enable the setting up of a country's competitive advantages as well its proper social entities. This area includes comprehensive actions to increase the efficiency of public institutions (consolidation, integration of activities), changes in the administrative structure and its functioning (de-bureaucracy), boosting efficiency of the judicial system, changes in the public procurement system, and emphasizing the importance of dialogue.

3. **E-state** portal makes it possible to take advantage of the opportunities offered by all digital technologies available. Electronic programs used both for servicing citizens and entrepreneurs are within some state administration agendas and will enable the improvement of the functioning of the latter in the long-term, reduce service costs and make companies function in a more efficient way.
4. **Public finances** – in order to implement state policy as providing favourable conditions for potential growth in the incomes of Polish citizens – while increasing cohesion in social, economic and territorial aspects – it is crucial to undertake appropriate stabilizing actions as well as to boost the efficiency of public finance management.
5. **Effective use of EU funds** is first and foremost perceived in terms of reorienting the current way of spending European subventions while taking into account the scope, coordination and forms of support useful to co-financing projects regarded as of key importance for achieving the defined development goals.

All activities regarded as priority objectives shall be at the same time

conditioned by the need to guarantee sustainable macroeconomic stability, also in the context of the state's budget policy. The aforementioned steps shall be supplemented by further infrastructural projects and other regulatory and institutional actions, also in such key areas for economic advancement and improving quality of life, including social and human capital (education, culture, health), transportation, energy acquisition and distribution as well as providing viable environmental protections in accordance with the idea of sustainable development.

ENTITIES FINANCING INNOVATIONS IN POLAND

The process of creating an innovative product is preceded by research and development, during which a lone inventor – or a team of innovators – processes an immaterialized concept of a product into its real form, thus resulting in a prototype. At this stage, financial outlays attain a considerable level that keeps growing until the product is finally launched onto the market. In order to perform the so-called market test, the very first merchandises are usually placed on the market in a relatively small quantity. In the case of successful feedback, a company begins preparations to start serial production. Putting the product onto the market will allow the enterprise to slow down the pace of preparations for mass production after the risk, understood as negative feedback on the product and its unsuccessful acceptance on the market, is eventually eliminated at an appropriate stage.

Nonetheless, private business entities were oftentimes unable to bear all unpredictable risks, which would make it challenging for them to incur any related expenses as a similar situation necessitated the state's active involvement. Such engagement in the economy is usually tantamount to refuting the liberal conception of the country as a "night watchman".



WARSAW, DECEMBER 28, 2016. HEAD OF THE NCBR, MACIEJ CHOROWSKI (L), AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF PFR VENTURES TOMASZ GIGOL (R) SIGN A CONTRACT ON LAUNCHING THE INVESTMENT FUND WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE BRIDGE VC PROGRAM. IN THE BACKGROUND: DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MATEUSZ MORAWIECKI (L) AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF SCIENCE JAROSŁAW GOWIN (R).

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The conviction, according to which no one should interfere in the economic sphere in order to make it flourish, does not correspond to current reality; in addition, such attitude may even constitute a real threat to the interests of national economies that face such challenges as regionalization and globalization. Therefore, the state shall first and foremost guarantee its active and appropriate presence in the economy, and to provide for the possibility of the inflow of foreign investment capital instead of just speculative capital. Such is the main theme noted by the economist Mariana Mazzucato in her book entitled *The Entrepreneurial State: debunking public vs. private sector myths*, which has been recently translated into Polish¹⁰. According to its author, the title myth consists of a conviction that innovative development is primarily powered by the private sector

while the state is bound to play a passive role during the entire process. Mazzucato opposes such a false image of the state's vision as an active participant, or even a director of pro-development policy, without which the innovativeness of the economy would be significantly reduced. In light of this approach, the state shall perform the duties of a dynamic – and sometimes even a leading – partner in the private sphere.

Therefore, the only state that can successfully face modern challenges is the entrepreneurial one as it is essentially focused on setting multiple directions for both development and regulating relations between the public and the private sectors. Nonetheless, a country's participation in all benefits achieved by the private sector is a serious problem that needs to be tackled. If the state engages in some high-risk projects, its share of profits would be perceived as appropriate, enabling

¹⁰ Mazzucato M., *The Entrepreneurial State: debunking public vs. private sector myths*, Heterodox 2016.

to at least partly neutralize the costs of a possible failure. At the same time, it would be easier to convince taxpayers to carry out projects that might potentially be related to high uncertainty. In her publication, Mazzucato argues that the state's role as an active inspirer, and therefore the main strategist of innovative development, will foster the proper conditions for the entrepreneurial state model being widely accepted by members of society. The future of economic development will, therefore, depend on whether such a vision of the state is accepted and further implemented in its practical dimension. Such perspective was outlined in the Responsible Development Strategy.

The main legal act determining the rules for financing innovative activities in Poland is the Act of April 30, 2010 on the Principles of Financing Science. According to Article 3 of the Act, science financing is defined as providing support for the implementation of the scientific, technical and innovative policy of the state, with particular regard to scientific research, development works and other tasks being of special importance for civilization's progress as well as the country's economic and cultural advancement.

The aforementioned objectives are more precisely implemented by two executive agencies: the National Science Center and the National Center for Research and Development, the latter being essential to put innovative policy into effect.

KEY ENTITIES TO FINANCE INNOVATIONS IN POLAND

The main task of the National Center for Research and Development¹¹ (pol. *Narodowe Centrum Badań i Rozwoju*, NCBR) is to foster modern solutions and technologies that may be conducive to

The Center's activities are aimed at strengthening the cooperation between various actors of the Polish business sector, which will result in greater involvement of entrepreneurs (including foreign ones operating in the territory of the Republic of Poland) in financing research and more effective commercialization of their results.

increasing innovations, and thus Poland's economy competitiveness. The Center's activities are aimed at strengthening the cooperation between various actors of the Polish business sector, which will result in greater involvement of entrepreneurs (including foreign ones operating in the territory of the Republic of Poland) in financing research and more effective commercialization of their results. While pursuing these goals, NCBR makes sure that any public funds spent on research and development works shall result in the greatest benefits to the Polish economy.

Thanks to several dozen programs currently being implemented by the institution, the Center is able to

¹¹ *Vide:* cf. <http://www.miiir.gov.pl/> (accessed on: July 30, 2018).

A particular focus shall remain on supporting young academicians.

provide financial support for a project (the NCBR's annual budget amounts to about 5 billion PLN¹²) at all levels of technological readiness, starting from initial industrial research to the development of an innovative product, service or technology. Such an offer is additionally complemented by other programs aiming to support the financing of international protection of industrial property or foreign expansion of young innovative entrepreneurs. In addition, the center pays great attention to ensuring favourable conditions for the further development of scientific staff. A particular focus shall remain on supporting young academicians. Moreover, governmental agencies such as the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of the Interior and Administration as well as the Internal Security Agency conduct joint activities related to research on the state's defence and security. Both programs and projects aim to increase the potential of Poland's scientific and industrial entities as well as to strive for the state's technological independence, mostly by setting up Polish know-how in such domains as technology, security and defence. Business partner projects are best evidenced by the INGA (Innovative Gas Industry) venture, constituting the¹³ result of cooperation initiated by GAZ-SYSTEM, PGNiG and NCBR in December 2016.

The program's objective is to increase the innovation and competitiveness of the Polish gas sector. The program's budget totals 400 million PLN. Financial grants for research and development works may be applied by consortia made up of enterprises or scientific units or by the latter only. Financial support may be guaranteed to the best proposals that encompass innovative projects to be implemented in such domains as exploration, hydrocarbons extraction and production of gaseous fuels, exploration of coal-bed methane, providing materials for gas network construction and operation, gas network as well as use, trade and new applications of both LNG and CNG. The Agency's activity embraces only the below-mentioned NCBR VC program.

The National Science Center¹⁴ (pol. *Narodowe Centrum Nauki*, NCN) provides for subsidising basic research carried out in the form of research projects, doctoral scholarships and internships (offered after obtaining a PhD degree), research projects for experienced scientists that are essential for implementing innovative solutions for scientific development, as well as other studies that do not fit into the scope of interest of the National Center for Research and Development. The NCN budget reaches approximately 1 billion PLN¹⁵.

Polish Agency for Enterprise Development¹⁶ (pol. *Polska Agencja Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości*, PARP) is involved in the implementation of both domestic and international projects financed by structural funds, the state budget and multi-annual programs of

¹² Vide: cf. <https://www.pb.pl/gowin-55-mld-zlotych-z-ncbr-na-innowacje-w-2017-r-852618> (accessed on: July 30, 2018).

¹³ Vide: cf. <http://pgnig.pl/aktualnosci/-/news-list/id/400-mln-zl-na-innowacje-w-gazownictwie/newsGroupId/10184?changeYear=2017&Page=2> (accessed on: July 30, 2018).

¹⁴ Vide: cf. <https://ncn.gov.pl/o-ncn/zadania-ncn> (accessed on: July 30, 2018).

¹⁵ Vide: cf. <https://ncn.gov.pl/aktualnosci/2015-10-13-plan-budzetu-ncn-2016> (accessed on: July 30, 2018).

¹⁶ Vide: cf. <http://poig.parp.gov.pl/> (accessed on: July 30, 2018).

the European Commission. PARP is actively involved in both creating and implementing state policy in the field of entrepreneurship, innovation and staff adaptability in order to transform the agenda into a key institution accountable for establishing an entrepreneur-friendly environment. Pursuant to the “Think Small First” principle, the Agency’s activities are carried out with particular regard to the needs of the SME sector. In 2007–2013, the Agency disposed of a total budget in the amount of over 7 billion EUR, which could be spent on implementing operational programs¹⁷. Moreover, PARP carries out 13 activities within the Innovative Economy Operational Program under the following priority axes:

- Priority axis 1: Research and development of modern technologies;
- Priority axis 3: Capital for innovation;
- Priority axis 4: Investment in innovative ventures;
- Priority axis 5: Diffusion of innovations;
- Priority axis 6: Polish economy on the global market;
- Priority axis 8: Information society – increasing the economy’s innovativeness.

The state’s support system is provided within the framework of the ScaleUP pilot¹⁸ program implemented as part of the StartInPoland governmental venture. As part of this activity, PARP seeks to combine the potential of creative start-ups with infrastructure, resources, and knowledge and experience offered and gathered by large corporations. The undertaking targets mostly young companies that may receive up to 60 million PLN to develop their ideas and further activities.

¹⁷ Vide: cf.: <http://www.parp.gov.pl/perspektywa-finansowa-2007-2013> (accessed on: July 30, 2018).

¹⁸ Vide: cf.: <https://www.parp.gov.pl/parp-uruchamia-konkurs-scale-up> (accessed on: July 30, 2018).



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WARSAW, DECEMBER 28, 2016. HEAD OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT MACIEJ CHOROWSKI. THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND PFR VENTURES HAVE SIGNED A CONTRACT ON LAUNCHING THE INVESTMENT FUND WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE BRIDGE VC PROGRAM.

The Foundation for Polish Science (pol. *Fundacja na rzecz Nauki Polskiej*, FNP) is an independent, self-financing Polish non-profit organization with its headquarters in Warsaw. Established in February 1991, its mission is to support Polish science. Its founding capital in the amount of 95 million PLN was provided mainly from subsidies of the Central Fund for the Development of Science and Technology, due to the fact that the institution was being liquidated at that time. FNP constitutes Poland’s largest non-governmental source of science financing.

The Foundation for Polish Science (pol. *Fundacja na rzecz Nauki Polskiej*, FNP) is an independent, self-financing Polish non-profit organization with its headquarters in Warsaw.

The EU Framework Programs¹⁹ for Research and Technological Development is the EU's main instrument for funding research studies and work in Europe. They constitute the third largest budget line of EU expenditure, preceded only by the Common Agricultural Policy and Structural Funds. The seven-year Horizon 2020 Framework Program, scheduled for 2014–2020, is currently being implemented, which makes it the EU's largest project in the domain of research and innovation. Its budget has a total of 80 billion EUR, 2.8 billion of which will be ultimately spent on the above-mentioned spheres²⁰.

BUILDING VENTURE CAPITAL FOR INNOVATIVE PROJECTS

Poland's new innovation policy should be further supported by venture capital funds and corporate venture capital funds (their company equivalents) while news on investments in start-ups or accelerators may eventually prevail over press releases about changes in Poland's tax. Investments

in innovative entities are widely discussed by representatives of the SME sector, both new and traditional industries, politicians and EU institutions. The idea of venture capital is widely recognizable in the financial world whereas corporate venture capital constitutes nothing more than an integral corporate structure within capital groups that operates in various industries, being also part of the open innovation system that aims to invest in small innovative enterprises for two main purposes:

- supporting the parent company strategy, with the investment objective to integrate a solution within the corporation, entering a new market and introducing a new product), or
- purely financial reasons (maximizing the company's return on investment).

Poland's current CVC structures accompany the implementation processes of the Responsible Development Strategy conducted within the framework of development capital. Perceived in terms of a catalyst for creating joint state and private capital units, the NCBR CVC support program will exert a positive influence on the development of the market. Nonetheless, it is difficult to provide any exact structural framework of the CVC within the open innovation system; over the past few years, it was possible to develop and successfully implement some of their functioning models. First and foremost, in spite of its name, corporate venture capital does not resemble a typical venture capital fund; CVCs are created not by investors but by corporations for a simple reason – as corporate venture capital aims not only to subsidise small “targets” at their early stage of development but also enterprises in much more advanced phases of growth. Poland has become an area of intense development of venture capital entities

¹⁹ Szatkowski K., *Zarządzanie innowacjami i transferem technologii [Innovation and Technology Transfer Management]*, PWN 2016, p. 174.

²⁰ Vide: cf. <https://www.nauka.gov.pl/horyzont-2020/> (accessed on: July 30, 2018).

specializing in financing innovation. Established in 2016 by the Polish government as part of the RDS, the Polish Development Fund (PFR) offered, via its subsidiary (PFR Ventures), repayable funding to innovative companies belonging to the SME sector, regardless of their advancement stage (pre-seed, growth or expansion). As part of the instruments, five programs were launched (PFR Starter FIZ, PFR Biznest FIZ, PFR Open Innovations FIZ, PFR KOFFI FIZ and PFR NCBR FIZ), which were to transfer over 2 billion PLN for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises in the form of repayable financing provided by appropriate intermediary institutions²¹. The following projects of funds and vehicles for financing innovation may be distinguished:

1. NCBR CVC. By pursuing the policy of combining public funds with resources and experience provided by private investors, the NCBR made a decision to launch the world's first NCBR CVC Fund-of-Funds. The total allocation of the NCBR funds for the NCBR CVC Fund under the Smart Growth Operational Programme amounts to 100 million EUR (440 million PLN) and constitutes 50% of the funds for the project capitalization (880 million PLN). The remaining funds will be secured by private corporate investors. NCBR CVC is managed by a professional funds fund manager, namely PFR Ventures consortium supported by PFR TFI. The fund is supervised by a team that can boast having unique experience on both Polish and international markets in the field of creating VC funds. The NCBR CVC project intends to create between

6 and 9 CVC funds, whose capitalization would vary between 60 and 100 million PLN, in different sectors of the R&D commercialization market. The investment goals of CVC funds are to be achieved within 13 years, which could be possible thanks to their cooperation with commercial investors, such as large enterprises (corporations), managed by independent management entities.

2. The EFC Magenta fund (pol. *Fundusz EEC Magenta*). The corporate venture capital (CVC), set up jointly by Poland's energy holding company TAURON, the Polish Development Fund and the National Center for Research and Development, constitutes the first such entity on the Polish market. TAURON will invest in two funds created under the PFR Starter: FIZ and BRIDGE VC / PFR NCBR CVC programs. Such support will enable multi-stage support for innovative companies. It could be possible due to involvement in acceleration programs, investing in enterprises at their initial stage or ensuring subsequent funding under the NCBR CVC.
3. PGE Ventures. Launched in 2016, the strategy of Poland's largest energy group envisages some innovative activities to be carried out. The plan will have a significant impact on the development of start-ups. PGE Ventures has announced the launch of external venture capital funds as part of the Polish Development Fund programs (PFR) and the National Center for Research and Development (NCBR). As Tauron seeks to set up Poland's start-up ecosystem, PGE Ventures also aims to invest in the following programs: PFR Starter FIZ, BRIDGE Alfa, BRIDGE VC. PGE Ventures submitted applications for these programs in order to create external funds, in which PGE Ventures will be supposed to act as the main

²¹ So far, PFR Ventures have signed the first seven investment agreements. PFR Starter FIZ: Xevin VC; KnowledgeHub; Tar Heel Capital Pathfinder; Ventures For Earth; PFR Biznest FIZ: SILBA. Within the framework of PFR Open Innovations FIZ: Montis Capital, APER Ventures.

investor, thus having a fundamental impact on the funds investment strategy. Innovation constitutes one of the pillars of the PGE Group's business strategy. By 2020, the company will have allocated a total of 400 million PLN to develop research and innovation, half of which comes from private funds while the remaining resources are provided within the framework of external financing. In addition, Grupa Lotos intends to invest 50 million PLN per year using its own funds in order to develop new technologies, products and business lines. While supporting the innovative project, PGE sought to undertake any comprehensive steps, which seems to explain why capital investments in start-ups are carried out by PGE Ventures, separated as a specialised CVC fund, while incubation and project acceleration processes at their initial stage shall be first and foremost treated by the PGE Nowa Energia company. Such distribution will allow for quick and efficient operation as well as optimization of the entire process.

4. The Lotos Group (pol. *Grupa Lotos*): Poland's oil company Grupa Lotos is bound to create a CVC fund²², with an estimated value between 40 and 50 million EUR. The work on establishing the CVC funds is still at a relatively early stage as the corporation is currently assembling its management team. Thus, one can assume that Grupa Lotos will invest in start-ups that may be classified as part of the fuel industry.
5. Poczta Polska²³ (Polish Post) This institution is currently making its

best effort to launch a venture capital fund this year and to invest in "new and promising companies". It is said that Poczta Polska aims to take over a Zapakuj.to box editor and Pakomatic intelligent pack stations. In the foreseeable future, the state agencies may also be interested in Hyperloop technology, which is currently being developed by the HyperPoland company and which would potentially be deployed to transport parcels. All these projects participated in the first edition of the Gamma Rebels acceleration program powered by Poczta Polska, which was co-organized by the postal operator while the second edition has only recently come to an end.

CONCLUSION

Such steps towards innovation development as well as establishing and adopting effective marketing strategies are crucial to implement the "Morawiecki Plan". They have an impact on eliminating the middle income trap by promoting projects of high intellectual capital at the expense of low-processed production and low-margin business services for international corporations. They directly reduce the average product trap, mainly by focusing on developing Polish technical solutions and supporting their expansion on foreign markets (one of the pillars defined in the strategy). The emerging venture capital and corporate venture capital market, supported by state institutions and large corporations, constitute an opportunity to set up development capital. It is vital that – apart from local, including public, sources – foreign entities also express their interest in projects of high growth potential. Such is the practical implementation of the idea of the Entrepreneurial State as depicted by Mariana Mazzucato.

Adam Stolarz ■
July 31, 2018

²² Vide: cf.: <https://mamstartup.pl/inwestycje/12854/grupa-lotos-uruchomi-w-tym-roku-fundusz-cvc-zainwestuje-w-startupy-40-50-mln-euro> (accessed on: July 30, 2018).

²³ Vide: cf.: <https://mamstartup.pl/spolka/12753/poczta-polska-bedzie-inwestowac-w-startupy-ma-utworzyc-fundusz-venture-capital> (accessed on: July 30, 2018).

A POST-WAR WAR. THE YEARS OF 1944–1963 IN POLAND

KAROL WOŁEK


Poland was the first country in Europe to experience World War Two, which began on September 1, 1939. Poland was also the first country to engage in armed combat with the joined forces of Nazi Germany and the USSR in their attempt the change the world order.

In their struggle to regain independence, Poles established a clandestine movement known as the Polish Underground State. Polish soldiers were ceaseless in their efforts to liberate the country not only during the course of WW II, but also well after the war ended. The year 1945 did not mean the end of the war in Poland. The struggle for independence continued on Polish territory until the 1950s while the last

known partisan was killed by the occupying Soviet forces as late as 1963. The last hiding partisan, however, is reported to have stayed active until 1982. He stayed in battle throughout the Nazi occupation and well into the Soviet occupation.

An outline of Poland's geopolitical situation feels compellingly necessary if one wants to understand the situation of the Polish nation after 1945.

Soviet and German Invasion of Poland in September 1939


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1939 – THE BEGINNING OF WORLD WAR TWO

World War II began with a coordinated attack on Poland conducted by the Third Reich and the USSR, led by Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin respectively. As of September 1, 1939, the very first day of World War Two, both totalitarian regimes held joint military action against Poland. Starting from September 1, German bombers were guided onto

their targets in Poland from a radio station located in Minsk, then in the Soviet Union.

In accordance with the secret protocol known as the Hitler-Stalin Pact (also referred to as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact), the new allies – Germany and the Soviet Union – were to jointly invade Poland. Red Army troops were to march into Poland three days following the Reich's attack. Joseph Stalin, however,

did not adhere to the protocol, with his troops advancing into Poland only 17 days after the Germans hit. The delay was caused by concerns over western propaganda which Stalin wanted to only focus on Germany's activity.

For 17 days the German troops were facing Polish soldiers without expected support. This resulted in one third of its tank fleet being destroyed. A quick victory, as intended by Adolf Hitler, required a mighty ally. Without it, the invasion of Poland might have proven to be risky. The secret protocol appended to the alliance agreement concluded between the Soviet Union and Germany divided Poland into two occupation zones and, more broadly, it divided Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence. Under the agreement, the German troops, which had attacked Poland much earlier and, therefore, had seized more land, had to recede. Polish territory was thus split in two halves. The Polish government was forced into exile, first in France, and following its surrender, further in the UK.

THE SOVIET UNION – AN OUTLINE

The Soviet Union was the world's first communist state. Its political elites were driven by communist ideology when it came to both foreign and internal affairs as well as the establishment of economic and social policies. Understanding the Soviet Union, its nature and policies, would not be possible without comprehending what goals communist ideology had set for the world's first communist state. The state emblem of the Soviet Union embodies those goals.

It depicts a hammer and a sickle over a globe. The hammer and the sickle are symbols of communism, of communist revolution, and of the USSR itself. The reasons behind the state's creation were as follows: world revolution and the

The secret protocol appended to the alliance agreement concluded between the Soviet Union and Germany divided Poland into two occupation zones and, more broadly, it divided Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence.

inevitable class struggle. Both are key elements of Karl Marx's ideology as well as the ideology of the Soviet Union.

World revolution means taking over the world by the communist state. According to communist ideologues capitalist states could not peacefully coexist with communist states. The Soviets' goal was inducing a world war. After the capitalist states would annihilate one another, the Soviets would take over the entire world. This was why the Soviet Union had always had strategic attack war planning, but had never prepared a plan for a defensive war.

The class struggle is a cornerstone of Karl Marx's philosophy. It requires a restructuring of society in accordance with communism. When put in practice, this brought about genocide: the killing of 10 to 15% of a given society as well as annihilating its elites and those strata of society that were unwelcome in a communist state. Predominantly, this hit entire families and the most educated,

For the communist partisans the German troops and the Polish Underground State were equal enemies.

who, when alive, acted as guarantors of culture, national and state traditions, knowledge and of faith. For communists they stood in the way of communist rule and of harnessing entire societies under a totalitarian regime.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF POLAND

Poles were the first nation to have been subject to extermination in the Soviet Union solely on grounds of nationality. Over the course of the Polish Operation, conducted between 1937 and 1938, nearly 140,000 were persecuted, with 111,000 suffering immediate death. The sole criterion of repression was Polish nationality. It was the first nationally-motivated act of genocide in a communist state, as opposed to mass killings carried out on political, social or classist grounds.

After the joint invasion of Poland, the two allies cooperated closely for nearly two years. Both Germany and the Soviet Union manifested equally hostile attitudes towards the Poles. It included mass killings, the annihilation of Polish elites and the extermination of Poles in concentration camps, often after having exploited them through forced labour. The Soviets methodically deported the Polish populace into forced exile in distant parts of the USSR, characterized by a hostile climate – semideserts, taigas or tundras. The deportation process was

halted by Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, thus saving millions of Poles from eastern parts of the former Polish state from being sent off. Suddenly, the entire Polish territory was under Nazi occupation.

Following the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union, the communists, who suddenly found themselves behind the front, were ordered to organize a partisan movement. Until 1941, it would have been impossible due to the close Hitler-Stalin alliance. The Soviet partisans and communist organizations manifested an openly hostile attitude towards the Polish Underground State. Polish resistance organizations, which were in a continuous anti-Nazi struggle since 1939, had lured most of Poland's youth into their ranks. This meant that the communists recruited chiefly from hoodlums and mobster gangs. They offered political protection, but demanded full loyalty to communist authorities. The communists allowed for the continued criminal activity of these groups, henceforth known as partisan units of the People's Army and of the People's Guard.

The Home Army, the Polish Underground State's biggest military organization, regarded it as rather unfortunate to fight against units answering to Joseph Stalin, since the Soviet Union was allied with the UK, home to the Polish Government-in-exile. It was the second biggest military organization within the Underground State, known as the National Armed Forces that fiercely tackled communist banditry. Communist partisans were not very successful, but for the countless acts of plundering, rape, and killings that they subjected civilians to. They were usually poorly skilled and depraved individuals. Predominantly, they were tasked with collecting intelligence, especially with regard to those involved in the structures of the Polish Underground State. The

information gathered was subsequently passed to the central headquarters in the USSR by way of radio transmission, and was used to identify and disband the Polish resistance movement.

Given their poor skills and munitions, the communist units rarely fought against the Germans. They chiefly focused on blowing up rail tracks in order to slow down German provisions sent to the eastern front. The Germans slaughtered civilians in retaliation. For the communist partisans the German troops and the Polish Underground State were equal enemies. They were both seen as an obstacle in the way of bringing worldwide revolution. For this reason, under the Nazi occupation, communist partisan units often murdered Poles involved in the resistance movement or attacked Polish partisan groups.

In 1944, the front-line was pushed back into pre-war Poland. As the German troops retreated, the Red Army soldiers were advancing into Poland. They were joined by the NKVD units. As seen by Poles, it was the same Red Army that had attacked Poland back in 1939 as Hitler's ally. The Soviets by no means changed their approach to Poles and their struggle for independence. The NKVD units, following the advancement of the Soviet soldiers, were tasked with methodical searches, arrests, investigations, murders and deportations of Poles involved in the resistance movement.

ANTI-COMMUNIST INSURRECTION


The following events ensued across the entire Polish territory. Polish partisan units engaged in armed combat with the Germans under Operation Tempest. It was aimed at liberating cities and territories in Poland before the onset of the Red Army. Some units disbanded before the front-line advanced, thus avoiding saturation of a given area with

Polish partisan units engaged in armed combat with the Germans under Operation Tempest. It was aimed at liberating cities and territories in Poland before the onset of the Red Army.

regular military forces, which makes it impossible to engage in partisan warfare. As the Soviet troops advanced into Poland, they arrested and disarmed units of the Home Army, which revealed themselves during Operation Tempest. Polish officers were murdered or deported eastwards to Soviet concentration camps. Privates, however, were incorporated into special units created especially for them within the Red Army.

The NKVD used the intelligence that the communist partisans had gathered to target members of the Polish resistance movement. It was aimed at a total liquidation of those who had confronted the Germans in the struggle for Poland's independence. For the USSR, they were a major threat to the advancement of communist ideology and to the final conquest of Poland, because of their great attachment to the Polish state and national values as well as to the idea of freedom in general. Consequently, mass terror ensued in the territory occupied by the Soviets. Following the end of WWII, over two hundred concentration camps

Map of Soviet concentration camps after World War II



for Polish civilians were put up in Poland. The Soviets also used existing camps, which had been in use under the Nazi occupation.

Soldiers of disbanded partisan units were chased down and murdered. In no time, the forests had filled yet again with fugitives, evading capture and terror by the occupier. Partisans, who had previously fought with the Germans, were forced to return to combat and fight against the Soviets in self-defence. Many new partisan groups were formed. Their total number was higher than that under the Nazi occupation. This was the response to the mass terror and killings to which the Soviets resorted.

It is estimated that following the end of WWII over 200,000 people were involved in partisan warfare. They fought for independence and against mass terror. It is commonly referred to as the Polish anti-communist insurrection. The years 1944–1947 saw the fiercest combat between pro-independence partisans and the Soviet occupier. On the Soviet side, the NKVD mechanized brigades were predominantly engaged in the combat. They were special units, specially designated to fight partisan groups, armed with fast-firing heavy machine guns and AFVs. This gave them an overwhelming advantage over lightly-armed partisans.

Organized combat continued on Polish territory until the 1950s. The last Polish organized military units revealed themselves and ceased their activity in 1954. The National Military Union was among the largest military forces that had fought the occupier for the longest time. The last Polish partisan died in combat against Soviet-led forces as late as 1963: Sergeant Józef Franczak, a soldier of the Polish Army and a partisan fighting both German and Soviet troops. In his eyes,

the war did not end in 1945. He continued his partisan struggle for 18 years on end. In the last years, he was mostly in hiding, as he knew that if he was to be captured by the Soviets, he would be murdered.

Warrant officer Antoni Dołęga was the last soldier of the Polish Underground State who did not surrender. He stayed in hiding while being continuously chased down by the communists until 1982. A Polish soldier before the war, he fought in Poland's defensive war in 1939. Then he was involved in the Polish conspiracy movement under the Nazi occupation. During the Soviet occupation, he was a partisan unit leader. After he was left with a handful of soldiers, he made them go home while he stayed in activity until his natural death in 1982.

Partisan units and soldiers of the Polish Underground State would not have survived in combat against the Soviets, if it had not been for the overwhelming support of the Polish populace. While Western societies went on to rebuild their homelands after the war, the UK saw the onset of Beatlemania, and Elvis Presley's career was in its infancy, gunshots were still being heard in Poland. The struggle for its independence was far from being over. The Soviets had established their military bases. And through imposed terror they exerted total control over Poland, its economy, politics and society.

Poland did not regain its independence after World War Two. After the great conflict, the Soviet Union, which had first attacked Poland as Hitler's ally in 1939, seized the entire Polish territory, with the open connivance of the triumphant Allies.

Karol Wołek ■
October 1, 2018

THE KRESY: JÓZEF BRANDT IN SEARCH OF PAINTERLY INSPIRATION

MARIUSZ KLARECKI, PhD

The Kresy, its events and genre scenes are perhaps the most defining topics of Józef Brandt's *oeuvre*.

The paintings by Józef Brandt ingeniously capture the particularities of old Polish life and the cultural mosaic underpinning the identity of the Kresy (literally borderlands, though the term yields much broader cultural and historical meaning) at the time. The painter depicted it without forceful grandiloquence or theatrical pomposity. His brushstrokes are frank, yet poetic. While literary works had undoubtedly stimulated his imagination, it was not enough for the young artist. He knew perfectly well that the Kresy are the only

place where time truly slows down. It was there that he conceived his characters or such particularities of his oeuvre as decaying wooden khutors, or hamlets, and herds of horses that grazed on local meadows. In the outskirts of the former Kingdom of Poland he grasped the might of endless steppe for the first time; there he discovered old Polish garments and militaria, hidden in estates and palaces of the gentry and doomed to oblivion. He encountered it all while exploring the distant lands of Volhynia, Polesia or Bessarabia, but also on much shorter excursions to Kazimierz



WARSAW, NOVEMBER 4, 2013. HORSE TEAM IN MOTION BY JÓZEF BRANDT.

© GRZEGORZ JAKUBOWSKI (PAP)

Dolny or Cracow. Not all letters by Józef Brandt have lasted to the present day. Some vanished fairly recently; regretfully, as they could have provided a tremendous insight into the artist's life and travels. Notwithstanding the loss of these works, it is possible to recreate Brandt's errs by putting together a fragmented mosaic of his correspondence, sketchbooks, photographs, watercolor and oil paintings. To this end, one must focus on the accurate dating of his works, which would allow the most likely sequence of events to be recreated. Although paintings are rarely dated by their authors, it seems easier to follow the chronology of woodcut reproductions usually done shortly after the painting was made. This was especially the case in the 1870s. Very often accurate dating is made possible by the minutest details.

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In 1871, Brandt and Juliusz Kossak, also a painter, set out on a journey eastward, that is, to Eastern Galicia and the western lands of Podolia.

lands of Podolia. The over one-month-long expedition was documented in four letters penned by Brandt, as well as depicted in illustrations *signé* Juliusz Kossak, who was Brandt's dear friend and travelling companion, and Aleksander Gryglewski, whom the two happened to meet in Podhorce. Brandt wrote the first letter on October 19, 1871 in Lwow. We are informed that the travellers commenced their journey on October 17, in Cracow and made their first stopover at the palace

of Prince Sanguszeko in Gumniska, not far from Tarnów. It is with absolute awe that the artist remembers the visit paid to Sanguszeko's horse stud. On his first day there, he marvelled at 12 stud mares and numerous foals grazing in the pasture located right where the Biała River flows into the Dunajec. *All were of tremendously thick bones, broad chests, stout croups, and, above all of excellent legs. That place where they graze, of tradition proudly reaching the times of Hetman Tarnowski, [...] marvellous grove bursting with snowball trees, willows, beeches, lush herbage, two rivers, such beauty, oh, how envious I am of these horses and their place of stay*¹. On the second day, Brandt, joined by Julek, as he called Kossak, admired the finest stallions of the stud. Prince Eustachy demonstrated 12 stallions and 18 carriage horses. One stood out the most: an Arab horse, originally from Turkestan, that Prince Eustachy had bought in Vienna. Brandt's imagination is especially captured by leopard-spotted horses, a recurrent topic of his early works: *They have pretty leopard horses over there, so tiny, as if one gently sprinkled their white background with ink. Incredibly hairy, with marvellous heads, you'd find more skin than meat under their scalp [...] So I sketched some, harnessed, as they stood there. But Prince Paweł liked them all too much and greedily took all of my sketches*². In the evening of that very day, the two travellers took a train to Lviv, where they arrived shortly before midnight³.

¹ Listy Józefa Brandta Ilustrowane Przez Juliusza Kossaka Z Podróży Po Galicji w 1871 by M. Radojewski in Ze Skarbcza Kultury, Biuletyn Biblioteki Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich, ed. J. Szczepaniec, vol. 26 (1875), p.p. 13–14.

² *Ibidem*.

³ The letter included the following drawings: 1) Our arrival in Gumnice, 2) a drawing depicting greeting a carter and artists in Tarnów, signed JK (Juliusz Kossak), 3) depicting the painters accompanied by prince Eustachy Sanguszeko watching horses graze.

The second letter was written on October 24, 1871, already in Podhorce.

Brandt opens with his impressions on Lviv, which he explored with Juliusz Kossak and Kossak's brother Władysław. In the Ossolineum, the three met Prince Jerzy Lubomirski, who showed them the museum and its collection, prior to the official opening. Brandt notes: *They have a pretty array of dated paintings, armours, drawings, books and other sentimental items. The collection is expanding. Surely it will soon be a great selection with the eagerness of this great man that Lubomirski is*⁴. Another highlight of the stay in Lviv was the collection of Count Włodzimierz Dzieduszycki, including a collection of taxidermy that the travellers had a chance to see. It had *all specimens of animals inhabiting Poland: birds, fish, plants, rocks, reptiles, trees, fossils, excavated bones of antediluvian animals, in a word, all that lives in Poland, but for people. The cabinet was so big, so splendidly arranged that I don't remember seeing a rival to it not even once*⁵. The following day was marked by a meeting with a great aficionado of fine arts, the priest Józef Nowakowski, residing in Żółkiew (now Zhovkva in Ukraine). In the parochial church, they marvelled at the tombstones of the Żółkiewskis, the founding family of the town, portraits of King Stephen Báthory or a painting depicting George Rákóczi begging for pardon after plundering Poland. There were four monumental paintings, though, that sparked the most attention: *Battle of Kluszyń*, commissioned by Żółkiewski himself and three works commissioned by King John III Sobieski, namely *Battle of Chocim*, *Battle of Vienna* and *Battle of Parkány*. Victories of Vienna and Parkany were immortalized in painting by Martin Altomonte, shortly after the Viennese triumph of 1683. Their size is perhaps what impresses the most, with

⁴ M. Radojewski, *op.cit.*, p. 16.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 16.



WARSAW, JUNE 29, 2012. ON THE LOOK OUT BY JÓZEF BRANDT RECLAIMED BY THE POLISH STATE; CURRENTLY IN THE COLLECTION OF THE NATIONAL MUSEUM IN WARSAW.

© RADEK PIETRUSZKA (PAP)

each canvas covering 60 square meters. As Brandt puts it *I so ardently studied the paintings that I would infallibly redraw the most minute of their details; we must have spent there several good hours*⁶. Such in-depth studies were part of the

artist's preparation to conceive his own composition two years later. It depicted the onslaught of Polish hussars on a Turkish camp put up by Vienna in 1683⁷. The very evening, the aspiring artists

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 17.

⁷ Battle of Vienna, 1873, oil on canvas, 136×318 cm, property of the Polish Army Museum in Warsaw.

were back in Lviv, where two days later they caught a train for Złoczów (currently Zolochiv in Ukraine). There they hopped on a *balagula*, a carriage typical of the Kresy, and went to Podhorce (currently Pidhirtsi in Ukraine). As Brandt confesses in his letter, his heart skipped a beat upon seeing the Palace of Podhorce. They were housed in rooms fitted with a canopy, lusciously decorated rooms that boasted *an imposing wall of thirty-six hussar armours, originally from hetman Jabłonowski's Viennese mission, with their wings and guidons; it had banners, bunchuks, all kinds armours and what not. Other rooms, abounding in paintings, portraits featuring the most magnificent of outfits, were fitted with richly gilded plafonds, furniture, vases, pure delight since it was kept as it was in the olden days. Two days we spent on sketching, from dawn to dusk; here's me sketching a hussar armour, and here's Julek, standing on a wobbly table sketching some fascinating garments depicted on the plafond*⁸.

The author, writing to his mother, eagerly describes the material that he gathered over the course of these two days, with which he planned on using when preparing his next painting *Battle of Vienna*. Brandt is exceptionally keen on the idea of coming back for longer in the following year. Interestingly, Kossak and Brandt's stay happened to coincide with that of Aleksander Gryglewski whose painting *Crimson Room* was reproduced as a woodcut and published in *Kłosy Review* in 1872⁹.

The third letter was written on September 28, 1871 on a steppe in Strusów (currently Strusov in Ukraine), where Brandt

was hosted by Count Włodzimierz Baworowski, owner of Strusów and member of Imperial Council in Vienna. Tarnopol would be the following destination. This was where a gathering of gentry and a horse race were to be held. The two travellers arrived on September 25, aboard a train packed with noblemen arriving at the town to attend the gathering. As the painter boasts in his letter, he was presented to numerous household names, including Andrzej Zamoyski, Artur Potocki, Count Jan Tarnowski of Dzików, Jabłonowski, and General Władysław Rozwadowski. The estate and stud farm governed by Włodzimierz Baworowski were set to be the next stopover. Unquestionably, the planned dressage competition promised to be interesting. The following day the travelling duo were already off to Trembowla (currently Terebovlia in Ukraine), where they visited a castle, while joined by a photographer they had met in Strusów. He was supposed to take some photographs¹⁰ which are currently included in the collection of the National Museum in Warsaw. They were donated by the painter's family five years following his death. Three photographs depict Trembowla, and another three focus on a market organised in the town square of Strusów. They were the inspiration behind Brandt's painting *Ruthenian Market Held in the Town of Strusów*, completed already in 1872¹¹.

The fourth letter was written on October 16, 1871 in Cracow, after the artists had come back from Eastern Galicia. From the opening paragraph we learn, quite unexpectedly, that the next destination was to be Podhajce, and more precisely

⁸ The letter included the following drawings: 4) drawing depicting the castle of Podhorce, drawn in the heading, signed AG, made by Aleksander Gryglewski, 5) Our Arrival in Podhorce, signed JK, 6) Here's Us While Drawing.

⁹ *Kłosy*, vol. 15, 1872, p. 237.

¹⁰ The letter included the following drawings: 7), Strusów's Steppe, 8) Dressage Arena in Strusów, signed JK.

¹¹ The National Museum in Warsaw (MNW): nr inw. DI 34363 MNW, DI 115433 MNW, DI 115432 MNW, DI 29346 MNW, DI 29348 MNW, DI 29347 MNW.

the estate of the Czartoryskis, governed by Ludwik Kastory. The two painters arrived there on October 29. Unfortunately, the weather suddenly worsened. Figuring out the French barometer turned out to be the predominant pastime of this short stay. It also included a visit paid to Kossak's sister in Kozowa, who treated the wanderers with exquisite confiture. Following that, the artists came back to Podhajce for one day only, and, aboard a carriage, departed for Stanisławów (currently Ivano-Frankivsk in Ukraine), in the direction of Monasterzyska (currently Monastyriska in Ukraine). Brandt pointed out that Stanisławów, with its cultural mosaic and Ruthenians and Hutsuls as prevailing ethnic groups, differed substantially from northern parts of Galicia. The next destination on the list was Radowice. Again, due to the worsening weather and much lower temperatures, the artists decided to change their plans. As the cold season was advancing, they renounced the idea of going hiking in the mountains, where it had already snowed. Instead, the painters took a train to Lviv, where they stayed overnight. The following morning, they were already on their way to the befriended family of the Count Starzeńskis. They owned an estate in Słowita (currently in Ukraine), in the Przemyśl District. The way from the station to the estate was quite memorable as the painters were escorted by the count and his service, riding on glorious Arab horses from the Dzieduszycki stud farm. The painter had the chance to mount one of these fine horses the following day, while hunting. The count appreciated Brandt's unusual equestrian aptness by offering one of his personal horses – a bay Arab named Mazepa. The three-day-long stay was a moment of joy and inspiration. The evenings were celebrated with music and singing, and the joyful moments were depicted in cartoons. Juliusz Kossak was tasked with painting watercolour

portraits with horses. Brandt also mentions plans of another stay in Słowita the following year, as the invitation was extended. There were talks of a joint horseback excursion to Radowice and then to the Carpathian Mountains with the count and his wife. It remains unknown whether Brandt actually stuck to his plan of going to the Carpathians. The two painters came back to Lviv amid heavy snowfall. Lviv and Cracow were the last stops of their joint journey. From there, Brandt went on his own to Vienna, where he stayed overnight, and then to Munich¹².

Andrzej Daszewski¹³, Józef Brandt's grandchild, mentions another journey that the painter set out on with Juliusz Kossak. It would be in 1874 with the two going to the Ukraine, as far as to Bałta in Podolia (currently Balta in Ukraine). Sadly, we do not know the details of the journey, which makes it uncertain whether it actually took place¹⁴. Such details could perhaps be provided by the photographs from the artist's collection taken between 1870 and 1875, currently owned by the National Museum in Warsaw. They depict Podolia including its villages, ruins of a former defence Basilian monastery in Podgórzany, not far from Trembowla, ruins of a castle and of Carmelite Church in Trembowla, a castle in Olesko. Several photographs were taken in Buczacz (currently Buchach in Ukraine), which depict a Basilian monastery, the town hall, the town, and ruins of a castle¹⁵.

¹² The letter included the following drawings: 9) Novel French Barometer, 10) On the Way to Stanisławów, 11) Daniel and Confiture, signed JK, 12) Plenary Meeting in Stanisławów, signed JK, 13) drawing depicting carters seen from behind with an inscription reading Inhabitant of Szyk, Jew, Cracovian, Ruthenian.

¹³ A. Daszewski, *op.cit.*, p. 56, 58.

¹⁴ Letter by Józef Brandt sent to Roman Padlewski from Munich on 23rd May 1874. Jacek Malczewski Museum in Radom (MOR), manuscript, sygn. 7851 IV.

¹⁵ National Museum in Warsaw (MNW): DI 29182 MNW, DI 29301 MNW, DI 29302 MNW, DI 29212

Brandt sought inspiration also during much shorter excursions. Like the one he made to Kazimierz Dolny, located by the Vistula River. The artist's collection contains several photographs (also available in the National Museum in Warsaw), taken anonymously between 1870 and 1875, which depict the parish church, tenements houses of St. Christopher and St. Nicholas as well as wooden constructions of the town's main square. There are also shots of the Celej House as well as Kazimierz landscape, seen from the southern part of the city, with the Three Crosses Mountain exposed¹⁶.

One's imagination is captured by an imposing granary known as the Passion of Christ Granary, located near the river crossing into Janowiec. The photograph must have been taken before 1881, they year its ruins were demolished¹⁷. It was arguably one of the finest Renaissance granaries in Poland. Similarly, granaries clearly captured Brandt's imagination as he had decided to paint at least two watercolor featuring granaries precisely from 1875. These were dated by the artist himself, who included the date and place of painting under his signature. Therefore, it was possible to date Brandt's trip to Kazimierz and perhaps even the following stages of his 1885 travels.

Brandt sought inspiration also during much shorter excursions.

MNW, DI 29180 MNW, DI 34360 MNW, DI 115370 MNW, DI 29181 MNW, DI 34364 MNW, DI 27812 MNW, DI 27811 MNW, DI 29303 MNW, DI 29156 MNW.

¹⁶ MNW: DI 28898 MNW, DI 28912 MNW, DI 29267 MNW, DI 94281 MNW, DI 29268 MNW, DI 29320 MNW, DI 94281 MNW, DI 29266 MNW, DI 29319 MNW.

¹⁷ MNW, inv. number DI 29260 MNW.

One such watercolor, presently privately owned, depicts Feuerstein's Granary located at 60 Puławska Street¹⁸. Another one, owned by the National Museum in Cracow, depicts the Twin Granary, as it was called, located at 46 Puławska Street. Initially, there were two separate granaries sharing one of the side walls. Only half of the construction has lasted to the present day, that is, one granary¹⁹. Many other pencil sketches made by the artist at the time were not dated. Therefore, we cannot state with absolute certitude that they depict Kazimierz, even though they focus mainly on wooden architecture.

The painter often used them as background for oil paintings representing the life in the towns of Podolia²⁰. Vast landscapes of sandy beaches stretching along a mighty river, which are especially picturesque in Kazimierz Dolny nad Wisłą, are often present in Brandt's series of paintings entitled *At the Crossing*. The romantic scenes, focusing on borderland banks of the Dnieper were made as early as 1875. They usually depict Cossacks with horses by the river bank, or a group of horse riders with distant gazes as they wait for the crossing. Brandt developed the topic later by depicting the army at the crossing making its way with military supplies.

¹⁸ Granary in Kazimierz by Józef Brandt, 1875; pencil, watercolor, gouache, paper, signed Kazimierz/75./J Br., on the reverse of the letter there is a sticker from TZSP in Warsaw (?) no. 15564, entitled Old Construction, with a date of issuing 1926; stamp 'private property of Z. SZUSZCZYKIEWICZ. The watercolor was auctioned by REMPEX Auction House on 29th March 2006 and reproduced in the auction's official catalogue. Granary in Kazimierz by Józef Brandt, 1875; pencil, watercolor, gouache, paper, 30,3×47,4 cm, signed Kazimierz/75./J Br., The National Museum in Cracow.

¹⁹ Granary in Kazimierz by Józef Brandt, 1875; pencil, watercolor, gouache, paper, 30,3×47,4 cm, signed Kazimierz/75./J Br., The National Museum in Cracow.

²⁰ Town in Podolia, woodcut reproduction, Kłosy review, 1876, vol. XXII, p. 389; Street in Chocim, woodcut reproduction published in Album Malarzy Polskich, Warsaw, 1876.



THE LISOWSKI'S SOLDIERS ON RECONNAISSANCE BY JÓZEF BRANDT, 1882, OIL ON CANVAS, 100 X 88 CM. PRIVATE COLLECTION.

Thanks to the drawings published by *Tygodnik Ilustrowany* in early October 1875, we can establish that Brandt was in Warsaw. Two sketches were published under the title *Drawings by Józef Brandt*. They were two small-sized woodcuts taking on Bessarabia, entitled *Gypsies of Bessarabia* and *Cossack Camp*. The artist first sketched them and then slightly collared them with watercolor. Around September, Brandt must have sent his works to a publisher in order to have them graphically reproduced. Brandt's arrival in Warsaw in October 1875 is further confirmed by the letter he sent to his mother and uncle Stanisław Lessel.

The painter informs: *we're publishing an album of works by Munich painters with Tygodnik Ilustrowany as the publisher. When I was in Warsaw, I struck a deal with them, they put me in artistic charge. It would seem that such a publication will be of interest to all. It shall have portraits of the painters involved as well*²¹. Brandt's excursions to the Kresy assuredly translated into numerous pencil sketches,

²¹ Source: Collection of letters sent to mother and uncle Stanisław Lessel quoted, A. Daszewski, *op.cit.*, p. 59; H. Stępień, *Artyści Polscy W Środowisku Monachijskim W Latach 1828–1914*, Warsaw, 1994, p. 113. The album mentioned by Brandt: *Album Malarzy Polskich. Seria Pierwsza*. Munich. Warsaw 1876, published by J. Unger, table 10, p. 10.



© REMPEX

**GRANARY IN KAZIMIERZ BY JÓZEF BRANDT,
[THE FEUERSTEIN'S GRANARY] 1875, PENCIL,
WATERCOLOUR, GOUACHE, PAPER, 39,5X29 CM.
PRIVATE COLLECTION.**



GYPSIES OF BESSARABIA BY JÓZEF BRANDT, A PHOTOGRAPH OF A MISSING PAINTING.

watercolor and ideas for oil paintings, which the artist put in practice after he came back to Munich. Quite possibly it was in the fall and winter of 1875 that the artist conceived several oil painting compositions, for instance *Crossing the Dnieper*, *Bar Confederates* or *Cossack and a Girl by the Well*²².

In 1877 Brandt married Helena Pruszkowa, a widow to Brandt's old friend Aleksander Pruszek. This was when he deepened his ties with Orońsko. From that moment on, the married couple would spend every summer there. Looking after the estate required regular presence, which meant that Brandt could travel elsewhere only between late summer and wet fall season.

A pocket sketchbook, currently privately owned, sheds light on yet another series of Brandt's travels in the years 1879–1887. Brandt would use it during open-air sketching sessions around Munich,

drawing sessions in the Oriental Museum in Vienna or during distant travels to Cracow and further into Podolia. And it is precisely his 1884 journey to Podolia that seems the most intriguing, as the majority of sketches include dates and names of the places where they were sketched. The journey began on August 18, in Cracow. There, the artist drew elements of horse tack, with an inscription reading '3 horse tacks' and elements of horses themselves. For the next 10 days, that is, from August 31 until September 9, Brandt is hosted by Roman Konopka in his estate in Tomaszowice near Cracow. There, the artist closely studies a dovecot, drying pots (August 31), nineteenth-century cavalry spurs and a horse's head (September 9) and a sign hanging in front of an inn reading 'selling vodka and beer'. Later Brandt went to Lviv, where he stayed in Hotel Krakowski and on September 18, he closely studied thick ropes.

In the morning of September 20, the artist was already in Mariampol. Sitting on the left bank of the Dniester, he hastily expressed his impressions by giving his drawings such titles: *From the Dniester*, depicting a boat on a river bank, *Overtaken Ship*, *Cabin Next to Galar Construction*, and *Construction of a Galar*

²² *Crossing the Dniester*, oil on canvas, 31,5×63,5, signed Józef Brandt/from Warsaw/1875, the National Museum in Cracow; *Bar Confederates*, oil on canvas, 61×110 cm, signed JBr., the Polish Army Museum in Warsaw; *Muzeum Wojska Polskiego w Warszawie*; *Cossack and a Girl by the Well* oil on canvas, 51×99 cm, signed Józef Brandt/from Warsaw/1875, the National Museum in Kielce.



JULISZ KOSSAK, HERE'S US WHILE DRAWING, DRAWING DEPICTING JÓZEF BRANDT AND JULIUSZ KOSSAK WHILE DRAWING EXHIBITS IN THE ARMOURY OF THE CASTLE OF PODHORCE. IT WAS INCLUDED IN THE LETTER WRITTEN IN PODHORCE ON 24TH OCTOBER 1871. SOURCE: LISTY JÓZEFA BRANDTA ILUSTROWANE PRZEZ JULIUSZA KOSSAKA Z PODRÓŻY PO GALICJI W 1871 BY M. RADOJEWSKI IN ZE SKARBKA KULTURY, BIULETYN BIBLIOTEKI ZAKŁADU NARODOWEGO IM. OSSOLIŃSKICH, ED. J. SZCZEPANIEC, VOL. 26 (1875), P. 16.

(*galar* is a type of boat especially popular in the 18th century). Brandt drew his attention to an embankment located on the opposite river bank – *In the Shallows*. Other drawings depict a shepherd's cabin or little boys standing by the riverside. The sketches are done in a rather hurried fashion, documenting what the artist saw during his journey. This reportage made of drawings gives an impression as if the painter moved along the river on a boat and observed the world from that perspective.

Brandt moved further along the riverside in the following days. In the village of Dołhe he sketched some boys standing by the riverside. In Niżnów, he studied the church and a carriage with horses and people. The drawing made on September 22 in the village of Dolina presented church towers seen from afar. On the next day, that is, on September 23 the painter is forced to go ashore to reach the cemetery of Czernelica village, two kilometres away from the river. There he sketched three tombstones. On his way there, Brandt drew a signpost, a roadside cross, a fence, grazing horses as well as fellow wanderers. That very day, Brandt was back at the riverside, opting

for a different way though, straying from the riverside road and passing by the village of Kunisowice. There, a church belfry of unique architecture sparked his interest. Brandt stayed in the area for several days.

The next drawings are marked with a date of September 29. They were made in the village of Uniż, located on the left bank of the Dniester. They depict household containers, plants, peasant huts and a countryside gate. This journey alongside the Dniester came to a halt in the town of Zaleszczyki. It is located in a picturesque deep ravine, squeezed into a meander of the Dniester. Zaleszczyki was founded by Poland's last king Stanisław August Poniatowski and belonged to the Poniatowskis. Brandt was inspired by villagers making tar in a yard, which he depicted in two drawings entitled *Tar*. Back on the shore, Brandt went from Zaleszczyki to Horodenka. It is unlikely that he stayed there for long, as the sketchbook features only one drawing. That of a woman of the village, entitled *Horodenka*. It remains unknown where he was when he sketched a horse and a pair of stirrups included on a separate sheet of paper dated October 7.

While on the way from Horodenka to Kołomyja near Czermiatyn, the painter sketched a carriage loaded with timber. The long way to Cracow got perhaps a touch more interesting on October 11 in Szeparówka, when Brandt spotted and sketched a well-sweep on October 19 in Biłka Królewska (16 kilometres away from Lviv), where steam chimneys piqued his interest. The artist finally arrived in Cracow on October 27, where he did a drawing of a typical house with an avant-corps and a gambrel roof, incorporated into the city's modern architecture.

The journey lasted just over two months. The most interesting sketches were made in Podolia, which focus on rural life and landscapes, on the region's towns and the Dniester bank area. It seems most likely that the artist spent the summer in Orońsko and on August 18, 1884 departed for Cracow and from there headed to the Kresy. After October 27, the painter went straight to Munich, where he typically stayed to for the wintertime. The sketches made during his trip to the Kresy were enough to occupy him with composition making in the painter's atelier in Munich. The small size of the sketchbook as well as the nature of the drawings are proof of Brandt's very personal approach. He did not sketch to prepare a specific composition. It was rather a brief overview of the surroundings that he felt like "photographing by drawing".

The last group of photographs documented Brandt's journey to Bessarabia, which he made together with photographer Michał Greim. It was most likely in 1888. The photographs depict Moldovan carriage with a four-ox team, Landscape with a herd of buffalo in the river, and Peasants [Gypsies] in front of mud huts²³. One photograph is particularly interesting,

and depicts peasants standing in front of a mud hut and a shack. Interestingly, it is very similar to Brandt's missing painting *Gypsies of Bessarabia* from 1889²⁴. The position of the hut in the photograph is akin to the one in the painting. Similarly, at closer look, one will see that the peasants are wearing the same garments both in the photograph and in the painting. The oil painting, however, has a different composition. Brandt solely selected some elements from the photograph, and by adding horsemen he completely changed the narrative of the painting. In the foreground, he placed hunters asking for directions and gypsy women. The mud hut stands in the background, without its adjacent shack. All in all, the painting seems to depict a genre scene somewhere on the outskirts of the Kresy.

Undoubtedly, travels to the Kresy became intrinsic to Brandt's artistic practice. The painter had a unique way of translating his experiences and observations into a painting. He enriched elements from photographs or sketches with a historical background or landscapes of wild steppe. The inhabitants of the eastern and southern parts of the Kresy were immortalized first in his sketches, then in his paintings. Such compositions were complemented with accessories of Brandt's own collection of garments and military equipment. That, combined with Brandt's excellent painterly skills made for a tremendous oeuvre, depicting not only historical events, but also the reality of the Kresy.

Mariusz Klarecki ■
September 1, 2018

²³ MNW: DI 29292 MNW, DI 27810 MNW, DI 29293 MNW.

²⁴ The painting was reproduced as a woodcut in *Tygodnik Ilustrowany* 1875 (2) s. 248; Świat (that of Cracow) 1888, p. 248. The painting reproduced as a photograph in *Józef Brandt*, published by A. J. Ostrowski Łódź, b.d.w. [after 1915].



“The United States Congress and the Pentagon are considering further enhancements to the U.S. military presence in Poland and our Polish friends are willing to put forth significant resources toward this effort”.

Joint text by HE Georgette Mossbacher and HE Piotr Wilczek

SOURCE: NOVEMBER 10, 2018 THE HILL/RZECZPOSPOLITA



Poland's First Geopolitical Think Tank in Washington

According to Marcin Gawęda, president of the think tank – being at the same time its associated U.S.-based foundation – “the strategic goal of The Warsaw Institute Foundation, as the first Polish geopolitical think tank in Washington, is to reinforce Polish interests in the United States”.



Established in June 2018, **The Warsaw Institute Foundation** is an organization inspired by the Poland-based **Warsaw Institute**. Its experts hold regular meetings with American institutions, which constitutes an excellent occasion to depict a Polish perspective on such important issues as geopolitics, international order, historical policy, energy and military security as well as the Polish attitude towards Putin's Russia. “All activities of our association are essentially aimed at setting up a consensus around politics, cultural and economic relations between Poland and the United States”, Mr. **Marcin Gawęda** said.

Bernard Bartnicki, one of the initiators of The Warsaw Institute Foundation, stresses out that – as a young Pole and an American – he can notice the need to create and develop a strong organization whose aim will be to enrich U.S.-Polish ties. “I am deeply convinced that our Warsaw branch will play a predominant role in disseminating knowledge about geopolitical conditions of Central and Eastern European countries”, he emphasized.

Bart Bagniewski (The Warsaw Institute Foundation) focuses on the need for further deepening of Polish-American relations: “We consider partner communication with the American state administration as a key factor since the government pursues a policy being consistent with the U.S. interests, regardless of current regime or political conditions in Poland”, he added.

The Warsaw Institute Foundation remains in close cooperation with the Warsaw Institute based in the Polish capital. Their partnership seems best evidenced by the U.S. promotion of the “**The Warsaw Institute Review**” – an **English-language quarterly** that is regularly delivered to the world's top 1,300 research, analytical and expert centers.

In March this year, all experts, who later contributed to works of The Warsaw Institute Foundation, took an active part in an international conference on the Polish Three Seas Initiative, organized jointly by Poland's Warsaw Institute and The Heritage Foundation in Washington. The event was attended by renowned guests, including Chief of Cabinet of the President of Poland, Professor Krzysztof Szczerski. In addition, representatives of The Warsaw Institute Foundation accompanied **President of the Republic of Poland Andrzej Duda** during his September visit to the United States as well as they participated in a conference held by The **Jamestown Foundation**; the meeting, attended by Secretary of State in the Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland, **Piotr Naimski**, was devoted to such issues as the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline.

More information on the activities of The Warsaw Institute Foundation think tank is available online and on social media.

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