


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THE VISEGRAD GROUP CONTRIBUTION TO EUROPEAN SECURITY COMMON CHALLENGES AND GOALS



Dear Readers,



A special geopolitical relationship is coming to an end before our very eyes: an old union, now almost 70 years old; an unusual relationship, because it is one between the defeated and the winner; a union that has brought many benefits, and not only to both these sides. This is how **Grzegorz Kuczyński**, an expert from The Warsaw Institute Foundation, diagnoses the geopolitical situation by looking at the current relations between the United States and Germany.

It is indeed hard to shake off the impression that this relationship is crucial for the current distribution of power, not only for Europe but for the entire world including Central Europe.

Experts point out that the crisis in the European Union is multifaceted and that indeed we are witnessing the simultaneous occurrence of *many* crises: the crisis in the eurozone, the crisis in the context of pursuing a common foreign and security policy, the migration crisis, Brexit, and the growing threat and occurrences of terrorist attacks. These trends have consequences for all members of the European community and increasingly call into question the effectiveness of EU leadership. EU countries with less economic potential, on the other hand, have little chance of resisting the pressure of European bureaucracy, which only increases a lack of trust towards EU institutions. In this issue of the Western Report, we examine the situation in Europe in its various aspects, focusing largely on geopolitics, demographics, and economics.

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I can refer here to an article by **Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse** who analyzed geopolitical changes in the EU, drawing attention to their political, social, and economic dimensions.

Given the discussion on the location of the monument commemorating the victims of the Katyń massacre in New Jersey, it seems fitting to recall (in the History section) several episodes from the history of Poland, which, as it turns out, are little known to the general public. In particular, I would like to recommend two articles on the preservation of the memory of the Warsaw Uprising (written by **Katarzyna Utracka**) and on the pillaging of collections of works of art in Warsaw during the first months of the German occupation (written by **Mariusz Klarecki**).

We wish you a pleasant read.

ANNA KAROLINA PIEKARSKA

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

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GERMANY-USA: A DISCREPANCY PROTOCOL WITH RUSSIA IN THE BACKGROUND

GRZEGORZ KUCZYŃSKI

A special geopolitical relationship is coming to an end before our very eyes: an old union, now almost 70 years old.

It represents an unusual relationship, as it is one between the defeated and the winner: a union that has brought many benefits, and not only to both these sides.

The agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany has been beneficial to the entire Europe, and to the West in general. The current format of cooperation is now exhausted – and it is not Donald Trump who is responsible for destroying this connection; rather, he is only trying to diagnose the problem and expects it to be resolved. Washington's relations with Berlin may continue to deteriorate or, on the contrary, may result in finding a new

formula for cooperation. This is important for every country in Europe, but, in the context of the Russian threat, this is of particular importance for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

“Ich bin ein Berliner”: the words spoken in June 1963 by US President John F. Kennedy may symbolize decades of the exemplary German-American alliance. The Alliance was undoubtedly the key to peace and security in the Old Continent, especially during the Cold War. West



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BRUSSELS, BELGIUM, JULY 11, 2018. CHANCELLOR OF GERMANY, ANGELA MERKEL (TOP), WALKS PAST US PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP (R) AND US FIRST LADY MELANIA TRUMP DURING THE FAMILY PHOTO IN FRONT OF THE ARCADES DU CINQUANTENAIRE, DURING THE NATO SUMMIT. HEADS OF STATES AND GOVERNMENTS OF NATO MEMBER COUNTRIES GATHERED IN BRUSSELS ON 11 AND 12 JULY 2018 FOR A TWO-DAY MEETING.

Germany was the central frontier of the West's defense, but on the other hand, of this special relationship with the United States. This protective umbrella provided by the Americans enabled Germany to quickly recover from the destructions of war which then led to impressive economic development. Therefore, it may be regarded as somewhat ironic that one of the main sources of their current dispute concerns economics.

However, the discrepancy protocol is much longer, which means that German-American relations must be reorganized. This does not mean, though, that Donald Trump's current aim is to isolate and weaken Germany. All the more so, it is not a foregone conclusion that Washington's disputes with Berlin will result in a permanent weakening of Europe and the transatlantic alliance. Since the shock victory of Trump in November 2016, the reaction of the German elite, the media, and public opinion has been a mixture of moralization combined with hysteria as well as, most of all, disappointment at the defeat of Hillary Clinton: "Germany and America are bound by values – democracy, freedom, as well as respect for the rule of law and the dignity of the individual, regardless of their origin, skin color, creed, gender, sexual orientation, or political views. On the basis of these

This protective umbrella provided by the Americans enabled Germany to quickly recover from the destructions of war which then led to impressive economic development.

In the US presidential campaign, there were accusations in Trump's power base that Clinton was, indeed, an "American Merkel".

values, I offer close cooperation to the future president of the United States of America, Donald Trump" – such words, uttered by Angela Merkel the day after the elections in the USA, suggested that according to Berlin, all these standards were now under threat by the fact that Trump was in power. It seems that the German Chancellor made the same mistake as many other politicians, by admitting that she was counting on a different candidate and denying the winner from the very start. Perhaps Merkel had forgotten that she was now dealing with the leader of the greatest power in the world.

In the US presidential campaign, there were accusations in Trump's power base that Clinton was, indeed, an "American Merkel." The German Chancellor was a tried and tested ally of Barack Obama, the fact of which could disqualify her in the eyes of Trump. Merkel also pursues an immigration policy that is entirely at odds with the ideas of the current US President. She opposed Trump on trade and climate change at the G7 and G20 summits in 2017. In May 2017, she said that Europe could no longer rely on the Americans. Meanwhile, she survived a humiliatingly short and dry visit to the USA in April 2018. She does not react to the attacks of the new US Ambassador to Berlin, Richard Grenell. She survived

Trump's attacks at the Brussels summit. The reason for Trump's aversion towards Merkel cannot be underestimated. In the case of this president, we clearly see an increase in the importance of the personalization of politics at the highest level, as evidenced by the summits in Singapore and Helsinki. However, it would be a grave mistake to reduce the current crisis in US-German relations to purely personal issues.

“RUSSIAN CAPTIVE”

The main accusation made by Trump of Germany, judging by his public statements, is in a sense “life at America's expense.” Berlin benefits from the military protection of the USA and is careful in its own defense spending. What is more, by buying gas from Russia, Germany finances the armaments of the largest enemy of the West. “I think it's very sad when Germany makes a massive oil and gas deal with Russia, where you're supposed to be guarding against Russia, and Germany goes out and pays billions and billions of dollars a year to Russia. So we're protecting Germany. We're protecting France. We're protecting all of these countries. And then numerous of the countries go out and make a pipeline deal with Russia, where they're paying billions of dollars into the coffers of Russia” Trump said.

Not only is the United States losing out on this situation, as it bears the greatest military effort in the Alliance, but also countries close to Russia, which are exposed to its aggression. There is, therefore, a convergence of interests between the USA and Central and Eastern Europe, with Poland at the forefront. It is no coincidence that Trump, during his infamous breakfast with NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg at the summit in Brussels, juxtaposed the politics of Berlin and Warsaw: “And you have a country like Poland that won't accept the gas. You take

The main accusation made by Trump of Germany, is in a sense “life at America's expense”.

a look at some of the countries – they won't accept it, because they don't want to be captive to Russia. But Germany, as far as I'm concerned, is captive to Russia, because it's getting so much of its energy from Russia. So we're supposed to protect Germany, but they're getting their energy from Russia.” In short, from the point of view of the US, Poland is a more reliable ally than Germany, not only because it strives to reduce supplies from Russia and develop imports of American LNG; rather, Warsaw does not want to finance Russian armaments by buying gas from that country, and continues to develop its military potential and increase its defense spending. In other words, Poland is in this sense the complete opposite of Germany.

Germany imports as much as 80% of its gas, half of which comes from Russia. As a result, gas from Gazprom accounts for 10% of Germany's energy. However, the construction of Nord Stream 2 would result in even more Russian gas on the German market. Berlin explains that it is increasing its imports from Russia because it pays off economically (unlike American LNG, for example).

Germany needs to close the gap in the energy balance that they have created, and to do so as soon as possible. The blind obsession with renewable energy resources and the phasing out of the nuclear sector have resulted in a current electricity bill for Germany that is five times higher than the total value of the market. On the other hand, electricity in a German home is on



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QUEBEC, CANADA, JUNE 8, 2018. CHANCELLOR OF GERMANY, ANGELA MERKEL (L), US PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP (2L), AND FRENCH PRESIDENT EMMANUEL MACRON (R) PARTICIPATE IN A WORKING SESSION OF THE G7 SUMMIT IN LA MALBAIE.

average three times more expensive than in an American home. Once again, let me quote Trump from Brussels: “If you look at it, Germany is a captive of Russia. They got rid of their coal plants, they got rid of their nuclear; they’re getting so much of their oil and gas from Russia.”

Trump's words on Germany's gas cooperation with Russia have been the subject of criticism.

Trump's words on Germany's gas cooperation with Russia have been the subject of criticism. Experts point out that Berlin is not so dependent on supplies from the East, and that it has the potential to diversify its imports significantly. Even if we consider that the current scale of cooperation with Russia does not threaten Germany's security and that Moscow does not have such a position of leverage here as it does with Ukraine, it does not change the fact that Berlin finances the Russian state with such a policy and allows it to strengthen itself on the gas market throughout Europe. Moreover, while Ukraine, the Baltic States, and Poland, for historical reasons, are for the time being heavily dependent on Russian supplies and

exposed to a form of energy blackmail, Germany voluntarily allows Russia to put a noose around its neck.

THE GAS PISTOL

The problem is that at the same time they weaken the position of other countries, especially transit countries lying between Russia and Germany. That is why, in the case of the Nord Stream 2, the positions of the USA, Poland, the Baltic States and Ukraine are in line with the fact that the German-Russian project poses a threat to European security, and not only to energy security.

The construction of Nord Stream 2 and the pumping of vast quantities of gas into Germany and through Germany (the share of gas imported from Russia is growing, which is then sold by Germany to its neighbors) across Central Europe can effectively halt the diversification efforts of the countries of the Three Seas Initiative.

The primary objective is to build North-South connections and LNG terminals through which gas other than Russian will be supplied to this gas network. The flooding of the region with cheaper Russian gas (it can be assumed that Moscow is even capable of dumping prices in order to eliminate competition) may seriously impede the financing and defense of projects such as the Baltic Pipe and the terminal on the island of Krk in the eyes of public opinion of individual countries (one should bear in mind Russia's threatening disinformation machine).

In this case, therefore, the interest of the energy security of the Three Seas Initiative countries is convergent with the economic interest of the USA. This is because American LNG may contribute to the diversification of supply sources in Europe and the reduction of dependence on

supplies from Russia, mainly in Europe. Undoubtedly, this was one of the main reasons why the US President supported the Three Seas Initiative. Trump came to Warsaw in July 2017 from Hamburg and talked about the development of cooperation in LNG with Poland and Croatia.

The primary objective is to build North-South connections and LNG terminals through which gas other than Russian will be supplied to this gas network.

Since June 2015, when the intention to build Nord Stream 2 was announced, Berlin has consistently supported the project, disregarding the objections of its NATO and EU allies, minimizing the influence of Brussels and arguing that this is a purely commercial idea, and outside the project parties, primarily companies from Germany and Russia, nobody should care. It was not until this spring that Berlin changed its rhetoric, and for the first time Angela Merkel admitted that the gas pipeline also had a political dimension. However, this does not mean a reduction in support for the project. Together with the Russians, Germany will reduce the risk for Ukrainian transit - and this, according to Berlin, will solve the problem. However, according not only to Kiev and Warsaw but also to Washington, it will not solve the problem. A certain modification of the German position results only from the growing pressure of the American administration and the threat of U.S. sanctions. The public

Low expenditure on the army, cannot be defended by the claim that post-war Germany abandoned its militaristic idea of doing politics and preferred to build a powerful position by peaceful means.

demands made by Trump to Germany on Nord Stream 2 are beneficial for Central and Eastern Europe, NATO and transatlantic ties, as they hit the Berlin-Moscow axis.

However, too much enthusiasm is not desirable because Trump has only been tough on one country at one end of a potential pipe. Moreover, after all, Nord Stream 2 is a project that involves Russia in particular. The warning signal should be Helsinki. There, Donald Trump presented a much softer position regarding the gas pipeline. He said that the US is now one of the largest gas producers and that it will “compete as hard as it can” with Russia. There was no word uttered about the security issues and fears of the countries in the region. Trump inscribed in the narrative that the opposition of the USA results only from business calculations (Americans want their LNG to compete with Russian energy in Europe). Trump suggested that it was Berlin that took the decision to build but did not mention any sanctions. He only confirmed that American LNG would compete with Russian gas in Europe, although the Nord Stream 2 project has a geographical advantage.

CARS INSTEAD OF TANKS

According to Trump, the increase in gas imports from Russia is all the more outrageous as, at the same time, Germany is failing to meet its defense spending target of 2% of its GDP. The results are visible: the Bundeswehr is in a terrible condition. The army lacks tents, winter clothes, bulletproof vests, and most (yes, most!) of the heavy equipment like tanks, planes, helicopters, and ships are not suitable for combat. According to NATO's estimates, Germany is currently ranked 17th out of 29 members of the Alliance in terms of the percentage of GDP allocated to defense. This constitutes only 1.24%, slightly more than in 2014, when Berlin, like other NATO allies, decided to increase this expenditure in view of the Russian threat.

Contrary to the Nord Stream 2 issue, the Chancellor agreed with the US President on the issue of insufficient defense spending. Angela Merkel asserted that Berlin felt obliged to aim for 2% of GDP to be spent on defense. “We are doing this year by year, also in 2018 and 2019, and in 2024 we will be spending 80% more on defense than in 2015.” However, it will still be a long way from 2% of GDP. Defense spending is growing steadily, from \$38 billion five years ago to today's \$45 billion, but it is still expected to be just \$57 billion in 2025. That is 1.5% of Germany's GDP. Trump's pressure on defense spending puts Merkel in a difficult situation in her own country. No other issue than defense spending raises such tensions in the coalition between the German Union parties and the Social Democratic Party of Germany.

Low expenditure on the army, which also affects the condition of NATO as a whole, cannot be defended by the claim that post-war Germany abandoned its militaristic idea of doing politics and preferred to build a powerful position

by peaceful means; namely, through economic expansion. It was Europe that felt this most, naturally, with various consequences (the Greeks and the Italians could say the most about this). One such complaint is that the trade disputes and claims of the USA against the European Union are mainly due to German domination on the Old Continent. The Americans, who have been protecting Germany for decades, have every right to ask openly where this huge US trade deficit in relations with Germany (\$64 billion) comes from. On average, the European Union imposes higher customs duties on imports from the USA than the Americans impose on imports from Europe. In the case of the automotive sector, which is of crucial importance for German exports overseas, this difference is four times as big! Donald Trump, who fights for the votes of the inhabitants of the industrial Rust Belt, cannot ignore such a problem. Therefore, although the imbalance in trade affects the entire EU, Trump deliberately focuses on accusing Germany of exploiting America. It should be remembered, however, that the war rhetoric concerning Berlin is not an exception in the policy of the current White House, but the rule: Trump's business claims also apply to other countries, such as China. In the case of this conflict of interests between the USA and Germany concerning trade, Berlin must proceed with caution. There is too much to lose; and much more than the effect of Trump introducing customs duties on imports of steel and aluminum in March. The structure of trade between Europe (especially between Germany) and the USA makes a trade war unprofitable for Germany. Merkel understands this very well, so all personalities of the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, to Trump have been replaced by a visit by the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, to the White House, which distanced the vision of the commercial battle.

WHO IS OUR FRIEND AND WHO IS OUR ENEMY?

German anti-Americanism would be the easiest way to explain Trump's policy. However, this is not the case. Most of these attitudes have been present in German society and elites for a long time. The only difference is that now it is possible to express them openly. For years, Germany has been one of the most anti-American nations in the Old Continent (even if they loved Obama). Even the reaction to the disclosure of the fact that American NSA was invigilating German politicians was hysterical in Berlin compared to the reaction of Paris. The Germans set up a commission of inquiry and expelled the head of the CIA residence in Berlin. It is hard not to notice that the reaction to Russian hackers accessing the Bundestag's computer systems in 2015 barely released a fraction of these emotions. The Germans went so far as to mock American democracy since that made it possible for someone like Trump to take power. However, it is they who should be watching closely the rise in popularity of their own political parties calling for the 'improvement' of the current democratic system, seeking models found in the Putin regime. Since Merkel is becoming weaker and weaker, some political forces in Germany, such as AfD and Die Linke, are even openly against America.

For years, Germany has been one of the most anti-American nations in the Old Continent (even if they loved Obama).

The SPD and the Liberals are also becoming increasingly anti-American. Merkel must take into account Germany's internal political situation, all the more so as it is in the weakest position in many years. In July, the popularity of the CDU-CSU coalition (which is tormented by a dispute over immigration policy) dropped to a record low of 29%, while already 17% was recorded by AfD, a coalition, which is anti-American and pro-Russian (as are more and more Germans). The May survey for ZDF showed that only 14% of Germans trust the US, 36% trust Russia, and 43% trust China; while as many as 82% of respondents do not trust the United States. In addition, 67% are in favor of Merkel taking a harsher attitude towards the US, and 32% believe that Trump represents a higher risk for Europe than Putin (52% think that they are of equal risk).

The indignation caused in Germany by Trump's words about Berlin's ties with Moscow only testifies to the hypocrisy of the national elite between the Oder and the Rhine. The US President was severely criticized for the very fact of holding a summit with Putin in Helsinki. A little earlier, in May, three key members of the German government had traveled to Russia: Foreign Minister Heiko Maas (May 10, Moscow), Minister of Economy and Energy Peter Altmaier (May 15, Moscow), and Chancellor Angela Merkel (May 18, Sochi). Support for Nord Stream 2 and increased energy cooperation with Russia in Berlin – while still maintaining support for sanctions – is independent of party divisions. Altmaier and Merkel are Christian Democrats, and Maas is a Social Democrat. It is true that the latter is being confronted with an excessively strict policy towards Moscow by his colleagues from the SPD. It can be seen that in the ranks of the Merkel coalition, the camp of friends of Russia is growing in strength. For example, Manuela Schwesig, Prime Minister of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, who made

relations with Russia one of the priorities of her government, made her first trip abroad to St. Petersburg. She is also head of the German-Russian Friendship Group in the Bundesrat.

The growth of pro-Russian attitudes among German elite and society, despite clear warning signals, may be a cause for concern, especially among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It is no longer just about solidarity with allies who may be attacked in various ways by an aggressive Russia. The worst thing is that in Berlin, many decision makers do not want to take notice of Moscow's unfriendly actions towards Germany. In November 2017, the head of the German BND intelligence service listed five major challenges for Germany's security and foreign policy until 2030. In second place, Bruno Kahl pointed to the growing ambitions of the Russian Federation, for which an effective counterbalance to the eastern flank can only be created with the help of the USA. In short, Russia is a threat, and the Americans are allies in neutralizing it. The German secret service and the Ministry of Defense have long regarded Moscow's policy as a significant threat and have alerted politicians. The second characteristic of the German secret services is that they point to the USA as the cornerstone of European security and Berlin's most important ally. Unfortunately, the political front in Germany, founding its security and defense policy on an alliance with the USA and NATO, seems to be weakening. Another camp is growing in strength, namely one calling for an alternative policy to distance itself from the US and to focus on building one's own capacity within the EU, mainly in close cooperation with France.

THE LONELINESS TRAP

It is hard to ignore the fact that the dispute between the government in Berlin and the core of the German political elite and Trump and his



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ORZYSZ, POLAND, NOVEMBER 26, 2015. BUNDESWEHR SOLDIERS DURING GERMAN-POLISH COMBAT SUPPORT TRAINING EXERCISES ON THE TRAINING GROUND OF THE GROUND FORCES TRAINING CENTRE. THE TRAINING EXERCISES ARE ATTENDED BY 350 SOLDIERS FROM THE 15TH MECHANIZED BRIGADE OF GIŻYCKO AND FROM THE 21ST ARMoured BRIGADE OF THE BUNDESWEHR IN AUGUSTDORF.

supporters in America concerns fundamental issues in the field of international politics. It is no longer just a matter of personal animosity of the leaders, commercial disputes, German weakness to Russian gas and allergy to expand defense potential. After all, there are also differences in matters such as Iran, immigration policy, and climate policy. The today's US policy towards Germany is also the result of a new approach to the EU as a whole. Previous administrations were in favor of integration, and the current one is more focused on the union of nation states.

Heiko Maas, even if he is not pro-Russian enough according to his SPD colleagues, certainly meets their expectations when it comes to the USA. At the beginning of June, the head of German diplomacy strongly criticized Trump's policy, claiming that none of the recent US measures "would make the world better, safer or more friendly." Moreover, they are harmful to Europe, which according to Maas the host of the White House is aware of. The head of the German MFA believes that there are "differences between the USA and Europe that can no longer be swamped under the carpet." It is clear what

The only problem is that Germany may find it increasingly difficult to find allies in Europe ready to adopt such a line of action towards the USA.

course the German government has taken. Faced with growing confrontation with America, Germany is trying to involve the entire European Union in it. This is, of course, more advantageous for Berlin. As a result, not for the first time in the recent history of united Europe, German interests turn out to be European interests, and threats to Germany are threats to the EU; a little like with Russian gas, which is also supposed to be a blessing not only for Germans but for all inhabitants of Europe. The manifesto of such a policy formed the basis of Maas's speech in Berlin on 13 June. The SPD politician said that the European Union needed reforms and that its members needed to create a more united front in the face of a changing global order. Although Maas mentioned Russian "attacks on international law" and Chinese "expansion" as signs of this change, the biggest challenge is the "America First selfish policy." According to the head of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the face of challenges posed by Trump's team (termination of the climate agreement, abandoning the nuclear agreement with Iran, threats of sanctions against Europe, and protectionism), "we Europeans have to act as a conscious counterweight when the US crosses red lines," he said. "Where the US government aggressively throws into question our values and interests, we have to react more robustly."

The only problem is that Germany may find it increasingly difficult to find allies in Europe ready to adopt such a line of action towards the USA. Germany's strongest potential partner would be France. In fact, in terms of customs, Paris is even more determined to confront the Americans than Berlin (because it is also less risky in economic terms). However, that is the end of it. From the outset, it has been signaled that France could be the USA's primary partner in Europe, and not the UK, not to mention Germany. Trump successfully plays this role, as illustrated by the juxtaposition of Macron and Merkel's visits to the USA in a short period: a very pompous and honorable welcome was arranged for the French President, and a brief, even humiliating reception was waiting for the German Chancellor. The French, with their superpower syndrome, are also keen to let Trump tease their vanity when, for example, the US President invites them to join military operations (as in April in Syria). How different this is from Obama's behavior, which ridiculed the French in 2013 by withdrawing from the decision to launch a rocket attack on Assad at the very last minute. The French ships and aircraft sent to the Syrian region also had to withdraw. In addition, if Berlin is looking for people with whom to discuss America, it will not find them in Rome either. The current populist government in Italy has not been hiding its aversion to Germany from the outset, and it has also turned out that Italy's Prime Minister Salvini enjoys talking to Trump. However, the situation is no better in the so-called new Europe. These are different times than a decade or so ago, when the area between Germany and Russia became a zone of mixed influence of both these countries (some called it a condominium), and such a state of affairs perfectly satisfied Obama, who was not interested in Europe and eagerly accepted that Berlin should keep an eye on the continent's order. We could see with the example of Ukraine how it

all ended. The year 2014 can be seen as the termination of Moscow's unwritten agreement with Berlin on influence in Central and Eastern Europe.

Nevertheless, it was Angela Merkel who left the issue of resolving the conflict in Ukraine to Obama. Four years later, it appears that the peace process has hardly begun. Meanwhile, the situation has become even more complicated for Berlin. Opening Europe's gateway to immigrants from Asia and Africa has led to the most profound divisions in years between Germany and its neighbors in Central Europe. The turning point was the change of the governing team in Poland. The most influential country in the region ceased to be a customer of Berlin and became an ally of Washington (and of Trump).

STUCK WITH EACH OTHER?

The change in the situation in the USA has significantly weakened Berlin's position in Europe. After years of ruthlessly imposing their commands on others, at some point Germans may become virtually alone, surrounded by indifferent, disappointed, and even reluctant or hostile countries. Then their only strong partner will be Russia. Such a scenario is not beneficial for either Germany or Europe. It would only benefit Moscow – just as it benefits from the differences within the Euro-Atlantic community with regard to Nord Stream 2.

Further developments in this geopolitical game will indicate whether this bleak scenario could happen. If Berlin persists and consistently continues with their project, the Americans can impose sanctions on German construction companies. This will lead to a worsening of the situation and may trigger retaliatory measures on the part of Germany, both at a bilateral level and in the European Union. Besides, relations between Berlin and the countries of Central Europe and Kiev

Further developments in this geopolitical game will indicate whether this bleak scenario could happen.

will automatically deteriorate. Of course, the Russians will continue to reach out to the Germans.

The question that Germany should ask itself is this: is it worth risking relations with several neighbors and, above all, exposing ourselves to serious economic losses by means of one gas pipeline?

However much Berlin imports gas and oil from Russia, the United States is and will remain its most important partner outside the EU. It is America that is the largest market for German exporters. Every fifth euro in Germany's trade surplus comes from the US taxpayer's pocket. No wonder that the results of Juncker's visit to the White House in Berlin were received with relief. It may be possible to avoid a trade war, but German concessions are necessary for this. The problem is that two problematic issues, i.e., defense spending and Nord Stream 2, have already mostly become hostages to internal politics in Germany. If surveys show that more Germans see Trump as a threat to world peace than Putin, it means that improving bilateral relations will be a difficult task. On the German side, only Merkel can take on this responsibility; yet one major problem in this regard is that she is becoming increasingly weaker. That is why Trump should embrace this paraphrased Polish saying: "Respect your partner, because you may always get a worse one."

Grzegorz Kuczyński ■

August 1, 2018

POLAND IN THE FACE OF GEOPOLITICAL CHANGES IN WESTERN EUROPE

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The basic thesis of this article is the assumption that Western Europe, the geopolitical center of the European Union, is weakening, devastated by successive crises largely out of its control.

Although the most unfavorable problems mainly concern the western part of the continent, they can also reach Central Europe, which may have a long-term negative impact on European integration, making it a sustainable suboptimal project, either developing below its potential or developing asymmetrically. Besides, these problems make the EU internally incoherent and exposed to a range of social and economic problems. All of this makes Europe susceptible to all sorts of political tensions, the effects of which could even lead to the eventual collapse of

the European Union. There have also been several external challenges, most of which have a negative impact on the geopolitical situation of the EU. The aim of this article is, firstly, to diagnose internal and external factors of changing geo-economic conditions in Europe and, secondly, to consider strategic recommendations for the Polish political elite in the face of these challenges.

INTERNAL CONDITIONS

The primary challenge for the EU is a dysfunctional eurozone. The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) project

is flawed by design and has had many institutional gaps from the very beginning. These gaps have never been addressed, even when the dysfunction of the monetary union has proven to be visible. The defective design of the EMU resulted in a long-lasting economic crisis that started in 2010, shortly after the global financial crisis. This was particularly harmful to the countries of Southern Europe, which, according to IMF estimates, experienced a loss of up to two decades of development (some have failed to rebuild their pre-crisis growth levels even by 2018)¹.

All of this makes the eurozone a suboptimal system, meaning that it is permanently functioning below its economic potential². At the same time, it is an asymmetric system, beneficial primarily to Germany and problematic for the majority of the other countries involved³. The system accumulates surpluses in the North of the EU (mainly in Germany) and debts in the South, and has at the same time a deflationary (and therefore an anti-growth) tendency⁴. Its main disadvantage is the lack of solutions that would stimulate economic growth in weaker parts of the European Union or so-called automatic stabilizers of the economic situation which would react

The primary challenge for the EU is a dysfunctional eurozone.

to asymmetric shocks, i.e., a deterioration of economic conditions in one of the EMU countries.

Countries in trouble have immense problems in regaining economic competitiveness, the process of which takes place primarily through internal devaluation rather than through the growth of their economy. It is, therefore, a very socially costly and politically troubling process. The problem concerns the decentralization of fiscal policy in the EMU at the national level, which excludes the communitarization (or mutualization) of debt and the introduction of general taxes at the EMU level that could stimulate investment. Moreover, there are no instruments for reducing macroeconomic imbalances (especially in the current account, i.e., in trade).

Worst of all, the eurozone is difficult to reform⁵. Firstly, the German electorate does not want reforms leading to a transfer union, and therefore prefers to defend their taxes against their transfer to countries of the South. Secondly, Germany does not want to give up its financial and competitive advantages provided by the asymmetry of the monetary union. Moreover, the mechanisms of accumulated debt in this zone make most of the countries of Southern Europe clientage of Berlin, i.e., countries dependent on loans, and are thus geopolitically submissive.

This brings us to the question of Franco-German leadership in the EU, or of a

¹ Greece, Staff Report for the 2016 Article IV Consultation, International Monetary Fund, 2017; Italy, Staff Report for the 2017 Article IV, International Monetary Fund, July 2017.

² G. Strange, The euro crisis, euro reform, and the problem of hegemony, "Asia Europe Journal", 2018, 16 (2), pp. 125–139.

³ R. Jessop, Variegated Capitalism, das Modell Deutschland, and the Eurozone Crisis, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 2014, 22 (3), pp. 248–260; J.E. Stiglitz, *The Euro and its Threat to the Future of Europe*, London 2016; S. Kawalec, E. Pytlarczyk, Paradoxs euro. Jak wyjść z pułapki wspólnej waluty? Poltext, Warsaw 2016.

⁴ B.J. Cohen, The international monetary system: diffusion and ambiguity, *International Affairs*, 2008, 84 (3), pp. 455–470; B.J. Cohen, P. Subacchi, Is the euro ready for prime time? Chatham House Briefing Paper, 2008.

⁵ T.G. Grosse, Polska a przyjęcie euro [Poland and the adoption of euro], „Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny”, Vol. 73, No. 2, April-June 2018, pp. 84–93.

The eurozone is difficult to reform.

‘collective’ regional hegemony in the performance of this tandem. There is little doubt that cooperation between the two countries is a fundamental mechanism for progressing integration, especially because, after Brexit, the political position of both countries in the EU is being strengthened⁶. It can also be assumed that both countries have so far been less focused on competing with each other or on balancing forces within the EU, and more focused on balancing external powers, such as with the USA or China. Also, after Brexit, the more protectionist countries of Southern Europe have gained greater importance in the EU Council in relation to the slightly more liberal Germany and the like-minded Nordic, Baltic and Benelux countries⁷. That is why some academics believe that there is no alternative to the Franco-German “motor” in Western Europe as otherwise progress in integration will be blocked⁸.

While this is likely to be the case, there are, in my view, severe risks to the implementation of such a scenario. Firstly, the construction of the EMU will systematically strengthen Germany and weaken France and its Southern European allies. Paris is unlikely to be able to reform the eurozone in such a way that this asymmetry can be changed. Secondly, France will probably not carry out enough internal reforms to restore its competitiveness towards Germany. Thirdly, the geostrategic superiority of

Paris over Berlin, resulting, among other things, from its military potential and its permanent position on the UN Security Council, can be easily outweighed by Berlin through both the progress of EU defense policy and through governance reforms in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (including the introduction of majority voting in this area and the emergence of a joint EU representation in the UN Security Council). Moreover, research has shown that, historically, the most important aspect that determines a country’s geopolitical position is not military, but rather economic potential. A strong economy offers opportunities to build an adequate military capacity in a very short time, e.g., in the case of Germany, nuclear weapons⁹. It is worth noting that the discussion on this subject is becoming increasingly widespread in Germany itself¹⁰. This means that economic potential, and hence the situation in the eurozone, is crucial for geopolitical relations in Europe.

Something that should, in its assumptions, “bind” (and thus limit) Germany’s power in Europe – European integration and, in particular, a monetary union – has become an instrument for increasing its geopolitical power, or even a means of “binding” and, in some cases, of weakening other European countries. The problem is that, while the EMU provides Germany with the hegemony of Europe, making it the largest economic power and the most important decision maker in EU policy, its system of power is suboptimal

⁶ U. Krotz, J. Schild, Back to the future? Franco-German bilateralism in Europe’s post-Brexit union, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 2018, Vol. 25, No. 8, pp. 1174–1193.

⁷ H.W. Sinn, Die Bedeutung des Brexit für Deutschland und Europa, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 16, 2017.

⁸ U. Krotz, J. Schild, Back to the future? *op.cit.*

⁹ M. Beckley, Economic Development and Military Effectiveness, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 43–79, February 2010.

¹⁰ The criticism of this idea in the USA: R. Herzog, German Nukes Would Be a National Tragedy, *Foreign Policy*, March 10, 2017, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/10/german-nukes-would-be-a-national-tragedy/> [accessed: 29 July 2018]; U. Kühn, T. Volpe, Keine Atombombe, Bitte, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2017 Issue, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2017-06-13/keine-atombombe-bitte> [accessed: 29 July 2018].

and leads to internal political tensions. It is, therefore, a weak hegemony (referred to in the literature as “minimal”¹¹) and potentially perishable. Internal disputes with countries dissatisfied with the design of the euro, in particular France and the largest Southern European countries, may be the biggest challenge in this sense¹². It is not by chance that both world-renowned economists¹³ and Italian intellectuals¹⁴ are considering leaving the EMU or introducing a parallel currency. Previously, the Greek finance minister had such a plan, but there was a lack of political will to implement it¹⁵.

In this situation, the discussion taking place in Poland on the deepening “two-speed Europe,” i.e., the potential marginalization of Poland under the influence of deepening integration in the monetary union, should be looked at more closely. The eurozone, even if it is reformed, will probably not change its asymmetrical and dysfunctional character. This means that entry into the EMU is subject to substantial economic risks and the risk of geopolitical dependency on Berlin¹⁶.

Another factor that systematically weakens Western Europe is the migration

crisis. In this regard, the problem concerns the growing wave of immigrants from non-European countries, for many years now, who do not always want to integrate into European societies and who often disregard local rights and values¹⁷. This creates the phenomenon of “parallel societies”, as well as the poverty of immigrants, their illegal employment, the increase in crime and the threat of terrorism. This is causing increasing resistance from local societies

Another factor that systematically weakens Western Europe is the migration crisis.

to immigrants, who are culturally alien and potentially a threat to public security. In this way, local communities are increasingly denying liberal admission rules, even if this would be justified by labor market needs and growing demographic problems.

In many cases, social revolt turns against European integration, which promotes an open attitude towards immigration. This problem cannot be solved quickly, especially in the context of the political correctness currently prevalent across Western Europe and in a situation where universal human rights are at stake.

In many cases, the rights of immigrants and refugees are considered superior to those of the citizens of a given democratic community. This has already generated social problems and political tensions within Western Europe which may further destabilize political stability in the EU. An example of how toxic this crisis is for

¹¹ A. Lipietz, *Towards a New economic order: postfordism, ecology and democracy*, Polity, Cambridge 1992.

¹² E. Murlon-Druol, *Rethinking Franco-German relations: a historical perspective*, Bruegel, Policy Contribution, No. 29, November 2017.

¹³ J. Stiglitz, *How to exit the eurozone*, Politico, 2 July 2018, <https://www.politico.eu/> [accessed: 29 July 2018].

¹⁴ B. Bossone, M. Cattaneo, M. Costa, S. Sylos Labini, *A parallel currency for Italy is possible*, Politico, <https://www.politico.eu/> [accessed: 29 July 2018].

¹⁵ J.K. Galbraith, *Welcome to the Poisoned Chalice: The Destruction of Greece and the Future of Europe*, Yale University Press, New Haven 2016.

¹⁶ T.G. Grosse, *Eurozone: crises, exit strategies, risks, Analysis, the New Confederation*, Warsaw, April 2018, https://nowakonfederacja.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/TGGrosse-Strefa_euro-ANG.pdf [accessed: 27 April 2018].

¹⁷ C.L. Adida, D.D. Laitin, *Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies?* Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2017; D. Murray, *The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam*, Bloomsbury Continuum, London 2018.

However, since the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany, the geopolitical situation has changed and is heading towards a permanent division between the US and Western Europe.

European integration is the deep divide in the EU around the mechanism for relocating refugees (introduced in pilot form in 2015). Another example is the longstanding difficulty of negotiating reform of the Dublin system (concerning the admission of refugees by the Member States). In addition, in almost all EU countries, political parties considered Eurosceptic and populist have gained in significance as a result of the wave of opposition to immigrants.

EXTERNAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Western Europe is further weakened by external factors. The most significant of these is probably the deteriorating transatlantic relationship. It is worth noting that these relations were already in crisis, for example, when the US dismantled the Bretton Woods system (in the early 1970s)¹⁸. However, since the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany, the geopolitical situation has changed and is heading towards a permanent division between the US and Western Europe. Donald Trump's

presidency is a period of growing economic and political clashes between the two sides of the Atlantic. Trump himself focuses primarily on economic aspects and much less on geopolitical issues. For this reason, he prefers bilateral agreements to multilateral agreements on trade and investment relations. In bilateral agreements, the US has clear negotiation dominance. That is why Trump has shown reluctance toward the EU, as the latter jointly negotiates economic agreements. This poses a challenge to US negotiators, especially as the interests of several countries – the biggest exporters, in particular, Germany – are hiding under the EU banner. It is precisely the considerable export surplus of this country (over EUR 50 billion in 2017) that most irritates the US administration, which is most likely why Trump has welcomed the announcement of Brexit and has expressed his expectation that further countries will leave the EU in the future. The US administration treats the EU as one of its most dangerous economic competitors (sometimes even more so than China). For this reason, the United States will seek ways to reduce the export power of European companies and balance the benefits of mutual economic exchange.

In this sense, Trump often refers to geopolitical arguments. He expects the gratitude of Europeans for US military protection over Western Europe. Moreover, he believes that Berlin owes particular credit to the USA for its care and for Washington's prior consent to the unification of Germany¹⁹. Without a recalibration of economic relations with Germany, the US president finds NATO to be an obsolete organization²⁰. He does not

¹⁸ T.G. Grosse, Bretton Woods jako reżim geoeconomiczny [Bretton Woods as a geo-economic regime], *Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations*, No. 3, Vol. 53, 2017, pp. 65–82.

¹⁹ Germany slams 'intimidating' £300bn White House bill, *The Sunday Times*, March 26, 2017, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/> [accessed: 27 April 2018].

²⁰ Europe braces itself for twin Trump summits, *Financial Times*, 6 July 2018, <https://www.ft.com/> [accessed: 7 July 2018].

want to protect those allies (and thus incur expenses) which at the same time benefit excessively from trade with the USA. Washington is therefore clearly linking geopolitical and economic issues, which makes its approach close to the concept of geo-economy²¹. According to the US, the Alliance should cover both geopolitical and economic issues. Under the same conditions, the US president has criticized Germany, which, on the one hand, imposes economic sanctions on Russia and, on the other, signs an agreement extending the northern gas pipeline with Gazprom²². What is crucial here is that the geopolitical alliance with the US should, in the opinion of the US, be of particular benefit to them. It is worth noting that this approach is not unique to Trump, but has been practiced by many previous US leaders. Taking advantage of Japan's geopolitical dependence on the USA, Ronald Reagan forced the appreciation of the yen and limited the export surplus of this country with the United States²³.

The problem is that Europe no longer feels dependent on US protection, as both the Germans and the French do not feel threatened by Russia. On the contrary, they have been striving for strategic autonomy for many years, both from the US and from NATO²⁴. This trend is reflected in the development of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). So far, progress on this policy has been blocked by the UK. However, as a result of Brexit, CSDP's development has accelerated. One of its recent

Europe no longer feels dependent on US protection, as both the Germans and the French do not feel threatened by Russia.

successes has been the establishment of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (an embryo of CSDP's headquarters), the launch of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), as well as the announcement of the launch of a European Intervention Initiative.

At the same time, the largest EU countries do not intend to give way to the US in terms of economy and trade. This will lead to growing tensions in economic relations, which will result in a geopolitical crack between the US and Western Europe. These tensions could result in a division of NATO or even its eventual disintegration. This could also mean that the influence of Washington would be pushed out of continental Europe. At the same time, Western Europe may feel hostility from the US. This means that the US would stop fighting disintegration trends in the EU, as they have done before. Instead, they may even start to actively support them (as Trump has in fact been doing since the beginning of his presidency²⁵).

Another geopolitical challenge for Western Europe is Brexit. Here, the fundamental uncertainty concerns whether the EU will be able to negotiate a 'soft' exit with the United Kingdom, as dictated by Brussels, or whether it will

²¹ T.G. Grosse, W poszukiwaniu geoekonomii w Europie [In search of geoeconomics in Europe], Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Warsaw 2014.

²² Trump accuses Germany of being 'a captive of Russia', Financial Times, July 11, 2018, <https://www.ft.com/> [accessed: 23 July 2018].

²³ C.D. Johnson, *The Wealth of a Nation. A History of Trade Politics in America*, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York 2018, p. 542.

²⁴ Ch.G. Cogan, *The Third Option. The Emancipation of European Defence, 1989–2000*, Praeger Publishers, Westport 2001.

²⁵ T.G. Grosse, Donald Trump rozbija Unię Europejską [Donald Trump breaks the EU], Rzeczpospolita, February 3, 2017, p. A11.

Poland should strive to limit the excessive power of both the European Commission and the EU Court of Justice under EU treaties and reduce the possibilities for the most powerful countries to dictate political solutions through majority voting.

be a 'hard' exit, i.e., initially without a negotiated agreement. The question of whether the UK will leave the EU 'hard' or 'soft' is of increasing geo-economic importance. Firstly, the future strategic relationship between London and Washington will be determined by this. The question is whether it will become increasingly significant (which is what 'hard Brexit' guarantees) or whether the UK will remain in the strategic orbit of Berlin and Paris. Secondly, the fate of the status of the UK after Brexit is at stake. Will it be marginalized to the level of Norway, which benefits from economic exchanges with the EU (within the European Economic Area) but has no ambition to become a regional power? For London, it is not only economic benefits that matter, but its international presence and aspirations to play a more autonomous role in the future. Thirdly, the question is whether Brexit will strengthen the EU and the Franco-German leadership of Europe, or whether it will undermine it. "Soft Brexit" under the conditions

proposed by Brussels will pave the way for the European side to prevail.

Two further conditions of the changing geopolitical situation in Europe are worth noting. One challenge is, above all, China's growing power and influence in Europe, especially in the Central and Eastern Balkans. This trend is reflected in growing Chinese investments in the region, as well as in the developing political cooperation, organized, among other things, around the "One Belt, One Road" initiative and cyclical meetings in the "16+1"²⁶ format. The largest Western European countries perceive these actions as clear interference in their area of geo-economic influence. Undoubtedly, China is taking advantage of the EU's weakness to exacerbate its influence on the borders of Western Europe.

Another geopolitical condition is the eventual rapprochement between Western Europe and Russia. More and more influential politicians in the EU expect the lifting of the sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014 for its interference in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. This would probably be beneficial for Western Europe, above all in economic terms. At the same time, it would violate the strategic interests of some Central European countries and could also be a destabilizing factor for NATO. The intensification of relations with Moscow may also lead in the future to a division of the geo-economic zone of influence between Western Europe (mainly Germany) and Russia in Central and Eastern Europe.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLAND

The primary geo-economic priority for Poland should be to foster economic development, i.e., the potential of

²⁶ Read more: <http://www.china-ceec.org/eng/> [accessed: 27 April 2018].

fundamental geopolitical significance in Europe. The aim should not only be to direct the development path towards innovation and the development of new technologies, but also to maintain access to the EU's internal market and increase its presence on the Eastern markets, especially in Russia and China. For economic development, geopolitical stability is essential, both in relations with Western Europe and with Eastern powers. It is possible that this may be put to the test in the coming years.

Poland, like all other EU countries, should focus on defending its interests in the EU, in particular with regards its economy. This means, for example, supporting increasingly threatened freedoms on the internal market, defending Polish interests within the EU multiannual financial framework, including the cohesion policy, the common agricultural policy as well as the EU innovation policy. A major challenge for Poland is the concentration of EU power in the largest countries, including the increasingly visible "minimum" German hegemony. Another challenge is the growing power of technocratic and judicial institutions in the EU. Poland should strive to limit the excessive power of both the European Commission and the EU Court of Justice under EU treaties and reduce the possibilities for the most powerful countries to dictate political solutions through majority voting. The possibility of one country (or group of countries) outvoting another in the EU should be possible only if the losing countries could have an official opt-out from implementing the law thus adopted. Experts mention this as the only democratic form of majority decision making in the EU²⁷. Besides, Poland should distance itself from risky projects

that may reduce its strategic autonomy (or increase its geopolitical dependence on the largest EU countries) and may have severe repercussions for development, security or political stability. Such projects include the EMU as well as ideas about a common immigration and asylum policy and the strengthening of the CSDP.

It is also necessary to prepare for adverse scenarios in European politics. It is possible that further crises and increased disintegration tendencies will occur. Poland should protect itself in particular against further problems in the eurozone, as well as against the intensification of the migration crisis. This should imply, among other things, a concern for the stability of the national banking system and public finances, as well as close monitoring of borders and a well-planned migration policy.

The Polish government is not in a position to reverse geopolitical trends; meanwhile, these trends may expose Poland to difficult choices. This would be the case with the increasing rupture in transatlantic relations or the possible rapprochement between Western Europe and Russia. Warsaw should adapt to some changes and try to prepare for others. The alliance with the USA will probably remain the fundamental geopolitical choice for Poland. Nevertheless, it is equally important to continue cooperation with Germany, especially as its hegemonic position may prove to be unsustainable, and the weakening of Western Europe may lead to more significant concessions to Polish demands. Poland should also engage in cautious cooperation with China and, once again, as in recent years, try to normalize relations with Russia.

²⁷ F.W. Scharpf, De-constitutionalisation and majority rule: A democratic Vision for Europe, *European Law Journal*, No. 23, 2017, p. 331.

THE NEW EUROPEAN CONSTELLATION

KRZYSZTOF RAK

The international constellation formed after the West's victory in the Cold War is being inevitably eradicated, and the three pillars that originally constituted it have already been eroded – namely the American-German “partnership in leadership”, the German-French directorate of powers in the European Union, as well as neoliberal dogma.

The new system will be more anarchic as there will be no hegemonic or quasi-hegemonic power in Europe and centralist, homogenizing tendencies in European politics will become weaker and weaker. Thus, the ever-increasing diversification of the various regions will inevitably take place – the interests of which will contribute to a greater extent to the shape of continental politics.

THE END OF THE WASHINGTON-BERLIN AXIS

Close cooperation between the USA and Germany was of crucial importance for the European order established at the beginning of the 1990s. American politicians, aware of the depletion of their hegemonic resources, decided to bet on the Germans to be their younger “partner in leadership”, who would take primary responsibility for the continent's affairs.



CHARLEVOIX, CANADA, JUNE 8, 2018. GERMAN CHANCELLOR ANGELA MERKEL SPEAKS WITH US PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP AFTER THE FAMILY PHOTO AT THE G7 SUMMIT. THE G7 SUMMIT RAN FROM 8 TO 9 JUNE 2018.

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The disintegration of the “partnership in leadership” principle that is happening before our very eyes cannot only be explained by Donald Trump’s antipathy to Angela Merkel; in fact, it has rather more serious and tangible consequences. Over the last quarter of a century, Germany has failed to become the continent’s quasi-hegemon of America’s choosing. Twenty-five years ago, the Americans overestimated Germany’s potential, as too did Germany. Today, the

Over the last quarter of a century, Germany has failed to become the continent’s quasi-hegemon of America’s choosing.

The relentless crises of late in the eurozone have had a destructive effect on the political effectiveness of the entire integration project.

understanding of this fact from both sides of the Atlantic has led to the dissolution of the “leadership partnership” project.

This failure is also one of the main reasons why Americans are becoming less and less interested in Europe, an attitude similarly harbored by Europeans towards the presence of the USA on the Old Continent. As far as the United States is concerned, China, a competitor on the other side of the Pacific, is more important than Europe, the latter of which is plunging into further crises. Washington is now focusing the majority of its attention and resources on Trans-Pacific relations, which means that it will be taking ever-decreasing responsibility for stability in Europe. This could lead to a situation where the West, an entity understood as a transatlantic community, could cease to exist by the end of the next decade.

However, this does not mean that the USA will ultimately lose interest in Europe. For instance, it is unlikely that they will entirely withdraw from European politics as they did after the end of the First World War. Rather, they will keep a watchful eye not to allow the creation of a Eurasian continental block, founded on the Berlin-Moscow-Beijing triangle, and thus will continue their limited political and military presence on the continent, at least to prevent the emergence of such an alliance. NATO will therefore still be

a principal instrument of Washington’s policy toward Europe.

CREDITORS VS. DEBTORS

The strategic transatlantic partnership cannot be replaced by the independence of Western European countries, contrary to what had previously been anticipated. These countries were to create a European superpower (or empire), which would play a key role in global politics, i.e., equivalent to that of the USA today. However, the relentless crises of late in the eurozone have had a destructive effect on the political effectiveness of the entire integration project. It has established a permanent division between the indebted countries of the south and the creditors of the north. This division is not entirely visible because today a real recovery plan is not even envisaged in the political agenda.

Some economists argue that the problem of the eurozone is the constant trade surplus of the highly developed economies of the north with respect to the economically weaker countries of the south, the symbol of which is a substantial positive balance in Germany’s foreign trade. It is evident that this situation cannot last forever, and can be solved by two ways – either by significantly increasing financial transfers from the north to the south, as desired by the supporters of state interference in the economy (Joseph Stiglitz) or by abolishing the eurozone and dividing it into, for example, two currency zones: one grouping the countries of the south and the other – the countries of the north, as desired by the supporters of the free market (Hans-Werner Sinn). European politicians do not seem to be aware of the current economic reality, and are clearly stalling without acknowledging the need for one of these procedures. This means that the division between the poor south and the prosperous north will deepen and

become a permanent factor in European policy.

Chancellor Merkel's agreement on the eurozone's common budget, expressed in June 2018 in Merseberg during a meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron, will not serve the purpose of healing the eurozone, contrary to expectations. The reason behind this is that the EU budget would have a symbolic dimension of at most a few tenths of a percent of the GDP of its member states. Meanwhile, transfers from north to south, to make any sense, would have to amount to several percentage points (just like transfers from the north to the south in Italy). In other words, it is a matter of scale. Tens of billions of euros will not solve the problems of the eurozone; rather, the question remains whether several hundred billion will be enough. It must not be forgotten that there is still the debt reduction problem of Greece as well as that of other countries in the south, which amounts to several other hundreds of billions of euros. There will be no such sums of money in any common European budget, and the crisis in the eurozone will continue unabated.

THE EAST-WEST DICHOTOMY

There is much to suggest that the implementation of the German-French plan to create a common budget in the eurozone will deepen further historical division: the East-West dichotomy between the post-communist countries admitted to the EU at the beginning of the 21st century, and the old EU member states. Aware of the stinginess of the rich countries of the north, Eurocrats decided to save on funds destined for those states of Central Europe to reduce their distance from the highly developed countries and to render them as indebted countries of the south. This conclusion can be drawn from the European Commission's new EU budget draft, which was presented in

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June. It cannot be ruled out that the recent Merkel and Macron plans will entail further cuts in funding for poor Central European countries, with the result that EU funding for convergence will be even more limited than Brussels now envisages it. This may provoke a situation that would be incomprehensible to ordinary Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians, who feel disadvantaged with the fact that they are out of money to which they are entitled, as the European Union subsidizes relatively more affluent countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain.

The Brussels elites cannot understand the mentality of the poorer EU member states. For the latter, EU accession meant the fulfillment of a great dream: catching up with the rich countries of the West. Integration without convergence will no longer make any sense to them.

DEMORALIZATION OF ELITES

For the European establishment, power has become the golden calf: not only axiology but also any ideology was dedicated to its altar. The traditional division between left and right began to gradually disappear as a result of the alleged historical victory of neoliberalism after the fall of communism. The consequential liberal consensus brought the two closer together and then equalized the traditionally polarized remote political camps. Politics as a competition between different visions of the realization of the common good has ceased to exist. One



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BRUSSELS, BELGIUM, JULY 11, 2018. FRENCH PRESIDENT EMMANUEL MACRON AND GERMAN CHANCELLOR ANGELA MERKEL IN FRONT OF THE ARCADES DU CINQUANTENAIRE DURING THE NATO SUMMIT. HEADS OF STATES AND GOVERNMENTS OF NATO COUNTRIES GATHERED IN BRUSSELS ON 11 AND 12 JULY 2018 FOR A TWO-DAY MEETING.

group holding power and one program have been set up, and those opposing the status quo are immediately accused of populism, racism, anti-Semitism and so on. In this way, the myth of the “end of history” served to legitimize the power of the political elite of the West, which won the Cold War. It seemed to them that it was History and Ideology that gave them the eternal right to rule European nations. Democracy, for instance, the free vote of the citizens, seemed to be of secondary importance. The elites knew better what

was good and what was bad for those being ruled: commoners should enjoy their increasing prosperity (consumption) and leave politics to those who knew it better than they did.

Meritocracy can be a way of governing. The problem is just that for a long time political elites of the West have been struggling with corruption. In the last two decades, corruption scandals have come to light in every Western country, the effect of which was the transformation

of national political scenes. The symbol of European political elites is still the multi-term Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, involved in corruption scandals and in cooperation with the Sicilian mafia. When these scandals came to light, the Italians decided to do without the governing political class. It comes as no surprise that instead of the mafiosi, they preferred comedians.

Today, it is difficult not to notice the end of the so-called post-Cold War order of the last quarter of a century, which was characterized by, among other things, the belief that traditional powers would be playing a less and less significant role in global politics and that their place would be taken by increasingly centralized integration areas, which would gradually evolve towards quasi-empires.

What was supposed to be a model example of such an evolution was the European Union, which was to become an empire equal to the United States. This project turned out to be nothing more than another utopia created in the minds of alienated elites. Instead of integration, we are entering a period of disintegration. Instead of being a superpower, the European Union is threatened with impuissance and decay.

These processes will pose a particular challenge to Poland's foreign policy, which, in the last quarter of a century has been in an extremely comfortable situation. The country understood that the pursuit of national interests to be a fit for the constellation created as a result of the primacy of the Washington-Berlin axis. As a result, Warsaw became a member of two exclusive Western clubs: NATO and the European Union. Today, there is no such axis, and a new constellation is being created, which

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will be characterized by ever stronger divisions on our continent.

A new equilibrium system, however, is not yet in place, and it is hard to say how long it will take to create it. In the coming years, we will have to cope with many internal issues. The divisions that were outlined earlier may lead to the accumulation of international conflicts. Polish diplomacy will face a challenging task, but also an opportunity to establish real subjectivity.

Poland is neither a superpower nor will it become one in the next decade. However, it is not a small country that is doomed to the role of customer. This international "underdeterminacy" is our curse, but it is also an opportunity because it allows us to think realistically about our subjectivity. The latter will only be achieved if we do not focus on one of the currently competing centers of power (puissance). Then we will bring Poland down to the role of a subordinate satellite. Poland will become an influential player only if we learn how to play many pianos at the same time.

Krzysztof Rak ■
July 1, 2018

THE DYNAMICS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IMMIGRATION TO EUROPE

PIOTR KWIATKIEWICZ, PHD

Population growth can be considered as one of the main underlying causes of human migration; however, the factor that is crucial here is the pace of this growth. Demographic estimations from the past give some insight into these dynamics.

The revolutionary transformations that are taking place in modern times are worth noting. What is interesting and worth emphasizing is that the first impulse for change in the current rate of natural growth came from Europe. Since 1700,

Europe's population has not needed even a century and a half to double in size; Asia was not much behind in this respect (see Table 2).

However, the natural growth rate in the Old Continent was much higher than could be concluded from the historical data on the state of the population in Europe. It nominally doubled in the 19th century, but it is enough to look at the demographic changes in the New World to see the inaccuracy behind this figure. In the USA, the number of inhabitants increased eleven-fold in the analyzed

Table 1: The dynamics of demographic change since the beginning of our era.

Demographic shifts since the beginning of our era

POPULATION (WITH ITS MILESTONE COUNTED IN MILLIONS)	YEAR	SHIFTS DYNAMICS
250	approx. 1	
300	approx. 500	
350	approx. 1000	
400	approx. 1250	
500	approx. 1500	(doubled after 1,500 years)
750	approx. 1750	(doubled after 1,250 years)
1 000	approx. 1820	(doubled after 320 years)
2 000	approx. 1930	(reached the level of 1 billion after 110 years)
3 000	1960	(reached the level of 1 billion after 30 years)
4 000	1974	(reached the level of 1 billion after 14 years)
5 000	1987	(reached the level of 1 billion after 13 years)
6 000	1999	(reached the level of 1 billion after 12 years)
7 000	2011	(reached the level of 1 billion after 12 years)

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Source: Own elaboration; based on The International Data Base (IDB)

period. It is not difficult to identify the causes of such a dynamic population growth: it was migration from Europe, which constituted the overwhelming majority of those who came to the continent. The same applies to both Americas and Australia. It is therefore necessary to include in the estimates also a large part of those who left the Old Continent. Europe's population at the beginning and at the end of the century is not reliable material for establishing the difference between births and deaths in its area. As a result, it is with a high degree of probability that Europe, alongside the USA, can be identified as the parts of the world where population grew the fastest. The pace of these changes significantly outpaced the progress in agricultural production, forcing people to leave "to earn a crust".

The natural growth rate in the Old Continent was much higher than could be concluded from the historical data on the state of the population in Europe.

The major changes in the dynamics of population growth in each continent took place no earlier than in the first half of the last century. In Africa and Europe, population growth has not changed much, while in other parts of the world it has

Table 2: World population by continents from the 16th to the 19th century

World population by continent,
1500 – 1900

YEAR	WORLD	AFRICA	ASIA	EUROPE	LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN	NORTH AMERICA	AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA
1500	458	86	243	84	39	3	3
1600	580	114	339	111	10	3	3
1700	682	106	436	125	10	2	3
1750	791	106	502	163	16	2	2
1800	1,000	107	656	203	24	7	3
1850	1,262	111	809	276	38	26	2
1900	1,650	133	947	408	74	82	6

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Source: Own elaboration; based on: United Nations Population Division, *The World at Six Billion* and A. Maddison, *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective*

Table 3: World population by continents since XX century

World population by continent,
1900 – 2010

YEAR	WORLD	AFRICA	ASIA	EUROPE	LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN	NORTH AMERICA	AUSTRALIA AND OCEANIA
1900	1 650	133	947	408	74	82	6
1925	1 987	155	1 175	425	140	102	10
1950	2 519	221	1 399	547	167	172	13
1975	4 072	408	2 398	676	322	246	21
2000	6 118	821	3 705	729	523	316	31
2010	6 896	1 022	4 164	738	590	345	37

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Source: Own elaboration based on The United Nations Population Division and Historical Estimates of World Population

significantly accelerated. The slowdown, or rather the lack of progress in the latter case, among other aspects, not to mention two world wars took their toll on the Old Continent with unprecedented severity. The relative peacefulness that prevailed in Europe in the second half of the 20th century did not reverse this trend. It was clearly the exception as opposed to other areas in the world, which experienced

a real demographic boom. From 1950 to 2000, the number of inhabitants increased 370 per cent in Africa, 264 per cent in Asia, 31 per cent in South America, and 180 per cent in North America. The same was true for Australia and Oceania, where the change reached 240 per cent.

For the purposes of this analysis, it is essential to give priority to the first two

cases due to their proximity to the Old Continent. The regions surrounding Europe, i.e. the widely-defined East and North Africa, are of particular importance in this respect.

An interesting example illustrating the demographic changes in this part of the world is Egypt, which has territory on both continents. Just under 100 years ago, there were just over 10 million people living in the former Pharaoh country. In comparison, newly-independent Poland was twice as populated. This proportion was maintained throughout the interwar period.


One year before the outbreak of World War II, the population of the Second Republic of Poland amounted to 34.8 million, while that of Egypt – 16.5 million. A slightly faster increase in the population was therefore observed in Poland. Both countries became equal in population about 40 years ago, somewhere at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s. Compared to 1955, Egypt doubled its population in 1979.

This has not yet happened in Poland and there are no signs that it will happen in the coming decades. As a result, at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Egypt had twice as many citizens as Poland.

The case of Egypt can be considered typical of this part of the world. The reasons for can be found in some cultural proximity of the countries located in this area, which also translated into similarities between the adopted systemic solutions and political and economic development. Examples include Syria, Iraq, and Libya.



All of these countries have at some point embarked on a path of change in the spirit of Arab socialism. For the vast majority of their population, this time was to represent a period of some stability – relative peace conducive to the transformation of their

Fig. 1: Natural growth dynamics by continent



Source: Own elaboration

Figures 2 and 3: Demographic changes in Egypt and Poland from 1919 to 1939 and from 1949 to 1979



Source: Own elaboration

Table 4: Changes in the population of selected Arab countries since 1980

Population change in selected Arab countries, 1980 – 2010

	1980	1990	2000	2010
EGYPT	43763,0	56312,0	62694,0	72726,0
SYRIA	8704,0	12116,0	16305,7	23331,0
IRAQ	13010,0	18078,0	22675,6	32540,0
LIBYA	3042,0	4545,0	5115,5	8796,0
JORDAN	2923,0	3154,0	4998,6	6686,0
LEBANON	2669,0	2740,0	4345,0	4903,0

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
Naturally, there was no lack of flawed reforms or reforms implemented in a way that contradicted the very idea of their implementation.

economic structure. Previously treated in the manner typical for colonial areas, they slowly became fully independent entities of growing importance on the international arena. The period of accelerated development, or more precisely the prosperity they entered, was largely due to their general situation. It allowed them to find balance in a bipolar world and take advantage of the rivalry between different antagonized blocks. It is true that they did incur costs in the form of coup d'états caused by external factors. None of them, however, undermined the Nasserian spirit of the Free Officers and the associated ideas of brotherhood and equality. As a result, in most cases, the

existing pro-social regulations were not limited, and often, in an attempt to obtain support from society, they were reinforced.

Naturally, there was no lack of flawed reforms or reforms implemented in a way that contradicted the very idea of their implementation. The overall balance of change was positive. The percentage of illiterate people has been decreasing year by year, and the number of graduates has been growing. Access to health care has become widespread, hidden unemployment has fallen, and an increasing number of people no longer need to be involved in traditional gainful employment activities and can be employed in the public sphere or in newly-established or nationalized and expanding companies. This aspect is very important when considering the dynamics of demographic change. It has significantly improved social security, which, due to civilizational and cultural conditions, has allowed many men from the most disadvantaged social groups to start their own families. The only country that has not been involved in an armed conflict and avoided war damage was Egypt.

Figure 4: Percentage of the population benefiting from agricultural work



CLIMATE CHANGE

Dynamic population growth is a factor strongly conducive to migration processes, but it does not trigger them on its own. Usually, they are also stimulated by economic factors. In the case of agrarian societies, changes in the natural environment were decisive. They were also responsible for the following years of crop failure, which caused the displacement of population masses. It is difficult to directly refer to the attitudes specific to this type of community in the context of the processes taking place in the contemporary world as they belong to the past in a model approach and the term itself has historical connotations. Nevertheless, even being a relic of the pre-industrial period, they still remain a significant factor. This is particularly the case in agricultural regions, where land cultivation and animal farming remain important economic sources for a high percentage of their population.


However, it refers not only to those for whom working on a farm is a basic activity, but also to a much wider group of people who, thanks to it, their living conditions improve. The total number of

such farms in the world is estimated at 570 million, 74% of which are located in Asia, and only 4% in the Middle East - this is the equivalent to almost 23 million farms. Given the size of the local population of 437 million and the average family size, this is something that cannot be ignored.

What is more, the increase in average annual temperatures, often with values that are physically completely imperceptible to inhabitants, does not remain indifferent to the state of the natural environment. The decrease in groundwater level is reflected in the steppe formation or even desertification of areas cultivated until recently. The decrease in the area of land suitable for cultivation has become a common phenomenon in the Near East and Middle East over the last two decades. In the case of North Africa, this is particularly strong in areas of Libya where, since the fall of al-Gaddafi, all efforts and initiatives to halt erosion and depletion of agricultural land have all but stopped. The massive Great Man-Made River project, which is of sizable importance to the region as a whole, has also been hit hard, and whose

Figure 5: Areas most at risk from climate change in Africa

African areas most affected by climate change



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infrastructure was one of the first targets of bombings¹.

In addition, climate change in sub-Saharan areas reinforces the likelihood of such a scenario. The systematic rise in temperatures and improvement of living conditions have resulted in successive waves of refugees from these areas. They leave their home countries and come to the north to look for better lives. As in the already mentioned internal population flows observed in Libya, Egypt and the Maghreb, these processes should be treated as natural trends in population and settlement movements. The only difference is in their intensity and size.

¹ NATO bombs the Great Man-Made River, <https://humanrightsinvestigations.org/2011/07/27/great-man-made-river-nato-bombs/>, [accessed: 10 December 2018].

POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND LAND RECLAMATION IN IRAQ AND SYRIA

The process of desertification of agriculturally-used areas took place in Mashriq, and has been most severely reflected in Mesopotamia, a region traditionally considered to be the region's breadbasket.

Irrigation investment in Iraq has stopped since the early 1980s. The war in Iran proved to be an extremely costly conflict. It has absorbed not only the surpluses and financial reserves of the state but has also caused indebtedness. The funds received were not always sufficient even for necessary repairs of the irrigation canal system. The occupation of Kuwait, which was supposed to provide the Iraqi economy with modernization and the population with prosperity, led to effects that were quite different from what was intended.

The military intervention against Iraq in 1991, followed by international isolation and restrictive trade restrictions, limited not only the flow of money but also of technology and specialists. As a result, renovation and engineering work that could even partially mitigate the effects of climate change and desert expansion has been undertaken on a disproportionate scale compared to the needs. The next war campaign in 2003 was also not favorable for such projects. Only after 2004 was some progress made in this area, which involved the creation of a fund for the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy deprived of investment as a result of a US embargo and wars. Critical infrastructure was at the forefront. The progress of the work carried out, to a large extent, by and with Western companies has been significant, although it has been effectively slowed down by corruption, bureaucracy and political instability. The loss of control over the latter and the emergence of ISIS have again shifted the burden of the state's tasks to objectives other than the fight against the desert and the restoration of all its lands.

After attempts by Western countries to use the so-called Arab Spring movement to overthrow the Bashar al-Assad regime, Syria's political and economic instability continued. The areas on the banks of the Euphrates have been brought under the control of a hostile power in Damascus. All the work to stop the soil from drying up and the desert from expanding has stopped. Even if the scope and scale of this work had been decidedly inadequate before, the economic and social dimension of this work could not be overestimated. After 2011, the situation in this field has become even more dramatic. There is also little prospect of its improvement in the coming years. This applies to both aspects: climate change and the dynamics of political processes in the Middle East. In the first case, the nature of the changes is irreversible, and in the second, the conflict of interests of the

regional powers and the lack of will on the part of the major international players who support them make it impossible to put an end to the ongoing armed conflicts.

CONCLUSION

Contemporary Europe owes its current shape to the historical processes that have formed it, among which successive waves of settlements on its territory have played a key role in its cultural and civilization dimensions. Antiquity appears here to be the period of its settlement, interrupted in the areas to the west of the Danube and Rhine lines by the rise of the Roman Empire, while the Middle Ages – as the declining period of migration of peoples and the time of the creation of modern states. In this respect, modern history can be seen as a period of migration from Europe of peoples, whose representatives, with a few exceptions, used Indo-European languages to the “new world”. They may also be regarded as a time of colonization of the Old Continent by groups of nations now associated with Asia and Africa.

As in the past, the settlement of people from these nations was met with resistance and opposition of societies, which, due to the much earlier settlement of areas, acted as their historical owners. This phenomenon is as natural as migration itself.

What is important and worth emphasizing, is that armed conflicts, demographic processes and climate change, which are now responsible for the current wave of migration, were also the determinants of past migrations. The phenomenon of modern processes is participation in generating migration by the society living in the areas constituting the settlement target. This applies to both political and natural dimensions.

Piotr Kwiatkiewicz ■
August 1, 2018

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LET'S NOT HURRY WITH POLAND'S EUROZONE MEMBERSHIP

ŁUKASZ CZERNICKI

Since the outbreak of the crisis in the Eurozone, the enthusiasm of Central and Eastern European countries, including Poland, to join the European Monetary Union has been significantly weakened.

However, in the face of growing international tensions in recent years, some opinions have emerged indicating that the adoption of the common European currency could contribute to the increase in Poland's geopolitical security. This analysis is an attempt to answer the question about the rationale of Poland's accession to the monetary union, taking into account the current dynamics in the geopolitical situation.

AT THE HEART OF THE EUROZONE CRISIS

Before presenting arguments for and against Poland's accession to the Eurozone, it is first necessary to understand the nature of the crisis, which affected mainly the peripheral countries of Europe, i.e., Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland.

First of all, we must be aware that the economic turbulence that has occurred has not been caused directly by the over-



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inflated spending of the state apparatus. Of these countries, Portugal alone saw a slight increase in its public debt-to-GDP ratio in the decade before the crisis, Greece remained relatively stable, and Spain and Ireland even managed to reduce it.

The root cause of the crisis was the credit boom that started in the Eurozone peripheral countries a few years before the introduction of the single currency. The excessive credit expansion at that time was due to several factors. Firstly, the creation of the single currency area coincided with a substantial reduction in interest rates around the world. Secondly, the deepening of European integration created a wave of optimism at the periphery of Europe: entrepreneurs and consumers were keen to borrow, and banks were keen to lend. Thirdly, the economic recovery

and increasing demand for credit encouraged financial institutions from other countries, in particular, Germany and France, to invest in the southern and western borders of Europe. The credit boom, therefore, had strong external financing¹.

The dynamic change in global market sentiment at the end of the last decade contributed to the slowdown in the periphery of the Eurozone.

The significant slowdown revealed the illusory nature of economic growth, especially in southern countries.

¹ Ł. Czernicki, (2012): *Euro(pa) w kryzysie. Scenariusze rozwoju sytuacji, propozycje zmian w funkcjonowaniu Unii Gospodarczo-Walutowej, alternatywa dla członkostwa w strefie euro* [in]: Staniłko, J.F. (ed.) (2012): *Europejski ład gospodarczy w 2020 roku*; <http://www.sobieski.org.pl/wp-content/uploads/Stani%C5%82ko-red-Europejski-%C5%82ad-PDF.pdf> [accessed: 21 July 2018].

It turned out that a significant part of the capital in the period of economic boom was spent there for consumption, often on purchases in the housing market. The bursting speculative bubbles and the worsening general economic situation contributed to the crisis in the financial sector. Problems of financial institutions combined with the recession subsequently undermined the financial credibility of individual countries (e.g., Ireland's public debt-to-GDP ratio increased several-fold, due to the country's takeover of banking liabilities). The unemployment rate increased dramatically. There were two main reasons why it was not possible to quickly resolve the problem. The peripheral countries, stuck in the Eurozone, could not reduce their currency exchange rate in comparison with other countries. Such a move could have had a beneficial impact on their economies, as the robust credit expansion in the 2000s made the countries of the South and Ireland relatively expensive. The so-called internal devaluation, i.e., manual price cuts and wage reductions, without changing the exchange rate, is always a long and painful process. Besides, attempts have been made at all costs to avoid the official bankruptcy of individual countries by supporting them financially, fearing a contagion effect on the countries using euros and the consequences for the financial sector. A declaration of insolvency and profound debt restructuring would help to alleviate the financial pressure exerted by the governments of countries in crisis, which has further reduced economic activity.

Less than a decade after the outbreak of the crisis, some say it is a thing of the past. Even the countries most affected by the economic turmoil are starting to see positive economic growth; the

The dynamic change in global market sentiment at the end of the last decade contributed to the slowdown in the periphery of the Eurozone.

interest rates on their bonds are steadily decreasing. However, the road to returning to a stable path of economic development in the southern Eurozone countries seems to be still long and challenging. This is particularly evident in the tiresome recovery of employment in the south of the monetary union. For example, the Greek economy had approximately 4.5 million employees before the crisis. Nowadays this figure is almost one million less. Also, it should be remembered that for a decade now, interest rates on world capital markets have been at a record low level. Accelerating their increase could efficiently suppress the recovery of economic activity at the periphery of the Eurozone.

ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS

Before the crisis broke out, two arguments were quite often used in the media and political debate on Poland's accession to the Eurozone, probably because they were easily accepted by ordinary citizens who did not have much knowledge of macroeconomics, one for and the other against the adoption of the common currency. On the one hand, joining the Eurozone was supposed to eliminate transaction costs related to the necessity of exchanging national currency for transactions within the monetary union. On the other hand, it

Before the crisis, the main line of reasoning put forward by supporters of the adoption of the euro, was that joining the monetary union was supposed to lead to a decrease in interest rates in the economy.

was feared that replacing the Polish zloty with the euro would contribute to a rapid increase in prices in Poland. The importance of both arguments in considering the advisability of joining the Eurozone is, in fact, marginal. The experience of many countries shows that price increases after the monetary union, if any, have been modest. The transaction costs associated with currency exchange, especially at a time when the financial sector is becoming increasingly digitalized, are in fact negligible.

Before the crisis, the main line of reasoning put forward by supporters of the adoption of the euro, was that joining the monetary union was supposed to lead to a decrease in interest rates in the economy. From today's perspective, however, we can say that the reduction in the cost of loans following joining the Eurozone entails a severe risk of the economy overheating, which may result in the outbreak of another crisis.

The most important arguments in the debate on joining the Eurozone in the

post-crisis economic reality are related to the experiences of the peripheral countries, described in the first part of the text. They argue in favor of preserving the Polish zloty. Firstly, the adoption of the euro increases the risk of a credit boom in a given country. Having its own currency makes it easier to limit the inflow of foreign capital, which is often the primary source of financing for credit expansion in the local market. The very fact of the existence of exchange rate risk seems to be a real obstacle to the external money inflow. The speculative bubbles on the real estate market in the last decade and the economic slowdown after the outbreak of the global crisis in the Baltic States maintaining a constant exchange rate of their own currencies against the euro were much larger than in Poland, where the central bank allows the zloty exchange rate to be shaped by the market. It is worth mentioning in this context, for the sake of justice, the fundamental change that has taken place in the area of macroeconomics over the last few years. After the crisis, economists' confidence in financial markets has significantly weakened, and more emphasis has been placed on effective regulations. The so-called macroprudential policy introduces mechanisms limiting the probability of credit booms, regardless of the exchange rate regime in a given economy. However, these seem to be far from sufficient at the moment.

Secondly, being in a monetary union, in the event of a crisis caused by excessive credit expansion, a given country is exposed to the risk of a deeper economic recession. Recent economic studies show that the decline in GDP per capita in those countries most severely affected by economic turbulence in the Eurozone, i.e., Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Cyprus in the years 2010–2015 was, on average, several percent higher than



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ATHENS, GREECE, JUNE 29, 2011. GREEK FINANCIAL CRISIS PROTESTS. DEMONSTRATORS CARRYING BANNERS AND THE GREEK FLAG PUT THEIR HANDS UP AND SHOUT SLOGANS CLOSE TO THE GREEK PARLIAMENT BUILDING ON THE SECOND DAY OF A 48-HOUR GENERAL STRIKE. MILLIONS OF GREEKS PARTICIPATED IN THE STRIKE TO OPPOSE NEW HEAVY AUSTERITY MEASURES, PART OF THE MEDIUM-TERM FISCAL STRATEGY FRAMEWORK 2012–2015 WHICH WAS TO BE CONCLUDED IN THE GREEK PARLIAMENT.

during the standard global crisis that has occurred over the last 50 years².

Currency adjustment is the simplest and most effective way of restoring international competitiveness following an inflation boom³ described in the first part of the text on the basis of the Eurozone peripheral countries. It is well-known that such an operation is not possible in a monetary union.

² A. Terzi, (2018): *Macroeconomic adjustment in the Eurozone*; https://growthlab.cid.harvard.edu/files/growthlab/files/terzi_cidwp88.pdf [accessed: 28 July 2018].

³ J. Gąska, S. Kawalec, (2018): *Syndrom długotrwałej utraty konkurencyjności. Ryzyko, które powinno powstrzymać Polskę przed przyjęciem euro*; speech at the: „Euro a sprawa polska” conference held on April 16, 2018 r. in Vistula University, Poland; <http://www.capitalstrategy.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/G%C4%85ska-Kawalec-2018-04-11-Prezentacja.pdf> [accessed: 26 July 2018].

Conversely, there is an assumption that accession to the Eurozone would entail entering a club of countries with a strong currency, the effect of which would be an increase in salaries in Poland⁴. Since the political transformation, wages in the Polish economy have been growing in comparison with the EU average, much slower than the Polish GDP, so it would undoubtedly be a desirable effect of the accession to the Eurozone. Moreover, greater appreciation pressure could encourage Polish enterprises to make more courageous optimization investments or even to change their

⁴ This argument was used by, *inter alia*, M. Bukowski, in the interview on May 18, 2018, by M. Muszyński entitled „To Polacy płacą za to, że jesteśmy poza strefą euro”, *Forbes*, <https://www.forbes.pl/gospodarka/maciej-bukowski-wiseeuropa-czy-powinnismy-wejsc-do-strefy-euro/2w4ns7h> [accessed: 23 July 2018].

There is an assumption that accession to the Eurozone would entail entering a club of countries with a strong currency, the effect of which would be an increase in salaries in Poland.

business models, the latter of which are often based on relatively low labor costs in Poland. However, the validity of this argument is weakened by several factors. Firstly, the strengthening of the zloty - to some extent - is also possible outside the Eurozone. It is a matter of conducting the right exchange rate policy or the appropriate economic policy. Secondly, it seems that the situation on the Polish labor market already shows signs of a strong revival (the unemployment rate is the lowest in years), which results in dynamically growing salaries. Entering the Eurozone could, at this point, trigger an additional wage spiral. Thirdly, when having its own currency, it is possible to control the whole process of salary growth by increasing the currency exchange rate. Excessive wage increases, combined with high demand for consumer credit, are a simple way to lose competitiveness on the international stage and, eventually, to start a crisis. An example of this is most visible in the southern countries of the Eurozone.

POLITICAL ARGUMENTS

A full account of the benefits and potential losses of adopting the euro also requires consideration of political

arguments. The reasoning that joining the monetary union will increase our security in the international arena revived the debate about the euro in Poland.

It should be stressed at the outset, following Professor Grosse, that the Eurozone is not a military alliance⁵. The current shape of the monetary union does not guarantee that, by joining it, a country is given additional protection in the event of geopolitical turmoil. The crucial point of accession to the Eurozone is the transfer of monetary policy decisions to the European Central Bank. It can, therefore, be said that the impact of Slovakia's adoption of the euro on its security is now the same as that of Montenegro, which unilaterally euroized itself years ago, i.e., practically none.

Following the outbreak of the crisis, new ideas were put forward for the reform of the European Monetary Union, the aim of which is deepening the integration of countries with a common currency. However, changes in the institutional architecture of the Eurozone will have a real impact on the security of its members, as long as they lead to the communitarization of costs, including those related to the activities of third countries.

There are two main proposals now on the table, the adoption of which could contribute to the distribution of financial responsibility between the Member States, for example in the event of aggression against a particular country from abroad. The first one is the idea of communitarizing the debt of the Member States of the Eurozone. This idea is currently being pushed forward

⁵ In this part of the text I mainly consulted: T. Grosse, (2018): *Strefa EURO: kryzys, drogi wyjścia, zagrożenia*; <https://nowakonfederacja.pl/raport/strefa-euro-kryzys-drogi-wyjscia-zagrozenia/> [accessed: 24 July 2018].

in European high society mainly by French President Emmanuel Macron. The second one consists of the introduction of Community guarantees covering bank deposits for countries which have joined the so-called banking union. The problem is, however, that Berlin coldly receives both proposals. The approach to the role and the desired level of public spending in Germany is fundamentally different from the one in France, which is why it is doubtful that our western neighbors will take responsibility for the debts of other countries in the Eurozone. This is in direct conflict with their culture of maintaining strict budgetary discipline.

The Berlin's agreement on the implementation of the third pillar of the banking union (i.e. the Community deposit guarantee), in addition to the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism for financial institutions, is dependent on ordering the situation in the banking sector. This mainly concerns solving the problem of risky loans, the amount of which in the banking systems of the Eurozone countries is estimated at a considerable amount of almost one trillion euros⁶. It, therefore, seems that this issue will continue to block for years to come Berlin's acceptance for the completion of the banking union. Besides, it should be remembered that participation in the banking union is also open to countries that are not members of the Eurozone.

IT IS BETTER TO WAIT

On the basis of the above analysis, it can be said that the current economic arguments are in favor of preserving the zloty. The highest potential risk associated with

There are two main proposals now on the table, the idea of communitarizing the debt of the Member States of the Eurozone, or Community guarantees covering bank deposits for so-called banking union countries.

membership of the Eurozone is, on the one hand, a possible increase in the likelihood of economic overheating and, on the other hand, a deeper recession than would be the case if a country had its own currency. At the same time, the political analysis has shown that there are plans for reforms to strengthen integration within the Eurozone involving communitarizing public debt and providing pan-European guarantees for deposits held in banks in the monetary union. However, these proposals are being blocked by Germany - the most powerful economy in the Eurozone. Without effective mechanisms charging costs to the other Member States of the monetary union, in the event of economic problems caused, for example, by the aggression of third countries, it is merely an illusion to expect that the adoption of the euro will contribute to Poland's geopolitical security. Therefore, Warsaw should refrain from joining the Eurozone, at least before institutional reforms in the European Monetary Union are completed.

Łukasz Czernicki ■
August 1, 2018

⁶ S. Terliesner, (2017): *Einlagensicherung ist Knackpunkt der Bankenunion*, <https://www.springerprofessional.de/bankenaufsicht/finanzen/einlagensicherung-ist-knackpunkt-der-bankenunion/15316308> [accessed: 26 July 2018].

THE ROLE OF ELECTROMOBILITY IN MODERN ECONOMIES

MARCIN KRAŚNIEWSKI

Electromobility is a new technology for land transport designed to revolutionize the transport model that has been shaped over decades. A system of support for the development of new technology is now visible in the legislation of many countries.

Undoubtedly, Norway has been at the forefront of the development of electromobility since the mid-1990s. The Norwegian support system was based on the assumption that the electrification of passenger cars was a *sine qua non* for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions on a large scale¹. An additional impulse for the activities

undertaken was the pursuit of Norway's economic growth through the creation of a domestic electric vehicle industry.² The most important elements of its system are: no indirect purchase tax (high on combustion vehicles); 25% VAT exemption on purchase and leasing; low annual circulation tax; exemption on toll roads, river crossings, ferries, and municipal car parks.

¹ Norwegian Centre for Transport Research (Institute of Transport Economics), *Society's Costs and Benefits of Electric Vehicle Incentives* (Oslo: COMPETT Conference, 2015). <https://www.toi.no/getfile.php/1340810/mmmarkiv/Forside%202015/compett-foredrag/Fridstrøm%20-%20compett.pdf> (DOA: 30 June 2018).

² M.A. Aasenss, J. Odeck, The Increase of Electric Vehicle Usage in Norway – Incentives and Adverse Effects, *European Transport Research Review* 2015, 7(34), p. 3; U. Tietge, P. Mock, N. Lutsey, A. Campestrini, Comparison of Leading Electric Vehicle Policy and Deployment in Europe, *International Council on Clean Transportation* 2016, p. 47.

Legislative actions for the development of electromobility are also being taken in Poland. Unlike Norway, the Polish system of support for electromobility is still at an early stage, beginning with the Act on Electromobility and Alternative Fuels of January 11, 2018. The Act is intended to be the first regulation which will comprehensively define the principles governing the alternative fuels market and the system of support for the development of electromobility in Poland.

The strong interest of countries in this technology, which is a novelty to the economy and unknown to the law, raises questions regarding the reasons behind such extensive worldwide interest in electromobility. This paper will outline the importance of electromobility and the barriers to its development, and go on to highlight the role of the state and the law in the innovations in the area of electromobility.

IMPORTANCE OF ELECTROMOBILITY

Geopolitical aspect

The current demand for oil makes it a commodity of strategic political and geopolitical importance. As a result, a significant proportion of the world's countries consuming fossil fuels do not have adequate resources of their own and are forced to obtain them from other regions of the world. The transport of energy-producing raw materials creates a situation of dependence on their supply inherently related to the efficiency of the means of transportation and the circumstances surrounding their transport.³ The diversification of energy supplies and the reduction of energy dependency represent some of the priorities

³ J. Kamiński, P. Janusz, *Rola magazynowania w zapewnieniu ciągłości dostaw gazu ziemnego – kluczowe wyzwania*, in M. Pawełczyk ed., *Współczesne problemy bezpieczeństwa energetycznego – sektor gazowy i energetyczny* (Warsaw 2018: Ius Publicum), p. 57.

The diversification of energy supplies and the reduction of energy dependency represent some of the priorities of each country in the world.

of each country in the world. The current transport model has a significant impact on the geopolitical system in the modern world, which results in oil-producing countries gaining important international significance. As a consequence, countries such as the United States of America, Russia, the Gulf countries and the North Sea Region countries today play a significant role in the supply of oil.

The development of electromobility is, therefore, a fundamental geopolitical issue. The increase in the number of electric cars will result in a decrease in the geopolitical significance of the countries extracting crude oil in favor of those extracting metals used for the construction of electric vehicles, in particular: lithium, cobalt, and graphite. Metals are the primary raw material used in the production of batteries; specifically lithium-ion batteries. The electrification of transport will undoubtedly contribute to an increase in demand for these metals – according to statistical data, after 2050, this increase will amount to 2898% (lithium), 1928% (cobalt), and 524% (graphite). The biggest producers, and thus the biggest beneficiaries of electromobility, are Australia, Chile, Argentina (lithium); China, Canada, Congo (cobalt); China, India, Brazil (graphite).⁴

⁴ J. Aber, *Electric Bus Analysis for New York City Transit* (Columbia University, 2016), p. 11.



WARSAW, JANUARY 17, 2018. POLISH PRESIDENT ANDRZEJ DUDA DURING THE PRESENTATION OF ELECTRIC VEHICLES AFTER THE CONFERENCE “TECHNOLOGIES OF THE FUTURE. ELECTROMOBILITY” AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE IN WARSAW.

The development of electromobility will result in geopolitical changes by reducing the significance of the states producing crude oil for the benefit of countries extracting metals.

The development of electromobility will result in geopolitical changes by reducing the significance of the states producing crude oil for the benefit of countries extracting metals. The shrinking oil supply chain will make other geographical areas play a more significant role in the future. It should be stressed at this point that the amount of extracted metals and significant technological progress for electro-mobility are bringing China to the forefront.

Economic and social aspects

The automotive industry is one of the most challenging industries in today's economy. To justify the above statement,



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(70.1; Germany), Honda (52.6; Japan), BMW (42.7; Germany), Daimler (42.3; Germany), Ford (40.4; United States of America), Hyundai (37.7; South Korea), Nissan (37.1; Japan), General Motors (32.0; United States of America), Kia (23.6; South Korea).

Increased interest in electric cars and their distribution has an impact on the automotive industry. Manufacturers of combustion vehicles will face a significant risk of revenue decline, and as a consequence, individual countries will be exposed to declines in budgeted revenues. The beneficiaries of electromobility development will be entities producing batteries, lithium-ion batteries and electric cars on their own. As a result, there will be a notable shift in the value chain between national economies.⁷ New players such as Tesla (electric car manufacturer) and Panasonic (lithium-ion battery manufacturer) should, therefore, appear on the market. The transformation of the transport system will mainly affect the competitiveness of the European economies, which are currently the leaders in the production of combustion engines, but in the case of batteries for electric cars are inferior to those from other continents.

it is necessary to refer, for instance, to takeovers and mergers that took place during the economic crisis between 2007 and 2009.⁵ There are huge car companies on the market, created as a result of takeovers and mergers, which resulted in a reduction in production costs and an increase in the ability to acquire new technologies. The largest automotive companies, according to their market share in dollars, include:⁶ Toyota (99.8; Japan), Volkswagen Group

These economic changes will also have a social impact. In the first place, these will involve changes in the structure of employment and an increase in unemployment. Such changes will indicate an increased demand on the labor market for qualified engineers who keep up with the latest technologies. The increase in unemployment will result from the reduction in jobs, since the construction of an electric car requires half as many parts as an internal combustion engine car, and therefore requires much less work overall. Furthermore, it should be noted that the

⁵ I. Warter, L. Warter, The Phenomenon of Merger and Acquisition Within the Automotive Industry, North International Conference on Economics, 23–24 September 2016, (Romania 2016), p. 214.

⁶ The numbers in the brackets present market values in billions USD as well as their origins.

⁷ J. Wajer, K. Rajczyk, Którym pasem zamierzamy jechać? Samochody elektryczne, Ernst & Young. ING Bank Śląski (Warsaw 2018), p. 30.

Vehicle emission standards and the development of alternative fuels are of particular importance for the development of the transport system and the protection of the environment.

development of electromobility requires a change in the awareness of the users themselves. Reliable and comprehensive information on all modes of transport, their combination possibilities and their environmental impact should be made publicly available. This, therefore, requires an adaptation of the legal system, in particular regarding documents and access to relevant information.

Environmental aspect

One of the pillars of the European Union's socio-economic policy is sustainable development directed towards a low-carbon economy.⁸ The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union stipulates that environmental protection conditions shall be integrated into policy formulation and implementation as well as into the Union's other initiatives.⁹ The focus on

the environmental aspect in the concept of sustainable development is aimed at reducing the negative effects of the dynamic development of transport. Unsustainable modes of transport manifest themselves in the rapid growth of motor vehicles as well as in the uncontrolled and irreversible use of natural resources (in particular oil). This situation destroys global and local ecosystems and poses a risk to human well-being and health.¹⁰

The adoption of the concept of sustainable development in the European Union's policies has led to the formation of an increasing number of legal instruments enforcing the integration of environmental aspects into its transport policy. In order to achieve the EU's policy objective of sustainable development, it is also necessary to take legal action against the transport sector, accounting for a quarter of greenhouse gas emissions in Europe.¹¹ Vehicle emission standards and the development of alternative fuels are of particular importance for the development of the transport system and the protection of the environment.

The EU EURO standards play an essential role in the production of combustion vehicles and environmental protection, and should be met by combustion-engine vehicles – as they define the level of basic (side) components generated during the combustion process. They are, therefore, a key determinant of exhaust emission standards and, at the same time, an important constraint for car manufacturers. The history of the EURO standards dates back to 1993 when

⁸ European Commission. *Communication from the Commission Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth*, COM(2010) 2020 final, Brussels, 3 III 2010: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC2020&from=PL> (DOA: 30 June 2018).

⁹ Article 11, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, consolidated version, OJ C 221, September 9 1997, p. 1. EU 2012 C 326/47 in M. Górski, M. Michalak, *Komentarz do art. 11 Traktatu o Funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej*,

in *Traktat o Funkcjonowaniu Unii Europejskiej* [TFUE], Vol. 1, (Art. 1–89), in A. Wróbel, ed., (Warsaw: Wolters Kluwer, 2012), p. 244–247.

¹⁰ OECD, *Guidelines Towards Environmentally Sustainable Transport*, (OECD, 2002).

¹¹ European Commission, *Transport emissions. A European Strategy for low-emission mobility*,

^bhttp://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/index_en.htm (DOA: 30 June 2018).



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WARSAW, APRIL 20, 2018. CHARGING POINTS FOR ELECTRIC VEHICLES PRODUCED BY THE RAILWAY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS COMPANY (KZŁ) BEING PRESENTED AFTER THE CEREMONY OF SIGNING COOPERATION AGREEMENTS ON ELECTROMOBILITY BETWEEN COMPANIES OF THE STATE TREASURY IN THE MINISTRY OF ENERGY.

Directive 91/441/EC defined the EURO 1 standards¹². Over the years, the EURO norms have undergone significant changes to protect the environment, while at the same time forcing the production of cars with new generation engines, i.e. meeting EU standards. However, the practice of applying the EURO norms indicates that the enforcement of the adopted standards is ineffective. According to a study conducted by the European Federation for Transport and Environment, new diesel cars sold in Europe have on average five times the emission limit permitted by the EURO 6 standard.¹³ Another step in reducing exhaust emissions from internal combustion vehicles will be the adoption of the EURO 7 standard announced by the

European Commission, which envisages a significantly lower limit on CO₂ emissions and a strengthening of the system for controlling vehicle emissions.¹⁴ Adoption of the new EURO standard will result in the reduction of the level of emissions into the atmosphere and, at the same time, an increase in the costs of production of combustion engines.

The European Union's transport policy also emphasizes the development of alternative fuel infrastructure as also being part of the concept of sustainable development. Alternative fuels as such should be understood as fuels or energy sources acting, at least in part, as a substitute for crude oil energy sources used in transport vehicles and with the potential to contribute to the de-carbonization of transport and the improvement of the environmental performance of the transport sector.¹⁵

¹² Council Directive 91/441/EEC of 26 June 1991 amending Directive 70/220/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to measures to be taken against air pollution by emissions from motor vehicles (OJ L 242, 30.8.1991, p. 1).

¹³ European Federation for Transport and Environment, Don't breathe here. Tackling air pollution from vehicles, Brussels 2015, p. 31 et seq.

¹⁴ European Commission, EU legislation on passenger car type approval and emissions standards, Brussels 2016.

¹⁵ Article 2, point (a) of the Directive of the

The environmental aspect renders electromobility an important economic phenomenon.

Directive 2014/94/EU requires the EU member states to develop alternative fuel infrastructure, and to ensure the development of recharging points for electric vehicles, natural gas CNG or LNG refueling points and LNG bunkering points. The Directive also obliges the EU member states to introduce particular technical specifications, harmonized rules for charging electric vehicles and rules on consumer information.

The above Directive corresponds in its entirety with the provisions of the 2011 White Paper on Transport,¹⁶ which addresses the issue of environmentally friendly transport at the EU level. The White Paper stressed the importance of the transport sector for the economy and society but also emphasized the challenges associated with the use of natural resources. The document also proposed a 60% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from transport by 2050 compared to 1990 levels. Following the analysis of both EU documents, it is necessary to point out that the development of alternative fuels infrastructure and their increased share in the transport market will ensure compliance with the principle of sustainable

development and reduce the current societal and economic threats.

The environmental aspect renders electromobility an important economic phenomenon. The development of electromobility is in line with the concept of sustainable development and is also part of, and to a large extent a consequence of, the actions taken by the European Union in the pro-environmental shaping of its transport model. The carbon efficiency requirements of the EU regulations will be reflected in an increase in the price of combustion vehicles, and will thus increase the competitiveness of electric vehicles with regard to their compliance with environmental requirements.

BARRIERS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTROMOBILITY

Electromobility continues to be a technological niche. It should be pointed out, for example, that the number of electric cars sold in Europe in 2016 represents 0.5% of all passenger cars. China accounts for almost 40% of the market for newly-sold electric cars, but even in China, the percentage of electric cars sold is 1.5%.¹⁷ A similar situation prevails in the Polish market where the number of registered electric buses is 250, and electric cars – 1200.

The main obstacles to the development of electromobility can be divided into two main groups: technological barriers and economic barriers.

Technological barriers include the infrastructure of vehicle charging stations (there are too few charging stations for electric vehicles, the number of which has significantly increased in recent years) and battery charging time as well as capacity (charging time is too long and a battery

European Parliament and of the Council of October 22, 2014 on the development of alternative fuel infrastructures, OJ L 283, 31.10.2014, p. 1. L 307, October 28, 2014, pp. 1–20 (Directive 2014/94/EU).

¹⁶ European Commission, White paper. Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system, COM(2011) 144 final, Brussels, March 28, 2011.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

weighs too much; electric vehicle users expect a reasonable charging time, i.e. 15–30 minutes). In addition, the average distance that an electric car can cover is 100–150 km on a single battery charge, and driving a car over this distance requires 15kWh of electricity to recharge the battery – while keeping in mind that the average monthly electricity consumption of a household is about 300 kWh. This requires improving the performance of electric cars in terms of battery charging time and the distance they can cover without charging.

The primary economic barrier to the development of electromobility is the cost of an electric car. The price of an electric car is still higher than the price of a combustion car, which is mainly due to the high cost of batteries.¹⁸ The cost of batteries amounts to between a third and a half of the price of the car. In terms of the economy, electric cars are more advantageous when it comes to their use, as electricity prices and simple car construction result in lower operating costs.

The above-mentioned barriers to the development of electromobility are entirely consistent with the opinions of electric car users and market operators. When asked about the most significant barriers for electric cars, respondents indicated: a lack of a widely available network of fast charging stations (this was indicated as the principal barrier by both users and entrepreneurs); limited distance; high car price; lack of possibility to charge the car at home/ at work; lack of tax incentives and program subsidies.¹⁹

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹⁹ Based on: Innogy Group, Autostrada do elektromobilności. Report, Warsaw 2018, <https://www.innogy.pl/pl/~media/Innogy-Group/Innogy/Polska/Dokumenty/Artykuly/2018/innogy->

Technological barriers include the infrastructure of vehicle charging stations and battery charging time as well as capacity.

ROLE OF THE STATE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ELECTROMOBILITY

Having analyzed the main barriers to the development of electromobility, it should be recognized that legislation is not a *sine qua non*. Rather, the most important aspects in this regard include the technological parameters of the vehicles, their production costs, the degree of development of the infrastructure of the vehicle charging stations, the charging time and the price to be paid by consumers for the purchase of the vehicle and for the energy to be used to charge it. Electromobility is real and needs to be addressed accordingly. The law should play a servant role in its technological development and should aim to change individual parameters for electromobility such as its price, mileage, range, etc. On the other hand, the member state's financial and legal support should cover not only the infrastructure market but also the electric car market, so that the public can be encouraged to buy new technology cars, and companies can increase their investments in this sector.

Marcin Kraśniewski ■

July 16, 2018

[polska-raport-autostrada-do-elektromobilnosci-web.pdf](#) (DOA: 30 June 2018 r.).



WARSAW, AUGUST 9, 2008. POLISH PRESIDENT LECH KACZYŃSKI DURING A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT OF GEORGIA MIKHEIL SAKASHVILI AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE IN WARSAW.

THE UNFINISHED MISSION – PRESIDENT LECH KACZYŃSKI'S FOREIGN POLICY

PAWEŁ OZDOBA

Effectiveness, self-confidence, the ability to form alliances, honesty and having high regard for morality – these are character traits that make a good politician. Lech Kaczyński possessed all these qualities, and strived with his determination to rebuild the significance of the Republic of Poland. Foreign policy in his implementation was an original concept which may serve as an excellent point of reference and foundation for the future.

During his term as President of the Republic of Poland, Lech Kaczyński repeatedly stressed the importance of creating and conducting the country's foreign policy. During his term in office, he was guided by the principles of solidarity and pursued his mission on the basis of a well-thought-out

and coherent concept. The president wanted Poland to become a regional entity and leader; a country aspiring to play a significant role in the European Union. He emphasized the value and historical heritage of the state and promoted patriotic attitudes in Polish society. During his inaugural speech, he pronounced words that were to become

characteristic of his overall foreign policy: “In order to be treated as a large European nation we must want to be such a nation. If you want the respect of others, you must start by respecting yourself.”

The mission undertaken by Lech Kaczyński certainly required courage, discipline and determination to meet set objectives. It should be noted that he took office several months after Poland’s accession to the European Union, which presented him, as the head of state, with profound and new challenges for Polish statehood. The first part of his presidency was a period of good cooperation with the government, which was largely based on the domestic political environment. However, in 2007, after the parliamentary elections were won by the Civic Platform party, the time came for “cohabitation” and serious difficulties. Nevertheless, Lech Kaczyński made efforts to implement his ideas concerning foreign and security policy, which were intended to be beneficial to Poland in the future.

When analyzing the achievements and work of President Lech Kaczyński, it should be noted that his foreign policy was in fact based on four important pillars. The first of them was the policy

concerning the countries to the east of Poland, and the second, a security policy understood not only in military terms. Next, it is necessary to mention the area of historical policy and the energy security policy, which were supposed to become not only some part of the project to increase state security but also a serious stimulus for the development of the whole region.

THE JAGIELLONIAN IDEA AND KACZYŃSKI’S MODEL

Kaczyński’s foreign policy was a coherent program based not only on the analyses of politicians, historians, and experts dealing with geopolitics; but it also contained an element of the so-called Jagiellonian idea, which at the turn of the century led to the creation of a powerful state by the Vistula River. The federation concept, which was a reference to the 15th-century idea, was used earlier by Marshal Józef Piłsudski, who also wanted to create a strong political entity based on alliances with Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine. In many cases, however, Kaczyński stressed that due to its geographical location, the Republic of Poland would always be situated between two very strong and influential states – Germany and Russia. In any difficult geopolitical situation, Polish interests could be secured in Lech Kaczyński’s concept thanks to the construction of a strong partnership between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The role of a regional leader was supposed to encourage other countries to truly cooperate with Poland. The key part in the president’s concept was to be played by the United States (as a guarantor of security), as well as by countries rich in natural resources (which would allow Poland to become independent from Russia). Lech Kaczyński also considered the alliance with EU Member States to be of major importance in the political game.

“In order to be treated as a large European nation we must want to be such a nation. If you want the respect of others, you must start by respecting yourself.”



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VILNIUS, LITHUANIA, JULY 6, 2009. LITHUANIAN PRESIDENT VALDAS ADAMKUS (2L) WITH HIS WIFE ALMA (L), UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO (3L), POLISH PRESIDENT LECH KACZYŃSKI (4L) WITH HIS WIFE MARIA (3R), GEORGIAN PRESIDENT MIKHEIL SAKASHVILI (2R) WITH HIS WIFE SANDRA ELISABETH ROELOFS (5L) AND DANISH QUEEN MARGARET II (R) DURING THE CELEBRATIONS OF THE LITHUANIAN MILLENNIUM.

POLAND'S EASTERN POLICY

Lech Kaczyński was a sincere supporter of cooperation with the countries to the east of Poland. For centuries, the geographical location of our country has meant that Poland had to maneuver skillfully between two powerful states: Germany and Russia. The Polish president believed that in today's world, the country's subjectivity and real significance could only be achieved by building an alliance with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The

priority for the president was to have good relations not only with Lithuania, Ukraine, Latvia, but also with Estonia, Georgia, and Romania.

"Poland's solidarity with the nations that lie south-east of it constitutes a great value" said Lech Kaczyński. History has shown that the declarations of the then president were not only wishful thinking but were also translated into real decisions and action. The declaration signed in 2007 by the leaders of Poland

In any difficult geopolitical situation, Polish interests could be secured in Lech Kaczyński's concept thanks to the construction of a strong partnership between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

and Ukraine was intended to become an indicator and a kind of new strategy of bilateral relations between the countries.

As it turned out, Lithuania, inhabited by a large percentage of (ethnic) Poles was to become a crucial partner of our country. At the beginning of 2006, Lech Kaczyński visited Vilnius, where he delivered a speech in the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania encouraging the inauguration of thoughtful cooperation in the EU based on mutual friendship.

“If we are to participate effectively in the European game and if we want to solve problems uniting our strengths, there must be enough room for this game. Nowadays, there is such a thing as a European game – a game of various interests. The interests of the strongest noticeably count, but often also the weaker ones can achieve success.” – said Lech Kaczyński. The president believed that alliances between countries could also be strengthened by building personal, friendly contacts with leaders of other countries in the region such as,

for example, Lithuania, Estonia, and Georgia. Leaders of these key (from President Kaczyński's perspective) countries had repeatedly called the Polish president their friend.

THE KEY ROLE OF GEORGIA

The policy of building alliances with the countries in Poland's neighborhood, as well as with the Baltic states, was only the beginning of a “game”. Kaczyński was determined to support Georgia becoming a kind of gateway to Europe. The president was well aware of the fact that the state led by Mikheil Saakashvili would be crucial not only for military security but also for the security of energy supply.

The conflict between Russia and Georgia, which escalated in 2008, has become a severe threat. Russia's neo-imperialist attempts could have turned the war in South Ossetia into a long-lasting conflict. Lech Kaczyński was aware of this and decided to undertake a risky, but, as it turned out, crucial mission to Tbilisi, where he also managed to engage the leaders of Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The arrival of the heads of state and the support of Mikheil Saakashvili in the Georgian capital were an expression of profound courage, but also of political intuition, thanks to which Russia most probably did not take control of the entire territory of Georgia. The Georgian president recalled that when the presidents spoke in Tbilisi Square to defend the country, Russian tanks, ready to attack, were located a dozen or so kilometers away. President Saakashvili has repeatedly stressed that it was thanks to Lech Kaczyński's initiative that the conflict did not escalate any further.

RECONCILIATION BASED ON TRUTH

Lech Kaczyński also strived to strengthen Ukraine, a large country with a painful past. The president wanted to achieve



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GEORGIA, NOVEMBER 23, 2008. POLISH PRESIDENT LECH KACZYŃSKI SURROUNDED BY GEORGIAN OFFICERS WHILE VISITING THE BORDER WITH SOUTH OSSETIA. THE CONVOY, THE PASSENGERS OF WHICH INCLUDED POLISH PRESIDENT LECH KACZYŃSKI AND GEORGIAN PRESIDENT MIKHEIL SAAKASHVILI, WAS ATTACKED WITH FIREARMS.

full reconciliation between both nations, on the basis of truth. He supported the political changes in Kiev which were distancing Ukraine from Russian influence. He stressed that the past cannot be changed, but that a better future can be built upon it. “We must speak openly, step by step, of a painful, difficult past, developing a single, fair assessment of all the tragedies of war at that time, both that of Poland and that of Ukraine. All the tragic events in Pawłokoma, Chełm Land, Volhynia, and Eastern Galicia, accompanying the “Vistula” action, should be thoroughly explained in the dialogue between politicians, historians, and ordinary people. Strong and lasting reconciliation can only be achieved on the basis of truth. We cannot change the past, but we can ensure that it does not determine the future”, said the president in 2006 during the ceremony of unveiling a monument in honor of the victims of the Pawłokoma massacre in the Podkarpackie province.

The arrival of the heads of state and the support of Mikheil Saakashvili in the Georgian capital were an expression of profound courage, but also of political intuition, thanks to which Russia most probably did not take control of the entire territory of Georgia.

“Poland wants to play a role in the European Union that suits its size, both in terms of population and global production.”

Lech Kaczyński saw opportunities in building a Central European political structure in cooperation with the Czechs, Hungarians, and Romanians. For this reason, the president had been accused of pursuing a ‘romantic policy’. In retrospect, however, it could be said that it was typical *realpolitik*, beneficial for all its participants, who, thanks to cooperation were able to pursue not only common but also individual interests in line with their *raison d’être*.

The establishment of good relations between the Republic of Poland and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was difficult, but effective. Kaczyński, due to the political situation in the country and the cohabitation which had occurred between him and the government of Donald Tusk, had to face numerous difficulties and misunderstandings. As the head of state, he wanted to carry out his duties actively and to fulfill the mandate granted by the Poles. In the meantime, opinions criticizing his actions appeared in the public space. Some politicians stressed that building alliances with small states, in opposition to Germany or Russia, would result in a fiasco. Lech Kaczyński, however, wanted to strengthen his Central European alliance with good relations with the USA.

THE ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES

Building good relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe indeed strengthened the region, but it did not guarantee adequate military security. In Lech Kaczyński’s concept, this was to be guaranteed by an alliance with the United States and a project to build an anti-missile system. He also stressed that the creation of a special defense system in Poland would provide an opportunity to secure NATO’s interests and strengthen this organization. The strategic partnership between Poland and the USA was also expected to be manifested by the permanent presence of US troops on the territory of the Republic of Poland. Lech Kaczyński appreciated the military potential of his ally from across the Atlantic Ocean, as well as the role it played in the fight against communism in Poland.

“We are very pleased with our good relations with the United States. We value the cooperation with this country because of the significant historical ties – because of the several million citizens of the United States, who are of Polish origin. But also because of the role of this powerful state in stopping communism in Europe and other parts of the world. Because of the struggle the United States is waging for the development of democratic systems. In this respect, we are and will remain in solidarity with the United States,” said the president during a meeting with the Diplomatic Corps in 2006.

The change in US president, the correction of the US concept for its presence in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the “political turmoil” experienced in the country finally stopped the process of building the proposed anti-missile system. There is little doubt, however, that the

United States, in Lech Kaczyński's view, was to play an essential role in the security of the region.

POLAND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

When Lech Kaczyński took office as the President of the Republic of Poland, Poland had been a member of the European Union for less than two years. What is more, there was also a critical period of negotiations connected with the Lisbon Treaty during his term in office. Despite the fact that the president's political environment was described by some politicians or publicists as "Eurosceptic", the president himself was rather a "Euro-realist". He was aware of the fact that Poland's accession to the European Union was a serious change, but he also saw it as an opportunity. He stressed that this would allow the development of the country to accelerate and for its security and significance on the international scene to increase. However, he was also aware of the risks and difficulties linked to joining the EU. He repeatedly stressed that Poland had joined the European Union in order to be treated on equal terms with the countries of the so-called old Union.

"Poland wants to play a role in the European Union that suits its size, both in terms of population and global production [...] There are 27 countries in the EU, and Poland is on the sixth place here. This is, as it used to be said, especially in athletics – a scoring place. Not in the form of medals, but in the form of scores. Nothing more, nothing less' - said Lech Kaczyński in autumn 2007 during a lecture at the Press Club in Paris.

Eurosceptics accused Lech Kaczyński of having ratified the Lisbon Treaty. Euro-enthusiasts, in turn, criticized the fact that he delayed taking this

decision. The choice of ratification may be assessed in many different ways, but it must be stressed that the then president was able to skillfully eliminate from the Treaty the provisions on the creation of a new state. Kaczyński also delayed the introduction of a new voting model, the so-called Nice system, which was less advantageous for Poland than the original one. The conditions set out by the president included: maintaining the independence of the European Council as well as maintaining the ability of individual states to block decisions imposed by stronger countries.

"Europe has a great deal of experiment ahead, and you should remember that the Treaty of Lisbon is changing a lot. It has been considerably weakened in its federal tendency compared with the so-called Constitutional Treaty. I do not hide the fact that Poland has pursued this goal and that this goal has been achieved to a significant extent", said the president in an interview for Reuters press agency.

According to Kaczyński, the Lisbon Treaty was a "wise compromise"; however, he decided to delay its ratification nonetheless. Sławomir Cenckiewicz and Adam Chmielecki, authors of the book *President*, point out that Lech Kaczyński treated this issue as an argument in negotiations with the European Union. Kaczyński's attitude, which supported his decision to ratify the Treaty, was clearly described by Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski: «Poland does not need either Euro-enthusiasts or politicians closing the EU in the slogan about the Union of European Socialist Republics. Poland needs people to act on its behalf in the EU, maximizing profits and minimizing losses. This is exactly what Lech Kaczyński did,» said the political scientist.

The objective pursued by the president was to create a Euro-Asian Oil Transport Corridor.

ENERGY SECURITY

The protection of Poland's borders through a modernized army, support from US allied forces, and the anti-missile shield, were all intended to be the main elements guaranteeing military security. However, Lech Kaczyński also focused on ensuring Poland's energy security. Thinking in such terms was certainly the result of the political maturity of the president, who was aware of the threats resulting from the country's dependence on natural resources originating only from Russia. It can certainly be said that the then president set himself the goal of increasing the country's energy security.

Lech Kaczyński stressed that Poland must protect itself against possible energy crises that could occur in Ukraine or Belarus. In view of the ongoing situation, the president decided to intensify the country's relations with Azerbaijan, a huge resource of raw materials, which would allow him to tip the balance of energy security in Poland's favor. The objective pursued by the president was to create a Euro-Asian Oil Transport Corridor. The construction of the transmission line would make it possible to bypass Russia and increase the role of Poland in the transport of raw materials to Western European countries.

In order to implement his plan to increase energy security, Lech Kaczyński



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organized a conference with the participation of the leaders of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and Lithuania, at which he advocated the legitimacy of the project. The talks were also attended by a representative of Kazakhstan who was also considering becoming involved in the project. In the post-conference statement, the politicians supported the idea of building a new transport corridor for raw materials from the Caspian Sea. They also maintained their position during subsequent energy summits in Baku, Vilnius, and Kiev. It is worth



GEORGIA, TBILISI, AUGUST 12, 2008. LECH KACZYŃSKI: WE ARE HERE TO TAKE UP THE FIGHT! FROM THE LEFT: POLISH PRESIDENT LECH KACZYŃSKI, PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO, PRESIDENT OF LITHUANIA VALDAS ADAMKUS, AND PRESIDENT OF ESTONIA TOOMAS HENDRIK ILVES DURING A RALLY IN TBILISI. THE ARRIVAL IN GEORGIA IS AN EXPRESSION OF SOLIDARITY OF FIVE COUNTRIES WITH THE NATION THAT WAS THE VICTIM OF AGGRESSION.

emphasizing that diversification of new sources of raw materials was also beneficial for the remaining countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which belonged to the system controlled by the Russian Federation. By acquiring new suppliers, the security of Poland's closest neighbors would also be strengthened.

Unfortunately, as a result of various political difficulties, such as the

instability in Ukraine and the subsequent death of Lech Kaczyński, the project has not been completed and it is not yet clear whether it will ever be resumed. According to Lech Kaczyński, however, energy security is not only about transporting crude oil from Azerbaijan, but also about the concepts of building an LNG terminal on the Polish coast (in Świnoujście) and the Baltic Pipe

“This is my message for today: The Polish state. The value on which we need to focus today.”

gas pipeline, enabling the transfer of gas from Norwegian sources. These initiatives required decisive steps on the part of the government, which, however, was reluctant to support the presidential initiatives. The LNG terminal was finally commissioned in 2015. Interestingly, it is named after its originator, President Lech Kaczyński.

REMEMBERING THE HEROES

An important element of the president's foreign policy concerned also the memory of Polish heroes, who, over the years, particularly contributed to regaining independence, fighting against communism or otherwise rebuilding Polish statehood. One of the symbols of this concept is the creation of the Museum of the Warsaw Uprising established on the initiative of Lech Kaczyński when he was still serving as President of Warsaw. Meetings with veterans and insurgents, as well as clear emphasis on the memory of victims of Soviet crimes, made his presidency unique. In 2005, Lech Kaczyński said that: “Those who were able to combine modernization with good tradition have scored the greatest successes in Europe”. He also stressed that a strong state can only be built on the basis of patriotism and the memory of its heroes. Such an attitude also had an impact on foreign policy and building the image of the Polish state.

“This is my message for today: The Polish state. A country called the Republic of Poland for five and a half centuries. This is the value on which we need to focus today and which is so important that our future success depends on its efficiency”, said the president during the oath-taking ceremony of newly promoted generals in 2009. It should be stressed that Lech Kaczyński considered it necessary to keep alive the memory of the country's heroes, the power of the state in the past, but also that of past tragedies. He was convinced that the current political situation was a consequence of various events from the past, which had a positive impact on the skillful shaping of foreign policy.

THE UNFINISHED PROCESS

Looking back at the activities and policies of President Lech Kaczyński, there is a strong impression that a certain process of reconstruction and strengthening of the state has been interrupted. Despite a coherent concept, personal predispositions, and political intelligence, many vital projects have not been completed. This was due to a number of factors, not only of an internal nature, but also of an external one. Between 2005 and 2010, Poland was a natural candidate to become the leader of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and by pursuing an active policy today, it could play an important role not only in the region, but also across Europe as a whole. The effort and legacy of Lech Kaczyński are becoming the perfect foundations for building a strong, influential and modern state, capable of ensuring the security of its citizens, its development and its future. Poland must seize this opportunity.

Paweł Ozdoba ■
July 1, 2018

THE LAND OF MIRACLES

ROBERT RAJCZYK, PhD

Moldova is a small country with enormous problems. For 25 years of statehood, the country has continued to be one of the fronts in the struggle for dominance in the post-Soviet area.

The Republic of Moldova is a small country situated between Romania and Ukraine. Little known in Europe, it impresses with its pristine nature, a few tourist attractions, a unique history and an even more intriguing present. A country of fewer than three million inhabitants, it is a place where the pro-Western struggles with the pro-Russian. This is also a place where one man pulls all the strings – the country’s wealthiest oligarch, and the so-called “puppet master”. Vlad Plahotniuc, nominally a MP and head of the largest parliamentary party, performs on three stages – each of which playing out its own drama. The action in

these performances is sometimes related, but most often the individual acts are characterized by their own dramaturgy.

Moldova is a country with three factual political entities, more or less dependent on each other.

Contemporary Moldova refers to the historical heritage of the Moldovan principality, although this is a massive



**TIRASPOL, MOLDOVA. A STATUE OF VLADIMIR
LENIN READING TO CHILDREN.**

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simplification due to the changes in its territorial range and the lack of continuity of the state and law between the then principality and today's Moldova. In 1812, as a result of a peace agreement between the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, the eastern part of the Moldovan principality became part of Russia. This area, located between the Prut River and the Dniester River, has since been called the Bessarabia Governorate (Bessarabia), the name of which probably comes from that of the medieval ruler of Wallachia.

The other part of Moldova created in 1859 a personal union with the principality of Wallachia to form the Romanian United Principalities on January 24, 1862.

Today's Moldova is, therefore, not only the sovereign Republic of Moldova, but also the name of a geographical-historical region in Romania. On 27 March 1918, the local parliament, the Country Council, passed a resolution on the inclusion of Bessarabia into the Kingdom of Romania. In 1924, the USSR, which filed territorial claims against Romania, established the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, out of land that had never been part of the principality of Moldavia, east of the Dniester River. According to Bartłomiej Zdaniuk, it was to be "a political forerunner of Soviet power, preparing for the future takeover of Bessarabia." In 1940, the Soviet Union annexed Bessarabia, implementing the provisions of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement. Its central part was connected with the Moldovan Autonomous SRR located on the left bank of the Dniester River, and transformed into the Moldovan SRR – one of the 15 republics of the Soviet Union. The northern and southern

In Moldova language has become the foundation of statehood – not of a nation in an ethnic sense, but in its statehood.

parts of Bessarabia were included in the Ukrainian SRR. Therefore, in political and legal terms and in terms of state tradition, the present-day Republic of Moldova's historical roots are not so much in the Principality of Moldova as much as they are in the heritage of the Bessarabia Governorate, but above all, in Soviet Moldova.

The Republic of Moldova proclaimed its independence on 27 August 1991. However, it is probably the one of only a few, if not the only, example in the world where the idea of state sovereignty is connected with the unification with a larger neighbor. In the 1980s, a social movement called Popular Front, which was anti-communist with the aim of uniting with Romania, was established.

MIRACLE 1: MOLDOVAN LANGUAGE

In Moldova language has become the foundation of statehood – not of a nation in an ethnic sense, but in its statehood. On the wave of Gorbachev's perestroika, the republican separatist movements began to emancipate. Victor Suvorov in his famous book *Aquarium* describes such a case as an example of training Soviet saboteurs. Suvorov gets a task from a superior in military intelligence to make an inscription in Moldovan on the wall of the Pedagogical Institute in Chișinău. The problem is that Moldovan is, in fact, Romanian,

Dissolution with the idea of unification took place for more than 20 years starting from the beginning of the 1990s.

but with borrowings from Russian. During the Soviet era, Moldovan was written in Cyrillic, and local nationalists demanded the restoration of the Latin alphabet. Incidentally, Moldovan still functions in the Transnistrian Republic of Moldova in the form of civil script.

In December 2013, the Moldovan constitutional court issued a verdict on the state language. The judges ruled that the official language was Romanian, as stipulated in the Declaration of Independence, and not Moldovan in the form of Latin alphabet, as stated in the constitution, which means that the Declaration of Independence takes precedence over the constitution. On a side note, in 2007 a Moldovan-Romanian dictionary by Vasile Stati was published, and a subject called Romanian started to be taught in schools. What is more, when communists exercised political power in Moldova, they described the state language (*limba de stat*) as Moldovan, while pro-European groups use the phrase: Romanian language.

MIRACLE 2: MOLDOVENI DECI ROMÂNI (MOLDOVANS I.E. ROMANIANS)

Dissolution with the idea of unification took place for more than 20 years starting from the beginning of the 1990s. The people of the Republic of

Moldova voted overwhelmingly in favor of maintaining national sovereignty in a national referendum. However, an overwhelming majority of Moldovans asked for Romanian citizenship to be restored. It is estimated that in 2017, about 700,000 Moldovans held a Romanian passport (which is an EU country). Also, public support for the idea of unification is growing – now this notion is possibly held by as many as one in five Moldovans. In a rally held in March this year, unionists gathered several thousand supporters on the streets of Chișinău, the country's capital, including former Romanian President Traian Basescu, who openly advocated the reunification of Moldova with Romania on the one-hundredth anniversary of its accession to the Kingdom of Romania after the First World War.

On this occasion, the Union's support for local authorities was also launched. More than 130 localities passed resolutions to this effect, but twice as many voted against, responding to an appeal from the pro-Russian President Igor Dodon, who took Moldovan citizenship away from Traian Basescu and his wife, which had been granted by his predecessor, Nikola Timofti in 2016.

Three-quarters of the population consider themselves Moldovan, 6.6% Ukrainian and 4% Russian, but the number of people declaring themselves as Romanian has tripled – from 2.2% to 7% (compared to the 2004 census). These figures do not include the Transnistrian Republic of Moldova, which is a quasi-state, not recognized by the international community. The authorities in Transnistria claim that one-third out of its half a million inhabitants are Russians, another 29% are Ukrainian, and one in three Transnistrian residents is Moldovan.



**LENIN IN FRONT OF THE TRANSNISTRIAN
PARLIAMENT IN TIRASPOL.**

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MIRACLE 3: PLAYING THE STATE

Although Moldova has existed for a quarter of a century, it is difficult to call it a stable state; for instance, Kamil Cașus considers Moldova to be an “unfinished state”. During this period successive governments were not able to build effective state institutions or create conditions for economic development, which would have helped satisfy the basic needs of the country’s inhabitants. With a population of almost three million, the country is constituted by *de facto* three separate political entities. Twenty-six towns in southern Moldova constitute the Autonomous Territory of Gagauzia, which is governed by

Successive governments were not able to build effective state institutions or create conditions for economic development.

its own rules, including an elected governor. Although the latter is *ex officio* member of the Moldovan government, it represents a community that is pro-



COMRAT, GAGAUZIA. THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE TOWN'S UNIVERSITY.

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Transnistria resembles the popular game Monopoly.

Russian to such an extent that, instead of a native Gagauz language closely linked to Turkish, it prevalingly uses Russian.

The Gagauz People, who make up almost 5% of the population, are “Bulgarized” Turks or “Turkified” Bulgarians – of the Orthodox Church. They had plans to separate from Moldova when Moldovan independence was being forged, and even enjoyed independence for a brief moment, but in the end, their separatism was suppressed in exchange for autonomy. However, what was achieved with almost 150,000 people in the Gagauz community, did not work with the inhabitants of the left bank of the Dniester. In Gagauzia, the armed

conflict was resolved quickly, while in Transnistria, the war lasted for as long as five months – from March to July 1992.

MIRACLE 4: THE COUNTRY THAT DOES NOT EXIST

Transnistria resembles the popular game, Monopoly. For 26 years, taxes have been levied there; it has its own police, military, border police, infrastructure, and industry, as well as its own currency, which, like in the Monopoly game, is not exchangeable. In addition, the Transnistrian ruble has recently become a form of actual plastic chips. Formally, Transnistria, which includes the left-bank part of the Dniester and the city of Bender on the right-bank, is part of the Republic of Moldova and no country in the world is questioning this. If it had not been for the specific political situation of the separatist Transnistrian region, it is unlikely that Western tourists would

have visited this territory located on the left-bank of the Dniester – due to the lack of traditional tourist attractions.

Western tourist guides describe Transnistria (or, as its inhabitants prefer – Pridnestrovie) as an open-air museum of the USSR. Emotions also accompany the reading of consular information warning against expeditions to the Transnistrian Republic of Moldova due to the impossibility of diplomatic support being provided. Entry to Pridnestrovie is *per se* a large part of the attraction to some tourists. It is necessary to fill a customs declaration (if you travel by your own car, you have to somehow import it internally).

Similarly to other post-Soviet countries, border procedures require the completion of a special migration card, the other half of which is issued upon departure. Border guards of the quasi-state do not have the possibility to stamp passports, so they record border traffic this way instead. Foreign tourists may be surprised by the lack of ATMs. Those that can be found in larger cities pay out only US dollars or Russian rubles, because the local currency, the Transnistrian ruble, is not exchangeable.

In the border village of Kamionka, located in the north of Transnistria, both in its restaurant and petrol station, the due amount can be easily settled in Moldovan lei. In the national media, the “besieged fortress” mindset has since given way to issues of everyday life, namely, the economic crisis that is now most troubling its inhabitants. The average salary in Transnistria is USD 150 per month. Transnistria is being rescued by subsidies from Russia, including those for pensioners, who account for 40% of the population, and the almost free supplies of Russian gas.

The primary concern of the inhabitants of Transnistria, therefore, is their own financial situation or international or legal sovereignty (although in 2016, 97% of Transnistrians voted in favor of the territory’s annexation to Russia).

The economy of Transnistria is dominated by the private holding Sheriff, which exists in symbiosis with the local authorities, who either originate from the very holding or are anointed by it. About 40% of Transnistrian exports go to the European Union, so geopolitics is less critical than business; meanwhile Russian peacekeeping forces is an important factor in Russia’s continued destabilization of the region. Recently, however, Moldovan diplomats have managed to adopt a draft UN resolution calling on Russia to withdraw its troops from the area. The pro-Russian Moldovan president strongly criticized the initiative, by stating: “Moldova should above all take care of its [constitutional – author’s note] status as a neutral state”, – wrote Igor Dodon on his social media profile.

MIRACLE 5: APPARENT CONFLICT I.E. SUCCESSFUL SYMBIOSIS

“We are focusing on international recognition”, said the current leader of Transnistria, Vadim Krasnoselsky, in the Russian press. But on both sides of the Dniester, the oligarchs are pulling the strings – in Chişinău it is Vlad Plahotniuc, and in Tiraspol it is Victor Gushan, the head of Sheriff holding. Moreover, the results of the technical agreement in the “5+2” format (Transnistria Political Negotiation Platform with Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, EU, USA and Moldova and Transnistria) can already be seen. At the end of 2017, the Dniester Bridge, which had been closed since the war in 1992, was reopened. The authorities in Chişinău will recognize diplomas awarded by

Transnistrian universities, in exchange for which Moldovan schools may operate in Transnistria.

Mobile communications are also being standardized. Until recently, the GSM standard was available only in border areas with Moldova or Ukraine; across the rest of the territory, there was only a cellular network operating under the U.S. standard. Now the Transnistrian operator will also be able to operate on the right-bank. Moldova and Transnistria are to have one common call prefix again; in addition, some farmers will be able to return to their fields, which they could not touch for 20 years because they are on the Transnistrian side. Interestingly, daily life is not the only thing that binds the two shores of the Dniester together. For a long time now, another fastening value was sport. Transnistrian players have been playing in the Moldovan Olympic team, and Sheriff Tiraspol is one of the best football teams in the Moldovan league. Sheriff has dominated the Moldovan league for over a decade between 2000–2010, 2011–2014 and 2015–2017.

Although Vlad Plahotniuc is not formally a member of the Moldovan government, he is the leader of the largest party in parliament (Democratic Party), and it appears that everything in Moldova happens through his politically-subordinate state institutions and business ties and with his knowledge and consent. Those who may have harmed him in the past are being eliminated, and the leading competitor in the “game of thrones”, former Prime Minister Vlad Filat, has been in prison for the past two years. In addition, he will spend another seven years locked up having been sentenced for charges concerning abuse of power and corruption, including cooperation



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with allegations of taking one billion dollars out of the Moldovan banking system: a sum equivalent to 12% of the country's GDP “evaporated” from three local banks in the form on the basis of legally enforced bills of exchange



MILESTI MICI, MOLDOVA. WINE FOUNTAIN.

guaranteed by Moldovan citizens and Russian fly-by-night companies serviced by local banks.

The leader of the Democratic Party officially represents the pro-European

direction in Moldovan politics in opposition to the anti-European and pro-Russian president. However, they have both successfully polarized society, which is increasingly fed up with the local political elite and

is increasingly willing to support integration with Romania: an idea not at all welcomed with enthusiasm in Bucharest.

MIRACLE 6: MIRACLES OVER THE BALLOT BOX

Government and presidential camps continually exchange blows. If a head of state refuses to sign a ministerial nomination or a law restricting Russian propaganda, the constitutional court suspends the president's duties. This has occurred three times already. It may appear strange though that the courts usually pass judgment in accordance with the views of the main Moldovan oligarch. At the end of June, the Supreme Court annulled the early elections of the Mayor of Chisinau. Officially, this was due to a violation of electoral regulations, but for the public it is no secret that this was all about the threat that the winner of the elections, the leader of the real but non-parliamentary opposition, Andrea Năstase, may have posed to the Plahotniuc's power due to the election success in Chisinau.

If a head of state refuses to sign a ministerial nomination or a law restricting Russian propaganda, the constitutional court suspends the president's duties.

Năstase could, therefore, pose a significant threat to the ruling camp in

the upcoming parliamentary elections in a few months' time, using for example the administrative apparatus of his office. Chișinău, the country's capital, is home to more than 30% of Moldova's total population, so the struggle over Chișinău is worth the effort, especially since the capital is the most pro-Western of all of Moldova's cities.

QUO VADIS MOLDOVA?

The idea of Moldovanism, formed on the basis of an independent state entity after 25 years of existence, has not bound its citizens together as well as some may have expected. A state appropriated by political and business interest groups is facing not only economic difficulties that are exacerbating society but also enormous levels of corruption that appear to be the country's most significant problem. One Moldova and Romania analyst on his social media network profile estimates that just over a hundred people emigrate from Moldova every day: "That amounts to about one person every fifteen minutes. Most of them return home only to visit. As a result, Chișinău is becoming a kind of holiday center, where pubs and restaurants are full, regardless of the time of day. However, this may change soon. Restaurants will become deserted as emigrants stop visiting. Moldovans who are working abroad, as soon as they secure their existence and feel confident enough, tend to attract their parents, children, and other members of their families to the likes of Italy, Portugal or France", says Kamil Cașu.

Visa-free travel to the European Union facilitates emigration. Transfers from economic migrants account for up to a fifth of local GDP. The economy is dominated by the agricultural sector (one in three employees), and industry and energy are located largely on the

left side of the Dniester River. “Moldova is a net importer of energy because its domestic resources satisfy only 3% of its needs. Natural gas meets almost 65% of its demand for all energy resources, and the annual demand for gas is 3–3.5 billion m³, 1 billion m³ of which is consumed by the territory managed by Chişinău (the separatist Transnistria consumes the rest)”, writes Anita Sobják. Energy independence can be improved by a gas interconnector on the Romanian border, but the prospect of such a project completion is far from realistic.

Social research shows that the main problem in Moldovan society, in addition to living conditions and the economic crisis, is corruption. It is estimated that, per capita, every Moldovan spends as much as USD 20 on bribes every year.

The political system is also unstable. Problems with presidential elections are already infamous. For 16 years since 2000, the head of state has been elected by parliament by a three-fifths majority of its 101 members. However, between 2009 and 2012, no such majority was achieved, and as a result Moldova did not formally have a president, the duties of which were carried out by the heads of parliament.

When it turned out that due to the necessary dissolution of parliament, the parliamentary elections could have been won by pro-Russian groups, after 16 years, the constitutional court restored direct presidential elections, which nevertheless were won by the leader of the Socialist Party, supported by Moscow. The age qualification for candidates was also raised, which effectively eliminated the then popular politician Renato Usatîi, mayor of the second largest city in Moldova, Bălţi.

A state appropriated by political and business interest groups is facing not only economic difficulties that are exacerbating the society but also enormous levels of corruption.

Incidentally, for the last two years, this politician has been on an ‘official mission’ in Moscow, because a letter accusing him of ordering a murder is awaiting him in Moldova. Until his resignation in early 2018, he headed the city literally online.

The frozen conflict over Transnistria, the state appropriated by oligarchs and heading in the direction of autocracy and ubiquitous corruption – these all haunt Moldova, a country which some may now describe as a “failed project”.

The simulated struggle between the nominally pro-European government and the pro-Russian president is aimed at maintaining the current model of power and control over the state, whose elites have not had a coherent vision of identity for a quarter of a century, around which the country’s citizens could unite. The end to the Transnistrian conflict may not favor either party; in addition, it should be noted that the inhabitants of Transnistria, for whom local identity is an essential factor in shaping a state-forming myth, also may not agree to

Between 2009 and 2012, parliament majority was not achieved, and as a result Moldova did not formally have a president, the duties of which were carried out by the heads of parliament.

terms which dilute their sense of *de facto* nationalism.

The authorities in Chişinău are not fighting for this either, because practically all the political proposals to regulate the matter have so far been based on the federalization of Moldova, which could result in Tiraspol having too strong an impact on the fate of Moldova. All hope is placed on the fortunes of Transnistria's economy, which after the change of power in Ukraine lost the kindness of Kiev. Moscow, in turn, also turned off its money tap.

The tap was also shut off by the European Union, although with resistance and quite late in the day. The 100 million euros of financial assistance was suspended due to Chişinău's failure to comply with the rule of law. Firstly in 2014, under a legally dubious pretext, the highly popular Renato Usatii was removed from the electoral list. The invalidation of the early election results of the mayor of Chisinau was criticized by the US and the EU. It is no secret that the

European Union cannot lose Moldova, as the country would most likely then fall prey to Moscow for good. Moldova is a successful example of the Eastern Partnership that is why losing Moldova means fail of Eastern Partnership project.

Vlad Plahotniuc is thus creating the idea that he is the only guarantor of a pro-Western political course and, as can be seen, it appears he can do a lot to preserve its power, such as changing the electoral law a year before the parliamentary elections. Now, in a mixed system, half of the members will be elected in a proportional distribution of seats, and the rest in single-mandate districts. In the latter, the Plahotniuc team will put up so-called independent candidates, unburdened with the low public support of his party and not formally associated with him, although this maneuver turned out to be unsuccessful during the early local elections in Chişinău. The independent candidate, who was intensively promoted by the Plahotniuc media empire, did not even enter the second round.

In Moldova, as in the Caucasus, there is a story popular among its inhabitants and willingly presented to tourists. Reportedly, when God was creating the world, he overlooked the Moldovan/Georgian/Abkhazian people, because they were celebrating at that time. The next day, when they were in despair that they had no piece of the world portioned for them, God supposedly assigned to them the last part of the world, which had been kept especially for him – a paradise. Each of these territories is indeed beautiful yet they also share similar problems – problems with recognition being one.

Robert Rajczyk ■
July 9, 2018

FROM PARIAH TO LEADER?

ROBERT RAJCZYK, PHD

In December 1989, television channels all over the world showed the scenes of revolution in Romania and the execution of Nicolae Ceaușescu, the last Communist leader of Romania alongside his wife, Elena.

The broadcasts also presented the humanitarian catastrophe in local orphanages and hordes of begging children on the streets. Thirty years later, Romania is a modern country, a member state of NATO and the European Union, but still struggling with the problems associated with its infant democracy.

Romania does not have a long history. It has been an independent political entity since 1878, when its independence from the Ottoman Empire was formally recognized at the Congress of Berlin. Just like an island, the country is surrounded

Romania does not have a long history.

from all sides by Slavs and Hungarians, who are ethnically unique in Europe. Meanwhile, their closest “cousins” live behind the Urals. Romania, on the other hand, is one of the Romance countries. Until 1918, there was a widespread theory that Romanians’ ethnogenesis was directly derived from the Roman civilization, which since Emperor Trajan’s rule had been permanently present on the territory



GHENCEA CEMETERY IN BUCHAREST. THERE ARE ALWAYS FRESH FLOWERS ON THE GRAVE OF THE CEAUȘESCU COUPLE.

Epoca de aur, or the Golden Age – is how Romanian propaganda called the period which started in Romania in 1965 when Nicolae Ceaușescu came to power.

of today's Romania, then called Dacia. In the time of Greater Romania, that is, in the interwar period, the tradition of the Dacians, an indigenous people who had adopted Latin and some

other elements of Roman civilization, was cultivated. Nicolae Ceaușescu, in turn, had an even more unusual concept of the origins of Romanians. The *Conducător* (Commander), and the genius of the Carpathians, among other monikers, due to his cult of personality, believed that Romania had a Roman Dacia origin. This idea, referred to as protochronism, has become the most important manifestation of the ethno-nationalism of the Ceaușescu regime. According to this term, Romania was one of the world's centers of civilization and a precursor of the discoveries and inventions of Western Europe.

EPOCA DE AUR

Epoca de aur, or the Golden Age – is how Romanian propaganda called the period which started in Romania



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Romania was notorious for other innovative concepts, like the idea of repaying its national debt in full; or the famous Decree No 770 of 1966, which assumed an increase in the Romanian population to 20 million by 2000.

describes the life of ordinary people in his excellent book *Czarujący księżę ludzkości: potęga i upadek Nicolae Ceaușescu* [EN: The Charming Prince of Humanity: The Power and Decay of Nicolae Ceaușescu].

in 1965, when Nicolae Ceaușescu, considered to be susceptible to influence and control, came to power, replacing Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the founder of the communist state. Indeed, the first decade of Ceaușescu's rule was marked by relative prosperity and even partial liberalization – for example, in the sphere of culture. The reality, however, was full of absurdities typical of a communist country, which are perfectly represented in Cristian Mungiu's movie "Tales of the Golden Age". Romania's daily grind included, for instance, breeding hens on the balconies of blocks of flats made of prefabricated concrete. Another norm was the common smell of boiled cabbage, which Romanians would use to make provisions to survive the winter and to be supplied with vitamins. Andrzej Korybut-Daszkiewicz

Kent cigarettes were another popular symbol among Romanians. They were considered to be a synonym of luxury to such an extent that many Romanians would preserve their packets to then fill up with cheaper Romanian cigarettes. Car colors were also important – they identified their owner's occupational status. Another absurdity was the police-piloted columns of government vehicles transporting the favorite dog of Ceaușescu, who had his biscuits imported from London by diplomatic post. In addition, the former head of the Romanian intelligence service, Ion Papec, claims that the Romanian dictator was so obsessed with his eventual assassination that he traveled abroad with foil-sealed clothes and beddings, which were used only once and then disposed of.

Romania was notorious for other innovative concepts, for instance the idea of repaying its national debt in full, which in turn led to the brink of the country's physical destruction; or the famous Decree No 770 of 1966, which assumed an increase in the Romanian population to 20 million by 2000. According to this peculiar family policy, abortion was only permitted in the case of rape, a threat to a woman's life, delivering children after the age of 45, or the precedent birth of four children. It is estimated that 11,000 women died as a result of illegal abortion procedures carried out by people without any medical qualifications, and often unofficially. Another Cristian Mungiu movie, "4 months, 3 weeks and 2 days", which won the Palme d'Or award at Cannes, tells the vivid story of such tragedies. The direct effects of Decree 770 were overpopulated orphanages and the phenomenon of Romanian 'street children'.

CEAUȘESCU'S "INVENTIONS"

One of the "inventions" of Ceaușescu was certainly his extraordinary cult of personality, which persisted in Romania – despite the fact that the country's inhabitants could only dream of hot water coming out of their taps, basic food products and heated apartments (the temperature in which did not exceed 15 degrees Celsius). Hardly any goods reached the villages at all, so in order to buy bread, inhabitants would often travel to a nearby town where there was a chance to buy some. The cult of personality also included the wife of the dictator, Elena, who was appointed by Nicolae Ceaușescu to be the second person in the country.

According to the famous book *Red Horizons: The True Story of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescus' Crimes, Lifestyle, and Corruption* by Ion Paceba,

the former head of Romania's foreign intelligence who escaped to the West during the dictatorship, one of Elena's hobbies, apart from passionately listening to the conversations of Romanian dignitaries (and to her own daughter), was collecting academic ranks. There were no barriers in this regard, despite the fact that Elena had the same level of education as her husband. She "specialized" in polymer chemistry and was even a professor in this field, largely as she had worked in her youth in a factory dealing with polymer production and had simply liked the subject. The ghostwriting of Elena's scientific work was practiced in Romania long before it became one of the major problems of modern science in the country. That is why the date of the public defense of Mrs. Ceaușescu's doctorate was secretly postponed until a day earlier than officially planned, so that no one would attend it. Moreover, there was a well-known joke in Romania about the scientific preparation of a dictator's wife, who read the chemical formula of CO₂ not with chemical symbols, but phonetically, the latter meaning in Romanian a protruding part of the belt usually clinging to a *kontusz* (a robe-like garment worn by male nobility).

Another "original" idea was the systematization program of several thousand villages – a settlement strategy supposed to equalize traditional rural areas, especially those with Hungarian populations, and replacing them with huge agro-industrial complexes with autarky production structures and a limited form of social life. This insane project was partially stopped, mainly due to the mass campaign of "adoption" of Romanian villages by their counterparts in European Francophone countries. Previously, before Mikhail Gorbachev took over power in the USSR, Ceaușescu was promoted by Western



BUCHAREST, ROMANIA. PEOPLE'S HOUSE BOASTS 1,100 ROOMS.

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countries as a way to break up the unity of the socialist camp.

SEEMING INDEPENDENCE

In the West, Ceaușescu enjoyed such recognition and support that he was accepted as a true statesman rather than a communist satrap. This was all the result of a clever game in which he created himself as a politician independent of the Kremlin. He was indeed sometimes autonomous, but still quite rarely – for example in 1968, when he refused to send the Romanian army to suppress the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia. Nicolae Ceaușescu, a journeyman shoemaker, who completed only a few grades of elementary school, was meeting with the most important politicians and heads of state of his time. In the White House, the dictator was received by Richard Nixon, while the British Queen granted him the title of a nobleman. The West was keen to lend money to Romania

Nicolae Ceaușescu, a journeyman shoemaker, who completed only a few grades of elementary school, was meeting with the most important politicians and heads of state of his time.

to finance economic programs, but kept forgetting to mention that a large part of this money was to be lent under very unfavorable conditions. This did not prevent Ceaușescu from fulfilling his dream of building a government district in the center of Bucharest with offices and VIP apartments. At the



FORMER CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY BUILDING. CEAUȘESCU SPOKE PUBLICALLY FOR THE LAST TIME FROM THIS BALCONY.

© FROM THE AUTHOR'S PRIVATE COLLECTION

same time, 7 km² of the city's area was demolished and 40,000 inhabitants were relocated. By 1989, six years from the very start of the project, 700 architects and 20,000 workers had completed 80% of the world's second largest office building after the Pentagon. Today, the 12-storey People's House (including four underground stories), serves the Romanian parliament and tourists.

REVOLUTION OR COUP D'ÉTAT?

Romania was the only country in the Soviet bloc that experienced a change of power as a result of armed violence. Whether it was a spontaneous revolution of a vegetative nation, or a *coup d'état* – this is still difficult to resolve after nearly 30 years. The facts, however, cast doubt on a hypothesis of a grassroots social uprising. Power was quite efficiently transferred to the hands of second-order party activists, as the Ceaușescus were rapidly brought to trial in a provisional military tribunal and immediately executed after the verdict

was given. Public discontent with the first few months of the new government was effectively pacified with the help of representatives of the working class. Miners from the Jiu coal basin used batons to break up demonstrations opposing the new authorities¹. Five such minerriads were organized between 1991 and 1999. Their leader, Miron Cozma, was sentenced to

¹ In June 1990, miners armed with batons and pickaxes roamed the streets of Bucharest for several days, pacifying actual and alleged opponents of the post-communist movement from the National Salvation Front. Injured people still assert their rights as members of the Minerriad Victims Association. Interestingly, Miron Cozma, the minerriad organizer, was a participant in the protests of miners from the Jiu coal basin in 1977 against the communist authorities. During the three days of August, 30–35 thousand miners were on strike opposing the raising of retirement age and demanding the introduction of a 6-hour working day. The protest in which miners Ceaușescu's brother-in-law, among others, was taken hostage, ended after the latter's visit and the fulfillment of some of demands of the mining industry. The strike was covered by the media embargo, the coal basin was blocked by the security services, and protest leaders were persecuted. One of them died in an unexplained car accident.

18 years' imprisonment in 1999. He was pardoned for several hours in 2004, on the last day of office of President Ion Iliescu, whose power Cozma saved together with miners, and whose collapse was caused by the first non-communist government of Petre Roman.

Despite the fiery announcements and contrary to the initial declarations, the National Salvation Front, which transformed from a revolutionary committee into a political party, the building of democracy in Romania continued with resistance. National communism of the Ceaușescu era was replaced by a flirtation with openly nationalist parties: The Greater Romania Party or the Romanian National Unity Party. This "precedence of ethnicity" has been demonstrated in the treatment of national minorities, who account for 11% of the country's population, especially the largest of them, the Székelys (a Hungarian ethnic group covering about 6.5% of the population). Ethnonationalist policies have given way to attempts to cohabitate with minorities following Romania's accession to the Council of Europe. Participation of national minority organizations in public life was institutionalized by establishing the Council of National Minorities. Interestingly, the official status of national minorities is granted only to those who are represented there. Minorities benefit from so-called positive discrimination, which manifests itself, *inter alia*, in electoral preferences². Every minority has the right to one seat in the lower house of

Romania was the only country in the Soviet bloc that experienced a change of power as a result of armed violence.

parliament. This is beneficial not only to organizations registered with the National Minorities Council, but also cultural and educational associations aspiring to this title in order to obtain a mandate "through the back door". There are some paradoxes here. At one point in time, even the Macedonian embassy in Romania did not recognize the Macedonian minority³.

Gheorghe Firczak, on the other hand, did not successfully complete his efforts to secure the mandate of a Member of Parliament until he founded the Union of the Ruthenians of Romania and took his place in parliament as a member of this minority group⁴. An interesting correlation was also noted in the case of the Union of Croats in Romania. During one of the parliamentary elections, the total number of votes on the organization's list increased twenty-fold compared with the previous election, although the number of Croats in Romania did not increase at all. It turned out, however, that membership in the organization made it much easier

² The Hungarian minority, whose organization, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania is regularly given mandates and has its own parliamentary club, is the only one not to benefit from electoral preferences. The other minorities form one club of 17 Members of Parliament during this term of office. There are 19 minority organizations in total, but the Czechs and Slovaks have one common MP and one organization.

³ The amended regulations were challenged by the president and the parliamentary opposition before the Constitutional Court, which will decide on their constitutionality in September. The 2002 census proved the existence of 740 people declaring Macedonian nationality.

⁴ They consider themselves to be an ethnic group of the Ukrainian people.

Romania has been ruled since 1989 by alternately social democratic teams.

to acquire Croatian citizenship, and thus the possibility of economic emigration.

CHILDHOOD DEMOCRACY

Romania has been ruled since 1989 by alternately social democratic teams, whose pedigree originates from the National Salvation Front or teams from so-called “old” parties, i.e. those which operated in the interwar period. In addition, there have also been new groups which have emerged as a result of divisions in the existing ones and which often have a high level of relevance. The same is true of those who hold the office of president. Ion Iliescu and Traian Băsescu came from the parties that had emerged from the evolution of the National Salvation Front, Emil Constantinescu from the so-called old parties, and Klaus Iohannis (of German origin) who was a long-standing mayor of Sibiu. The political struggle in Romania is intense. The parliament suspended President Traian Băsescu twice because of political conflict with the ruling majority. Twice, however, the president has been defended by ordinary Romanians. In the first referendum they voted to keep him in office, and in the second case the turnout was too low for the vote to be valid. The country was also unlucky with some of its prime ministers. One of them, Adrian Năstase, a former communist activist, a former spokesperson for the National Salvation Front, a former speaker of parliament and a former chief of diplomacy, was sentenced twice for fraud and corruption. In

turn, another head of the Romanian government, Victor Ponta, originating similarly to Năstase from the successor of the National Salvation Front – the Social Democratic Party (PSD), was accused in June 2015 by the National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) of forgery, tax fraud and money laundering during his legal practice. In addition, the prime minister, under pressure of allegations of plagiarism, renounced his doctoral degree, which he was eventually deprived of by the Council for Academic Titles in disciplinary proceedings.

ROMANIA OUTSIDE THE SCHENGEN AREA

The accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the Schengen area is one of the most controversial decisions that the European Union now faces. For the time being, several Western European countries are against this because of the high level of corruption and the question of border protection in Romania and Bulgaria. Corruption is one of the most significant social problems in Romania today. In a country where the average salary does not exceed EUR 500 net, the phenomenon of bribes is still widespread, although society itself is increasingly rebellious against it. In October 2015, a club burnt down in Bucharest bringing about nearly 30 deaths. This triggered mass demonstrations and the resignation of the then prime minister, who was blamed by society for tolerating corruption and who allowed the use of a building not compliant with fire regulations. In January 2017, demonstrations took place on the streets of Bucharest and other Romanian cities, provoked by government plans to change the Penal Code. The amendment was to consist in the abolition of penalties for certain corruption offenses, the latter of which resulted in losses to the state of



**AN EXAMPLE OF CEAUSESCU'S MEGALOMANIA.
GOVERNMENT DISTRICT OF BUCHAREST.**

© FROM THE AUTHOR'S PRIVATE COLLECTION

about 200,000 lei (approx. EUR 47,000) and amnesty for several thousand convicted of corruption offenses. Among them was Liviu Dragnea, the PSD leader, who was found guilty of abuse of office. For this reason, he could not become prime minister, and thus the changes made by the coalition government of PSD-ALDE were intended to make this possible. Public protests, in which Romanian president Klaus Iohannis was also present, led to the resignation of the two ministers and the discontinuation of the amendment. In return, the definition of “abuse of office” was liberalized, opening the way for the PSD leader to avoid punishment and forcing the president, under the threat of activating impeachment, to approve the dismissal of the head of the National Anti-Corruption

The accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the Schengen area is one of the most controversial decisions that the European Union now faces.

Directorate⁵. This institution was set up in the run-up to Romania's accession

⁵ The amended regulations were challenged by the president and the parliamentary opposition before the Constitutional Court, which will decide on their constitutionality in September. The European Commission, the Council of Europe and the US and Canadian embassies are also critical of this change.

Since Romania's accession to the European Union in 2007, 20% of the population aged 20–64 has emigrated to work elsewhere.

to the European Union, and its prosecutorial and investigative powers have led to 90% of DNA cases ending in convictions. Among them were nearly 40 proceedings against high-ranking Romanian politicians, including former prime ministers Adrian Năstase and Victor Ponta, as well as the leader of the PSD Liviu Dragnea.

ROMANIAN TIGER?

Since Romania's accession to the European Union in 2007, 20% of the population aged 20–64 has emigrated to work elsewhere. Romanians are most likely to emigrate to Italy, Spain, France and Portugal, with which the Romanian language is linked by the group of Romance languages. In 2017 alone, emigrants transferred nearly 5 billion euros to their homeland. In 2017, Romania's GDP increased by 6.9% compared to the previous year, and year-on-year consumption has increased by as much as 14%. This is due to the reduction in the VAT rate from 25% to 19% over three years. On the other hand, the World Bank forecasts for 2018 a 4.5% increase in GDP and 4.1% in 2019, while inflation in Romania remains within the 3% range. Changes in the tax system also include a reduction in the number and amount of social security

contributions, a reduction in personal income tax to 10%, taxation of profit transfers abroad for multinational corporations or a 1% turnover tax for companies with revenues below one million euros. The tax-free allowance was also increased eightfold. Among the most valuable Romanian brands, the Brand Finance consultancy mentions Dacia to be worth USD 1.4 million. In the top 10, there were also three banks, the petrochemical company Petrom, and the state electricity distributor⁶. In turn, Romania was ranked 18th out of 189 countries in the ranking of download speeds. According to a study, it takes 48 seconds in Romania to download a 7.5GB movie, almost two seconds faster than in Macao⁷, for example.

QUO VADIS ROMÂNIA?

Romania appears to be a modern country with a rapidly developing economy and a relatively fast motorway network (a 10-day vignette costs about 3 euros). However, the fight against corruption remains. What is hopeful is the relatively high level of civil society for a country in Central Europe during the biggest demonstrations against the deregulation of anti-corruption laws since 1989. In turn, environmental organizations have effectively blocked the extraction of the largest gold mine in Europe, in the region of Roșia Montană, in order to protect the country's nature – it is possible that cyanide was being used for the extraction of the ore from the deposit.

Robert Rajczyk ■
July 24, 2018

⁶ http://brandirectory.com/league_tables/table/romania-50-2017.

⁷ https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1A8LDcCLY3HN5Oqys6VxB0ug8xgroDADVIA2BeAF_tSM/htmlview#gid=0.

THE MAP OF NEW EUROPE 1918/1919: THE CHALLENGES OF INDEPENDENCE FOR POLAND

JULIETTE BRETAN

The day before that momentous Armistice was signed between the Allies and Germany - the conclusion to four years of shattering warfare - one seemingly inconspicuous man, face half-obsured with a heavy moustache, finally returned to Warsaw after spending a year languishing in a German prison.

His, however, had been a battle for two liberations: his own and that of his nation. Józef Piłsudski epitomized the Polish spirit, and his arrival in the war-torn Polish city, allegedly with a hero's welcome from its citizens, marked a new start for a Polish state which had spent 123 years sliced and pummeled to fit a map of Europe which unashamedly made clear it had no place for Poles.

The landscape of the newly-independent Poland in the immediate years after WWI has Piłsudski at its very roots: released as a result of declining German clout, he was the face – the voice – of the multitudes within Poland, driving a dispatch to world leaders in the days after his return that ‘the Polish state is being established in accordance with the will of the whole nation’ and that ‘henceforth no foreign army shall enter Poland until



© PAP/BARTŁOMIEJ ZBOROWSKI

WARSAW, DECEMBER 4, 2017. PRESS CONFERENCE ON THE NATIONAL RACE FOR THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF POLAND'S INDEPENDENCE, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY SUPERMARATHON AND 100-METER NATIONAL CHAMPIONSHIPS, AS WELL AS "FIVE WITH PIŁSUDSKI" ON THE 150TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE BIRTH OF THE FIRST MARSHAL OF POLAND.

His dispatch cemented what he saw as Poland's future – one which must be Poland's alone – and was a message of resolve to ensure an independence the Poles alone could manipulate.


we have formally communicated our will in the matter.' Piłsudski, who had commanded the Polish Legions unit in the Austro-Hungarian Army, was jailed in 1917 for encouraging those under him to refuse to swear allegiance to the decaying German and Austrian forces following a German refusal to support full Polish independence. His dispatch cemented what he saw as Poland's future – one which must be Poland's alone – and was a message of resolve to ensure an independence the Poles alone could manipulate, swelled with a promise that the 'Polish government will replace the rule of force...by a system built on the basis of order and justice.'¹

Yet the Poland which rose from the ashes of war and splintered diplomacy was hardly founded in Piłsudski's ideals of order and justice – at least, not at the start. Piłsudski had been incarcerated in the wake of the Act of the 5th November in 1916, a declaration by Germany and Austria to ensure the creation of a Polish nation, but with a catch: it would operate as a puppet-state at the mercy of the Central Powers. Piłsudski rapidly opposed this plan, eventually resulting in his imprisonment; just as the Central Powers allotted a provisional head to the Polish nation: the Regency Council.

With Piłsudski silenced, and alongside the Regency Council's limited and careful procedures supporting Polish nationhood, there was another group of Poles taking an equally delicate tack, led by the also-mustachioed Ignacy Daszyński. Daszyński's attitude towards the Act was one which mirrored the general feelings of Polish ambiguity towards its declaration – there was an irrefutable assertion of Polish nationhood within its pages, but this

¹ 'Independence', Millenium Studio, <http://s1millenium.kylos.pl/pilsudski/guide-to-independence/independence/?lang=en> [accessed: 22 July 2018]

Poland regaining its independence



would be heavily undercut; one Pole at the reading, the journalist Stefan Krzywoszewski, summarized the Polish mood when he remarked:

“A part of our patrimony was being returned to us... but under a watchful guardianship that could become the most dangerous of all the yokes yet placed on us.”²

It was this uncertainty that prompted Daszyński to only move against the Central Powers following their allocation of land to the Ukrainian People's Republic as part of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in early 1918. He exercised caution over the Regency Council's ideals, preferring a social program as a

counterweight. As the two groups quietly vied for power, it became apparent that all was not well in the relationship between Germany and Austria-Hungary – and so movement towards Polish independence began to blossom fast. On October 7th, the Regency Council declared an independent Polish state in Warsaw; the following day, the Polish National Committee – a Polish independence group in exile, headed by Roman Dmowski and recognized by France as quasi-governmental - petitioned the Allies for support; and two weeks later Daszyński established the Polish Liquidation Committee in Kraków to wield influence over Polish-speaking elements of Austria-Hungary.³

² J. Kauffman, *Elusive Alliance: The German Occupation of Poland in World War I* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), p. 79

³ H.A. Winkler, *The Age of Catastrophe: A History of the West, 1914–1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), p. 84.

As the icon of the Polish struggle for independence Piłsudski was recognized by both Regency Council and provisional government as the supreme authority.

The result was pandemonium. The Regency Council, Poland's best effort on the ground to gain land, failed to establish adequate governmental procedure, and so Daszyński leapt into the fray again, introducing the Provisional People's Government of the Republic of Poland, which proclaimed an independent Poland in Lublin on 7th November. This government, mainly consisting of socialists, was equally inadequate to rally widespread support, though the Regency Council was too weak to suppress it – and so the country was consumed by an impasse until Piłsudski's return.⁴

GOVERNMENTAL FOUNDATIONS

As the icon of the Polish struggle for independence – the only ideal both the Regency Council and Daszyński's provisional government both supported – Piłsudski was recognized by both institutions as the supreme authority. But the desiccated landscape of domestic politics he returned to was to mar Poland for long after independence had been assured. After Piłsudski's masterminding of the creation of a new government with Daszyński's support ended in failure,⁵

the staunch socialist politician Jędrzej Moraczewski was nominated as the first Prime Minister in order to push through electoral law provisions in a drive towards national elections.⁶ Thus, less than a month after Poland regained independence – and in one of the first legislative acts undertaken by the new nation – women were given an equal right to vote; despite Piłsudski's own belief that women were inadequately prepared to put their votes to good use.⁷

But domestic politics was still facing bedlam: the electoral law had been met with a tide of disapproval, and in the Greater Poland region Poles rose against German authority following a patriotic speech by Ignacy Paderewski, with fighting sustained until the Treaty of Versailles.

Then there was international dubiety. The Entente had been determined to grant Poland independence on their terms; they distrusted Piłsudski's ideals, and knew the Polish state would eventually depend on their influence, as swathes of the new nation were facing deplorable poverty, poor infrastructure and a lack of defense mechanisms. They also had a provisional government in France under Dmowski – and with support from Paderewski – ready to be slotted into place. But Piłsudski had the people behind him – even despite a pitiful attempt at a right-wing coup in early January, which resulted in some members of Moraczewski's government being arrested. The answer was a compromise in the form of legislative elections held in January 1919: Paderewski became Prime Minister in a coalition government – he and Dmowski would

daszynski_ignacy [accessed: 23 July 2018].

⁶ A. Nowakowska-Wierchoś, 'Prawa wyborcze kobiet w Polsce', *Archiwum Akt Nowych* (2016) [<http://www.aan.gov.pl/art,211,prawa-wyborcze-kobiet-w-polsce>] [accessed: 23 July 2018].

⁷ *The Struggle for Female Suffrage in Europe: Voting to Become Citizens*, ed. Blanca Rodriguez Ruiz, Ruth Rubio Marin (Leiden: Brill, 2012), p. 147.

⁴ *The Cambridge History of Poland*, ed. W. F. Reddaway, J. H. Penson, R. Dyboski, O. Halecki (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1941), p. 479.

⁵ A. Chojnowski, 'Daszyński, Ignacy', 1914–1918 [<https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/>]



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WROCLAW, JANUARY 17, 2018. PORTRAITS OF THE FATHERS OF INDEPENDENCE AND DEFENDERS OF LVIV FROM 1918 APPEARED ON THE FAÇADE OF THE LOWER SILESIAN PROVINCE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE IN WROCLAW AS PART OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF POLAND'S REGAINING INDEPENDENCE.



CRACOW, JULY 31, 2018. A METAL SARCOPHAGUS CONTAINING A COFFIN WITH THE BODY OF MARSHAL JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI IN THE CRYPT UNDER THE SILVER BELLS TOWER AT WAWEL CASTLE.

© PAP/JACEK BEDNARCZYK

petition for Polish territory at the Paris Peace Conference – whilst Piłsudski remained Head of State and commander-in-chief.⁸

TERRITORIAL TENSIONS

Undermining these developments, however, was the split in electoral results between right, center and left – and the haphazard means of defining electoral districts in the new state in the first place. Still there were issues of national boundaries to cement – issues international players also wanted to influence. Piłsudski promoted unifying

the ethnic groups which had constituted the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of 1772, allowing a diverse Polish state; whilst Dmowski intended to grasp land in the west, and envisioned an ultra-Polish nationalism at the expense of minorities. In the end, it was Piłsudski's dream which would prevail, largely as a result of luck, with a declining Soviet power, Ukrainian insecurity, and Allied support. The Polish-Ukrainian War between 1918 and 1919 resulted in an eventual Polish victory over some eastern areas, helped in part by Allied acceptance of a Polish bulwark against Soviet expansion, though the regions gained would remain in contention throughout the interwar period. Plebiscites were held in other

⁸ A. Zamoyski, *Poland: A History* (London 2015), p. 2792.

uncertain areas including Silesia, where successful protests by Poles between 1919 and 1921 marked an increase in Polish military clout over its neighbors.⁹ The conflict in Greater Poland was resolved when the Treaty of Versailles allocated most of the area to Poland, though disputes were entrenched between Poland and Czechoslovakia across the Zaolzie region, which both nations claimed.

Polish national instability reached its peak with the Polish-Soviet War which erupted in February 1919. Watching Bolshevik domination reach a standstill, Piłsudski's ambitions to create an Intermarium – a federation of eastern European states to emulate the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – prompted efforts to expand eastwards, eventually leading to an agreement between Piłsudski and Ukrainian leader Symon Petliura to attack Soviet forces.

SOCIAL HICCUPS

Yet aside from Piłsudski's charisma and charm, it was chaos which marked those early years – but a chaos belying an ever-firm Polish spirit. Though the ethnically-focused flavor of the new Sejm resulted in tangible tensions – alongside territorial disquiets and inadequate infrastructure – the centralized powers in Warsaw were determined to attempt to unite a state which had been carved into a triad of differing levels of socio-economic development, encouraging a unified and standardized approach across all facets of public life. The process began rapidly with education proposals to pave the way for a successful Polish future: the Law Concerning School Obligation in February 1919 affirmed compulsory and free schooling for young Poles, and efforts expanded with the creation of additional institutes of higher education: the Catholic University of Lublin was established in

Piłsudski promoted unifying the ethnic groups which had constituted the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of 1772, allowing a diverse Polish state, whilst Dmowski intended to grasp land in the west, and envisioned an ultra-Polish nationalism at the expense of minorities.

1918; Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań arrived in 1919, as did the AGH University of Science and Technology in Kraków.¹⁰

In June 1919, the first of the Minority Treaties, organized as a result of the Paris Peace Conference, was undertaken by Poles, establishing rights for groups to be taught their languages in public schools, and to create their own minority schooling system, thus setting a precedent for minority agreements made later by other nations.

But Polish society remained inherently unsteady, particularly as a result of a largely agrarian demographic and lack of successful and widespread business or entrepreneurial class. A cataclysmic result

⁹ Poland, ed. S. Wormell (London 2002), p. 50.

¹⁰ 'Poland-History & Background', StateUniversity [<http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1209/Poland-HISTORY-BACKGROUND.html>] [accessed: 23 July 2018].

of the partitions became evident: Poland's distance from any industrial revolution on the scale of its Western counterparts, with industrial developments during the 19th century supporting the three ruling states rather than Polish progress alone.¹¹ Continued Catholic endorsement of anti-industrialization and anti-urbanization exacerbated the issue, which seeped into dire infrastructural progress.

In a word, Poland was fundamentally underdeveloped: there were incompatible transport links between the old partition sectors – Poles were unable to travel by train between the major cities of Kielce and Kraków, 120 kilometers apart – and some cities had only recently gained modern facilities, with the country's second-largest city Łódź only acquiring drains and a municipal water supply after 1914.¹² Multiple currencies were in circulation, foreign investment was low, and there was limited immediate success even in agrarian fortunes, with the newly-acquired eastern regions rapidly sinking into poverty. The east faced the brunt of Polish misfortune as a result of growth

NATIONAL GROWTH

The Small Constitution in February 1919 had established a parliamentary system in Poland, and curbed the powers of the Head of State, but did little else, and for those first formative years after independence was achieved, the country exhibited more signs of disunity and upset than national unification. Despite Piłsudski's ambitions, minorities faced difficulties throughout the interwar period, with crumbling relations beginning from 1918; Jews faced hostility in towns such as Lwów, with the engrained public prejudice linking Jews to Bolsheviks coupled with government inability to fully quash pogroms resulting in brewing ethnic tensions. Even the Minority Treaty was taken by some to be an insult, with Polish historical tolerance cited as evidence that the measure was not needed. Throughout the period, however, those from minority backgrounds faced difficulties in gaining high office in the army or civil service; meanwhile, poverty persisted in some regions, and cultural development promoted some groups – such as Jews or Germans – over others, like Ukrainians.

But Poland enjoyed one success story in those delicate early years: culture.

rates during the period of partition, with the nation split between the wealthier western areas under German control, and the poorer eastern areas under Russia or Austria-Hungary – a divide still visible today in infrastructure maps or voting patterns, with the developed west exhibiting greater diversity and liberality.

¹¹ P.D. Stachura, *Poland, 1918–1945* (London 2004), p. 46.

¹² D. Crowley, *National Style and Nation-State* (Manchester 1992), p. 55.

But Poland enjoyed one success story in those delicate early years: culture. It was the cocktail of ethnicities and ideals so evident in the first election results to the Sejm that prompted an artistic move away from the national emblems celebrated during the partition period to a culture allowing influences from a myriad of sources. Two weeks after independence was declared, the Pod Picadorem café held its first poetry and discussion evening, in an event which would prove the foundation of the new Polish state's first modern literary movement: Skamander. The four poets most commonly associated with the group, Jan Lechoń, Antoni Słonimski, Julian Tuwim, and Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz, discarded the patriotic concerns of partition-era literature for a focus on originality, accessibility, and

above all the vibrant present. Skamander was notorious for its energy – an energy which appeared at odds with both traditional writing and modernism – and its rapid growth in a country so heavily and literally dismantled paved the way for other cultural expression: artists felt able to articulate themselves in any way they wished, and drew on sources ranging from Western, Eastern, international, ethnic ethical, religious, social and political, among others.

In fact, it was down to the undeniable lack of any core national identity that all cultural development could meet nationhood in a rich explosion of new content. Literature at first conglomerated around the Skamanderites and then the Futurists, with Anatol Stern's work the most renowned in the latter group. Stern's 1919 poem 'A Naked Man in Downtown' emphasized the close links between the human body and the city environment, with the individual experiencing a complete and comprehensive understanding of space; it was this loss of normal sense which has been cited to exemplify the links between Polish Futurism and Dada, placing this style in a more general field of absurdity. However – and indeed similar to the Skamanderites – the central theme of Polish Futurism was again its lack of unity: it existed to shock and to alter age-old styles, but had no coherent manifesto, and individuals operating within its bounds found themselves each adopting differing and often opposing ideals.¹³ Polish interwar literature really came into its own during the 1920s, as did most cultural expression, though the stumbling immediacy of some artistic productions before this time was certainly vital to later successes. As Stanisław Czernik's 1939 essay 'Dwadzieścia lat poezji polskiej

1918–1938' (Twenty years of Polish poetry, 1918–1938) puts it, "after 1918, there emerged the problem of virtually two literatures: Polish literature and literature in Polish".

Some such novel cultural production had in fact been blossoming in the wartime years: the journal *Zdrój*, linked to the Poznań Expressionist group Bunt, occupies a pivotal place in the development of the Polish avant-garde from 1917 through its aims to challenge the status quo in politics and art. This was a careful feat during the wartime years, but the magazine was soon able to acclimatize itself with the complexities of the new Polish state, promoting creative freedom and associating itself with other developmental artistic circles, like the Futurists. *Zdrój* questioned what was meant by art in Poland – a contemporary issue of national identity and modern progress with origins which lay further afield, in Germany and the West.¹⁴

Other artistic mediums were certainly also feeding on a steady progression of foreign influence, most notably in music and performance. The new sounds of jazz, tango and foxtrot whispered across record players and vinyl recordings over Europe and hit the Polish audiences with gusto: cabarets, theatres and dancehalls quickly spread across the nation, and celebrity culture began to grip the country by storm even before it had a government in place. Literary stars turned their hand to satirical skits or lyrics: Tuwim was writing for the Bi-Ba-Bo Theatre in Łódź as early as 1915, and newspapers began to seep the names of actors and singers, including Karol Hanusz, who brought tango to Warsaw in 1919, Zula Pogorzelska, as well as

¹³ A. Kremer, 'Polish Futurism Revisited: Anatol Stern and his Post-War Poetry Recording' in *The Modern Language Review*, (2016), p. 208.

¹⁴ M. Bartelik, *Early Polish Modern Art: Unity in Multiplicity* (Manchester 2005), p. 99.

Eugeniusz Bodo, Poland's interwar superstar.

It was in the capital that the entertainment industry truly exploded, even in the early years: by 1920, Warsaw was already home to multiple cabarets, including Qui Pro Quo, and also boasted film studios like Sfinks, which made six feature films in 1918 alone. Film was still primitive, with low budgets and substandard technology – but even by its independence Poland had already cultivated the career of its most notable actress of the era, Pola Negri, who had achieved success in her home nation before reaping acclaim in Germany in 1917, and then in Hollywood in the early twenties.

In music, the nation also somehow managed to maintain a consistent pace alongside its international – and more developed – neighbours. The innovator and cosmopolitan businessman Juliusz Feigenbaum established the record company Syrena Rekord in 1908, which had risen to become by far Poland's most prominent recording institution even by the eve of WWI, producing 2.5 million records a year, and dabbling in music from a wide variety of ethnic groups and languages. It was down to this early prosperity that Syrena could effectively pick up where it left off when the war ended; despite some financial difficulties, the company immersed itself in the burgeoning entertainment spheres, recording cabaret artists and soon establishing a home for itself, tied tightly to the development of theatre and film.

POLAND 1918–1919: YEAR ZERO

It was in a December 1918 article on the precursor to the Skamander group that the newspaper Świat summarized the mood of Polish social life in the first moments after independence had been regained:

“Cafe Pod Pikadorem...it is something between an ordinary Parisian cafe, and even a Berlin cafe, and a Warsaw cabaret. It was established for the public...”

There was nothing unusual in any such institutions mentioned, where the focus was on a state of normality just brushing against something unique, and adventurous, and different. For Poles belonging to the Poland reborn onto the map of Europe in 1918, the past and future must have seemed only alien in similarity – two worlds of isolation and nation; disunity and unity; division and revision which could never touch – and yet, the Poland which emerged seemed to draw from both old and new, distilled into a concoction of multi-talented, multi-ethnic multi-hood which could only find itself in those rich – if tense – present moments.

Historians view the early years of Polish independence as a year zero; a time for the country to begin afresh from a background crippled by war, national instability and hopelessness. Of course, the year zero certainly existed in the new Polish state, with an entire nation to reconstruct – but so, in this case, did a year one, or a year ten, or a year one-hundred. The feeling of Polish nationhood did not cease to exist in the 123 years before it re-emerged on the map of Europe; lying dormant, this Poland was one on the cusp of explicit development, where the groundwork could be laid but not completely hardened. Poland in 1918 and 1919 remained flimsy, but this was a flimsiness offset by those who, mirroring Piłsudski's politics, rapidly allowed the state's new boundaries more freedom; who absorbed and regurgitated influences from every facet of life; who opened the eyes of the new Polish public to a richer future.

There may have been a year zero – but there was also a year 1918.

Juliette Bretan ■
July 31, 2018

ART COLLECTIONS IN BOMBED WARSAW SEPTEMBER 1939

MARIUSZ KLARECKI, PhD

The very first concerns about the fate of Polish art work during the times of potential armed conflict emerged in the autumn of 1938.

At the initiative of museum workers, it was possible to engage Poland's Ministry of Religious Denominations and Public Enlightenment in talks on how to secure collections in case of war. The topic was even mentioned during a specially organized conference. As written by Stanisław Lorentz, Director of the National Museum in Warsaw: "Neither state nor municipal authorities made any decisions and – as it turned out – neither museums nor – as far as I know – libraries and archives were prepared in the event of a war, which disastrously affected the extent of losses during the siege of Warsaw in September 1939." In August that year, the employees of the National Museum in Warsaw

decided to prepare 230 chests in the basement of the building; they could be used to pack exhibits during a possible conflict¹.

The priority was to protect the museum collections, with special attention being paid to the intensely bombed Royal Castle. Stanisław Lorentz mentioned that just after the outbreak of the war, "the museum received both large and small deposits that came from both destroyed apartments as well as were brought by

¹ S. Lorentz, *Wspomnienie o ratowaniu zabytków i dzieł sztuki we wrześniu 1939 r.* [On saving monuments and works of art in September 1939], In: *Cywilna obrona Warszawy we wrześniu 1939 r.* [Civil Defense of Warsaw in September 1939], Warsaw 1964, pp. 256–258.

Plan Warszawy z roku 1941 z zaznaczonym obszarem getta. Na planie zostały również przedstawione projektowane ulice, osiedla i mosty zgodnie z planem rozbudowy miasta prezydenta Starzyńskiego. Źródło: polona.pl



WARSAW, FEBRUARY 26, 2015. EXHIBITION AT THE JABŁKOWSKI BROTHERS' HOUSE IN WARSAW.

© PAP/TOMASZ GZELL

people leaving the capital”². In addition, the institution had already disposed of deposits from private individuals. At the beginning of the bombing performed by the German aviation, an artillery shell destroyed to a great extent a “very valuable deposit of General Bylewski; filed at the Museum in 1932, it consisted of 71 clocks dating from the 16th to the 19th century, many of them being either Polish or foreign uniques. The collection, which was supposed to be donated to the Museum as a gift, encompassed many large-size, both cabinet and wall, clocks – difficult to be packed and moved [...] out of the entire collection, only 20 pieces survived –, all of them in a very poor condition³.” Michał Walicki, an employee of the Royal Castle, made an unsuccessful attempt to persuade Dr. Ludwik Bryndz-Nacki to store his valuable possessions in the secure basement of the National Museum building. The collection was completely destroyed during the bombing of Warsaw in September 1939. Its owner, who lived near Krakowskie Przedmieście Street, managed to gather 112 paintings of renowned Polish painters as well as those of slightly lesser known Flemish and Dutch masters, dating from the 17th century. The burned works of art had already been known to the general public due to the fact that their proprietor had frequently displayed them during numerous national exhibitions, thanks to which it was possible to preserve some photographs of many of the objects⁴.

² *Ibid.*, p. 263.

³ Questionnaire of losses submitted by Tadeusz Bylewski to the Ministry of Culture and Art: Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Kultury i Sztuki (AAN, MKiS), microfilm (micr.), ref. number: B - 1173, p. 169.

⁴ AAN, MKiS, ref. number mic. B-1173, p. 163–168; K. Estreicher, *op.cit.*, p. 389; A. Tyczyńska, K. Znojewska „Straty wojenne. Malarstwo Polskie” [War Losses. Polish Painting], Poznań 1998, Vol. 1, item 405, 418; A. Tyczyńska, K. Znojewska, „Straty wojenne. Malarstwo Polskie”, Poznań 2007, Vol. 2, item 40, pp. 93, 95–97.

While the bombing of the capital was intensifying, art works and antiques from all over the city were transported to the spacious basement of the National Museum.

While the bombing of the capital was intensifying, art works and antiques from all over the city – “including Potocki’s very valuable collection kept hitherto in the palace at Krakowskie Przedmieście Street 15 and the residence of Janusz Radziwiłł at Bielańska⁵ Street” – were transported to the spacious basement of the Museum. According to Lorentz, mansions, inhabited by nobles right before the outbreak of the war, were left open, as their dwellers had fled the city in a hurry. In this way, any property, which previously belonged to aristocrats, could be easily looted or ravaged. In addition, many residents of Warsaw who had their palaces and mansions outside the city were affected by severe losses. Due to their close location to the capital, some of the estates were subsequently occupied by German troops who were getting ready to siege the city. Such was the case of the “Basiówka» residence, positioned in the Młociny district and owned by Czesław and Irena Ludwig. On September 22, the house and all its equipment were set on fire by Wehrmacht officers. The fire devastated antique furniture, old prints,

⁵ S. Lorentz, *op.cit.*, p. 272.

One of the most important goals set by the Luftwaffe aircraft was the headquarters of the Staff of the Defence of Warsaw.

bronzes, carpets as well as paintings by Polish and foreign⁶ masters.

One of the most important goals set by the Luftwaffe aircraft was the headquarters of the Staff of the Defence of Warsaw, based in the Zamojski Palace (Nowy Świat Street 67). The backyard of the building held a so-called «Antiquarian quarter» located around the following streets: Mazowiecka, Świętokrzyska, Nowy Świat, Krakowskie Przedmieście and Traugutta. As a result of the intensified bombings in this part of the city, many art works in the antiquarian salons were badly⁷ damaged. According to Władysław Płachciński, «all of them [salons] burnt: Klejman, Szuberg from Lviv, Abe Gutnajer, Bernard Gutnajer, Czaja, Kaniewski, Studzinski, Grodecki – in Jerusalem Avenue – all of them burnt completely, without a trace»⁸. Jak dalej wspomina Płachciński – “Sapiecha na Obożnej zainkasował pięć bomb ...” In addition, five bombs hit the house of Mr. Sapiecha at Obożna Street: the blast completely

destroyed the corner of his dwelling on the first floor where he had a large flat filled with various objects. Now the place resembles rather a garbage disposal while old Sapiecha, unwashed and wearing an old dressing gown, has been moping around in the ruined apartment for 13 months, searching through the rubble and hoping to find some buried fragments of sculptures, shells, furniture debris; he has been collecting remains in the rooms; poor man! He has the intention to glue and restore them!»⁹.

The list of Warsaw's most famous antique shops burnt in September 1939 included also “Pałac Sztuki” [The Art Palace], located at Trębacka Street 4. In the appendix to the loss questionnaire submitted to the Department of War Loss Management of the Capital City of Warsaw, Józef Smokalski's wife detailed the losses of antiques and art works, both in their burnt apartment and the antique shop at Trębacka Street 4 and 5, dividing them into those created in 1939 and 1944. Following the city's bombing in September 1939, the total sum of damages amounted to 53,000 pre-war zlotys, which constituted a significant expense as compared to the overall cost suffered during the Warsaw Uprising (39,500 zlotys). For example, numerous paintings of renowned Polish masters (including J. Brandt, J. and W. Kossak, J. Malczewski, J. Chełmoński, T. Axentowicz, J. Fałat, A. Grottger and J. Lampi) were eventually burned and destroyed. In addition to the above-mentioned art works, the antique shop offered carpets, some porcelain, glass, silver and furniture. Both before the war and during the occupation, “Pałac Sztuki” was perceived as being one of the largest antique shops, being able to sell many valuable objects.¹⁰

⁶ State Archives of the Capital City of Warsaw, City Board of the Department of War Losses (APW ZM WSW), reference number 45, No. 3605, p. 511.

⁷ S. Böldok, *Antykwariaty artystyczne salony i domy aukcyjne* [Antique Shops, Salons and Auction Houses], Warszawa 2004, pp. 138–139.

⁸ W. Płachciński, *Wspomnienia zbieracza* [Collector's Memoirs], a typescript created about 1942–44, APW, *Zbiory rękopisów* [Collection of manuscripts], ref. 300, p. 1.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ APW, ZM WSW, ref. number 112, No. 20660, p. 701.

Z kolekcji Roberta Marcinkowskiego

12



Wista. Widok wybrzeży Wisły od ul. Mostowej w kierunku południowym. Widoczne mosty: Kierbedzia, Średnicowy i Poniatowskiego. Po prawej tereny podzamcza z budynkiem mieszkalnym przy ul. Wodnej, przedszkolem im. Michaliny Mościckiej i budynkami przy ul. Steinkellera. Na praskim brzegu widoczne zabudowania wokół pl. Weteranów 1863 r. oraz port rzeczny.

WARSAW, FEBRUARY 26, 2015. EXHIBITION OF PREVIOUSLY UNPUBLISHED AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF WARSAW AT THE JABŁKOWSKI BROTHERS' HOUSE IN WARSAW. THE PHOTOS WERE TAKEN BY THE LUFTWAFFE ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1939.

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Another place completely burnt in 1939 was “Salon Sztuki” [Art Salon], owned by Kazimierz Kaniewski and located at Nowy Świat Street 64. As written in the «Certificate», a document issued by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Warsaw on September 5, 1945: «[...] during the war, the enterprise was destroyed twice: once in September 1939 and again – as a result of the last attempts to save the capital. The losses suffered, both by our cultural achievements and the enterprise, are so significant that it is impossible to assess them at the moment. More than 20,000 art works (including 2,300 paintings), based in 40 rooms were completely destroyed by fire”.¹¹

The bombings of the capital devastated also a large collection belonging to an industrialist Edward Natanson, founded in 1850 by Ludwik Natanson. Edward Natanson occupied a 10-room apartment at Krolewska Street 10. As a result, the collector lost 60 paintings of outstanding artistic value by artists such as: J. Matejko, A. Gierzyński, J. Chelmonski, J. and W. Kossak, J. Falat, S. Wyspiański, J. Brandt, W. Podkowski, and J. Malczewski, J. Lampi, M. Bacciarelli as well as those of excellent Western European painters: J.B. Greuze, F. Boucher, G. Reni, Dutch masters and many others. Moreover, the fire ravaged numerous pieces of eighteenth-century French furniture, a high-class

¹¹ APW, ZM WSW, reference number 127, No.1916,

p. 729, appendix to the questionnaire, pp. 733–737v.



Zdjęcie lotnicze z 1943 roku. Ukazuje rozmiar zniszczeń w dzielnicy Śródmieście, która była ważnym centrum kulturalnym, edukacyjnym i handlowym Warszawy. W centrum fotografii widoczny skrzyżowanie ulic Nowy Świat i Świętokrzyskiej, których zabudowa została w ogromnym stopniu zniszczona podczas oblężenia w wyniku nalotu dywanowego w dniu 25 września 1939 roku. Obok przychodzący dach budynek w lewym dolnym rogu to Cerkiew św. Stanisława, zbudowany w latach 1882–1883 według projektu Wincentego Rakowicza. Podważony zachodni teren w górnej części fotografii zastępuje się wielką ulicą Marszałkowską z Dworcem Głównym. Równy dworek kulej Warszawsko – Wiedeńskiej zostały już zniszczone. Równy narożnik w prawym dolnym rogu, to fragment skrzyżła samolotu, z którego zrobiono to zdjęcie.

WARSAW, SEPTEMBER 29, 2017. OPENING OF THE EXHIBITION “DESTRUCTION OF WARSAW IN SEPTEMBER '39 IN POLISH AND GERMAN PHOTOGRAPHY” AT THE PROVINCE GOVERNOR’S OFFICE IN WARSAW.

© PAP/JAKUB KAMIŃSKI

Since the very first days of September 1939, all railway stations in Warsaw had been heavily bombarded.

collection of Meissen porcelain and as many as 18 vases produced in the eighteen-century royal manufactory of King Stanisław August Poniatowski in Belweder¹². It is estimated that Polish

¹² APW, ZM WSW, reference number 91, No. 15268, p. 74; E. Chwalewik, *Zbiory polskie. Archiwa, biblioteki, gabinety, galerie, muzea i inne zbiory*

museum collections across the country currently dispose of more or less the same number of items designed in the above-mentioned manufactory.

Since the very first days of September 1939, all railway stations in Warsaw had been heavily bombarded. The warehouses, located just next to them, held large quantities of food supplies as well as other goods belonging to people who had managed to leave border

*pamiętek przeszłości w ojczyźnie i na obczyźnie w porządku alfabetycznym według miejscowości ułożone [Archives, libraries, offices, galleries, museums and other collections of souvenirs of the past in the homeland and abroad were arranged in an alphabetical order according to the village], Warsaw 1927, Vol. 2, p. 407; K. Estreicher, op.cit., s. 395; A. Tyczyńska, K. Znojewska, *Straty Wojenne [War Losses]*, op.cit., vol. 1, items 39, 89, 134, 236.*

regions just before the German invasion of Poland. In addition, the railway depots could store a large amount of private property, including pieces of art that had previously served as household equipment. On September 4, precisely at 5 p.m., German aircraft bombed the Main Railway Station and the Western Railway Station¹³ in Warsaw. During the bombardment of the former, a certain Jozef Trawinski lost his entire chattel that he had sent by train from Sosnowiec to Warsaw on September 1, 1939. It was only five days later than he received a message stating that his possessions had been destroyed in a fire during a raid on the station. The package contained the following paintings: “Chrystus w ogrodzie” [Christ in the Garden] by D. Teniers, “W stepie” [In the Steppe] by J. Brandt, “Kapliczka” [The Shrine] by Z. Kłosowski, «Pejzaż» [Landscape] by J. Chełmoński and «Trębacz» [The Trumpeter] by M. Gierymski. In addition, several other artistic craft objects were completely shattered.¹⁴

Customs warehouses based at Eastern Railway Station started burning on September 4; it was on that day when German aviation carried out intensive bombing of the city. Material losses suffered by the Gora family comprised art works and antiques, including a collection of 18 paintings¹⁵. A few days

after the outbreak of the war, it was no longer possible to send any rail transport to Warsaw. In his “Report on the Activities of Institutions and Civilian Defence of War”, a Polish military commander Juliusz Rommel wrote the following: “on September 8, that is when I arrived to Warsaw, it became clear for me that all railways – from the western border to the Vistula river, along with the considerable Warsaw junction – had already been immobilized and bombed. All stations were packed down with broken cars while train tracks were completely cluttered with damaged trains that had been abandoned by railway crews¹⁶.”

The war deprived Felicja Herk-Lukanska of all her valuable possessions. As the result of the so-called September incidents, her belongings, along with 12 canvases and three sculptures, went missing “due to the German bombardment over Warsaw’s Main Railway Station while her luggage had been destroyed in a fire.” The first son of the victim died in the Dachau concentration camp in 1942 whereas her second son was killed in the Warsaw Uprising. After the fall of the revolt, her husband succumbed to lung disease. There were several cases of people who successfully managed to transport their property to Warsaw, even in spite of such heavy bombing. Before the war, a Warsaw-born woman, Helena Czechowska, lived with her husband Karol in Poznań. In September

guesthouse at Złota Street in Warsaw, was killed in Auschwitz on December 30, 1943. Gora family’s possessions were partially confiscated by the German occupier on the occasion of the detainment of the parents in October 1943. Both the guesthouse and the flat at Złota Street were burned during the Warsaw Uprising.

¹⁶ J. Rómmel, *Relacja o działalności instytucji i agend cywilnej obrony Warszawy* [Report on the activities of the institutions and agencies of the civil defense of Warsaw], No. 25, In: *Cywilna Obrona Warszawy* [Civil Defense of Warsaw]..., *op.cit.*, p. 370.

¹³ M. Emmerling, *Luftwaffe nad Polską 1939* [Luftwaffe over Poland], Gdynia 2005, Vol. 2, p. 83.

¹⁴ APW, ZM WSW, reference number 117, No. 21779, p. 109.

¹⁵ APW, ZM WSW, ref. number 79, No. 12469, p. 874. In 1945, a questionnaire on war losses of Krystyna Kinga and Andrzej Grzegorz Gora was submitted to the Department of War Losses. When the Second World War broke out, the siblings were only couple of years old. The document was filled out by Zofia Orlanska; after the war, the woman took care of the children of her niece, Antonina Gorzyna (née Gabszewicz). Before the war, Andrzej Gora, father and lawyer, belonged to the management of the Tyniec steelworks in the Zaolzie region. He was executed on November 12, 1943 in Warsaw. Antonina Gorzyna, mother and owner of the

Warsaw bridges and viaducts were bombarded to the same extent as the aforementioned railway stations.

1939, the widow of a soldier, killed on September 6, managed to relocate all her possessions to Warsaw and she settled in an apartment at the Old Town Square. The woman brought with her a large number of both art and collector's items, including such paintings as "Mała trojka i wilki" [Little Troika and Wolves] by Józef Chełmoński – with a dedication of Countess Jeziorska – and «Dziewczyna wiejska» [Girl from the Countryside] by Leon Wyczółkowski¹⁷.

Warsaw bridges and viaducts were bombarded to the same extent as the aforementioned railway stations. Three units of the anti-aircraft battery defended at the entrance to the Poniatowski Bridge from the side of the Washington Roundabout. German aircraft fiercely attacked the overpass, trying to kill its defenders. The tenements located in the immediate vicinity were most exposed to the damage caused by dive-bombers. And this is exactly how Alfred Birkenmayer, director of the Polish Radio, lost his eight-room apartment containing "a lot of antiques that been gathered over the years", including 30 canvases, old Japanese engravings, relic porcelain from European manufactories as well as

a collection of kilims. While developing his passion, Alfred Birkenmayer focused primarily on memorabilia related to the Polish national poet Adam Mickiewicz. The collection included such pieces as 52 portraits and occasional pictures from the life of the writer as well as a few of his busts and portrait medallions. In his apartment, the art enthusiast kept first editions of Mickiewicz's works that had been "partly removed from the rubble; nonetheless, they had been severely damaged, which constituted a terrible loss." Following the first aircraft attack on the Poniatowski Bridge, Janina Nurzyńska, a woman who lived in the neighbourhood, decided to transfer some of her most valuable items (including a collection of 26 canvases) to a house at 3 May Avenue. She managed to place her pieces of art in a seemingly safe shelter at Nowy Świat Street, on the corner of Ordynacka Street. Unfortunately, the tenement located in the quarter was set on fire in September 1939, along with some of the canvases that had been previously deposited in the building¹⁸.

On September 8, German motorized columns arrived to Warsaw from the direction of the Ochota district. Two days later, Wehrmacht troops managed to close the siege ring of the city from the side of Warsaw's Praga district. Both German artillery fire as well as the bombing of Polish defensive positions ravaged the residential buildings located on the front line. The fire additionally powered the destruction of the houses at Grójecka Street while unburned apartments were plundered by German soldiers. Circumstances of

¹⁷ APW, ZM WSW, reference number 41, No. 2588, p. 392, appendix to the questionnaire, p. 396v.

¹⁸ APW, ZM WSW, ref. number 47, No. 4091, p. 500. During the Warsaw Uprising, Janina Nurzyńska's house, located at 3 May Avenue, was bombed; the woman wrote: "my apartment turned into a bunker; everything was looted while the rest was shattered by bullets."

the loss of priceless seventeenth-century documents, including grants, wills and heraldic agreements were described by Elzbieta Maliszewska, who resided at Grojecka¹⁹ Street.

The residents sought to protect access to the city with streets barricades that had been built in a hurry. A great majority of such dams were made of wooden elements or even valuable household equipment. Both Polish soldiers as well as representatives of other services, involved in constructing fortifications and tank barriers in the Wola district, took from houses objects such as doors, tables and some other heavy pieces of furniture. As noted by Stefan Talikowski, a collector and antique enthusiast: "all these items could be found on the barricade built at Elektoralna Street. And as the fighting did not take place in this area, civilians removed the barricades right after the capitulation act had been signed, taking home the above-mentioned objects, also those that did not necessarily belong to them. Our caretaker managed to pick up the doors from the front apartment so that one half of them were missing; however, we could not find our Renaissance table that had previously stood in the living room. I conducted a private investigation, thanks to which I later determined where my table was"²⁰.

As a result of the September bombings, a valuable library owned by Wanda and Jan Rybiński was also destroyed to a large extent. The collection therein comprised about 500 books – such as incunables dating from the 15th to 19th century, including numerous examples

The residents sought to protect access to the city with streets barricades that had been built in a hurry.

of seventeenth-century Elzevirs in their original bindings. Previously, some items could be found in the library of Polish King Stanisław August Poniatowski. They mostly consisted of publications from the 18th century; they had leather bindings and contained engraved illustrations. The collection was rather of a bibliophilic nature; it contained both books originating from Napoleon's library with bookplates and supralibros of Louis Philippe's library. In addition, it encompassed first editions of numberless rare volumes, including Balzac's works along with their original dedications. According to its owner, it was «a unique book collection – also in terms of its opulent bindings – that was burnt to a large extent in 1939 at Hoza Street while other prints, hidden in a building at Ślupecka Street, were destroyed a few years later, during the Warsaw Uprising»²¹

Warsaw residents particularly remember the date of September 25, 1939 – later referred to as "bloody Monday". Polish politician Władysław Bartoszewski wrote the following: «after an all-night artillery fire in the capital, an aerial bombardment of an unprecedented intensity is taking place from 7 a.m. until dusk. Several hundred aircraft, arriving systematically in waves,

¹⁹ APW, ZM WSW, reference number 180, No. 3284, p. 351. The woman was a chemical engineer and worked as an assistant at the Warsaw School of Technology.

²⁰ National Library (BN), S. Talikowski, microfilm, ref. akc. 11061, p. 393.

²¹ APW, ZM WSW, reference number 52, No. 5286, appendix to the questionnaire, p. 163.

dropped loads of demolition bombs as well as incendiary charges on the central district of Warsaw²².” It was only on the same day that German Luftwaffe made 1,176 flights over the city. The city was bombarded by more than 400 airplanes: 240 Ju-87 B dive bombers, about 100 Dornier Do 17 light bombers, 30 Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft and Heinkel He 111 medium bombers. The city was bombarded by Luftwaffe aircraft; they dropped 560 tons of high explosive bombs and 72 tons of incendiary bombs. German air raids were mostly carried out in Warsaw’s city center, stretching along the Nowy Świat Street and Krakowskie Przedmieście Street as well as some other areas located near Świętokrzyska Street where Warsaw’s tallest buildings were located at that time (including the seat of the Polish Radio as well as the edifice of the telephone exchange). The city was on fire for 10 hours; from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m.²³

Zofia Peterson observed such frightening scenes of attempts made by Warsaw residents to save their property: “I could see something shocking on the corner of Lwowska Street. I have seen quite a lot of

fires in my life; nonetheless, that one was terrible; a huge quadrangle almost wallowed in a deep sea of fire. Bright pillars of flames hit the sky from the doors as well as balcony windows. Sparks were falling from glowing or already black beams while the dark figures of the rescuers were hurrying amidst the black and orange – almost bloody – veils of fire. The pavement on the opposite side was covered with randomly piled equipment; when a blow of wind moved an ignited curtain, people started to throw some items on the street. Thus, the roadway was littered with linen, clothing and bundles. Cracking objects and the roar of the fire – all these sounds mixed up with deafening cacophony and desperate screams²⁴.”

While some residents decided to leave their apartments to fate, more industrious Varsovians made their best efforts to prevent fire from being set and then to spread to other places. Apart from demolition bombs as well as incendiary (phosphorus) charges dropped by Luftwaffe, nose-diving aircraft were cannonading civilians with on-board weapons. The act of destruction was concluded by German artillery. Valuable items were taken to the basements while pieces of furniture were purposely placed against walls. The windows were covered with boards or tapes so that the glass broken by an exploding bomb could not hurt people nor damage the apartment equipment. Inhabitants of the buildings removed all flammable fabrics and carpets and also scattered sand on the floors of rooms, next to the windows. In addition, they placed baskets filled with sand on the roofs of their houses; any fire could be rapidly put out if a bomb was immersed in such a box. Although little known during the September bombings,

Warsaw residents particularly remember the date of September 25, 1939 – later referred to as “bloody Monday”.

²² W. Bartoszewski, *Warszawa w kampanii wrześniowej, kronika ważniejszych wydarzeń* [Warsaw during the September Campaign: Chronicle of Major Events], In: *Cywilna Obrona...*, op.cit., p. XXIV.

²³ M. Cieplewicz, E. Kozłowski, *Obrona Warszawy 1939 we wspomnieniach* [Defense of Warsaw in 1939: Memoirs], Warsaw 1984.

²⁴ BN, Z. Petersowa, *Piekło i ludzie* [People and Hell], microfilm, ref. 6405, pp. 32–36.



WARSAW, OCTOBER 1948. TENEMENT HOUSES DESTROYED DURING WORLD WAR II IN THE AREA OF THE OLD TOWN. NO EXACT DAY OF THE EVENT HAS YET BEEN DETERMINED.

© PAP

this method became more popular only a few years later, saving many tenement houses from total destruction during the Warsaw Uprising.

The US historian Richard Pipes noted his impressions of the September 25 bombing in his journal: "A day-long air attack has begun [...] while its scale has not been witnessed by anyone throughout the entire history of mankind. Numerous bombs kept falling on the defenseless city. Buildings of the capital rapidly became giant rubble, killing thousands of people and spreading a fire to the streets while hordes of people were wandering through rubble-covered street, holding their children and bundles with all their

belongings. The German aviators – the worst beasts that have ever lived on the Earth – purposely descended the flight to hit the civilians with machine guns. Over the evening, the entire capital stood in flames, which seemed to resemble the Dante's inferno²⁵."

It was on the same day that Warsaw Water Filters were bombed, which resulted in a lack of water throughout the city. Located in a local neighbourhood, the villa of Władysław Woydyno's family at Filtrowa Street was also completely destroyed. Woydyno recalled the event as following: «my apartment of a collector,

²⁵ R. Pipes, *Żyłem. Wspomnienia niezależnego* [VIXI – Memoirs of a Non-Belonger], Warsaw 2005, p. 5.

The walls of tenement houses, demolished by exploding bombs, revealed the interior of the buildings, which produced an extremely shocking sight.

expert, museum scientist, and educated painter, was filled with art works as well as antiques of museum importance; so many that it would take too much space to specify all of them and so renowned that are widely known by artists and historians from the National Museum and other institutions.» His valuable possessions were all destroyed including furniture, a book collection, not to mention paintings and artistic handicrafts. Nonetheless, Woydyno was most devastated by the destruction of his militaria collection. It included numerous ancient weapons: an old Persian gilt-repoussé helmet with drawings and inscriptions in silver and gold, a fifteenth-century Italian helmet, an engraved Italian half armor, two gold-engraved karabelas (a type of Polish sabre) and scabbards with an agate handle, a Turkish shotgun with a pattern-welded barrel (studded with rubies and turquoises), two ivory and silver-bound flintlocks, an Arab shotgun with the long stock and the barrel encrusted with silver and an engraved and gold-plated Arab inscription, a silver powder box of a Polish officer (dating from Napoleonic times), a sixteenth-century Italian rapier with an iron guard, a seventeenth-century Italian

rapier with a brass guard as well as many other interesting items²⁶.

The walls of tenement houses, demolished by exploding bombs, revealed the interior of the buildings, which produced an extremely shocking sight. As reported by Mrs. Regulska: “We were met by the heat from burning houses at Pius Street [now Piękna Street], nearby Ujazdowskie Avenue. At the opposite side, the whole corner of a large house was completely torn off, as if it had been cut off, depicting the remnants of both apartments and furniture; on the fifth floor, one could notice horns of deer and goats, some paintings and a lamp on an oval wall; below, there was a china room and two chairs, placed systematically on both sides.» In her report, the author depicted the bold activity of the looters. They stole goods from deserted or half-demolished flats, as evidenced by the following record: «in the middle of the [Wiejska] Street, some two peasants were pushing an ordinary gardening wheelbarrows filled with crystal vases, a bronze candlestick as well as a tailcoat, shimmering with silk²⁷ tails.”

The tragic aftermath of September 25, when the Germans conducted a mass-scale attack on the capital, made the defenders aware of acts that can be performed by the aggressor as well as the means used to accomplish this goal. Thus, it can be assumed that the events of that day constituted a preview of the consequences of the Warsaw Uprising – the total destruction of both the city as well as its inhabitants. The events of this tragic day prompted Polish soldiers to make some difficult decisions. In a conversation with Colonel Wacław Lipinski, General

²⁶ APW, ZM WSW, reference number 90, pp. 15041, p. 195.

²⁷ BN, Z. Petersowa, *op.cit.*, p. 33.

Tadeusz Kutrzeba stated as following: «we no longer bind anything and anybody; we are only an island that does not await any relief because it will never happen, we are not able to change anything [...]. And it was Warsaw and its inhabitants that were supposed to pay high price for such defense; they have to carry that horrible burden. Today's events do not mean the end of the tragedy; the city will be razed to the ground and if any attack starts and the German break through our lines and enter the city, we will witness the slaughter²⁸." Kutrzeba's words aptly refer to the disaster experienced by the capital during the Warsaw Uprising only five years later. At the commanders' briefing, summoned by General Rommel on September 26, the militaries decided to surrender. Such opinion was also maintained at the Citizens' Committee – an institution representing the inhabitants of Warsaw. On Thursday, September 28, General Kutrzeba, delegated to talks with the German side, signed the capitulation treaty.

The balance of Warsaw's losses in September 1939 constituted about 12 percent of the buildings destroyed within the city limits²⁹. Around 10,000 inhabitants of the capital were killed while 50,000 were injured; also 6,000 Polish soldiers fell in battle and another 16,000 were wounded³⁰. According to

data collected at some police stations, out of 18,495 Warsaw tenements, only 2,645 were not damaged while as many as 13,843 residential buildings were completely ravaged by the occupier. Thus, destroyed houses account for 2,007 cases (14.3 percent). Interestingly, despite the fact that all territory of the capital was sieged by the German troops, also from the east, such districts located directly on the front line such as Mokotow, Ochota and Saska Kępa did not suffer the most severe losses; quite the contrary, it was the city center that experienced the biggest destruction: 44.2 percent of chambers of the 1st Police Station, located at Krakowskie Przedmieście, were dilapidated or ravaged; while the 10th Police Station at Ordynacka Street noted similar losses amounting to 43 percent³¹. Meanwhile, 41 percent of tenements in the Ochota district – most exposed to the artillery bombardment – were either swept away or damaged. As a result of the bombings, numerous buildings of particular importance for the culture and history of the city were destroyed and burned, including the Royal Castle, St. John's Archcathedral, the Grand Theatre, the Warsaw Philharmonic, the building of the theatre (former edifice of the Golgotha panorama) at Karowa Street, the building of the Warsaw Stock Exchange at Karowa, as well as the palaces of Tepper, Primates, Branicki family, Bishops of Cracow and Małachowski family³².

Mariusz Klarecki ■

August 1, 2018

²⁸ W. Lipiński, *Dziennik, Wrześniowa obrona Warszawy 1939 roku* [A Journal. Defending Warsaw in September 1939], ed. J.M. Kłoczowski, Warsaw 1989, pp. 139–140.

²⁹ In total, 7 percent of residential room were completely ravaged while 17 percent [of the ones that survived] were damaged – see "Warsawa w liczbach" [Warsaw in Numbers] (1947); *op.cit.*, pp. 21, 28 and „Warszawa w liczbach” (1948), *op.cit.*, p. 30.

³⁰ T. Szarota, *Naloty na Warszawę podczas II wojny światowej* [Air Raids on Warsaw during the Second World War], In: W. Falkowski, *op.cit.*, p. 263. This material was found by the author of the following article in the group of files of the Government Delegation for Poland, Archiwum Art Nowych [Archive of Modern Records], 6th division, ref. number 202 / I-43, Vol. I, k. 6–10.

³¹ "Warszawa w liczbach" [Warsaw in Numbers] (1947); *op.cit.*, pp. 21, 28 and „Warszawa w liczbach” (1948), *op.cit.*, p. 30.

³² J. Majewski, *Śródmieście i jego mieszkańcy w latach niemieckiej okupacji: październik 1939 – 1 sierpnia 1944. Dzień powszedni* [Warsaw's City Centre and Its Inhabitants Under the German Occupation: October 1939 – August 1, 1944. An Ordinary Day], In: W. Falkowski, *op.cit.*, pp. 66–68.

THE WARSAW UPRISING: A FIGHT FOR REMEMBRANCE

KATARZYNA UTRACKA

The Warsaw Uprising constituted one of the most important and – at the same time – dramatic events in the history of Poland in the 20th century.

After the cruel experiences of German and Soviet occupation, Poles seemed to be perfectly aware about the true intentions of the Soviets. They were also conscious that the Red Army, coming to the country from the East, was not fighting to guarantee Poland's freedom; instead; it sought to transform Nazi totalitarianism into its own, communist, one. The battle, taken by Poles on August 1, 1944, aimed to liberate the country's capital and to welcome Soviet troops as their new hosts, constituted the very last attempt to save Poland from enslavement. However, the

Poles were to pay a huge price for this decision. Nearly 120,000-150,000 residents of the capital were killed while those who managed to survive were driven out of a city that almost completely disappeared from the face of the earth. As a result of the fighting, one quarter of the city's buildings was destroyed. Another 30 percent of buildings were demolished after the end of Warsaw Uprising.

It was at the same moment when the Polish Underground State, which had been active for five years in secrecy, took up the fight in Warsaw; a Moscow-controlled



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ON THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE OUTBREAK OF THE UPRISING, IN ADDITION TO THE OFFICIAL CELEBRATIONS, THERE WERE ALSO CEREMONIES ORGANIZED BY THE INSURGENTS; THE PROCESSION WITH THE WREATH HEADS TOWARDS THE COLLECTIVE GRAVE IN DRESZER PARK IN WARSAW.

After the cruel experiences of German and Soviet occupation, Poles seemed to be perfectly aware about the true intentions of the Soviets.

Polish Committee of National Liberation had already been operating in the city of Lublin. Control over the country was soon taken by an illegal government. The communists would have absolute power in Poland for the next 45 years; the then leaders falsified the memory of the Uprising by imposing their own untruthful narratives of the event: the fact of revealing the truth about the Uprising would also unveil that they had absolutely no legitimacy to govern.

Both insurgents and soldiers of the underground Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK), were treated with hostility in a communist-ruled country; they were referred to as “spit-drenched dwarf of reaction” and enemies of the “people’s homeland”. They became victims of persecution, arrests and even murder – committed under the majesty of communist law. This intensified after 1948 and continued uninterrupted until the mid-1950s. Poland’s communist authorities charged them with absurd accusations of anti-state activities whose aim was supposedly to overthrow the then government as well as of conducting spying activities for foreign powers and collaborating with the German occupier. It was only after the death of Joseph Stalin and some changes that occurred within the communist party that such sharp criticism of the Uprising began to gradually liberalize: political prisoners, including a large group of Home Army soldiers and insurgents, were released from penitentiaries. However, up until the very end of communist rule in Poland, the authorities perceived the memory of the Warsaw Uprising in terms of an

From the very beginning, the communist authorities had the intention of imposing an organizational framework on the celebration of Warsaw Uprising anniversaries.

uncomfortable, and even dangerous, uncomfortable truth that could unite members of society and uphold their resistance to the rulers.

APPROPRIATING MEMORY


From the very beginning, the communist authorities had the intention of imposing an organizational framework on the celebration of Warsaw Uprising anniversaries; the leaders counteracted any social initiative and thoroughly controlled the content of every speech. In his address delivered before the communist parliament just a few days before the first anniversary, First Secretary of the Polish Workers' Party Władysław Gomułka set an ideological framework on the appropriate manner of speaking and writing about the Warsaw Uprising; he divided the insurgents between heroic soldiers and cynical, almost criminal, commanders. Since that time, while such interpretation had been slightly modified, it was still in force until the fall of communism in Poland in 1989. At the same time, the communist government had been systematically creating the myth of the People's Army – an armed formation of the Polish Workers' Party subordinated to command centres in the

Soviet Union – as the main insurgent force fighting against the German occupier, spit-drenched dwarf of reaction.

Both the first and second anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising was celebrated by the country's authorities: state celebrations and numerous religious services were held while the main remembrance ceremonies were organised in Powązki Military Cemetery in Warsaw. A few days before the first anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising, Warsaw scouts decorated the walls and sidewalks of the capital with the following inscription: "Glory to the Heroes of the Warsaw Uprising, August 1, 1944 – August 1, 1945". The second anniversary was marked by the unveiling of the Gloria Victis Memorial ("Glory to the vanquished") in Powązki Cemetery; the statue commemorated soldiers of the Home Army who were killed during the Warsaw Uprising and German occupation. Thanks to the efforts of the Home Army soldiers, it was erected in memory of the Uprising, next to the graves of the insurgents.

The communists limited the third and the fourth anniversary to ceremonies taking place exclusively in cemeteries and churches. In the period 1949–1953, during the intensified struggle against the "class enemy", they even prevented Poles from paying tribute to the fallen insurgents in Powązki Military Cemetery.

In 1949, the Society of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy (Związek Bojowników o Wolność i Demokrację, ZBoWiD) was established; the organization brought together 11 social institutions but, interestingly, it did not include former Home Army soldiers. It was only after 1954 that their members began to be partially rehabilitated. Many soldiers of the Home Army, as well as participants of the Uprising, joined the ZBoWiD. The celebration was restored



"THE MONUMENT OF THE HOME ARMY", KNOWN AS "GLORIA VICTIS", WAS UNVEILED ON 1 AUGUST 1946 AT THE POWĄZKI MILITARY STATION; SINCE THEN, ON EVERY ANNIVERSARY OF THE OUTBREAK OF THE WARSAW UPRISING, THE INHABITANTS OF THE CAPITAL HAVE PAID TRIBUTE TO ITS SOLDIERS.

on the tenth anniversary of the Uprising – after many years of silence. The commemoration ceremony took place in Powązki Cemetery with the participation of the guard of honor of the Polish Army. Nonetheless, all events took place under strict control of the communists.

After a temporary "thaw" in 1957, the authorities again sought to marginalize the anniversary celebrations. They were disturbed by any form of commemoration that would distort the framework adopted by the ZBoWiD association. In the 1960s and 1970s, the authorities continued to conduct activities aimed at maintaining the local character of ceremonies. In the 1980s, annual meetings at the graves of the insurgents became an occasion to demonstrate support for the Solidarity labor union (*Solidarność*), outlawed by the communists. Poles, who remembered the immense price Warsaw paid for the Uprising, were tending to manifest

peaceful forms of resistance against the dictatorship.

FIGHT AGAINST CENSORSHIP

The political situation in the country after 1945 was not favourable to conducting any reliable research on the Warsaw Uprising. In Poland, apart from clandestine publications, there were also much smaller legal studies that depicted the event from the communist point of view. The state propagandists falsely portrayed this part of history by distorting and omitting some facts. Among the materials produced was their flagship booklet – *Powstanie Warszawskie. Fakty i dokumenty* [Warsaw Uprising. Facts and documents] – published in the autumn of 1944 by the Department of Propaganda of the Main Political and Educational Board of the Polish Army.

The bias contained in the publication was evidenced by the titles of subsequent



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IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE WAR, THE VETERANS AND FAMILIES OF THE PEOPLE BURIED IN THE MILITARY CEMETERY IN POWĄZKI INITIATED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE INDIVIDUAL MILITARY UNITS. BIRCH CROSSES ON THE GRAVES OF THE SOLDIERS OF "ZOŚKA" BATTALION BECAME A SYMBOL.

The political situation in the country after 1945 was not favourable to conducting any reliable research on the Warsaw Uprising.

chapters: *Criminal political game; Actions to the detriment of the People's Army; Strategy of betrayal, AK Command against the agreement with the Polish Army and the Red Army; Bór* [Tadeusz Komorowski, Commander of Home Army] *Bór" sold 11 000 defenders of Warsaw to Germans; and Nation condemns traitors from the AK command.*

The brochure constituted of elements of propaganda whose main purpose was to torpedo the notion of independence and to

set the ideological tone for historical works on the Warsaw Uprising for a long time.

Due to the political climate in the country, it was impossible to publicly conduct reliable research. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that credible works, including memoirs and studies, were printed in exile by Poland's high-ranking military officers and activists of the Polish Underground State, with the main actors of the Uprising: commander of its armed forces General Antoni (codename "Monter") Chruściel (*Powstanie Warszawskie* [Warsaw Uprising], London 1948) and chief of the Home Army General Tadeusz (*nom de guerre* "Bór") Komorowski (*The Secret Army*, London 1950).

Despite the unfavorable political conditions in the country, the head of the Institute of National Remembrance (transformed into the Institute of Contemporary History in 1948) opened the Warsaw Uprising archive and launched the research pending the closure of the Institution in 1950. One of his closest

associates Adam Borkiewicz, colonel of the Home Army and a participant of the Warsaw Uprising, had managed to collect impressive documentary material that later became the basis of the first military monograph of the Uprising – *Powstanie Warszawskie 1944. Zarys działań natury wojskowej* (Warsaw 1957) [*Warsaw Uprising 1944. Military outline*] – published after the 1956 thaw. It was groundbreaking work: long-awaited, it immediately disappeared from the shelves of many bookstores. This year, a new edition of Borkiewicz's book was printed by the Warsaw Uprising Museum; moreover, it was supplemented with contemporary historical knowledge.

Such momentary improvement of the political situation did not change the authorities' approach to the Home Army and the Warsaw Uprising, though. So it was state censorship, largely limiting the freedom of authors that was supposed to take on the main burden of fighting the memory of the Uprising. In this way, the licensors eliminated all uncomfortable content including those concerning the attitude of the Red Army or Stalin's to the Uprising.

At the expense of publications which, according to the communist authorities depicted the Uprising from unilateral perspective, the works of party historians were printed.

The real breakthrough did not take place until the late 1970s: at that time, there emerged a clandestine publishing movement whose aim was to break the party-state monopoly on knowledge and truth. The issue of the Warsaw Uprising became one of the most frequently raised in the clandestine press and in other non-official publications. Thus, Poles finally had the chance to learn about the true story of the Uprising and their leaders; one that had been hitherto ignored or falsified.

In the 1980s, the political situation in the country meant that some concessions on the authorities were imposed. The state censorship allowed the printing of many of the previously forbidden texts, memoirs and studies on the Warsaw Uprising. Despite the government's compromise as for the manner of commemorating the Uprising, the authorities did not change their theoretical interpretation of the matter. Such issues that would be uncomfortable for communists could only be addressed in national official papers in the post-1989 era; at that time, political censorship no longer existed. It was finally possible to continue the plots that had previously been discussed either in exile or in the country (through so-called "samizdat").

STRUGGLE FOR A MONUMENT

An almost 50-year-long struggle to erect the Warsaw Uprising monument constituted an essential element of the fight for the memory of this tragic event. The idea of its construction originated in 1945 when a fundraiser was announced as well as it was possible to hold a design contest. At the same time, there emerged a debate over the form, name and location of the memorial. At the end of 1946, the case was purposely covered up under pressure from superior authorities. Not for a long time, though. A year later, the Monument Committee was established; its honorary members included the highest representatives of the communist regime: Polish President Bolesław Bierut and Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz. However, the communists had no intention of erecting any such monument. After the fraudulent legislative elections in 1947 and liquidation of the legal opposition, the issue of the Uprising was ignored for several years. It was not until 1956 that the idea of unveiling a monument was once again revived.

The battle for its construction took place over many years. The idea of erecting

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a monument returned during the years of *Solidarność*. At the beginning of 1981, it became possible to register the Social Committee for the Construction of the Monument to the Warsaw Uprising 1944. Thanks to a plebiscite held regarding the location of the monument, it was decided it would be erected in Plac Krasińskich (Krasiński Square), which constituted a symbolic place for the Uprising, namely where the main hatch to the sewer canals used to evacuate the insurgent units from the besieged Old Town was located.

Once martial law had been abolished, the communists made their best efforts to improve their image. On the eve of the fortieth anniversary of the Uprising, the foundation stone-laying ceremony of the Warsaw Uprising Monument was held in the presence of the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, General Wojciech Jaruzelski. Nonetheless, the Monument could be unveiled only after the first partly-free legislative elections in Poland in 1989. The authorities managed to place the name «Warsaw Uprising 1944» on the criticized monument at the very last moment.

RESTORING THE MEMORY

It was only at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s when considerable changes, especially in social awareness, could take place. The choice of a Polish Cardinal, Karol Wojtyła, as Pope in 1978 had a significant impact on the entire process. The first pilgrimage of John Paul II to his homeland became a catalyst for a huge social movement. The papal words «do not be afraid» and «let your Spirit descend; and renew the face of the earth; of this earth!», pronounced in June 1979 in Plac Zwycięstwa [Victory Square, now Piłsudski Square] in Warsaw, provided the Poles with strength and new energy; the sermon gave birth to the «Solidarity» social-independence movement that was created a year later. During his memorable homily delivered at Plac Zwycięstwa, the Pope made reference to the Warsaw Uprising. «It is impossible to understand this city, Warsaw, the capital of Poland, that undertook in 1944 an unequal battle against the aggressor, a battle in which it was abandoned by the allied powers, a battle in which it was buried under its own ruins — if it is not remembered that under those same ruins there was also the statue of Christ the Saviour with his cross that is in front of the church at Krakowskie Przedmieście», he said.

Thus, there emerged a process that the communists were no longer able to stop. After several months of Solidarity's existence, completely changed the minds of Poles and even introducing martial law in 1981 couldn't prevent that. Polish society began to openly demand to be told the truth about the Uprising as well as to commemorate its heroes in a proper way. In 1982, the exhibition *Warszawa walczy. 63 dni powstania warszawskiego* [Warsaw fights. 63 days of the Warsaw Uprising] opened in the Norblin factory in Warsaw's Wola district. It was visited by over two million



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IN THE 1980S, A DECISION WAS MADE TO ESTABLISH THE MUSEUM OF THE WARSAW UPRISING IN THE RUINED BUILDING OF THE POLISH BANK ON BIELAŃSKA STREET, WHERE IN 1994 THE FOUNDATION ACT WAS LAID; THIS PROJECT WAS NOT IMPLEMENTED.

people over three months. The exhibition was then displayed in other cities across the country. Then returned the idea of erecting a monument while inhabitants of the capital witnessed another important initiative – the Social Committee for Construction of the Warsaw Uprising Monument –, which was to be revived and established. However, such plans could be implemented only in post-1989 Poland.

Polish citizens living in the country resisted numerous manipulations of state propaganda and remembered to commemorate the Uprising. The memory of the Uprising was also alive abroad, where communities of the Polish diaspora organized their own anniversary celebrations. Even the then U.S. President Ronald Reagan proclaimed August 1, 1984 as Warsaw Uprising Day. Several days later, the highest-ranking representatives of the Washington administration met with members of the Polish diaspora in the White House. A group of invited guests included Stefan Korboński – the last person to hold the

post of Government Delegate for Poland – who handed the Cross of the Home Army to the President of the United States.

VICTORIOUS MEMORY

The opening of the Warsaw Uprising Museum constituted a groundbreaking event. The idea of its creation first appeared after the war. This idea returned several times, also again in 1981. During the following years, its originators suggested various potential locations. According to one, the museum was supposed to be placed in the building of the former Bank of Poland at Bielańska Street in Warsaw (so-called Bielańska Redoubt). Nonetheless, the project could not be implemented due to some unresolved ownership disputes. Finally, it was on the 59th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising that the then president of the capital, Lech Kaczyński, decided to base the museum in the building of the former Tramway Power Plant in Grzybowska Street 79.

However, the contractors had to face quite a difficult task: the buildings,



THE MUSEUM OF THE WARSAW UPRISING WAS OPENED ON THE EVE OF THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OUTBREAK OF THE UPRISING.

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covered with bushes and shrubs, were in a terrible condition; some were even on the verge of disintegration. *The following months brought some challenges regarding both the scenario and the design of the exhibition.* The first construction machines entered the site of the former power plant in April 2004. As part of the renovation works, it was possible to adopt modern architectural solutions. The structured, vast area of the former power plant has become an extraordinary garden

- Freedom Park, whose central element is the Memorial Wall on which the names of fallen insurgents are written. The ceremonial opening of the Museum took place on July 31, 2004; a day before the 60th anniversary of the Uprising. Thousands of insurgents came to Warsaw from across Poland and abroad.

In the same year, the Warsaw Uprising Mound, located at Bartycka Street in Warsaw, was erected while at its top, next to a huge “anchor” (the emblem of the Fighting Poland), Warsaw residents inaugurated the tradition of lighting the campfire with a flame from the Tomb of the Unknown Soldiers, supposed to burn for 63 days – the symbolic period of the Uprising.

A huge role in popularising knowledge about the event was played by the book of British historian Norman Davies – *Powstanie '44 [Rising '44]* (Cracow 2004).

A few months earlier, the English edition of *Rising '44, The Battle for Warsaw* was published (London 2003). Over the following months, there appeared both the American (*"Rising '44. The Battle for Warsaw, New York 2004*) and the German versions (*Aufstand der Verlorenen: der Kampf um Warschau 1944, Munich 2004*). This publication made it possible to restore subjectivity to the armed effort of Poles in the world historiography of the Second World War. Until its publication, the issue of military activities in Poland in 1944 was usually ignored by Western historians.

Since the creation of the Warsaw Rising Museum, solemn and crowded anniversary celebrations have become a Warsaw tradition. Ceremonies are held on the eve of the outbreak of the Uprising in Krasinski Square in Warsaw, accompanied by their *inherent* elements: *Holy Mass* and *Call for Remembering the Fallen*. Also the aforementioned Powązki Cemetery, along with the Gloria Victis Monument, constitutes important place for the memory of the

Polish citizens living in the country resisted numerous manipulations of state propaganda and remembered to commemorate the Uprising.

event. Every year, on August 1, it gathers thousands of Varsovians who wish to pay homage to the insurgents. For many years, exactly at 5 pm (the so-called "W" hour – codename for the beginning of the Uprising), alarm sirens are activated in Warsaw and other Polish cities while trams, cars and other means of transport stop for a moment. It is a symbolic moment of reflection and homage to the victims of the Warsaw Uprising. In the evening in Pilsudski Square, inhabitants of Warsaw sing insurgent songs.



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ON THE DAY OF THE OPENING OF THE MUSEUM IN FREEDOM PARK THE INSURGENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES TOOK PART IN A MEETING WITH THE THEN MAYOR OF WARSAW LECH KACZYŃSKI.



ON AUGUST 17, 1984, THE HIGHEST REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATION MET WITH THE POLISH COMMUNITY IN THE WHITE HOUSE. DURING THE MEETING, THE LAST POLISH GOVERNMENT DELEGATE TO POLAND, STEFAN KORBOŃSKI, HANDED THE HOME ARMY CROSS TO RONALD REAGAN, THE THEN US PRESIDENT.

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And even though the Warsaw Uprising suffered a military defeat, its significance considerably exceeded the military sense. It was thanks to the legacy of the Warsaw Uprising and the ethos of the Home Army that it was possible to cherish the thought of freedom in the enslaved country. Although the memory of the Warsaw Uprising was fiercely opposed by communist propaganda and censorship, social awareness turned out to be stronger; it was society that managed to win the battle, which lasted nearly half a century. However, despite the communists, the Warsaw Uprising remained a symbol of love for freedom, sovereignty and sacrifice for the homeland.

Katarzyna Utracka ■
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